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Summary
Since 1949 China has been politically divided into two: 
the People's Republic (PRC) on the mainland, and the 
Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan, the offshore islands 
of Quemoy and Matsu, and the Pescadores. Each regime 
claims to be the sole legitimate government of the 
whole of China, and this continuing struggle has posed 
for both of them serious problems of international 
recognition as well as of domestic political legitimacy.
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the evolution 
of the foreign policy strategies of the ROC in coping 
with this national crisis. It is a historical account 
of the foreign policies and external relations of the 
ROC between 1949 and the end of 1979. Chapter One 
reviews the historical background to the division of 
China in 1949 and which led to the survival crisis of 
the ROC. Chapter Two describes the state ideology of 
the ROC and its place in the ROC's foreign policy 
formulation. Chapter Three, dealing with the strategy 
of military counterattack, dating from the end of 1949 
until the end of 1958, describes the ROC's dependence 
upon the United States. Chapter Four, dealing with the 
strategy of political counterattack, dating from the 
end of 1958 until October 1971, discusses the ROC's 
other foreign policy options, such as the Russian 
option, and the ROC's efforts to achieve close relations 
with neighbouring countries. Chapter Five focuses on 
the ROC's agricultural assistance programme directed 
towards the newly independent countries in Africa, from 
1960 to October 1971. Chapter Six analyzes the ROC's 
post-UN foreign policy strategy of economics- and trade- 
first diplomacy, from October 1971 until the end of 
1979. Finally, a conclusion will be presented which 
summarizes the evolution of the ROC's post-1949 foreign 
policy strategies for the purpose of national survival. 
It also pays particular attention to some of the reasons 
for the limited success of these strategies.
Introduction
Since 1949, the foreign policy of the Republic of China 
(the ROC, also known as Nationalist China), has concen­
trated on attempts to prevent diplomatic rejection as a 
nation. The ROC's problem was caused primarily by the 
result of the civil war in which it was finally defeated 
by the Chinese Communists. The latter then established 
the People's Republic of China (the PRC) on 1st October 1949 
on the mainland, following the ROC's retreat to Taiwan, an 
island about 90 to 120 miles off the south eastern coast 
of the Chinese mainland. Since then the ROC and the PRC 
have been engaged in a continuous struggle, across the 
Taiwan Straits, for the final control of China, including 
both the mainland, which has an area of 3,690,500 square 
miles, and Taiwan, which has an area of 14,000 square miles. 
In other words, despite the fact that it is no longer in 
control of the mainland after October 1949, the ROC 
continues to consider itself as the only legitimate ruler 
for all of China; whereas the PRC, or Communist China, 
claims legitimacy to rule Taiwan, which has never come into 
its possession. Had the ROC been defeated totally in the 
civil war, or had Taiwan not been historically a province 
of China, the current China problem, i.e. the problem of 
China's national reunification, would probably not exist. 
Nevertheless, with both the ROC and the PRC calling for 
"national reunification" and accepting there is but one 
China, which they each exclusively claim to represent, the 
world has been confronted with the dilemma as to which 
China is to be recognized.
1
The ROC, holding less than 0.38 percent of the whole 
Chinese territory and about 0.18 percentage of the Chinese 
population, plus the fact that it is a minority force in 
Taiwan in relation to the native Taiwanese, is clearly in 
a less advantageous position vis-a-vis its Communist rival. 
Thus, since 1949, the ROC has been engaged in a continuous 
struggle for survival. Internally, it encounters possible 
resistance from the Taiwanese islanders, and potential 
military threat from the mainland Communists. Externally, 
in addition to constant challenge by the PRC of its 
legitimacy, the ROC has faced a serious crisis of inter­
national de-recognition , particularly after October 1971, 
when the ROC was expelled from the United Nations of which 
it was an original member and replaced by the PRC. A 
crucial development was U.S. President Carter's announcement 
on 16th December 1978 that the U.S. would establish 
diplomatic relations with Peking, and de-recognize Taiwan.
The U.S. decision was essential to the ROC's status as a 
nation, not only because of the vigorous support and 
security protection the U.S. granted to the ROC but also 
because the U.S. was one of the superpowers and the only 
major western power which consistently supported the ROC's 
cause for almost three decades after 1949. It was under 
this prolonged period of U.S. assistance and protection that 
the ROC was able to construct and to consolidate its 
national and international development.
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Consequently, whai the ROC became increasingly isolated 
internationally and could no longer stem the tide of 
diplomatic de-recognition, commentators around the world 
predicted the imminent collapse of the ROC on Taiwan.
Some expected a military expedition from, or eventually a 
political absorption by, the PRC. Some expected an internal 
collapse of law and order in Taiwan. And some predicted 
that after a period of isolation and frustration, the ROC 
would inevitably come to terms with the PRC. Nevertheless, 
in spite of the unfavourable development, the ROC showed no 
sign of abandoning its declared goal of national reunifi­
cation, which was to be implemented through the programme of 
"mainland recovery". On the contrary, Chiang Ching-kuo, the 
current President of the ROC, made it quite clear that there 
would be no association whatever by his government with the 
Peking regime, whoever its spokesman might be. The fixed 
purpose of the ROC was to liberate the mainland from 
communism. There would be no compromise. And the ROC would 
continue its fight for national survival, whatever difficulties 
it might face.
The ROC's determination in carrying out its national 
programme, despite all the difficulties looming ahead, raises 
the question as to how it, as a small power in contrast to 
the vast mainland, managed to survive as a nation during the 
last three decades after 1949.
The purpose of this thesis is thus to analyze the different 
stages of foreign policy strategies that the ROC employed 
from October 1949 until the end of 1979 for the objective of
national survival. That is to say, it is to study the 
extent, if any, of flexibility and adaptability of the 
ROC’s post-1949 foreign policy in coping with the problem 
of national survival and its effects upon its external 
relations.
The foreign policy strategies under consideration will be 
the strategy of "military counterattack" (1949-1958), the 
strategy of "political counterattack" (1958-1971), the 
strategy of "foreign aid" (1960-1971) and the strategy of 
"economics-and trade-first diplomacy" (1971-1979). Since 
the time-period covered is extensive, it is necessary to 
point out that, in order to limit the scope of this thesis 
to the main points under discussion and to restrict the text 
to a manageable length, the thesis will be confined only to 
those policies or issues which had the most direct relevance 
to our present inquiry. In other words, rather than present 
a comprehensive historical account of the ROC's post-1949 
foreign policies and external relations, the thesis will 
concentrate on those subjects pertaining to the different 
stages of policy strategies essential for the political 
survival of the ROC.
The thesis will be divided into seven chapters. Chapters One 
and Two are introductory and will direct us towards the main 
body - Chapters Three to Six - of our discussion. The 
division of the time-period as shown above for each foreign 
policy strategy from Chapter Three to Chapter Six is to some 
extent artificial. This is because the transitions from one 
strategy to another were tightly connected and, as the study
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will show, their operation in some periods over-lapped.
Chapter One deals with the background of the ROC’s foreign 
policy formulation, their problems and causes. Why was (and 
is) the ROC's political survival at stake? Why was (is) the 
ROC confronted with the legitimacy crisis? Why, how and to 
what extent were (are) these two issues connected? In 
addition to tackling the above questions, attention will 
also be given to the situation in China before the 1911 
Revolution, which gave birth to the ROC in 1912, and the 
traditional Chinese view of the world order, as these in 
some ways help to explain some aspects of the contemporary 
Chinese mentality and ways of dealing with foreign countries. 
Mention should also be made of the national capability of the 
ROC after 1949, and the issue of "legitimacy" as related to 
the ROC situation.
Chapter Two introduces the ROC's official ideology, San Min 
Chu I, and its significance in the formulation of the ROC's 
foreign policy. What is the San Min Chu I ideology? How 
and why was it formulated? To what extent was (and still is) 
the ideology related to the orientation of the ROC's foreign 
policy and external relations? And to what extent is it 
related to the ROC's current programme of "mainland recovery" 
and the policy of anti-communism? Here, a brief examination 
of the role and the political thoughts of Sun Yat-sen, who 
was the founding father of the ROC, also the creator of the 
San Min Chu I ideology, and his political successor, Chiang
Chapter Three is about the strategy of "military counter­
attack" which, together with Chapter Four, dealing with the 
strategy of "political counterattack", give mainly an account 
of the ROC's foreign policies towards, and hence dependence 
upon, the U.S. Why did the U.S. support the ROC? How did 
the ROC perceive its role in the context of Cold War 
politics and make use of its alliance relationship with the 
U.S. for its foreign policy objectives? Why and how was the 
strategy of "military counterattack" formulated in the first 
place and later altered to emphasize "political counter­
attack"? In this transition, what aspects of policy were 
changed and what remained? Were the strategies effective in 
terms of policy objectives? Chapter Four will also include 
a brief description of some of the ROC's foreign policy 
options and its external relations with its neighbouring 
countries during the period concerned.
Chapter Five describes the strategy of "foreign aid", or the 
so-called "agricultural diplomacy". Our discussion concen­
trates on the ROC's agricultural assistance programme directed 
towards the newly independent countries in Africa with a view 
to winning their support over the issue of Chinese repre­
sentation at the United Nations. Attention will be paid to 
the evolution of the representation issue at the U.N., its 
implications for the two Chinese governments in the context 
of their diplomatic rivalry, and the significance of the 
newly independent African countries for the representation 
issue. Attention will also be given to the aid given by the 
PRC to Africa as well as the African responses to the ROC
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aid programme launched so as to assess the effectiveness 
of the ROC's aid strategy.
Chapter Six analyzes the ROC's post-UN foreign policy 
strategy of ''economics-and trade-first diplomacy". Our 
emphasis will be on the formation of the strategy, its 
relevance to the ROC's concern of national survival and, 
most of all, the degree of flexibility and adaptability of 
the ROC's foreign policy in the operation of this strategy.
A brief account of the ROC's economic performance on Taiwan 
will be provided so as to give a fuller picture of how this 
strategy has come into being. The notion of "intermediate 
technology" as the core of the strategy under discussion 
will also be introduced here.
Chapter Seven will present conclusions, paying particular 
attention to some of the reasons for the limited success of 
the ROC's foreign policy strategies.
Finally, mention should also be made regarding research 
methods and research material. The thesis is based on a 
historical approach, from sources available in Taiwan and 
England.
The former, mainly in Chinese, included several interviews 
with government officials of the ROC and/or people who have 
direct or indirect connection with, or were interested in, 
the subject. Most of the interviews took the form of 
informal conversations. It also included official publications 
from the government of the ROC; newspapers such as Jung-vanq
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jih pao (the Central Daily News), Lien-huo pao (the 
United Daily) and the China News were also consulted.
The latter, mainly in English, were secondary sources in 
various libraries.
Other sources of data used included official publications 
of the United States government and the United Nations 
organization for general material on the ROC-U.S. relations 
and ROC-U.N. relations.
1
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Chapter One
The Background and Main Directions 
of the RPC's Foreign Policy
Since its arrival on Taiwan island in 1949, the government 
of the ROC (hereafter the Nationalist government) has faced a 
vitaland permanent constraint in the formulation of its 
foreign policy, i.e. the concern for national survival which 
is inextricably intertwined with the issue of legitimacy.
The legitimacy of the Nationalist government has been 
challenged from three sides: the native Taiwanese majority 
(internal), the Chinese Communist government on the mainland 
(internal and external) and the international community 
(external). This three-fold challenge constitutes a major 
threat to the continued existence, hence the survival, of the 
Nationalist government and the Kuomintang, (abbreviated the 
KMT). To cope with these threats, the Nationalist government 
has depended on the U.S. and its allies for support. Such 
external dependence, however, has its negative effects. The 
Nationalist government has to act quickly to cope with any 
possible modification of such support, particularly if it 
declines. It also has to take into account the possible 
risks of foreign intervention. Thus, the Nationalist 
government becomes vulnerable to external pressure. In this 
regard, accurate calculation of external support has also 
been an important issue of concern in the foreign policy 
formulation of the Nationalist government.
1*1
The main purpose of this chapter is to introduce and to 
analyze the above issues, i.e. the causes and problems of 
the foreign policy of the ROC since 1949. To do this, it is
necessary to outline the history of the power relations of 
the KMT-CCP, the two dominant political parties in China 
after 1911, during the period up to the end of the Chinese 
civil war in October 1949. It is also necessary to look at 
the social conditions and political circumstances that gave 
birth to the two parties concerned. Thus this Chapter has 
three parts. Part one deals with the situation of China 
before 1949, and it will be further divided into two sections 
for discussion: China under the old system, i.e. before the 
establishment of the republic in 1911, and during the 
republican period, from 1911 to 1949. Part two looks at the 
situation of China after 1949. Finally, part three deals with 
theoretical aspects of the issue of legitimacy, and its 
relation to the ROC's struggle for survival.
China before 1949
1. China before the establishment of the republic in 1911
This section will examine China's old practice of foreign 
relations, namely, China's traditional view of its place in 
the world, and its growing clashes with the West in the 19th 
century. This is not just because it outlines the antecedents 
of ROC foreign policy, but also some of the
principles embodied in the ROC's own foreign policy at least 
up to 1949.
Under the old system, China governed its affairs according to 
the Confucian philosophy of "peaceful ordering". This 
philosophy emphasized the existence of a natural order 
between men and the universe which governed and regulated
-  10 -
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It was within this context of atheir relationships.1 
natural order that the Chinese political system as well as 
the framework of its foreign relations was fixed.
On top of the system, there was the ruler, or the Emperor, 
who had absolute power and was regarded as the almighty "Son 
of Heaven" and "Ruler of the World". His main duties were to 
rule according to the Confucian philosophy which was fully 
expressed in the "Mandate of Heaven", for the benefit of the 
country and to bring about an orderly state of affairs. The 
main duty of his subjects was to help him to carry out his 
mandate. Between the ruler and the ruled, there was very 
little communication. Consequently, there existed a tremendous 
gap between the two classes with the ruler obviously placed 
high above the ruled.
This superior mentality of the Chinese Emperors also 
affected traditional Chinese attitudes towards foreigners, 
and it informed the pattern of their external relations. 
That is, as a consequence of this superior feeling, and as
1. The crucial principle of this philosophy is jen, or benevo­
lence in English. Confucius defined a man of jen as one 
who is "courteous in his private life, deferential in 
public service, and faithful to other people". To put 
it more precisely, in Confucious' view, jen is the mani­
festation of what is genuine in human nature and doing 
of what is right and proper. It embraces all the moral 
qualities a man should exhibit in his relations with 
others, emphasizing sympathetic fellowship among men 
and unselfish assistance to others.
See Chester C.Tan, Chinese Political Thought in the 
Twentieth Century (David and Charles, Newton Abbot,1 9 7 2 ) .  pp 1 -  2 .
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a result of China's early civilization, the Chinese Emperors 
and the Chinese people normally regarded Westerners either as 
"barbarians" or "foreign devils" and treated them accordingly. 
That is, they either tried to erect a "bamboo curtain" between 
themselves and Westerners, or, if contacts were inevitable, 
imposed stringent restriction on their activities in China. 
Those countries that wished to trade with China or to do 
missionary work there were permitted to do so only if they 
were willing to recognize the Chinese Emperor as "the Son of 
Heaven, ruler of the world", just as the Chinese themselves 
believed. As a matter of fact, possibly as a result of this 
unequal treatment, and possibly due to geographical 
distance, Westerners rarely came to China before the 19th 
century. Needless to say, such an unequal relationship was 
even more pronounced in ancient China's relations with its 
neighbouring "states" such as Korea, Nepal, Siam (now 
Thailand) and Burma. These "states" for centuries paid an 
annual tribute to the Chinese Emperor to recognize the 
latter's power.
It is largely true to say that, traditionally, China paid more 
attention to domestic affairs than to external affairs. It 
is also true to say that Chinese had the belief that as long 
as they could cope with domestic affairs, external matters 
would run their proper course. Thus, the Chinese Emperors 
were quite ignorant and unaware of developments outside the 
Chinese borders. China became very self-centred, isolated, 
and unconscious of the growth and progress made in the Western
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world. This, the so-called " sLno-centricism"^, was the 
traditional Chinese perception of the world order and of 
its role in this order.
As the dominant characteristic of ancient China's external 
relations^this mode of "Sino-centricism" went almost 
unchallenged until the middle of the 19th century when 
Westerners and their civilization began to penetrate into 
China. Particularly towards the end of the century when the 
Manchu dynasty was declining, China experienced unprecedented 
blows to its status.
The Manchu dynasty, which ruled China from 1664 to 1911, was 
the last dynasty in Chinese history. During its reign, the 
Manchus, like their predecessors, ruled China in accordance 
with Confucian philosophy. It was inevitable therefore that 
they were more concerned with domestic affairs and took little 
notice of the Industrial Revolution, which had significantly 
modernized the Western world, until it had a serious impact 
on China.
One of the conseguences of the Industrial Revolution was 
that foreign countries became more interested in China as a 
potentially huge market for their goods. Confident in their 
new prosperity, naval and economic strength, they were no 1
1. For more information on the traditional Chinese view of 
the world order, see Norton Ginsburg, "On the Chinese 
Perception of a World Order", in Tang Tsou, ed. China in 
Crisis, Vol. II (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
1968), pp. 73-91; see also C. P. FitzGerald, The Chinese 
View of Their Place in the World (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1964).
longer content with the stringent trade restrictions 
imposed upon them by the imperial government or with the 
inferior treatment that they had received for centuries.
They came to China in large numbers with the intention of 
improving their status and promoting their commercial 
interests there.
The foreign countries most active in China during the latter 
half of the 19th century were Great Britain, Russia, France, 
Germany, Japan and the United States. It was during this 
period that China was declining with the strength of the 
imperial government severely challenged at home and abroad.
At home, the imperial government was confronted with large- 
scale uprisings and local unrest caused by a general mood of 
dissatisfaction of the people towards the government. ^  The 
internal disorder severely crippled the capacity of the 
imperial government to cope with the growing strength of 
the foreign countries in China and their respective bids to 
increase their power and influence over China.
The turning point in Chinese history and China's external 
relations, from the self conviction of superiority to its 
humiliation, came when China lost the Opium War in 1842 which 
resulted in the signing of the Treaty of Nanking. The Treaty, 
in addition to the ceding of Hong Kong, compelled China to
The chaos was caused mainly by sudden rapid population 
growth during the 18th century and by the growing conflicts 
between bureaucrats and commoners. Although this disorder 
was not a new phenomenon in the late Manchu period as it 
had also haunted the previous dynasties, this time the confused situation was exacerbated by the military and Çgmmepcial geçetratjioo of^tfre Wesf^ Forman account of
. . . r ________________t f . , . ____Hsi-ch'ao (Tides f CoT , 1976),"pp. j z
lunn^this period see Chi anrom the west^ (TaiDei: Worlg Mèng-ling, a Publishing
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open five ports to British trade, to establish official 
recognition and extend diplomatic relations on an equal 
basis, and to pay reparations, etc.* The impact of the 
Treaty in terms of the subsequent national status of China 
was incalculable. It was the first of a whole series of 
"unequal treaties" imposed on China by Western countries.
Other countries, i.e. France, Russia, Germany, Japan and the 
U.S., followed suit. China was thus forced to open itself up 
to the outside world and made a series of political, commercial 
and territorial concessions to foreign countries. After the 
granting of privileges to Britain in China, other foreign 
countries made similar demands on China. The imperial 
government, constrained by its internal weaknesses, always 
responded to these demands by signing treaties which provided 
foreign countries with leased territories, or extra-territor­
iality, or foreign control of custom tariffs, or the exercise 
of foreign authority over Chinese territories. These were 
the so-called "unequal treaties" which the Chinese subsequently 
fought to annul for about‘half a century. Gradually China's 
old system weakened and disintegrated. Not only was China's 
traditional feeling of superiority gradually undermined by 
the foreigners' privileges in China, but even the Chinese 
themselves questioned the strength of the old system in 
dealing with national affairs. 1
1. The five ports were Canton, Amoy, Foochow-fu, Ningpo and Shanghai, see Articles II, III, IV, V and VI of the Treaty.
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Thus, at this time China faced the threat of partition by 
foreign countries on the one hand; on the other hand, its 
internal order continued to deteriorate, and calls for 
national reforms and regenerations were widespread.^ If the 
Confucian philosophy of "peaceful ordering" had provided old 
China with remarkable internal stability and national security 
enabling it to endure dynastic changes at home and to remain 
apart from, and superior to foreign countries, it also made 
the traditional Chinese governing system quite dogmatic, i.e. 
less responsive to sudden changes. Thus when foreign countries 
and Western civilization penetrated into China, Confucian 
philosophy became gradually less effective in coping with the 
impact of Western influence. As Chester C. Tan described:
"Rules of propriety may contribute to the moral order, 
but they are plainly inadequate to cope with the 
complexity of modern commercial and industrial 
relations. Moreover, the Confucian concept of grand 
unity, which viewed the Chinese Emperor as a cultural 
universe embracing all of humanity, is obviously 
unsuitable to the modern world of sovereign, indepen­
dent states committed to power politics.
Thus, what was missing in the old system was the ability
flexibly to handle conflict caused by power politics. It
was natural therefore, when China was confronted with the new,
1. For instance, there were the T'ung-Chih Restoration and 
the Self-Strengthening Movement in 1862, and the Hundred 
Days of Reform in 1898. For more information on these 
reforms and their meaning and significance in China, see, 
for example, Franz Schurmann and Orville Schell, eds. 
Imperial China (London: Penguin Books, 1972), pp. 195- 
233; Dun J. Li, Modern China: From Mandarin to Commissar 
(New York: Charles Scribner and Sons, 1978), Chapter 4, 
"Partition of China", pp. 79-113; also Chester C. Tan, op. 
cit., Chapter 2, "Moral Conservatism and Liberal 
Democracy", pp. 23-45.
2. Chester C. Tan, ibid., p. 7.
modernized Western world which threatened the partition of 
China, that its old order should be attacked severely.
It was against this background that a large number of 
revolutionary forces were formed. However, instead of 
agreeing on a positive solution for the programme of national 
regeneration, they held conflicting viewpoints as to how the 
programme should proceed. These ranged from those advocating 
total reform, i.e. total westernization of the old system, 
to those proposing a return to the old system. As a result, 
China's situation became more critical. The interplay of 
internal disorder marked by widespread revolutions and 
external calamity marked by the threat of partition plunged 
China into a dark period of uncertainty. Needless to say, 
even the tribute system gradually collapsed, causing not only 
a great loss of the Qnperor's virtue, but also an important 
loss of his annual revenue.
In 1899, the American Secretary of State John Hay issued the 
commercial "Open Door" policy, which called on the great 
powers to support the principle of equal trading opportunities 
in China. Hay also asked the powers to stop seeking special 
privileges at the expense of China and other nations.* In so 
doing, however, a significant consequence was that it helped
China to preserve its territorial and administrative
2integrity. Partition of China by foreign countries was
1. Hyman Kublin, China■ World Regional Studies Series (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin, 1968), p. 132.
2. Hyman Kublin, ibid., p. 133; Leften S. Stavrianos, China:
A Cultural Area in Perspective (Boston: Allyn & Bacon,1967), pp. 33-34.
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therefore avoided. Nevertheless, the policy could not help 
to restore the declining prestige of the Manchu government.
In October 1911, the Manchu dynasty was overthrown. In 
January the following year, the Republic of China was 
proclaimed, with the Kuomintang (the history of the KMT will 
be dealt with shortly) as the central force in the 
administration. Nevertheless, the republic existed only in 
name because, due to internal weakness and the emergence of 
warlords, it was unable to unify the entire country under a 
centralized political structure until 1928.1 During this 
period, a new revolution was staged, which saw the emergence 
of another political force, the Chinese Communist Party, the 
CCP, collaborating and competing with the Kuomintang for 
the final control of China.
1. After 1916 the new Republic was challenged by the
emergence of about a dozen "military governors" for a 
period of 15 years. These military governors, also 
known as warlords, controlled vast areas of China, in 
particular in some northern provinces. In order to obtain 
more power, the warlords not only fought against each 
other but also challenged the KMT-established national 
government, whose power concentrated in the south. 
Consequently, China was divided into several power regions, 
each run by different military factions. As a result, a 
unified and centralized political authority could not be 
created in China until 1928 when the warlords were put 
down by the Northern Expedition (1926-8), under Chiang 
Kai-shek's leadership. For a more detailed study of 
the warlords' politics, see Ch'i Hsi-sheng, Warlord 
Politics in China, 1916-1928 (Stanford, California: 
Stanford University Press, 1976); also his The Chinese 
Warlord System: 1916-28 (Originally issued by the Center 
for Research in Social Systems, the American University, 
Washington, 1962, reprinted by U.S. Department of 
Commerce, Washington, 1971).
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2. China during the republican period; 1911-1949
The evolution of the KMT-CCP relationship up to 1949 can be 
divided into four aspects for consideration: (1) the 
formation of the two parties respectively; (2) the KMT-CCP 
relationship from 1921-1945; (3) China's relations with
Soviet Russia and the U.S. during this period and after 
World War II; and (4) the KMT-CCP relationship after the 
War, namely, the Chinese civil war from 1945 to 1949.
(1) The f ormation of the KMT and the CCP
(A) The f ormation of the KMT
In discussing this topic, two things deserve our special 
attention. That is the Communist influence in, and the 
internal split of, the KMT. The two issues, interrelated in 
some ways, will be dealt with only briefly here, a more 
detailed study will be given later.
The formation of the KMT into an effective party took several 
years. Its history began in Honolulu in 1894 when Sun Yat-sen 
organized Chinese emigrants in that year to form the Hsinq 
Chung Hui (Society for the Regeneration of China).1 Its 
declared objective then was "to overthrow the Manchus, 
restore the Chinese nation, and establish a republic". ^  
Nevertheless, from then until 1919, this revolutionary
1 . For the role of Sun Yat-sen, his political philosophy and 
his relations to the KMT, see Chapter Two.
2. Chiang Yung-ching, "The First National Congress of the 
Kuomintang of China", China Forum (Taipei: The China 
Forum, Inc., January 1972), IV, 1, p. 10.
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organization had been renamed, reorganized and its 
objectives reformulated four times. They were the T'unq 
Menq Hui (The Alliance) in 1905, the Kuomintanq (the 
Nationalist Party) in 1912, the Chung Hua Ko Min Tang (the 
Chinese Revolutionary Party) in 1914, and Chung Kuo Kuomintanq 
(The Nationalist Party of China, abbreviated to Kuomintang, or 
the KMT) in 1919. Apart from the Kuomintanq and Chung Kuo 
Kuomintanq which were set up on the Chinese soil, the rest 
were headquartered abroad. All of these organizations, aimed 
at the realization of Chinese national revolution, were to 
establish a republican form of government and to reconstruct 
China into a modern state.
According to Sun, the revolutionary programme of China's 
reconstruction should be divided into three stages for 
implementation: first, military administration; second, 
a one-party political tutelage; and, third, constitutional 
government. According to Sun, this three-stage transition 
to democracy was mainly due to the deeply-rooted monarchical 
tradition in Chinese society that made a quick transition 
impossible.1 Moreover, Sun maintained, the KMT should be
1 . Howard L. Boorman, ed. Biographical Dictionary of
Republican China, (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1970), Voi. Ill, "Sun Yat-sen", p. 187.
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the dominant force to reach this constitutionalism.''’
(a) The reorganization of the KMT in 1924
In 1919, the KMT was still a loose organization, largely made 
up of intellectuals. Thus, in 1924 Sun proposed another 
reorganization of the KMT with the intention to strengthen 
it and to recruit new members from different classes. This 
decision marked a turning point in modern Chinese history, 
because it not only opened the way for the subsequent 
involvement of Soviet Russia in China's domestic affairs, 
but also, as a direct consequence of this, provided a solid 
foundation for the subsequent development of the CCP in 
opposition to the KMT. Thus, it was from this occasion that 
Communist influence began to be institutionalized in China.
The reorganization of the KMT was held in Canton during its 
first National Congress in January 1924. The significance 
of the occasion was marked by two momentous decisions adopted 
by the Congress: (i) cooperation with Soviet Russia and 1
1 • Sun first revealed his intention of following the Soviet 
example of one-party rule in a lecture in October 1923, 
see Sun Yat-sen, Sun-wen Hsueh-shuo (The Theory of Sun 
Yat-sen), in Tsunq-li Ch'tian-shu (Complete Work of the 
President) 12 Vols., (Taipei: The Central Committee of 
the KMT, 1956), Vol. II-B, p. 686. His position was 
further clarified in January 1924, when he proposed to 
place the Kuomintang above the state: "There is one 
thing more which we may talk as our model. Russia is 
governed entirely by one party, which wields greater 
power than parties in Great Britain, the United States 
and France...(The success of the Russian Revolution) was 
due to the fact that the party has been placed above the 
state." See Sun Yat-sen, Fundamentals of National 
Reconstruction (Taipei: China Cultural Service, 1953), 
p. 161. Thus to Sun, government by a single party was 
to form the basis of the Chinese state. "At present we have no state to govern, and we can only say that we should use the party to build a state." Sun, ibid.
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(ii) admission of the Chinese Communists into the KMT.
(i) Cooperation with Soviet Russia
First of all, it needs to point out that the reorganization 
of the KMT was based on the model of Russian Communist Party. 
Sun was not a Communist sympathizer. Nevertheless, in order 
to win support for his revolution, and after failure to 
obtain support from other western countries,1 Sun turned 
his attention to Soviet Russia. In fact, Sun's decision to 
seek support from Soviet Russia was also caused by two other 
reasons. Sun was possibly impressed by the successful 
performance of the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution, and by the 
announcement of Soviet Russia in 1918 of the intention to 
relinquish all rights and privileges acquired by Tsarist 1
1. Sun had asked for assistance from Great Britain, the U.S., 
France and other countries, but none of them, except for 
Russia, showed any sympathy. See Chong Key-ray, The 
Sources and Development of Sun Yat-sen's Nationalistic 
Ideology as Expressed in His "San Min Chu I".
(Claremont Graduate School and University Centre, Ph.D. 
thesis,1967), pp. 27-36.
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Russia.^ The former led Sun to adopt the Russian method 
of revolutionary organization for a new KMT in 1924.2 
And the latter attracted Sun as an expression of genuine 
friendship.
Similarly Soviet Russia had its reasons for supporting Sun's 
call for assistance. To put it very briefly, first of all, 
immediately after the 1917 Revolution, the new Russian 
government was desperately in need of international recog­
nition and friendship. For this reason, a friendly China 
was important not only because Soviet Russia and China shared 
the longest border in the world (about 3,000 miles), but also 
because China, though beset by serious internal and external 
problems, then was still a big country. Secondly, precisely
1. The Russian intention was made known in July 1918.
Speaking before the Fifth Congress of the Soviet,
Chicherin, the Commissar for Foreign Affairs, outlined 
the content of Soviet Russia's foreign policy toward 
China as follows! "We renounce the conquests of the 
Tsarist government in Manchuria and we restore the 
sovereign rights of China in this territory...We recall 
from China all military consular guards...." For text, 
see Jane Degras, Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy (1917- 
1941), (London! Oxford University Press, 1951), Vol. I, 
pp. 158-161. A more dramatic gesture made by Moscow in 
regard to China was the famous Karakhan Manifesto of 25th 
July 1919, issued by the Council of the People's Commissars. 
In a blanket address "to the Chinese Nation and the 
Governments of Southern and Northern China", the Manifesto 
proclaimed that the Soviet government abrogated "all 
secret treaties made before the revolution with China..." 
returned "to the Chinese people without any kind of 
compensation the Chinese Eastern Railway, and all mining, 
gold and forestry concessions which were seized from them
by the government of Tsars..." as well as renounced "all 
territory obtained through aggressive means by the former 
Russian imperial government in China, Manchuria, and else­
where...and all special privileges formerly obtained by 
Russia in China..." See Keiji Furuya, Chianq Kai-shek:
His Life and Times, abridged English edition by Chang 
Chun-ming (New Yorks St. John's University, 1981), 
pp. 123-4.
2. See footnote no. l,page 21.
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because of this geographical connection, for reasons of 
security, Soviet Russia wanted to incorporate part of 
China's territories, especially Manchuria, into its system. 
Manchuria— the Northeast Provinces of China— was a huge and 
rich area with profound economic and industrial potential 
and strategic importance. That is, in addition to its size, 
Manchuria had the greatest concentration of heavy industry 
and railways in China. It also had enormous reserves of 
coal, iron, and many other minerals. For these reasons, 
the region had been an issue of major conflict between Japan 
and Russia since the 19th century because both countries 
wanted to gain control of it, seeing it as a stepping stone 
for an invasion of China. China was inevitably involved 
because Manchuria was historically a part of it. After 1905 
Russia had become more concerned about Manchuria, because, 
as a result of the 1904 Russo-Japanese war, Japan had gained 
control of Port Arthur and Dairen, a lease of the Liaotung 
Peninsula, and railway and mining-rights in southern Manchuria 
Since then Japan had become a serious menace to China. Even 
the Russians felt threatened. Thus it was important for 
Russians to see a strong China opposing Japan.^ Thirdly, 
Soviet Russia wanted to spread Communist influence (i.e. 
ideology) into China. This Soviet effort was to bring China 
into the anti-imperialist camp of "world revolution". 
Consequently, Soviet Russia was willing to assist Sun's cause 1
1 . This motivation to see a strong China however did not 
conflict with Russia's territorial ambition on China.
For the Russians, the strategy to gain access to Manchuria and its neighbouring areas was to get the Japanese out of the region first.
and had actually worked to get involved in China's domestic 
affairs.
Nevertheless, although Sun sought collaboration with Soviet 
Russia, he was still sceptical about the real intentions of 
the Russians. Thus, in order to avoid the possibility of 
Communist influence spreading in China, Sun insisted on 
issuing a joint manifesto with Adolph A. Joffe, a Soviet 
adviser, before the reorganization of the KMT. The manifesto, 
issued on 26th January 1923, contained Sun's position that he 
had no intention whatsoever of instituting the Communist 
system in China on the one hand, and on the other hand, a 
Soviet pledge not to impose Communism on Chinas
"Dr. Sun Yat-sen holds that the Communist order or 
even the Soviet system cannot actually be introduced 
into China, because there do not exist here the 
conditions for the successful establishment of either 
communism or Sovietism. This view is entirely shared 
by Mr. Joffe, who is further of the opinion that 
China's paramount and most pressing problem is to 
achieve national unification and attain full national 
independence, and regarding this great task, he has 
assured Dr. Sun Yat-sen that China has the warmest 
sympathy of the Russian people and can count on the 
support of Russia."!
To further reaffirm this position of "no Communism in China", 
Sun proposed that his San Min Chu I,i .e . the Three Principles 
of the People— Nationalism, Democracy and People's Livelihood, 
be the cornerstone of the Chinese revolution. 1
1, The China Year Book, 1924-1925 (Tientsin: The Tientsin Press, Limited, n .d . ) p . 663. For the full text of the 
joint statement, see same page.
The manifesto hence became the foundation of the subsequent 
cooperation between the KMT and Soviet Russia. The 
programme of cooperation was immediately implemented with 
exchanges of personnels between the two sides. In June 1923, 
Sun sent his military aid., Chiang Kai-shek, to Russia to 
study Soviet military and political conditions. In exchange, 
an old Bolshevik, Michael Borodin, together with some other 
Soviet advisers, arrived in China. Borodin's major tasks were 
to act as the principal political adviser to Sun and to assist 
him in carrying out the reorganization of the KMT. Meanwhile, 
under Russian coaching, the Whampoa Military Academy was 
founded in Canton, with Chiang Kai-shek as Commandant, to 
train national revolutionary forces. As a result, Soviet 
influence in China's national affairs grew steadily. Never­
theless, it did not take the KMT too long to realize that the 
real Soviet intention was not to help it in the Chinese 
revolution but to assist the CCP to build up its own 
strength and to split the KMT, already torn by serious 
internal clashes.
(ii) Admission of the Chinese Communists into the KMT
First of all, it needs to be mentioned that Communist 
influence in China began prior to the establishment of the 
CCP in 1921. It began since 1919. In that year, the 
International Communist Organization, the Comintern, was 
set up in Moscow. Its influence immediately reached in 
China when a Communist agent Grigory Voitinsky was sent to 
China to meet radical elements there and to help organize
The important leadersthe Marxism Society in some cities.^
in charge of organizing various Communist groups at that
. 2 time were Ch 'en Tu-hsiu, Li Ta-chao and Mao Tse-tung.
Abroad, in France, Chou En-lai and others carried out
similar activities among the Chinese there with the purpose
of propagating Communism. The arrival of the Russian
Communist agents in China constituted an important factor in
the subsequent birth of the CCP. The role of the CCP and its
relations with the Russian Communist movement will be examined
in more detail shortly.
In 1924, encouraged by Russian Communists and reassured by 
the Sun-Joffe manifesto, the reorganized KMT recruited 
several Chinese Communists as individual members. As a 
consequence, a number of important Communists were elected 
to the Central Committee of the KMT: for instance, Li Ta-chao, 
T'an Ping-shan and Yu Shu-teh as regular members; Mao Tse-tung, 
Chang Kuo-t'ao, Ch’il Ch'iu-pai, Lin Tsu-han, Han Lin-fu and 
Yii Fang-chou as alternate members. Also important in this 
recruitment was the appointment of Chou En-lai as head of 
the political department of the Whampoa Military Academy.
One needs to emphasize the point that, despite this decision,
Sun never trusted the Chinese Communists wholeheartedly. On 
one occasion he was quoted as saying: "if the Communists 
betray the Kuomintang, I will be first to propose their
1 . 
2 .
The society was headquartered in Shanghai with branches 
in Peking and in several other provinces: Hunan, Hupei, Chekiang, Anhwei, Shangtung, and Kwangtung.
Ch’en Tg-hs^u was in charge.of the group activities in Shanghai, Li Ta-chao in Peking, and Mao Tse-tung in Hunan.
expulsions."1 As this study will show later, Sun's concern 
proved justified.
Other decisions adopted at this occasion concerned the 
organization of peasants and workers. Sun was fully aware 
of their living and working conditions and intended to 
improve them. As a consequence, the KMT set up a department 
in charge of labour and peasant movements, headed by Liao 
Chung-kai. In Sun's opinion, the task of the Chinese labour 
movement was not to attack the capitalists, but to support
, . 2his San Min Chu I. As to the peasant problem in China,
Sun deemed that it could be solved through peaceful
cooperation among the government, farmers, and land owners,
3rather than through conflict and destruction. Various mass 
organizations were also established at this time throughout 
the country by students, workers, peasants, and businessmen. 
Unfortunately, as will be shown later, the KMT were not able 
to mobilize their support. On the contrary, it was the CCP 
which played a leading role in all these activities.
(b) The goals of the KMT
Accompanying the reorganization of the KMT was the 
modification of the Party goals. These were made in
1. T'ang Liang-li, The Inner History of the Chinese 
Revolution (London, 1930), p. 178.
2 . Sun's Labour Day speech in 1924 under the title, "The
Sufferings of the Chinese Workers from Unequal Treaties", 
which is contained in The Collected Works of Sun Yat-sen 
(Shanghais New Cultural Press, 21st edition, 1929),
Vol. Ill, pp. 189-196.
3. Sun's speech on 23rd August 1924, before the Government 
Institute for the Training of Workers for the Peasant 
Movement at Canton, ibid., pp. 337-342.
accordance with the prevailing conditions in China. The 
initial goals of the Party, as declared in the Hsinq Chung Hui 
mentioned earlier, were "to overthrow the Manchus, restore 
the Chinese union, and establish a republic".^ In 1919, the 
Party was to advance the "consolidation of the Republic and 
implementation of the San Min Chu I". In the 1924 National 
Congress of the KMT, its goals were obviously broadened to 
include elements of social reform and a fundamental readjust­
ment of China's international status. Its tone was 
nationalistic: it identified China's enemies as imperialism 
and militarism (i.e. warlordism). It singled out farmers and 
labourers as potential sources of support but also appealed 
to intellectuals, soldiers, young people and women. It 
condemned the position of landlords in relation to tenants 
and of employers in relation to labourers. Western privileges 
in China were condemned openly. Thus, the KMT adopted a more 
detailed programme for the implementation of San Min Chu I.
It was to "abolish the unequal treaties and to restore China's 
international status" (Nationalism), to encourage "direct 
exercise of right by the people" (Democracy), and to promote 
"equalization of landownership" and "regularization of private 
capital" (People's Livelihood). These goals were subsequently 
reaffirmed several times. Realization of San Min Chu I 
therefore became the political platform of the KMT as well 
as the ideological framework of the ROC on which the task of 
national revolution and reconstruction was to be based. In 
1947, it was officially incorporated by the national 1
1. See footnote no. 2, page 19.
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government of the ROC in its Constitution as the state 
ideology. ^ <
(c) The KMT leadership
Sun died in 1925 with his goals of unifying and rebuilding 
China unfulfilled. At the time of his death, Sun was the 
supreme leader or Tsunq-li (President) of the KMT. The 
leadership then passed to Chiang Kai-shek who was elected to 
the Presidency in 1928. Ten years later, Chiang became the 
Tsunq-tsai (Director-General) of the Party. Here one needs to 
point out that during this ten years Chiang's dominating 
influence in the KMT was exercised through his control of 
the Whampoa Military Academy. That is,Chiang was not actually 
in full control of the KMT party, due to inner Party divisions. 
The split was marked by the existence of different factions, 
notably the leftists (radicals) and the rightists (conser- 
vatives), in the Party, opposing each other. The rightist 
faction, led by Hu Han-min, proposed to oppose imperialism and 
warlordism and believed in Sun's San Min Chu I. The leftist 
faction, led by Wang Ching-wei, also proposed to oppose 
imperialism and warlordism, but was more in favour of 
Communist ideology. This faction later proved to have very
1. Article 1 of the Constitution reads: "The Republic of 
China, founded on theThree Principles of the People, 
shall be a democratic republic of the people, to be 
governed by the people and for the people." The China 
Yearbook, 1980 (Taipei: China Publishing Company, 1980), 
p. 594.
2 . For literature on the KMT's internal split and the power 
struggle between Chiang Kai-shek, Hu Han-min and Wang Ching-wei, see Chester C. Tan, op.cit., Chapter VI, "The Kuomintang Leaders", pp. 162-2231
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close relations with Communist movement, for instance, it 
cooperated with the Chinese Communists and hit hard at the 
rightist faction.1 As a matter of fact, some of the leftists 
were actually Communists. The split was severe after
Sun's death with the emergence of three powerful figures: 
Chiang Kai-shek, Hu Han-min and Wang Ching-wei, competing for 
leadership in the Party. Chiang was in a more advantageous 
position in the struggle because he was then in command of 
the Party army. Hu died in 1936. Eight years later Wang 
died. The death of these rivals helped Chiang to consolidate
his power base, which was luckily strengthened anyway during
. 2 the period of Japanese invasion of Manchuria.
In 1948 Chiang was elected president of China by the National 
Assembly in accordance with the new Constitution. He was 
re-elected four more times after that— in 1954, 1960, 1966, 
and 1972. He was also commander-in-chief of the armed forces.
Despite the damage to his prestige suffered as a result of 
the loss of the mainland to the Communists, and despite. 
Taiwanese dissatisfaction under the initial period of the 
KMT rule (1945-49; this will be dealt with later), when 
Chiang arrived in Taiwan in 1949 as head of the government, 
party, and army, no one was in a position to challenge his 
authority. In effect, as the national leader, Chiang was
1. Ibid., p . 208.
2. In 1931 Japan invaded and then occupied Manchuria. This 
action aroused strong anti-Japanese feeling in China.
Many anti-Japanese demonstrations were formed. Chiang prohibited demonstrations and concluded an armistice with 
Japan. It was during this period that Chiang's popularity 
grew steadily.
__
regarded as a stabilizing factor for the internal unity of 
his island nation. However, he died in 1975, having, like 
Sun, failed to achieve Chinese unification under KMT leader­
ship.
The current leader of the KMT is Chiang Ching-kuo, Chiang 
Kai-shek's eldest son. He became the President of the ROC 
in 1978 and formally took over the chairmanship of the KMT 
after his father's death.^
(B) The birth and formation of the CCP
In addition to the influence of the Comintern, the birth of 
the CCP also owed a very great deal to the May Fourth 
Movement in 1919, but it was not formally institutionalized 
until 1921.2
The May Fourth Movement was led by the patriotic and 
progressive students in Peking (renamed Peiping by the KMT 
in 1937) in protesting against unfair Japanese demands at 
the Versailles Peace Conference. The story of the Movement 
can be summarized as follows. A few months after World 
War I broke out, Japan presented China with the notorious
In accordance with the Constitution, the then Vice- 
President Yen Chia-kan succeeded Chiang Kai-shek.
However Yen was never very powerful or influential in 
terms of policy formulation. This was mainly because 
Yen, during his presidential term (1975-8), acted 
practically under Chiang Ching-kuo's guidance and 
supervision. The latter formally took over Yen's 
position after the 1978 presidential election.
For the most comprehensive description of the movement, 
see Chow Tse-tsung, The May Fourth Movement; Intellectual 
Revolution in Modern China (Cambridge, Mass.! Harvard 
University Press, 1960). For the Communist evaluation 
of the movement, see Hu Chiao-mu, Thirty Years of the 
Communist Party of China (Peking, 1951), pp. 4-7.
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Twenty-One-Demands (1915), the acceptance of which would 
make China a Japanese protectorate. During the Versailles 
Peace Conference in 1919 the victorious Allies, headed by 
Great Britain and France, acceded to the Japanese demand of 
transferring the former German possessions in Shantung to 
Japan. China, who fought on the side of the Allies, had 
hoped that Shantung, the home of Confucius, would be 
returned to China. When this was not done, the Chinese 
delegation walked out of the peace conference and refused to 
sign the Versailles Peace Treaty. When news arrived in China 
that the Chinese delegation had failed in its main mission, 
students in Peking staged a massive demonstration on May 4, 
1919 that was followed by similar demonstrations across the 
country. Though begun as a patriotic reaction to the unfair 
treatment of China by the victorious Allies, the May Fourth 
Movement, named after the Peking demonstration, proved to be 
much wider in scope in terms of its impact. That is, the 
Movement not only brought the intellectuals into the streets, 
in popular demonstrations, but also brought them into even 
closer contact with the masses. Among these intellectuals, 
there were, for instance, Ch'en Tu-hsiu, a professor at 
Peking University, and his colleague, Li Ta-chao, later a 
co-founder of the CCP, and other prominent figures such as 
Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai.
After the May Fourth Movement it began to show that the KMT, 
while under the leadership of Sun having a large following, 
did not attract many intellectuals into its camp. Like Ch'en 
Tu-hsiu and Li Ta-chao, for example, they preferred a 
Communist solution for China. This can be seen from their
33
earlier action to set up Marxist study groups at Peking 
University in 1918 to popularize socialist doctrines and 
the ideas of Karl Marx. This effort, together with the May 
Fourth Movement, accelerated the spread of Communist 
revolutionary ideas rapidly in China. This intimate 
relationship between Russian Communist Party and the CCP 
was clearly pointed out by Chiang Kai-shek in his book 
Soviet Russia In China. He said:
"The Chinese Communist Party is not indigenous to China. 
It is an outgrowth of Soviet Russia. This offshoot of 
Soviet Communism had first to live as a parasite on 
the Kuomintang and then seek a chance to organize 
workers, farmers, and other masses in order to stir 
up class struggle in the name of the Kuomintang. Its 
aim was to set up, during China's fight for national 
unification and independence, Russia's very first 
satellite in Asia." 1
At its inception, the CCP had only a handful of members,
2mainly professors and students, but its influence and 
prestige grew steadily. It even set up its own army, the 
Red Army, in 1927 opposing the KMT's armed forces. In some 
ways identical to the KMT's declared objectives, the CCP 
also stressed the importance of unifying China through the 
policies of anti-imperialism, anti-militarism, labour reforms,
1. Chiang Kai-shek, Soviet Russia in China (New York: The 
Noonday Press, a division of Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 
1965), p. 11.
2. The First Congress of the CCP was held in Shanghai on 
1st July 1921. At that time, the total number of 
Communist members throughout the country was no more 
than sixty. The Congress was attended by 12 delegates 
including Mao Tse-tung, Chang Kuo-t'ao, etc. The 
Comintern was represented at the Congress by H. Maring. 
Ch’en Tu-hsiu was elected as first Secretary-General of 
the CCP. Later in October, Mao Tse-tung became the 
Secretary of its Hunan branch.
and "democratic revolution". But, it was very obvious
that, the CCP's long term goal was not to set up Sun's 
San Min Chu I system but a Communist system in China.^
It was on this matter— i.e. ideology— that the KMT and the 
CCP found themselves in complete disaccord. Thus, although 
the KMT allowed the admission of the CCP members to its 
ranks and the two parties formally formed two United Fronts 
(1924-26 and 1937-38), conflict, distrust and incompatibility 
were really the main features of their relationship. These 
were also the crucial reasons for their final split after 
1945.
In 1935, Mao Tse-tung emerged as the Party leader. In June 
1945 he was formally confirmed as Chairman of the CCP and he 
held this post until his death in 1976.
1. At the Second Congress in 1922, the CCP declared its 
goals as follows: (1) Overthrow the feudal warlords 
and stop civil wars, so that internal peace can be 1 
established within China; (2) Free China from imperialist 
oppression, so as to bring about her true independence;
(3) Unify China, including Monogolia, so that a truly 
democratic republic can be established; (4) Recognize 
the internal autonomy of Monogolia, Tibet, and Sinkiang;
(5) Under the principle of federation, incorporate 
Monogolia, Tibet, and Sinkiang as part of the Republic 
of China; (6) Respect and protect all freedoms; and 
(7) Enact laws to protect workers, peasants, women, and 
children. The CCP's First Congress did not issue a 
declaration or pass a resolution. The Second Congress 
was much better prepared, because it not only passed a 
CCP organizational law but also issued a long declaration.
See Wang Chien-min, Chung-kuo Kunq-ch'an tang shih-kao 
(History of the Chinese Communist Party: A Rough Draft)
(Taipei: Publisher and date of publication not indicated),
Vol. I, pp. 58-9.
2. The CCP joined the Coipintepn in 1922, indicating its intention to institutionalize Communist ideology inChina. ___Mi
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(2) Collaboration and confrontation: the KMT-CCP
relationship from 1921 to 1945
The KMT and the CCP formed alliances on two occasions. The 
First United Front, from 1924 to 1926, was formed to stamp 
out the warlords, and the Second United Front, from 1937 to 
1938, was to resist Japanese aggression against China. The 
former was known as the Northern Expedition campaign and the 
latter as the Resistance War against Japanese aggression.
Both coalitions were short-lived, because while the primary 
motivation of the CCP was to advance its own power base among 
the masses and in the armed forces at the expense of the 
declared objectives of the coalitions, the KMT, suspicious of 
the CCP's real intention, also wanted to promote its own 
interests, namely, to undermine the CCP's influence and to 
unify China under the San Min Chu I system. Thus, shortly 
after the completion of the Northern Expedition, Chiang Kai- 
shek started a series of "annihilation campaigns" against the 
Communists. This decision to curb Communist influence 
included the expulsion of several Russian officers whom 
Chiang believed were scheming with the leftist elements of 
the KMT against him. In this connection, a few words must be 
said to describe Russian penetration in the KMT's affairs.^
Initially Chianghad continued Sun's policy of cooperation with 
Soviet Russia, and had also depended on Soviet agents for 
political advice. He had even sent his son, Ching-kuo, to 1
1. For an account of Russian activities in China, see 
Chiang kai-shek, op.cit■, pp. 30-38.
36
Russia for military training and political education.1 
Nevertheless, Chiang soon discovered evidence of Russian 
Communist plans to use China's national revolution to stir 
up trouble in China and to allienate him from other factions 
of the KMT. In fact, although the Russians had responded to 
Sun's call for assistance, they were unwilling to see a 
coalition within the KMT as this might affect its plan to 
spread Communist ideology in China. Moreover, the Russians 
were of the view that a united KMT might again seek alliance 
with the imperialist powers. Thus, the Russians worked, 
through the radical elements of the KMT, first, to split the 
KMT, then, to drive out the conservative members, and finally 
turn it on to an even more radical course.
When Chiang realized Russians’ real intention, he, in 
addition to the purge campaign to rid the KMT of Communists, 
ordered the immediate closure of all Russian diplomatic 
missions and commercial establishments in China. Diplomatic 
relations between the two countries were severed. Thus came 
to an end, at the close of 1927, the first period of China's 
ill-fated alignment with Soviet Russia. After that, there 
were another two periods of KMT cooperation with the Russians: 
from 1932 to 1945 and from 1945 to 1949. These will be 
dealt with later. 1
1. For information on Young Chiang's experience with
Russian Communists, see, e.g. Tillman Durdin, "Chiang 
Ching-kuo’s Taiwan", Pacific Community, VII (October 
1975), pp. 92-227j also his "Chiang Ching-kuo and 
Taiwan: A Profile", Orbis, XVIII (Winter 1975), pp. 
1023-1042. See also "Chiang Ching-kuo" in Howard L. 
Boorman, ed. Biographical Dictionary of Republican China 
Vol. I, pp. 306-312.
Chiang’s extermination campaign did little to achieve its 
purposes. Instead, it reinforced ties between the two 
Communist parties. It also helped the CCP to win more 
sympathy and public support, and hence contributed to the 
consolidation of its strength.
In September 1931, the Japanese army launched a military 
invasion of Manchuria. This aggressive action gradually 
escalated into the Sino-Japanese War on 7th July 1937. Almost 
immediately, the Second United Front was established. In 
this connection, it is necessary to say a few words about 
Japanese interests in China.
The expansionists in Japan had long held the opinion that 
China's unity was Japan's disaster. In the mind of the 
Japanese militarists, a unified and strong China would block 
their aggressive design in Asia. It was therefore a great 
disappointment for them to see the achievement of the 
Nationalist unification of China in 1928. The fact that 
China was now united did bring prestige and guick inter­
national recognition to the KMT-dominated national government 
of the ROC. And during its first few years in power, the 
national government had proved its ability and intention to 
advance national conditions and had, to some extent, improved 
its political image at home and abroad. It also had some 
success in reasserting China's sovereignty. For instance, 
several concession areas were returned to Chinese control, 
and the foreign powers assented to China's resumption of 
tariff automony, which China had lost during the period of 
the unegual treaties. Yet these were merely token gains 
because the unegual treaties were scarcely breached. One 
instance was Japan's continued possession of its special
rights in Manchuria. Chiang wanted Japan to leave Manchuria 
but Japan wanted to stay. Relations between the two 
countries remained cold and strained. On top of this,
Soviet Russia was waiting for a chance to get into Manchuria. 
Thus, in order to prevent China from further integration as 
well as from Soviet domination, Japan took preemptive strike 
in Manchuria in 1931.
China immediately appealed to the League of Nations to take 
action against the Japanese aggression. The League called 
upon Japan to refrain from aggravating the dispute, but it 
failed to impose sanctions on the aggressor. The Great Powers, 
though not solidly behind the League decisions, took little 
action to support China. After that until the War broke out 
in 1937, the Soviet Union was in fact China's major supporter. 
The Soviet support— came during the KMT-CCP Second United 
Front— was marked by the U.S.S.R.-ROC Non-aggression Pact, 
signed on 21st August 1937. Under the Pact, the Russians 
quickly sent ammunition, military advisers, and hundreds of 
aircraft with Soviet pilots to China. Later on the Soviet 
Union also extended credits for military aid to China for 
civilian purchases and currency stabilization.
Thus, during this period Russian influence in China had 
resumed and grown into its climax. It had effectively set 
up several Soviet regimes in China's important areas. For 
instance, during the period of 1930-34, there were six 
scattered areas under the control of the Chinese Soviet 
Republic. Among these, the "Central Soviet District" along 
the Kiangsi-Fukien border, was most important. With 17
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Ihsien (counties) and 3 million of population under its 
control, it lasted for 4 years. The other Soviet districts 
were much smaller and less permanent. Even so, the 
establishment of Soviet regimes in China, though controlled 
by the Chinese Communists, seriously endangered Chinese 
sovereignty. It also undermined the prospects of China's 
national unification.
Here, it needs to be mentioned that during the Second United 
Front, the CCP, in order to show its sincerity in the 
collaboration, declared its intention of renouncing all 
Communist programmes, and of adhering to the San Min Chu I 
doctrine as advocated by Sun.'1' The CCP also declared its 
intention of abolishing the Chinese Soviet Republic and the 
Red Army. Nevertheless, as the War dragged on, conflict 
between the two parties renewed. The major cause of the 
conflict was the old issue of power— dominance over the 
other. Thus, instead of concentrating the power of the 
coalition to resist the common enemies, both Chiang and Mao 
concentrated on consolidating their power in the areas which 
they respectively controlled. As soon as these power bases 
were strengthened, they turned to fight against each other. 
Consequently, the longer the War went on, the more chaos and 
confusion China's internal situation underwent.
On 8th December 1941, Japan attacked the U.S. at Pearl 
Harbour, starting the Pacific War. The War brought the U.S. 
into alliance with China, and Great Britain joined the 
Pacific War as its colonial possessions were attacked. This 
widening of the Sino-Japanese War had both positive and
1. B.Crozier, op.cit., pp. 186-187.
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negative effects on China. On the positive side, it lifted 
Chinese morale, consequently contributing to the winning of 
the long-standing War. As one of the War victors, China 
regained its lost territories, such as Manchuria, Taiwan, 
the Pescadores Islands, etc. and prestige.  ^ On the negative 
side, however, the return of these territories, noticeably 
Manchuria at this stage and Taiwan after 1949, created new 
problems for China. This was because both the KMT and the 
CCP were determined on a race to gain control of Manchuria, 
even at the cost of civil war. (The KMT-CCP confrontation 
over Taiwan will be dealt with later.) The situation became 
more complicated when the Soviet Union, in view of its 
strategic and economic significance, also joined into the 
race for Manchuria.
(3) China's relations with the U.S, and the Soviet Union 
during World War II
(A) Relations with the U.S.
Unlike Soviet Russia, the U.S. refrained from military 
assistance to the KMT government during its war with Japan. 
The U.S. decision was partly due to its national policy of 
non-involvement in China's internal affairs and partly due 
to the decisions reached at the League of Nations. However, 1
1. The decision was made at the Cairo Conference which
issued the Cairo Declaration (1st December 1943) dealing 
with the post-War situation in the Far East. See 
Documents 11 and 12: "The Cairo Conference: The Chinese 
Record of the November 26, 1943, Meeting," and "The 
Cairo Declaration, November 26, 1943," in Hungdah Chiu, 
ed. China and the Question of Taiwan: Documents and 
Analysis (New York: Praeqer Publishers. 1973). d p .
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as an expression of sympathy and friendship, the U.S. had 
provided China with financial assistance by extending both 
loans and credits to China in addition to lend-lease 
assistance. The first U.S. military aid to China came on 
17th April 1941 when President Roosevelt approved an amount 
of US #45,000,000 to Chiang.^ After that the U.S. assistance 
to China, hence its involvement in its national affairs, 
began to grow steadily.
First of all, after Pearl Harbour, the U.S. and Great Britain 
became fully-fledged allies of China, meaning a promise of not 
only collaboration with, but also financial and military 
support to, China. Secondly, as an expression of friendship 
to China, the U.S. and Great Britain, by their treaties with 
China dated 11th January 1943, abolished their extraterri­
torial jurisdiction in China. They also attempted to elevate
. . 2 China into a great power status after the War.
However, this international alliance was marked by deep 
conflict, which was caused mainly by the different priorities 
of interests of the partners involved. While Chiang’s main 
concern was in China and in Asia, the other allies were more 
concerned with Europe. The existance of these divergent 
viewpoints led to many controversies that had powerful
1. The China Yearbook, 1980, p 397.
2. Actually British Prime Minister W. Churchill did not agree 
with this policy initiated by U.S. President F.D. Roosevelt. 
Churchill, while admired and liked the Chinese as a race 
and "pitied (them) for their endless misgovernment", 
however, "did not much like the idea of the Chinese running 
up and down the Pacific". For information on the U.S. policy of making China a great power and the different views 
of the major powers on this policy, see Tang Tsou, America's 
Failure in China, 1941-1950 (Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1963), pp. 33-87.
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repercussions in China. One serious consequence was the 
decision of the Yalta Conference (February 1945) which was 
taken at the expense of China without its previous knowledge 
and consent.
(B) Relations with the Soviet Union and Yalta Conference
Prior to Pearl Harbour, Soviet Russia had been the major 
military and economic supporter of China. This support was 
clearly expressed in the 1937 U.S.S.R.-ROC Non-aggressive 
Pact. Nevertheless, Joseph Stalin's real intention to 
assist China was to keep China continuously fighting against 
Japan so as to reduce the chance of the latter's attack on 
Siberia. This motivation became more pronounced when 
Germany attacked Russia in June 1941 because Soviet Russia 
could not possibly fight against two formidable enemies in 
both East and West at the same time. Thus, during the War 
period, the relationship between the two countries was 
rather cordial, despite the fact that Chiang was deeply 
suspicious of Soviet encouragement for the Chinese Communists 
to fight against his government.
The turning point of the U .S.S.R.-China relationship was the 
Yalta Conference. At Yalta, Stalin exacted a very high 
price for Soviet entry into the Far Eastern War from U.S. 
President F.D. Roosevelt and the British Prime Minister W. 
Churchill. Stalin demanded the independence of Outer Mongolia, 1
1. The Soviet Union had provided China with its most 
substantial military aid, but when Germany attacked 
Russia in June 1941, this aid virtually ceased. By 
then, however, the U.S. had sold China 100 fighter 
planes— the beginning of an American effort to provide 
air protection.
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full occupation of Port Arthur and partial occupation of 
Darien (both ports are defence keys to Manchuria) and the 
joint management of the Chinese Chungchun Railway. On the 
basis of these decisions reached at Yalta, the territorial 
integrity of China was again severely damaged. Chiang had 
no alternative but to sign the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 
Friendship and Alliance on 14th August, the same date of 
Japan's surrender, confirming what had been secretly arranged 
among the big powers at Yalta. In return, Soviet Russia 
promised to support the Nationalist government as the central 
government of China. This Treaty, officially terminated by 
Chiang on 10th January 1953, marked the third and last 
period of the KMT alliance with Russian Communists.
After the War the KMT-CCP alliance also came to an end.
Though Chiang's prestige stood high at that time and China 
was now ranked as a great power, 1 these achievements helped 
little to bring the country peace and unification. On the 
contrary, post-War China was immediately split by a new 
civil war which, fought between the KMT-led national 
government and the CCP, finally led to the political division 
of China in 1949. This division has lasted to the present 
day. 1
1. By now, all the "unequal treaties" formulated under the 
Manchu government were abrogated. Thus China had 
regained its national independence.
(4) China during the civil war period: 1945-1949
The factor that caused the outbreak of the civil war was the 
Manchuria crisis, in which both the national government and 
the CCP had raced against each other for the final control 
of Manchuria. The conflict was an extension of the long­
standing power struggle between the two hostile parties.
Each side distrusted the other, each sought to ensure its 
own survival. Even a coalition government, which was 
initially suggested at the Cairo Conference in 1943, was 
impossible because while the KMT intended to continue its 
political dominance, the CCP insisted upon the independence 
of its armies and regional governments under whatever 
coalition formula might be worked out.1 Thus after the War, 
while trying to reach a peaceful settlement through 
negotiations between the two parties, they had located 
their military strengths respectively in different areas 
and tried to resist each other.
The process by which the post-War KMT-CCP conflict developed 
until October 1949 may be divided into three phases for 
discussion: (i) from August 1945 to the end of 1946, the
KMT and the CCP raced to take over Manchuria, built up their
The idea of a coalition government was suggested 
when China was still engaged in War and when peaceful 
negotiations between the two parties were carried on.
The main issues in the negotiation were: the disposition, 
size, and command of the Communist armies; the relation­
ship between Communist-organized regional governments 
and the national government; and problems of civil rights
and.legalization of the CCP and its activities in the Nationalist area. Hollington K. Tong, Chiang Kai-shek
(Taipei: China Publishing Company, 1953), pT 309.
forces, and fought many limited wars while still conducting 
negotiations for a peaceful settlement; (ii) during 1947 and 
the first half of 1948, after initial success by the KMT, the 
strategic balance turned in favour of the Communists; amd (iii)
the Communist victory in the later part of 1948 and during 1949.
During the first phase, the roles of both the Soviet Union 
and the U.S. deserve our special attention.
A concomitant result of Russian entry into the Far Eastern 
War was its deliberate occupation of Manchuria. Thus, three 
days before the unconditional surrender of Japan, Soviet 
Russia declared war against Japan and its troops immediately 
moved into Manchuria. After the War, Russian troops 
continued to remain on Chinese soil. They took over 
military depots of Japanese equipment, weapons and ammunition 
or destroyed them. More than this, when they eventually 
evacuated Manchuria in 1947, they handed over some of the 
military depots that had been well-kept to the Chinese 
Communists. In this way, they strengthened the CCP 
considerably in the civil war against the Nationalists.
The U.S. had hoped that there would be a unified and 
prosperous China after the War so that it could play a 
positive political role in Asia, opposing Soviet expansionism 
and Japanese militarism, and maintaining peace in Asia.'*' Thus 
the American government lost no time in mediating between the 
two parties, hoping to bring about a coalition government or 
a cessation of hostilities in China. The mediation efforts 
lasted from September 1944 until January 1947. During this 
period, the U.S. sent Ambassador Patrick Hurley and General 1
1. Tang Tsou, American Failure in China, 1941-50 (Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 1963), pp. 33-57.
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George C. Marshall to China, but both missions failed.
All negotiations ended in March 1947.
The conflict became more severe when both parties took 
action to consolidate their individual positions. In 
November 1946, for instance, the national government 
convoked a National Assembly which, in the absence of the 
CCP and other minor political parties,1 decided on the 
adoption of the Constitution of the Republic of China.
The Constitution, which was originally drafted in 1936,^
1. In the early years of the Chinese Republic, there were 
a number of small parties and political groups. Chiefly 
because of their limited membership, loose organization, 
as well as lack of leadership and policies, most of them 
either vanished or were merged with others. The KMT 
alone weathered the political storms of the Republic and 
became the ruling party of China until the advent of 
Communist power on the mainland. When the KMT 
reunited China through military force, the activities 
of other political parties were not allowed prior to the 
Sino-Japanese War. The CCP had to resort to arms in 
order to carry out its programmes. The Chinese Youth 
Party, founded in Paris in 1923, maintained its existence 
by seeking protection from local warlords, who were 
beyond the control of the Nationalist government. Under 
the circumstances of almost one-party dictatorship, there 
was little opportunity for people to organize political 
parties against the policies and programmes of the KMT. 
The other political parties were, for instance, the 
China Democratic Socialist Party (founded in 1931), the 
National Salvation Association of the Chinese People 
(organized in 1936), the Liberation Action Committee of 
the Chinese People (organized in 1927), the Chinese Rural 
Reconstruction Group (established in 1930), the Chinese 
Vocational Education Association (founded in 1917) and 
the Chinese Democratic League (organized in 1939). The 
Chinese Youth Party still functions in Taiwan. Another 
party in Taiwan is the China Democratic Socialist Party, 
established in Shanghai on 15th August 1946. See, e.g.Thp china Yearbook, 1974.118-131.
2. There was a draft constitution proclaimed by the national 
government of the ROC on 5th May 1936. A constitutional 
National Assembly was scheduled for 12th November of that 
year to write a finished constitution based on the draft. 
However, shortly afterwards, the Sino-Japanese War broke 
out. The ROC's efforts .to introduce constitutional 
government were therefore delayed. The Constitution of 
the ROC of 1947 was based on the 1936 draft constitution 
with some revisions.
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came into effect on 25th December the following year. It 
has been and still is the fundamental law of the ROC. It 
has also been regarded as the mandate on which the ROC's 
rule is based.
This Constitution reaffirmed Sun Yat-sen's San Min Chu I as 
the basic philosophy of the state. It called for a division 
of power between five government bodies of Yttans: the 
executive (the cabinet), and legislative (the law-enacting 
organ), the judical (the agency to interpret the Constitution 
and serve as a court of last resort), the control (the agency 
exercising the power of administrative impeachment and of 
supervising officials), and the one responsible for the 
civil service examination; and it also enshrined the four 
people's rights of initiative, referendum, election and 
recall. More information concerning this division of powers 
will be given in Chapter Two. The fundamental national 
policies outlined in this Constitution include six sections:
national defence, foreign affairs, national economy, social
1 1 security, education and culture, and frontier regions.
The Constitution may be amended directly by the National
Assembly (the agency responsible for amending the Constitution
and for electing the President and Vice-President) or upon
the proposal of the Legislative Yuan to the National
2Assembly. In this respect, it seemed the way was prepared 
for election of both central and local officials, upon which 
KMT tutelage would end and democracy would begin. 12
1, Arts. 137-169, The China Yearbook, 1979, pp. 635-653.
2. Art. 174, ibid.
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Regardless of this development, in December the same year, 
the Communists launched a drastic land reform policy in 
their occupied areas by enforcing the "Regulations on 
Compulsory Purchase of Excess Land from the Landlords".
By doing this, the CCP effectively weakened the KMT's 
position and strengthened its own popularity, among the 
rural classes.
During the second phase, the situation began to tilt in 
favour of the CCP. One of the reasons for the CCP's success 
was the result of the land revolution in rural China.
Another reason was the poor performance of the national 
government in the management of national economy. The 
economic situation in China after the War progressively 
deteriorated because of the prolonged fighting. This was 
also the main cause of inflation and declining living 
standards. Moreover, much tax revenue failed to reach the 
treasury because of malpractices throughout the bureaucracy. 
There were also widespread criticisms of corruption and 
inefficiency in the government.^ But the turning point in 
the war came with the battles fought in Manchuria in late 
1947, when the CCP forces crushed the government's best 
armies. After this the KMT-led national government exper­
ienced irreparable military and economic disasters, with one 
province after another being lost to the Communists. 1
1. For information on the national condition of China at 
that time, see Brian Crozier, The Man Who Lost China 
(Londons Angus and Robertson, 1977), pp. 301-346.
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Finally, the fate of China was gradually sealed after early 
January 1949 when the Communist victory became gradually a 
political reality on the mainland. During the first half 
of 1949, the national government lost control of more than 
half of China although it still had a large army. At this 
stage the U.S., clinging to its basic policy of non­
involvement in China's civil war and internal political 
problems, continued to provide a moderate amount of aid to 
the national government. Nevertheless, this support did 
little to promote the KMT's military operations.
After the second half of 1949, the national government 
became helpless with its forces suffering one debacle after 
another, and with the government base moving from one place 
to another; it moved first from Nankingto Canton, then to 
Chungking, and finally, to Taipei. Then in August, the
U.S. State Department issued a White Paper on Sino-American 
. 2relations. This document released at that particular 
time--when the situation of the national government was 
undoubtedly hopeless— was really intended to absolve the
1. After the War, U.S. aid to China continued. For a 
detailed account of U.S. aid-to-China programme during 
this period, see D.C. Gupta, United States Attitude 
Towards China (Delhi: S.Chand & Co., 1969), pp. 191-231.
2. The White Paper was proposed by U.S. Secretary of State 
Dean Rusk and drafter by Philip C. Jessup. The choice 
of the publication date for the Paper was a heavy blow 
to the morale of the ROC. The fall of two provinces 
without a battle in southwestern China during the winter 
of 1949 was said to be related to the publication of the 
Paper. The full text of the Paper is included in United 
States Relations with China with Special Reference to
the Period 1944-1949, Department of State Publication 75731 tar tastern Series 30; the text of which has been translated and printed in Chinese by the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, ROC.
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American government of any responsibility for the imminent 
fall of China's mainland. Thus when Communist armies 
succeeded in taking the provinces of south and west China—  
almost the last footholds of the KMT forces on the mainland—  
the final fall of the national government and the collapse 
of the KMT forces on the Chinese mainland became inevitable.
In December 1949, the defeated national government re-esta­
blished itself on Taiwan, to which ChiangKai-shek had with­
drawn early in the year, taking most of the government's 
gold reserves and the Nationalist air force and navy, and 
with him, about 1.5 million Chinese emigrants. Taipei, the 
largest city in Taiwan, was chosen as the provisional capital.
On 1st October the same year, with most of the mainland held 
by the CCP’s forces, Mao Tse-tung proclaimed the establish­
ment in Peking of the People's Republic of China (the PRC), 
with Peking as its capital. This, however, was not the end 
of the civil war, as both Chinese governments continued to 
think of themselves as participants in an unfinished 
struggle, with the main fronts now to be found along the 
Taiwan Straits, and with diplomatic confrontations all over 
the world.
It will be recalled that, on 2nd October, one day after its 
establishment, the Soviet Union extended recognition to the 
PRC. The Soviet action constituted a clear violation of the 
Treaty of Friendship and Alliance signed with the ROC in 
1945. As a reply to the Soviet action, the U.S. State 
Department issued a statement two days later, reaffirming 
American recognition of the Nationalist government of China.
Thus the initial connection between the unfinished Chinese 
civil war and Soviet-American post-War rivalry was 
established. This caused the transformation of the China 
problem from an internal issue of ideological and political 
confrontation between two political parties into a Cold War 
issue, dependent on the development of international 
ideological and power relations.
II. China and Taiwan after 1949
1. Taiwan and its historical connection with mainland China
Taiwan— or Formosa in Portuguese— * is a tropical island 
lying about 90 to 120 miles off the south eastern coast of 
the Chinese mainland. It is about 85 miles across at its 
widest point and about 240 miles long. With an overall area 
of 14,000 square miles, Taiwan constitutes about 0.38% of 
the total Chinese territory. In fact, Taiwan is the smallest 
province and the only island province of China.
Despite this smallness is size, Taiwan, even in its early 
history, had strategic value. Both Japanese and Chinese 1
1. Formosa is a word of Portuguese origin, meaning "the
beautiful island". Westerners often use it to describe 
the island, although Taiwan, a word of unclear origin, 
is also popularly used. From time to time, attempts 
are made to attach political significance to one word 
or the other. For example, advocates of Taiwanese 
independence living in America usually used the term 
Formosa in an attempt to deny even a linguistic 
affiliation with China. Independence advocates who 
live in Japan, however, are obliged to use the word Taiwan if they wish to be understood. In this study, the island will be called Taiwan. No connection is 
intended.
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pirates used the island as a base for raids on the sea lanes 
along the Chinese coast, and throughout the kingdoms of 
Southeast Asia. The 15th century brought the Europeans to 
Taiwan: first the Portuguese, then the Spanish and the 
Dutch. They were interested in establishing trading posts.
In 1662, Koxinga, the son of a famous Ming pirate and a 
Japanese woman, expelled the Europeans and made the island 
his personal kingdom. Twenty years later, his grandson 
surrendered the kingdom to a Manchu emperor, who incorporated 
it into Fukien, the closest Chinese privince on the mainland. 
Thus Taiwan was made a province of China.
The Manchu emperors ruled Taiwan from 1683 to 1895, though 
their administrators did not venture far from the island's 
garrison towns. In 1894, China and Japan went to war. The 
Japanese won. By the Treaty of Shimonoseki, the Chinese 
ceded to the Japanese Taiwan and the Pescadores, a group 
of islands lying off the west coast of Taiwan. 1 The first 
decade of Japanese rule was spent in pacification, the next 
four decades in modernization. At the start of the Second 
World War, Taiwan was the oldest and wealthiest Japanese 
colony.
It was not until the Second World War that other nations 
rose to challenge the Treaty of Shimonoseki. In Cairo in 
1943, the Allied powers, headed by Churchill and Roosevelt 
and Chiang Kai-shek, declared: "All territories that Japan 1
1. Article II, Treaty of Shimonoseki, signed on 17th April, 
1895, see Hungdah Chiu, op.cit., pp. 197-198.
has stolen from China, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and 
Pescadores, shall be restores to the Republic of China." 1 
The Potsdam Declaration of 1945 reaffirmed this intent. 2 
When the War ended, the Supreme Commander of the Allied 
powers gave the Nationalist government of Chiang Kai-shek 
authority to accept the Japanese surrender and administer the 
island. In the 1952 Peace Treaty between the ROC and Japan, 
the latter formally relinquished its claim to the island. 2
2. Taiwan under the KMT rule, the initial period: 1945-1949
It is said that the native Taiwanese population, about six 
millions, initially welcomed the arrival of the new Chinese 
government in 1945. Nevertheless, to their disappointment, 
for two years after its transfer from Japan to China, the 
national government, still dominated by the KMT, preoccupied 
with the civil war, paid relatively little attention to the 
development of the island. The first Governor-General, Chen 
Yi, was appointed by the national government from the main­
land. His policy was to exclude the native islanders from 
the government, and meanwhile to exercise some sort of 
military control over them. Chen Yi's discriminatory policy 
not only antagonized the native population but also provoked 
tension between the latter and the 1.5 million mainlanders 
who came to the island after the Second World War. On 28th 
February 1947, conditions had become so bad that the local
1. Ibid., p. 207 .
2. Ibid., pp., 208-209
3 . Ibid., pp. 245-247
Taiwanese revolted, which led the national government to 
resort to force to restore order. The incident is known as 
the "February 28th Uprising". One serious consequence was 
that a few of the Taiwanese who had been active in the 
uprising escaped to Hong Kong, where they founded the 
Taiwan Independence Movement. The Movement advocated an 
independent state of Taiwan governed by Taiwanese only, 
and it appealed to the memory of the uprising to stimulate 
Taiwanese antipathy to KMT rule.1 This Independence 
Movement has constituted another potential threat to the 
KMT's minority rule on the island.
In May, a new Chinese governor, Wei Tao-ming, was appointed. 
Wei was a civilian and his policy was to pacify local 
discontent by admitting large numbers of natives into his 
administration. Nevertheless, he was unable to repair the 
damage caused by the uprising. Nor could he win the 
confidence of the native Taiwanese immediately and whole­
heartedly in KMT rule.
1. The Taiwan Independence Movement is also active in the 
U.S., Japan and some European countries. For a full 
account of the movement, see George H. Kerr, Formosa 
Betrayed (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965). Kerr, who 
was American vice-consul in Taipei when the uprising 
and its supression occurred, was an eye-witness to some 
events and had first hand account of others. He had 
many friends among the Taiwanese, some of whom were 
killed, and his account is openly partisan. For another 
account sympathetic to the Taiwanese, see Douglas Mendel, 
The Politics of Formosan Nationalism (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1970). Even detached 
observers such as General Albert Wedemeyer were strongly 
critical of the conduct of the Nationalist government 
during the uprising. See US Department of States. United 
States Relations with China (Washington, D.C. August 
1949> p. J09.” For an official Nationalist report, see 
The Truth about the February 28, 1947 Incident in Taiwan 
(Taichung; Historical Research Commission of Taiwan 
Province, 1967).
In the meantime, the unsettling consequences of the civil 
war reached the island. As mentioned earlier after January 
1949, Nationalist troops began to withdraw from the 
mainland. Accompanying them were a large number of the 
civilian mainlanders. Thus, by autumn that year, there 
were about 1.5 million Chinese mainlanders living among 
6 million Taiwanese. General Chen Cheng (1898-1965) was 
appointed by Chiang Kai-shek as the new governor of Taiwan. 
It needs to be pointed out here that while the mainlanders 
began to emigrate to the island, some communist underground 
agents, capitalizing on local dissatisfaction with the 
Nationalist government, started a vigorous drive to 
infiltrate the island. Thus, in his short term as governor, 
Chen Cheng concentrated his efforts not only on stabilizing 
the island's political and economic conditions but also on 
suppressing communist activities.
For these reasons, "Temporary Provisions Effective During 
the Period of Communist Rebellion" were adopted on 18th 
April 1948 by the National Assembly of the ROC on Taiwan.
In accordance with the procedure prescribed in Paragraph 1 
of Article 174 of the Constitution, the provisions empower 
the Presidents
"...during the Period of Communist Rebellion, 
by resolution of the Executive Yuan Council, 
to take emergency measures to avert an imminent 
danger to the security of the State or of the 
people, or to cope with any serious financial
or economic crisis, without being subject to 
the procedural restrictions prescribed in Article 
39 or Article 43 of the Constitution." 1
In addition to these measures, Chen Cheng also reformed 
Taiwan's currency to ward off the impact of inflation on 
the island, and introduced the 37.5 per cent land rent 
reduction programme. This was the first phase of Taiwan's 
land reform.
In December that year, with the arrival of the national 
government and the national headquarters of the KMT, the 
relocation of the ROC on Taiwan seemed to have been completed. 
Chen Cheng became Premier the following year. ^
During the first years of Chinese rule on Taiwan, the KMT 
had little party activity locally. It setup a provincial 
committee but made no serious effort to recruit the indi­
genous elements. It was only after the arrival of the 
Party's national headquarters that the KMT began to develop 
its local strength and actively to seek natives as members.
The terms "Nationalist government" and "Communist government" 
will be used from now on to refer to the two Chinese 
governments.
1. The procedural restrictions prescribed in Art. 39— which 
allows the President to declare and to terminate martial 
law, and Art. 43— which authorizes the President to 
issue emergency orders, are that the President's decisions 
to carry out the above rights during state emergency 
depend on the confirmation of the Legislative Yuan. In case the Legislative Yllan withholds confirmation, the 
said orders shall forthwith cease to the valid. The 
China Yearbook, 1979, pp. 551-2.
2. Chen Cheng was elected as the Vice-President from 1954 
until his death in 1955.
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3. Taivan under the Nationalist government! after 1949
Thus, in the whole course of history» Taiwan has been 
administered from the mainland of China for only two 
periods— from 1683 to 1895 and from 1945 to 1949. Since 
1949, the island has been governed by the Nationalist 
government of the ROC directly. The island has never been 
under Communist rule.
As noted earlier, the cause of the dispute has been that 
both Chinese governments have claimed legitimacy over the 
island, in addition to the claim on the mainland.
Despite the outcome of the civil war, neither Chiang Kai-shek 
nor his followers regarded the 1949 retreat as permanent, 
but as merely tactical. They were determined to return to 
the mainland, to terminate Communist rule there and to 
re-unite the country under Nationalist leadership. Chiang's 
determination can be found in one of his numerous speeches:
"So long as there are still a few comrades who are 
willing to die with me for the cause (i.e. national 
reunification and reconstruction), I shall keep the 
White-Sun-Blue-Sky flag (the Nationalist flag) flying 
and fight on."l
Taiwan was, and still is, therefore, regarded as a base 
for offensive operations: 1
1. Extract from President Chiang's speech in the opening 
address to the Seventh National Congress of the KMT, 
held on 10th October 1952 at Taipei. See Chang Chi-yun, 
The Rebirth of the Kuomintanq (The Seventy National 
Congress) translated into English by Nee Yuan-ching, 
revised and edited by Tsao Wen-yen, (Taipei: China 
Cultural Service, no date), p. 10.
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"After making Taiwan secure, we (the Nationalists) 
can proceed to mobilize our resources to turn it 
into a model province based on the Three Principles 
of the People, and also a formidable stronghold for 
the recovery of the mainland."1
"Hsiao-mieh Kunq-fei, Tai-hui Ta-lu" ("Wipe Out the Red 
Bandits (i.e. Chinese Communists) and Recover the Mainland") 
thus becomes the national slogan of the Nationalists. In 
relation to this slogan, as Chapter Three will show, a 
programme of resisting Soviet Russia is adjoined. The 
slogan can therefore also be understood as "Fan-kung K ’ang- 
eh", meaning "Opposing Chinese Communists and Resisting 
Soviet Russia".
However how did the Nationalist government, as a defeated 
force, secure Taiwan in the first place and then proceed 
to the programme of modernization there after the island 
had been badly damaged politically, economically, socially 
and psychologically by the Second World War?
Here it is necessary to say a few words about the capabilities 
of the Nationalist government after 1949.
As mentioned earlier, since 1949, the area under the 
Nationalist government's effective control has been confined 
to an area of 0.38% of the whole Chinese territory, including 
Taiwan, the Pescadores, and the offshore island groups of 
Quemoy and Matsu. Thus in comparison to the Communist 12
1. Chang Chi-yun, ibid., p. 35.
2. "Capability" is only a relative term. This section 
provides only some very general background information about the ROC's national capability after 1949, but does 
not imply that the ROC's national capability is static.
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government on the mainland, the Nationalist government on 
Taiwan is but a minor power. Nevertheless, as a minor 
power, the Nationalist government has had both advantages 
and disadvantages in terms of capability. The advantages 
were that it made the Nationalist government's modernization 
programme (i.e. transforming Taiwan into a model province 
based on the Three Principles) possible and manageable, 
which it had not been during the Nationalist rule on the 
mainland. The disadvantages were that it set a physical 
limit on the development and capability of the Nationalist 
government.
Taiwan has very few mineral resources. But it has a good 
record of agricultural development. Similar to other island 
nations, Taiwan has depended on foreign trade. Particularly 
during the early stage of economic development, it had to 
make use of agricultural exports to pay for foreign raw 
materials or capital intensive goods. (For more information 
on Taiwan's post-1949 economic development, see Chapter Six.) 
Such a dependence on import-export trade, though important 
for the economic viability and modernization of the island, 
could have had a negative effect on Taiwan, had there been 
any economic blockage from outside.
Significantly related to Taiwan's economic situation has 
been its military strength. The two issues are often 
discussed together because on the one hand, a country's 
military build-up is dependent upon its economy; on the other 
hand, a large military build-up could drain resources which 
might otherwise be available for national economic growth
and development.
The Nationalist government has always been torn by the 
dilemma of whether it ought to maintain a large armed force 
of, reportedly, almost 600,000 (exclusing the reserve) ready 
for combat operations, equipped with modern, sophisticated 
weapons at the expense of the island's economic development; 
or whether it ought to abandon the "mainland recovery" 
programme and concentrate its economic efforts on improving 
Taiwan's economic conditions and people’s living standards.
The problems that have actually faced the Nationalist 
government in terms of military strength have concerned 
the maintenance of military supply lines from overseas, 
mainly from the U.S.; military modernization with the most 
up-to-date equipment; the ability and necessity of the 
Nationalist government on its own to maintain such a large 
armed forces; and internal and external support for its 
military programme of "recovering the mainland".
Since the 1950's the U.S. has been Taiwan's major arms 
supplier. Under the 1954 U.S.-ROC Mutual Defence Treaty 
(see Chapter Three), the U.S. was to assist the Nationalist 
government to modernize its weapons and equipment through 
either cooperative production or trade. The U.S. was also 
obliged to provide the Nationalist government with military 
advice. Nevertheless, important as it was (and still is) to 
Taiwan's national defence, this supply system has been 
interrupted several times since the early 1970s. The 
interruptions were caused by the changes in U.S. policies 
towards the two Chinese governments which were clearly 
marked in the 1969 Guam Doctrine, enunciated by the U.S.
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President Richard Nixon. Consequently, the Nationalist 
government has had to look to other countries for sources 
of supply, including South Africa, Israel and Western 
Europe. 1 Thus, despite the fact that the Nationalist army 
is numerically large compared to the island's relatively 
small size; and despite the fact that, it has been said, 
the Nationalist government is capable of manufacturing and 
repairing a limited amount of modern high performance 
weaponry, ammunition, electronic communications facilities 
and certain types of aircraft and vessels at home, and that 
it has the potential of producing nuclear weapons, the 
Nationalist government has suffered severely from an 
uncertain supply system, particularly during the 1970s.
(This will be dealt with again in Chapter Six.)
Closely related to the military supply system has been the 
question of whether a large military build-up is indeed 
necessary; or if the Nationalist government is capable by 
itself of maintaining such a large armed force and if so 
for what. In this connection, mention should be made of the 
importance of the two offshore islands, Quemoy and Matsu, 
to the national defence of Taiwan.
Judging from their location, there is no doubt that these 
two islands constitute the "front line" of the ROC's 
defence. This also partially explains the reasons why there
1. There were scattered reports that the Nationalist 
government have arms deals with these countries, see 
for example, Fox Butterfield, "Secret Taiwan Deal for 
Israeli Missiles Reported", International Herald Tribune 
(7th April 1977), p. 5; Melinda Liu, "Israel fills 
Nationalists' Arms Gap", Far Eastern Economic Review 
(FEER) (29th April 1077), pp. 24-6.
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were the two Quemoy crises. However, although for the 
purposes of Taiwan's defence, possession of these islands 
by the Nationalist government has advantages, it also has 
certain disadvantages for both governments in the civil 
war. For both rival governments, the islands constitute 
a link between Taiwan and the mainland, symbolizing the 
"one China" position maintained by them. For the 
Nationalist government, they also serve to bottle up the 
ports of Amoy and Foochou, preventing the Communist 
government from using them as assembly points for forces 
preparing to invade Taiwan. Nevertheless, for the Communist 
government, the islands offer a convenient place from which 
to exert controlled military pressure on the Nationalist 
government at an acceptable cost. They can be bombarded, 
or their re-supply can be interdicted (as happened during 
the second Quemoy crisis),1 without the awkward international 
repercussions that would result from blockading or attacking 
Taiwan.
Here the Nationalist government faces another dilemma: if 
it sets about strengthening the two principal islands' 
defence by deploying even more troops on the already over­
armed islands (the Nationalist government reportedly stations 
nearly one-third of its troops, all crack units, on the two
1. Quemoy depends heavily on Taiwan for consumer goods, 
military resupplies and many other things. It is 
because nearly 53.55% of the land is hilly and only 
36.36% is arable. Although Quemoy is almost self- 
sufficient in food (its major crops are sweet potatoes, 
peanuts, vegetables, soy beans, etc.) it does not grow 
rice. Hence the supply line from Taiwan either by sea 
or by air is of vital importance to the viability of 
Quemoy, The China Yearbook, 1979, p. 88.
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islands, with about three-quarters of that contingent on 
Quemoy), then it not only provokes tension along the 
Taiwan Straits but increases the risk of a Communist 
invasion of the islands. On top of this, the Communist 
government may attempt to prevent their resupply. 
Consequently, the Nationalist government may risk losing 
one third of its army as well as international (U.S.) 
sympathy. However, paradoxically, if the Nationalist 
government reduces its garrisons on the offshore islands, 
which may have the effect of reducing the chances of a 
Communist invasion on them, then the Communist government 
may mistake the purpose of this withdrawal as an attempt by 
the Nationalist leaders to opt for independence from the 
mainland. An additional consideration has been that the 
Nationalist government has maintained a rather weak navy 
and air force. 1 The significance of the offshore islands 
to the defence of Taiwan as well as their relevance to the 
unfinished civil war will be discussed again in Chapters 
Three and Four.
Finally, internal support for, and external opinions on, 
the Nationalist government’s programme of mainland recovery 
are also relevant to the military strength of the ROC's 
national capability. That is, if both internal and 
external opinion was in favour of the programme, i.e. if 
the local Taiwanese majority and the Mainlander minority 
supported the Nationalist cause and the U.S. etc. were
1. Bruce J. Esposito, "The Military Viability of Taiwan", in Jack F. Williams, ed. The Taiwan Issue (Michigan* 
Asian Studies Centre, Michigan State University, May 1976), pp. 55-59.
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willing to supply military equipment to Taiwan, then it 
might be often conducive to a more effective operation of 
the Nationalists' programme. Conversely, lack of these 
supports might cripple the ability of the Nationalist 
government to carry out this programme. Thus it is essential 
for the Nationalist government to secure support, and hence 
its national position, both at home and abroad. The two 
issues are inter-related and will now be examined.
To augment support from the local Taiwanese as well as to 
promote integration of the latter and the mainlanders (in 
other words, to imbue the Taiwanese with the value system 
of the Nationalists), the Nationalist government has since 
the 1950s adopted several measures to meet specific demands. 
For instance, with respect to the Taiwanese, the Nationalist 
government's policies are aimed at, essentially, a 
substantial improvement of their economic position whilst 
very slowly but positively responding to their political 
aspirations for participation in government. With respect 
to the mainlanders, the Nationalist government has 
concentrated its efforts on improving the life of two key 
groups of peoples the functionaries of the national 
government and the retired servicemen. 1 The government 
has also encouraged integration and communication between 
the two communities.
1. Tai Hung-chao, "The Kuomintang and Modernization in 
Taiwan", in Samuel P. Huntington and Clement H. Moore, 
eds. Authoritarian Politics in Modern Societys The 
Dynamics of Established One-Party System (New Yorks 
Basic Books, Inc., 1970), pp. 429-30.
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1949.
Here it is necessary to say a few words about the 
government structure of the ROC on (as well as the 
pattern of political participation in) Taiwan since
Despite, or rather because of, the fact that Taiwan is 
but a province of China, the Nationalist government has 
adopted a two-tiered government system on the island. That 
is, the ROC on Taiwan has: on the national level, (1) a 
President (Head of State), (2) a national (central) 
government, dominated by the KMT and its members (mainly 
the mainlanders), temporarily located in Taipei, (3) the 
National Assembly (the electoral college), (4) the five 
branches of government (the five Yuans); and on the local 
level, a Provincial government and two special municipal 
governments, led by the Taiwanese.^
Since 1948 there has been almost no popular selection 
of members of the national representative institutions.^
1. For. a more detailed information of the structure of the 
ROC's government system, see The China Yearbook 1980, part 
II—  Government system, and Part III— Taiwan Province, 
Taipei and Kaohsiung Municipalities, pp. 89-170. See 
also Annual Review of Government Administration, Republic 
of China (Taipei: Research, Development, & Evaluation 
Commission, Executive Yttan), annually since 1973.
2. The Nationalist government began to improve its democratic 
image gradually after Chiang Ching-kuo came to power.
Prior to this, elections, mainly on the local level, seemed 
to have only a routine function. It was dominated by the 
KMT which was (and still is) run by the mainlanders. A 
recent election on 6th December 1980, which saw 403 candi­
dates vie for 97 seats in the Legislative Ytlan and 76 seats in the National Assembly, however, may be seen as Taiwan's 
first national election. It was also precendent-setting in a number of other ways: new election laws had just been 
written, the government allowed one-party or "without party" opposition candidates to say almost anything they wished, 
many new issues were voiced during the campaigning, and the KMT seemed to reassess the need to appeal to the population as a competing party. For further details, see John F. 
Copper, "Taiwan's Recent Election: Progress toward a Democratic System", Asian Survey (October 1981), pp.
1029-39.
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These institutions include the National Assembly (the 
normal term is six years), the Legislative Yflan (the normal 
term is three years), and the Control Yuan (the normal term 
is also six years). Thus, the current National Assembly 
under the Constitution was elected in November 1947 with 
2691 delegates; the Legislative Yuan was elected in December 
1948, with 760 delegates; and the Control Yuan was elected in 
the same year, with 180 delegates. The National Assembly, 
which elected KMT Director-General Chiang Kai-shek to the 
presidency in 1948, subsequently renewed his term four 
times, the Executive Yuan (the cabinet) has since 1949 been 
under the exclusive control of the KMT without participation 
by other parties.
In other words, there has been a lack of popular election at 
the "national" level. According to the Nationalist government, 
this is because a national election could only be justified 
if it were carried out on the mainland with all the mainland 
population involved. "The Chinese leaders did not wish to 
absorb a large number of Chinese from one province (i.e.
Taiwan) into a government intended to rule all of China." ^
An additional consideration has been that; "Right now Taiwan's
survival is more important to the people than whether it has
2more or less democracy." Thus the terms of the original 
members of these elective bodies were extended for the 12
1. Neil H. Jacoby, U.S. Aid to Taiwan; A Study of Foreign 
Aid, Self-Help and Development (New Yorks Frederick A. 
Praeger, 1966), p. 112.
2. R. N. Clough, Island China (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1978), p. 57.
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duration of "the Period of Communist Rebellion". 
Nevertheless, the membership in these bodies has gradually 
declined over the years because old members slowly pass 
away. At the same time it was not possible to hold new 
elections throughout China. Thus by 1969, it was evident 
that new members would have to be added. Thus, special 
elections were held in Taiwan since 1969, adding new 
members to all three bodies. ^
In contrast to this, the Nationalist government has 
encouraged local self-rule (by the Taiwanese) since 1949 
by holding numerous elections at the provincial and local
1. Taking 1969, 1972 and 1973 as examples, new members 
adding to the three elective bodies were as follows:
National
elective
bodies
Original
Member­
ship
Remaining
Original
members
Members 
elected 
in 1969
Members
elected
•72-73
Total
membership 
in Dec.1979
National
Assembly 2,961(1) 1,281 15 53 1,185
Legislative
Yuan 760(2) 376 11 51 373
Control
Yuan 180(2) 57 2 15 57
(1) elected November 1947
(2) elected in 1948.
See The China Yearbook, 1980, pp. 93, 94, 110, 111 and 
124. See also note no. 2,page 66.
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1evels. 1
In terms of functions of the two tiers, the provincial and 
special municipal governments are responsible for management 
of local affairs; namely they should take charge of problems 
involving educational, social or rural developments. They 
should also help the central government in carrying out its 
duties. The duties of the central government are concen­
trated on matters such as national defence (including 
military affairs and the policy of mainland recovery), 
foreign affairs, national finance, foreign trade policies, 
and national economy, etc.
Thus, even to the present day, the Nationalist government
is predominantly and deliberately kept as a mainland
government, controlled by the KMT and its members.2 This
situation has been described by Tai Hung-chao as a "one-
3Party authoritarian government". At the top of the
1. The system of local self-government in Taiwan was 
introduced in 1950. The KMT, however, has had the res­
ponsibility of putting forward and supporting candidates 
for elections as city mayors, county magistrates, 
provincial assemblymen, city and county councilmen, and 
village and township chiefs. Normally candidates backed 
by the KMT have had a substantial advantage over indepen­
dents or those KMT members who sometimes ran without 
party approval. During the election held between 1964 
and 1968, for example, the proportion of KMT-backed 
candidates elected at all levels ranged from 78% to 92%, 
see The Kuomintang, A Brief Record of Achievements 
(Taipei, n.d.), p. 59. However, this one-party dominance 
seemed to have improved for a democratic image afterwards, 
see also footnote no. 2} p . 66.
2. Despite the fact that Taiwanese now constitute an overall 
majority of the party membership, for instance, 70% in 
May 1976, the top positions remain in the mainlanders* 
hands. Figure supplied by Hsueh Jen-yang, deputy 
secretary-General of the KMT from 1968 to 1976. 3
3. Tai Hung-chao, op.cit.
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government structure, there are the minority mainlanders and 
the KMT party; at the lower levels, however, there are the 
majority Taiwanese and the two minority parties, the Young 
China Party and the Chinese Democratic Socialist Party.1 
Both Parties are staunchly anti-Communist but rent by 
factionalism. The former generally supports KMT positions, 
while the latter has displayed greater independence.
The rationale behind this dual government structure is 
clear: if the system could be effectively implemented in
Taiwan with sufficient support at home (i.e. Taiwan or even 
perhaps the mainland) and abroad (i.e. the Chinese overseas 
and the world community), then the Nationalist government's 
claim for legitimacy, its prospects for political survival 
and return to power on the mainland, would have a strong 
basis. In this connection, the province of Taiwan is 
administered like a nation— the State of China— with the 
existence of the fully-fledged governmental structure.
From this perspective, the Nationalist government could 
never afford to abandon the dual governmental structure, 
nor its declared policy of "mainland recovery", nor allow 
a majority representation of Taiwanese at the national 
government.
Nevertheless, seen in these terms, the Nationalist government 
is faced by another profound dilemma: on the one hand, it 
has to stick to the claim of legitimacy and to the "mainland 
recovery" policy regardless of the costs involved and
1. The two minority parties have their history on the mainland, see note no. l,pg. 47.
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however unrealistic these positions may have become; on 
the other hand, in view of the political reality, the 
Nationalist government has to secure the existing power 
status quo on Taiwan in the expectation that it will be 
the only remaining permanent power base for the ROC in 
the very long run, while continuing its task of searching 
for more support on the island. This also explains the 
reasons why the Nationalist government has since the late 
1960s gradually but subtly increased the percentage of 
Taiwanese participation in the island's national affairs.1
It is essential for the Nationalist government to increase 
and to secure support from the Taiwanese community, to 
imbue it with the value system brought by the mainlanders, 
and to improve its political image which was damaged in the 
"February 28th Uprising". Thus, as noted earlier, the 
Nationalist government has begun to improve the living 
conditions of the native Taiwanese and, above all, towards 
the end of the 1960s, to increase slowly but progressively 
the percentage of their political participation in the 
government, though still mainly at the lower levels. Also 
through the years, tension and friction between the two 
communities seem to have lessened. They have become more 
tolerant towards each other and more cooperative. Thus, it 
can be argued that, in view of Taiwan's internal stability 
(which can be seen as an expression of domestic support for 
the government's position), the Nationalist government has 
achieved some kind of consensus among the people on the
1. See footnote no. 2 .page 66; and no. 1, page 68 .
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island, and that its authority, though still challenged by 
some natives, is largely accepted and rather firmly 
established internally.
However, what worries the Nationalist government most has 
been the problem of the continuation and stability of 
external support, namely the perpetuation of the U.S. 
commitment. Since the 1950s, the Nationalist government 
has depended on the U.S. heavily for national purposes, such 
as security, diplomatic competition against the PRC, and 
political,and economic development on the island. 
Nevertheless, such an overdependency can be counter­
productive in that, since the Nationalist government has 
very little influence upon the U.S. policies towards the 
two Chinese governments, the U.S. support has undergone 
several modifications, since the Nationalist defeat in 1949. 
In this regard, the Nationalist government has to calculate 
very carefully and to make predictions accurately regarding 
the trend, the value and cost of the U.S. commitment. It 
also has to search for a balanced relationship between the 
two governments. It is understandable therefore that the 
Nationalist government should regard its relationship with 
the U.S. as its top foreign policy priority. In other 
words, U.S. support for the Nationalist government has 
tremendous influence upon the latter's confrontation with 
the Chinese Communists, because the U.S. could use its 
position in world affairs to influence international opinion 
on the status of Taiwan.
This linkage, i.e. external support as an important element 
either contributing to or weakening the Nationalist 
government's national capability, can be better understood 
if related to the concepts of legitimacy and recognition.
The remaining section of this Chapter will first of all 
present the different claims made by the two governments 
concerning the issue in dispute, then, through a brief 
examination of the concepts and their inter-relationship, 
study the impact of external support— as a source of 
national capability— on the issue.
III. The controversy over legitimacy
1. Struggle for legitimacy between the two Chinese 
governments
The ROC's retreat to Taiwan and its intention to make the 
island a base for the "mainland recovery" programme has 
caused anxiety to the Communist government. For the latter, 
the existence of the Nationalist government on Taiwan, with 
assistance from the U.S., has not only challenged its 
authority as the sole legal government for all of China, 
but also, as a consequence of this, prevented political 
unification of the state of China (under the Communist 
system). By implication, it offers a political alternative 
for the Chinese people living on either side of the Taiwan 
Straits, and in other parts of the world, i.e. the overseas
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For theChinese concentrated mainly in Southeast Asia.1 
Nationalist government, however, the existence of the 
Communist system constitutes a more serious threat not only 
to its claim as the sole legal government for all of China 
but, more importantly, to its political survival as, 
geographically and demographically speaking, the Nationalist 
government is in a less advantageous position than its 
Communist rival.
Along the Taiwan Straits, this intra-China conflict was 
marked by the two Quemoy crises in 1954 and in 1958, and 
subsequently by sporadic shelling which contained largely 
propaganda leaflets. Internationally, the conflict is over 
world recognition, as both Chinese governments insist that 
they are the only legitimate government for the whole of 
China. This diplomatic campaign involves the condition 
that the legitimacy of the other system should be totally 
denied, the so-called "one China" principle. Both governments
1. According to the Nationalist government, at the end of 
1978, there were 24,037,274 overseas Chinese. In its 
opinion, the term of "overseas Chinese" should be 
broadly understood. They are the Chinese residing 
abroad, the naturalized citizens of Chinese descent and 
the descendants of Chinese parents. Most overseas 
Chinese are from Kwantung and Fukien provinces by birth 
of descent. Others are from Taiwan, Shantung, Yunnan 
and Kwangsu provinces. Most Chinese living in Thailand, 
Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and the U.S. are from Kwangtung 
and Cantonese and Chaochowese are their chief spoken 
dialects. The Chinese in the Philippines, Malaysia and 
Singapore are mainly from Fukien. In Indonesia and Burma, 
the Chinese are mainly from Fukien, Kwangtung and Yunnan 
provinces. The geographical distribution of overseas 
Chinese in December 1978 is like this: in Asia, there 
were 22,066,838 (constituting 91.80% of the total figure); 
in the Americas, there were 1,497,071 (6.23%); in Europe, 
there were 322,148 (1.34%); in Oceania, there were 77,521 
(0.32%); and in Africa, there were 73,696 (o.31%). The 
China Yearbook, 1979, pp. 361-2. More information on the 
ROC's policy towards overseas Chinese will be given in 
Chapter Four.
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uphold the same position, i.e. that there is but one China 
and that Taiwan is a part of it, and that they would enter 
diplomatic relations with other countries only if the 
latter agree to respect the above-mentioned principle through 
denying the legitimacy of, and/or breaking relations with 
(the two conditions are inter-related), the other.
The arguments employed by the two Chinese governments in the 
defence of their respective legitimacy have been many. The 
Nationalist government’s claims are based mainly on two 
assumptions, one historical and one cultural, whereas those 
of the Communist government are based on the power reality 
that came into being on the mainland in 1949.
The historical assumption; The Nationalist government 
argues that the Communist regime has unlawfully occupied the 
mainland because its power was consolidated at the expense 
of the Nationalist government during the course of their 
collaborations, particularly during the Second United Front 
while the latter was deeply involved in resisting Japanese 
aggression. It follows from this that the national 
government of the ROC, though now located in Taipei, continues 
to be the sole legitimate spokesman for all of China because 
it was the founder of the Chinese Republic; it was officially 
elected (in 1928) by the Chinese people on the mainland, and 
it has its mandate— i.e. the Constitution adopted in 1947 
on the mainland.
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The cultural assumption i The Nationalist government argues 
that the Communist rule on the mainland is un-Chinese in its 
orientation because it is based on principles of terror and 
therefore conflicts with the traditional Chinese principles 
of governing through humanity and "peaceful ordering". In 
this respect, the Nationalist government argues that it alone 
represents the true Chinese expression because its rule, 
based upon Sun Yat-sen's ideology of San Min Chu I, is 
within the framework of Chinese tradition (see Chapter Two). 
Thus it is part of the mandate of the Nationalist government 
to terminate the un-Chinese Communist system on the mainland, 
to save the Chinese populace from totalitarianism and bring 
them back to the great Chinese cultural system, now to be 
found on Taiwan.
In relation to the above assumptions, however, the 
Nationalist government has also counted on international 
opinion to reinforce its arguments. That is, the 
Nationalist government could argue that western (particularly 
U.S.) diplomatic support for its position as demonstrated in 
the ROC's diplomatic victory during the 1950s and the 1960s 
reflected the justification of its claims. This issue—  
dependence on external support for domestic purpose— will be 
dealt with shortly.
The Communist government disputes these assertions. It 
contends that the national government of the ROC lost its 
mandate in 1949 as a result of the civil war and that 
therefore it is now a rebellious group and has no 
grounds whatsoever to continue its authority on Taiwan
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The argument is supported by the fact that the Communist
government is now in effective control of almost all of
the Chinese territory and population; it too has a
Constitution (adopted in September 1953), its legitimacy
is therefore constitutional. Consequently, the claim of
the Nationalist government to be the sole authentic Chinese
spokesman is absurd. It is Peking's legitimate right for
the protection of its rightful position to "liberate"
Taiwan from the control of "the KMT cliques" and return
the island to the "motherland". As for U.S. support for
the Nationalist government, the Communist government is of
the opinion that this constitutes interference in China's 
1internal affairs.
As we will see shortly, these contentions have become less 
important than international opinion (i.e. external support 
of the claimants) in determining the issue of legitimacy.
The following study will limit discussion of the concept of 
legitimacy to the political context. That is, it will focus 
on the issue of legitimacy of "states" in the international 
community. The study will also discuss the concept of 
recognition, especially its effects upon the legitimacy of 
states in international community. 1
and/or to make claims of legitimacy on mainland China.
1. See, for instance, the Chinese People's Institute of 
Foreign Affairs, ed. Oppose U.S. Occupation of Taiwan 
and "Two China" Plot; A Selection of Important Documents 
(Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1958); Oppose U.S. 
Military Provocation in the Taiwan Straits Area: A 
Selection of Important Documents (1958); and Oppose 
the New U.S. Plots to Create "two Chinas" (1961 ).
77
The concept of legitimacy has a long history, especially
in the field of constitutional law. A large number of
definitions have been given to it, but most of them seem
to pay rather little attention to the significance of
external influence on the political institution in a state.
For instance, D. Sternberger defines legitimacy as "the
foundation of such governmental power as it exercised both
with the consciousness of the government's part that it
has a right to govern and with some recognition by the
governed of that right".1 S. M. Lipset, while taking
much the same view, defines legitimacy as an achievement
of the political system itself: "The capacity of the
system to engender and maintain the belief that the existing
political institutions are the most appropriate ones for 
2the society." Another definition given by W. J. Raymond 
regards legitimacy as "a notion applicable to statecraft 
whereby, as long as the electorate (or the people in 
general) obeys the government in general (provided that it 
is not a despotic dictatorship) and obeys the laws to the 
extent that the government can sustain itself, that 
government is considered legal and legitimate. Also, it 
can be the basis on which the government-of-the day may 
command obedience and use power of authority."2 3
2. Some definitions of "legitimacy" and "recognition"
1. Dolf Sternberger, "Legitimacy", in David L. Sills, ed. 
International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (New 
York: Macmillan & Free Press, 1968), Vol. 9, p. 244.
2. Seymour M. Lipset, Political Man: The Social Basis of 
Politics (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1960), p. 77.
3. Walter J. Raymond, S. J. D., International Dictionary of 
Politics.6th edition (Brunswich Publishing Company, 1980) 
p. 364.
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In fact, the issue of legitimacy can be divided into two 
aspects for analysis: the internal and the external, 
mutually complementing each other. The former, as defined 
above, usually refers to the extent of domestic consensus 
(recognition) and/or the level of internal political support 
for the government concerned, whereas the latter, which 
will be discussed later in connection with the issue of 
recognition, indicates the degree of international recog­
nition given by a third party for the existence, viability 
and functions of such a governing body.
To begin with, and with the above definitions in mind, there 
are inevitably two sides, one, the rulers, claiming 
legitimacy in the sense of the right to exercise authority, 
to call for sacrifices and to receive recognition, and the 
other, the ruled, accepting this right and showing its 
readiness to accord recognition to the other's legitimate 
claims. This mutual relationship in action also requires 
that the party demanding legitimacy must possess the 
capacities to enforce its claims.
Such an understanding of legitimacy— which can be loosely 
termed as internal legitimacy— however is not sufficient 
when applied to today's environment. That is because today 
the acceptance of a government's legitimacy by its own 
people (i.e. internal legitimacy) can be significantly 
affected by external influences (e.g. international 
recognition). In order to understand this linkage better, 
let us now take a look at the term recognition.
According to W. J. Raymond, recognition of a state1 is:
"The act of aknowledging the actual existence (de 
facto recognition) or legal existence (de jure 
recognition) of a sovereign state as a legal entity, 
or capacity of entering into legal obligations 
(e.g. capable of conducting international relations 
and living up to the traditional norms of international 
law). Recognition of a state is voluntary and can be 
withdrawn at any time upon termination of diplomatic 
relations or dissolution of the state (e.g. through 
joining another state in a union). In the strict 
practice of international diplomacy any act, such 
as contracts by one state with representatives of 
another, may be construed as recognition (explicit 
or implicit) although such may not be the intention 
of the actor." ^
Similarly, M. A. Kaplan and N. deB Katzenback give their 
vi ews:
"Recognition of a state (or a government) is 
normally an acknowledgement by the recognizinq state 
that it will for all purposes treat the recognized 
state (or government) as being entitled to the rights 
and privileges normally attached to that status under 
both international and domestic law. The new entity 
thus, at the moment of recognition, is endowed, insofar 
as the recognizing state is concerned, with a whole 
bundle of customary rights, the most important of 
which is that its independence is supported against 
adverse claimants. Non-recognition— a failure to 
acknowledge this status--does not carry converse 
inferences. States refusing formal recognition do not 
say that none of the rights ordinarily attached to the 
status of statehood or government will be accorded to 
the claimant. They say nothing, but may in practice 
accord some rights and refuse others." ’
The recognition of a state is not to be confused with the 
recognition of a government, although the two issues are 
very closely related. That is, the existence of an 
effective and independent government is the essence of 
statehood and, significantly, recognition of states may 
take the form of recognition of a government. But, non­
recognition of a particular regime is not necessarily a 
determination that the state represented by that regime 
does not qualify for statehood. In the ROC's case, the 
Nationalist government suffers from both, i.e. non-recog­nition of the Nationalist Government as the only Chinese 
government, and of the statehood of the ROC.
Walter J. Raymond, S. J. D., op.cit., p. 584-5.
M. A. Kaplan & N. deB. Katzenback, The Political Foundation 
of International Law, 4th edition, (New York: John Wiley 
& Sons, Inc., 1967), p. 11.
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Recognition then is an optional and political act. That is, 
the decision to recognize, or to withdraw recognition from a 
state or a government, is a matter not of legal duty but of 
discretion. Thus, although recognition implies a legal 
acknowledgement for acceptance of statehood (in this respect 
a state becomes a legal personality in accordance to inter­
national law with capacity to act in international relations), 
an absence of recognition may not rest on any legal basis at 
all. That is, recognition does not bring into legal 
existence a state which did not exist before. A state may 
exist without being recognized, and if it does exist in fact, 
then whether or not it has been formally recognized by other 
states, it has a right to be treated by them as a state.*
This is because non-recognition may simply be a part of a 
general policy of disapproval and boycott. Conversely, 
recognition may be part of a policy of aggression and the 
creation of puppet states. In other words, the granting 
or withholding of recognition can be used by the recognizing 
states to further a national policy, they can refuse it as 
a mark of disagreement and they can grant it in order to 
establish the very independence of which recognition is 
supposed to be a mere acknowledgement. Thus recognition is 
not essential to the continued existence of a state and it 
cannot be the factor determining a state's status. After all 
a state "is in existence when a people is settled in a 1
1. J. L. Brierly, The Law of Nations i An Introduction to 
the International Law of Peace, 6th edition (Oxford«
The Clarendon Press, lybd;, p. 139.
Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law 
(Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1966), pp. 84-5.
2.
country under its own sovereign government".  ^ This 
definition, given by L. Oppenheim, includes four distinct 
elements for statehood! a people, a territory, a government, 
and the attribute of sovereignty. Nevertheless, it does 
have important consequences: recognition normally facilitates 
the usual courtesies of international intercourse, namely, 
the establishment of formal, optional and bilateral relations 
including diplomatic relations and the conclusion of treaties 
between the recognizing state and the recognized state or 
between the recognizing government and the recognized 
government; whereas non-recognition may discourage the 
practice of the above-described relationships which are 
important channels enabling to either to consolidate or to 
minimize relationship and/or to dissolve conflict. As 
Stanley K. Hornbeck observed:
"Diplomatic recognition obviously demonstrates awareness 
of a political reality, and it of course facilitates 
the conduct of business between the states concerned 
and between their respective nationals. But 
recognition is not essential or indepensable for any 
of those purposes...
Diplomatic recognition gives birth to a corpus of 
rights and duties. In theory these rights and duties 
are reciprocally identical as between the according 
state and the recipient, but in practice the according 
state imposes upon itself obligations and confers upon 
the recipient rights without assurance that the latter 
will reciprocate. The consequences to the accorder may 
be either a gain or a loss, but to the recipient they 
can be only a gain." 2
1. Joseph Frankel, International Relations in a Changing 
World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), pp. 16-20.
2. Stanley K. Hornbeck, "Which Chinese? Diplomatic Relations 
and Official Representation", Foreign Affairs, Vol. XXXIV, 
no. 1 (October 1955), p. 26.
82
However, non-recognition, precisely because it ignores the 
existence of a reality, can have awkward practical 
consequences in addition to refusal to enter into 
relations.*
In similar vein, recognition of a government normally 
results in increased prestige, popularity and stability at 
home; access to state funds on deposit in other states; 
access to private and governmental loans because of the 
legal ability to pledge the state’s credit; diplomatic and 
consular status for its agents in the recognizing entity; 
access to foreign courts and immunity from foreign process; 
establishment of normal trade relations; a capacity to 
request assistance from the recognizing government in the 
form of financial assistance, supplies, and even military 
aid; respect in other states for its laws and decrees; and 
benefits of existing treaty arrangements. In this regard, 
recognition of a government by an outside force tends to 
increase the legitimacy of the recognized government. The 
absence of formal recognition has thus the effect of sus­
pending most of all these rights insofar as the non-recog­
nizing state controls them. They may be accorded to another 
claimant, or they may simply be suspended. As a consequence, 
non-recognition may upset, or weaken, the legitimate status 
of a particular government. 1
1. For some examples, see J.E.S. Fawcett, The Law of
Nations (Londons Allen Lane,The Penguin Press, 1968), 
pp. 49-50.
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The relationship between internal legitimacy and inter­
national recognition is therefore established in that, 
while the decision to recognize, or to withdraw recognition 
from a state or a government, can be used as an instrument 
of policy in advancing the national interests of the 
recognizing states, the granting or withdrawal of recog­
nition has an important effect upon the political (but not 
the legal) status of a particular government, or even of the 
state itself. And such a phenomenon— which can be loosely 
described as external legitimacy— has become increasingly 
significant during the 20th century, especially since the 
Cold War. This is because, as a result of the development 
of modern technology, and the policy of alliance politics of 
the Cold War, the growth of international communications has 
considerably increased the ways in which states have become 
"penetrable" by outside forces. Penetration was sought 
especially by the two Superpowers , because as far as they 
were concerned, it helped them not only to create and 
consolidate idological, political and military alliance with 
other countries but also, as a result, to expand their 
respective bloc influence. In this regard, states, as the 
proper and basic political units in the international arena, 
have become steadily "penetrable" and "vulnerable" through 
the creation of modern communication networks, characterized 
by political, economic, technological, ideological, or 
military interactions, dependences and interdependencies. 
Instead of remaining completely separate, the outside world 
can, and often does, influence the internal situation of 
states. That is, the outside world can always make known its
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stance regarding a particular state or a government through 
either the extension, denial or withdrawal of recognition 
or through the granting of membership in international 
agencies, particularly in the United Nations. The latter, 
legally speaking, "does not possess any authority to recog­
nize either a new State or a new government of any existing
State." * Nonetheless, it has the practical political
2effect of the so-called "collective legitimization".
As history has shown, almost all the separate parts of 
states, split by ideological divisions after the Second World 
War, such as the two "Koreas" (South Korea and North Korea), 
the two "Germanies" (West Germany and East Germany), the two 
"Vietnams" (South Vietnam and North Vietnam) until 1975, 
and the two "Chinas" (the Nationalist China and the Communist 
China), etc. have suffered from recognition problem. During 
the 1950s and the 1960s, all of these divided halves sought 
to win recognition, both domestic and international, for 
their respective claim as the only legitimate ruler of their 
countries. They placed national reunification as the top 
priority of their national objectives, and their policy toward 
the competing regime was often directed towards impugning 
its legitimate status as a step toward its destruction. In 
these cases each bloc sought the isolation and weakening of
1. Secretary-General Trygve Lie, 8th March 1950} see also 
Hans Aufricht, "Principles and Practices of Recognition 
by International Organization", American Journal of 
International Law, Vol. XLIII (1949), pp. 679-704.
2. On the effect of what he calls "collective legitimization" 
through acceptance into the U N  ., see Inis L. Claude,
The Changing United Nations (New York, 1967) p. 83ff.
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adherents of the opposing bloc. Thus, until the early 1960s, 
while South Korea, West Germany, South Vietnam and the 
Nationalist China were recognized by the western bloc, 
their Communist counterparts were recognized by the 
Communist bloc. Although this recognition had almost no 
direct bearing upon the legitimacy of either the recognized 
parts or the un-recognized parts— at least it said little 
concerning their legal existence— its political consequences 
were significant. It could upset the capacity of these 
divided halves to carry out their functions and policies 
properly and effectively at home and especially abroad. At 
its extreme, it could even affect its legitimate status, as 
in the case of Nationalist China. Evidently international 
recognition was considered an important factor by respective 
claimants in the winning of their struggles for national 
legitimacy and recognition.
As a matter of fact, according to L. Oppenheim's definition 
of a state, which was mentioned earlier, all of these 
divided halves could be declared sovereign states providing 
the opposing halves and the world do not challenge their 
positions. Nevertheless, only towards the end of the 1960s 
have the two "Koreas" and two •'Germanies" partially resolved 
their problems through some sort of political arrangement; 
namely, despite the political aspiration for national re­
unification, the hostile units concerned acknowledge and 
accept the current (i.e. temporary) existence of each other. 
Dialogues between the divided units on an equal and friendly 
basis are therefore made possible under this status quo.
More importantly, this situation of mutual acceptance enables
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other countries to establish relationships with, and even 
to recognize the existence of, each of the divided units.
The situation with the two "Chinas" however is far more 
complicated. After more than three decades of division 
since the end of 1949, during which time both military and 
non-military means have been used to try to settle the 
problem, the principles underlying the divided situation 
remain almost unchanged, and yet the relationship is 
substantially different. The Communist unit was denied 
legitimacy, and refused recognition, by the majority of the 
western bloc countries after its establishment until the 
early part of the 1970s. It was also not accepted as a 
member by international agencies, notably the U.N., despite 
the political reality existing on the mainland. On the 
contrary, the Nationalist unit, by holding a tiny part of 
Chinese territory and with a small population in relation to 
the huge population on the mainland, was recognized as the 
legitimate government of China, though this recognition was 
accorded to it only by the western bloc countries. The 
Nationalist unit also represented the State of China in many 
important international organizations, namely, the U.N. and 
its specialized agencies. * The situation remained unchanged 1
1. The other divided states, i.e. the two Germanies, the two 
Vietnams and the two Koreas, have also suffered from the 
representation problem in the U.N. Nevertheless, since 
none of them were original members of the U.N., their 
problems seem to be less complicated and controversial 
than that of China. The two Germanies were finally 
admitted to U.N. membership at the same time in September 
1973. Vietnam, after re-unification in 1975, was 
admitted in September 1977. The Korea problem is still 
unsolved, but both have permanent observers to the U.N. 
and they are members of many U.N. specialized and 
related agencies, e.g. FAO, UNESCO, WHO, etc.
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until October 1971, when the Nationalist delegates were 
expelled by the U.N. as "illegal representatives" and were 
replaced by Communist delegates. Since then the Nationalist 
unit has gradually been deprived of recognition by its former 
allies. It has also denied membership rights by many 
international organizations of which it was originally a 
member. All its advantages held in international relations 
during the 1950s and the 1960s have therefore slowly but 
progressively been transferred to the Communist unit. This 
situation, namely external recognition of internal legitimacy, 
can be regarded as a type of "external" legitimacy.
Hence, there are two aspects of legitimacy, internal 
legitimacy and external legitimacy, complementing each other. 
For a state, its (internal) legitimacy can become more stable 
and more enduring when external legitimacy (i.e. international 
recognition) is accorded. By implication, it can become 
more precarious if this external legitimacy is withdrawn or 
threatened. Thus the legitimacy of a state (or a government) 
can be effectively reinforced or undermined because of 
international opinion. And such opinion can change 
unpredictably because, for example, it can be influenced 
by the development of international power relationships.
The latter are normally beyond the control of any single 
state.
Thus Joseph Frankel noted:
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"Legitimacy is increasingly more achieved by what 
is sometimes termed 'organized persuasion', 
international debates about what the norms should 
be, in which individual states become so strongly 
aware of the views of others and of the reper­
cussions of their behaviour that they can be 
persuaded, sometimes more or less coerced, to 
accept rules which they do not readily find 
acceptable. When the cost of opposing the opinion 
of other states becomes prohibitive, it becomes 
rational to adopt the prudential policy of adapt­
ation, of abandoning or attenuating the pursuit of 
national interests, however much cherished." 1
The concept of legitimacy has now become more vague. Namely, 
the legitimacy of a state is not narrowly defined in 
accordance with international law but it has become 
complicated, politicized and internationalized because a 
state, however strong its "internal" legitimacy, could still 
have its legitimacy challenged not from within (which can 
be controlled through the use of force, or the adoption of 
martial law, etc.) but by international pressure. Conse­
quently, it is obvious why the search for international 
recognition has been one of the most important foreign 
policy objectives of the Nationalist government since 1949, 
and why external support is so vital to the ROC’s survival.
However, if the Nationalist government declared itself the 
legitimate government only on the island of Taiwan and on 
the offshore islands, thus abandoning its claim to the 
mainland, then, according to L. Oppenheim's four elements 
of statehood, legally speaking, the existence and the 
authority of the Nationalist government should not be denied. 
That is, the ROC on Taiwan is qualified as a sovereign state 
in the sense of the international law, because it has a fixed 1
1. Joseph Frankel, op.cit., pp. 172-173.
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territory (however small it is), a population larger than 
that of two-thirds of the members of the U.N.j moreoever, 
it has a stable and strong government, running both 
domestic and foreign affairs adequately for more than three 
decades.
The problem is, however, that the Nationalist government 
continues and has to continue to make claims that it is the 
only legitimate government of China, no matter how 
unrealistic its assertions have become, and no matter how 
loosely such claims are connected to the issue of survival. 
The Nationalist government is aware of the fact that it is 
only by insisting on these claims that its rule on Taiwan—  
since Taiwan is a part of China— can be justified. Otherwise, 
as a minority force, the Nationalist rule on the island 
might be forced out one day by the Taiwanese majority, if 
the latter demanded majority rule.
In conclusion, then, China since 1949 has been divided into 
two ideological units competing for final control. 
Fundamentally this is an internal issue, but it has acquired 
significant foreign-policy dimensions for both sides. Indeed 
the ROC's foreign policy since 1949 has been constrained by 
the fact that it has had to maintain survival as its top 
priority. Chapters Three to Six will examine the ways in 
which it has developed its foreign policy in pursuit of that
goal.
Chapter Two
The State Ideology
The main purpose of this Chapter is to introduce the 
essence of the ROC's ideological foundation, San Min Chu I, 
known to the West as the Three Principles of the People 
(Nationalism, Democracy and People's Livelihood), its 
relationship to the ROC's current policy of anti-Communism, 
and its significance in the formulation of the ROC's foreign 
policy. Our study will include examination of the role 
played by the founding father of the Chinese Republic, who 
was also the creator of San Min Chu I, Sun Yat-sen, and his 
political successor, Chiang Kai-shek. The latter took over 
Sun's legacy and made it the basis of the ROC's official 
ideology.^
1. Sun Yat-sen and the background of his political thought
Sun Yat-sen was born in 1866 when China, then under the 
Manchu dynasty, had already begun to experience national 
decline and humiliation. In Sun's view, China’s decline and 
humiliation were caused primarily by its internal weaknesses. 
But these internal weaknesses reinforced the opportunity of 
foreign aggression against China. It was to rescue China 
from the danger of extinction that Sun encouraged revolution 
and formulated the ideology of San Min Chu I. According to 
Sun himself, San Min Chu I was a set of inter-related 
ideologies which should be upheld as the highest guiding 1
1. See Chapter One, footnote no. l,page 30.
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1. See Chapter One, footnote no. l,page 30.
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principle for the Chinese revolution as well as the blue­
print for the KMT in the tasks of national reconstruction 
and regeneration during the post-revolution period.^
What is San Min Chu I? What are the Principles involved?
How should they be implemented? And to what extent are 
they related to the ROC's post-1949 foreign policy? Before 
discussing the above issues, let us first say a few words 
about its composition.
Sun's proposed strategy to rebuild China was based on a 
selection and combination of both Chinese learning (as the 
essence) and Western learning (for use). That is to say, 
China, in its process of modernization, should adopt western 
thoughts and institutions, etc. only if they were suitable 
for, and meaningful to, Chinese society and mentality.
China should avoid those western elements which could destroy 
China's internal stability, prosperity and ancient civili­
zation. The same attitude should also apply to China's 
policy toward its own (old) principles and institutions.
That is, in learning from the West, China should not ignore 
the value of its own traditional virtues of Li (courtesy), 1
1. Sun's political thoughts can also be found in his other 
writings, for instance, Wu Ch'uan Hsien Fa (The Five- 
Power Constitution), Chien Kuo Fang Lo (The Programme of 
National Reconstruction) and Sun-wen Hsueh-shuo (The
Theory of Sun Yat-sen). Most of Sun'g writings and his 
speeches can be found in Tsunq-li Ch'uan-shu (Complete Works of the president), 12 Vols. (Taipei: The Central
Committee of the Kuomintang, 1956).
1yi (justice), lien (integrity) and ch'ih (self-esteem).
Thus, as can be seen from his writing of the San Min Chu I
doctrine, Sun spoke highly of western democratic principles
and technological advancement, on the one hand, whilst on
the other hand he stressed the importance of strengthening
and perpetuating traditional Chinese virtues. He had openly
declared that his San Min Chu I doctrine was derived from a
careful study of both western sources and traditional
Chinese ideas. In this regard, Sun's early education in the 
2West provided him with the opportunity to become 
acquainted with, and at times critical of, western 
(particularly socialist) literature, including, for example, 
the writings of Karl Marx, as well as the works of the 
American economist Henry George, whose ideas on taxation and
1. The meanings of these vLrtues, like the meanings of 
classic Confucian texts, are subject to a range of 
interpretations. In general, however, they can be 
defined as follows: Li stands for regulated attitude, 
or etiquette in its broadest sense. The stress is laid 
on the essential rightness of a thing and not on its 
empty, ceremonial trappings. Yi means right conduct, 
or the visible manifestations of li. It also has the 
meaning of justice. Lien means integrity, the ability 
to distinguish right from wrong. Ch 'ih stands for 
conscience, the sense of knowing shame when a wrong 
has been committed. The four virtues should be 
considered as inter-related.
2. Sun was born in the province of Kwantung. Nevertheless, 
he spent much of his childhood in Hawaii, where he was 
educated at a college founded by the Church of England 
missionaries. He seems to have been much influenced by 
Christian teaching and Western ideas there. Later he 
studied at Hong Kong, became a Christian and a doctor
of medicine. Sun had also learned Chinese classics 
history during his childhood. Yet, comparatively 
speaking, Sun's western background was more prominent 
that his knowledge of his own country. For biographical
sketches of Sun and his political philosophy see Chester C. Tan, op.cit., Chapter 5, pp. 116-223;
Howard L. Boorman, op.cit., Vol. Ill, "Sun Yet-sen", pp. 170-189; and Chong Key-ray.op.cit.; see also footnote 
no. 1, p. 92.
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land rent exerted considerable influence upon the 
development of his social and economic thought.^- 
addition, his intensive travelling aboard for fund-raising 
purposes and/or for winning international sympathy for the 
Chinese Revolution ^  had reinforced further his knowledge
of the western world. This background, together with some
. , . . . 3learning of Chinese classics during his childhood, enabled
Sun to make judgements as to the strengths and weaknesses
of both the western and eastern cultures. Sun made
selective use of both of them, and the San Min Chu I
ideology was, as he claimed, a hybrid product of different
cultures.
According to Sun, the formulation of the San Min Chu I 
ideology was inspired by Abraham Lincoln's famous phrase,
"government of the people, by the people and for the
4 . . . . .people." They first appeared in writing in 1905 in Sun's 1
1. Howard L. Boorman, op.cit., p. 173.
2. The major part of Sun's revolutionary activities were 
actually conducted from outside China. One reason was 
that Sun was in exile for 16 years. Another reason 
was that, while in exile, Sun drew support from Chinese 
overseas and from foreign countries. See Sun Yat-sen, 
"The Revolution is the Path to the Regeneration of 
China” . An extract from his Memoirs of a Chinese 
Revolutionary (Londons Hutchinson and Co. Ltd., 1918), 
pp. 184-224, is reprinted in F. Schumann and 0. Schell, 
eds. Republican China (London: Penguin Books, 1967), 
pp. 9-20.
3. See footnote No. 2, p. 93.
4i Kuomintanq— Key to China's Future, compiled and issued 
by Department of Overseas Affairs, Central Committee, 
Kuomintang, Taipei, Taiwan, August 1976, p. 29.
statement introducing the initial issue of the T'unq Menq Hui 
magazine, the Min-pao. However, little more than a vague 
outline was presented in this statement. Although later 
on Sun frequently referred to these principles in speeches 
and writings, he did little in fact to elaborate upon them. 
Sun finally gave a concrete version of the San Min Chu I 
in transcriptions of three series of lectures in Canton in 
1924. The first six lectures, which were concerned with the 
Principle of Nationalism, were published as a booklet by the 
KMT Central Executive Committee's Bureau of Propaganda in 
April, with a preface by Sun; the next six dealing with his 
Principle of Democracy, were printed in August; and the 
final four lectures, expounding the Principle of the People's 
Livelihood, appeared in December. Subsequently, the sixteen 
lectures were published as a single work in numerous 
editions.
There is one point worth mentioning here. Sun modified his 
version of San Min Chu I several times during the prolonged 
period of its construction and elaboration. In a way, such 
modifications, which was caused by China's changed conditions, 
reflected Sun's thoughtfulness and his dynamic view of the 
ideology and of the methods of its implementation. Neverthe­
less, because of this, Sun has often been criticized— and
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even dismissed— as a poor, inconsistent ideologist.^
Worse than this have been the varying, conflicting 
interpretations surrounding Sun's ideology given by his 
political opponents. The main attack on Sun was that he 
was not only a poor ideologist but a Communist sympathizer 
in disguise.
Ironically, the above issue put the KMT leaders at both an 
advantage and disadvantage in their programmes to carry out 
Sun's ideology. The advantage was that they could modify 
certain elements of the interpretations of Sun's ideology 
to suit their own political purposes; the disadvantage was 
that, in so doing, they could easily be criticized for 
misusing Sun's original formule. In this study, we 
recognize that there exists a certain degree of conceptual 
difference between Sun's original version of San Min Chu I 
and the later one of Chiang. Such differences— according to 
Chiang they were products of changed circumstances— have been 
justified since 1949 in the Party programmes of the KMT. 
Nevertheless, we will not dwell on those criticisms of Sun 
as a vague ideologist, etc. as this is not really relevant 1
1 . Sun's work was translated into several foreign languages 
after his death, but since there were both Chinese and 
Western translators, confusion and ambiguity frequently 
occurred in their translation. Brian Crozier suggested 
as an additional reason for this the "paradoxical 
concrete vagueness of the Chinese language". For 
instance, he said, "in principle the written language 
is monosyllabic, but in practice the spoken language 
is polysyllabic, since two or more monosyllabic 
ideographs cohere to form a longer word. Most abstract 
concepts— such as 'nationalism' or ’democracy’— are 
thus formed by separate components brought together, 
but each of which, taken signly, suggests a concreteness 
which the whole lacks." See Brian Crozier, op.cit.. 
p . 69.
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to the purpose of our present inquiry. Rather, our emphasis 
is to review some of the different interpretations given by 
Chiang to Sun's ideology. We will first give a very brief 
outline of some of the different stages of development of 
Sun's ideology. Then we will describe the role of Sun's 
Principle of Nationalism in the formulation of ROC's foreign 
policy. Finally, we will describe Chiang Kai-shek's view 
of San Min Chu I and its relations to the ROC's current 
foreign policy.
II San Min Chul; The Three Principles of the People^
San Min Chu I consists of the Principle of Nationalism, the 
Principle of Democracy and the Principle of People’s 
Livelihood. Nationalism (or min-tsu) means literally 
"People's Race", and has been more generally held to mean 
"National Solidarity". Democracy (min-ch'uan) means 
"People's Right". And People's Livelihood (min-shenq) 
means "Social Well-being".
1. Nationalism--the state belongs to the people
In its earliest form, the Principle of Nationalism aimed 
at the overthrow of the alien Manchu dynasty and the 
restoration of the (Han) Chinese as rulers of their own 1
1. For a detailed study of the Three Principles, see Sun 
Yat-sen's San Min Chu I, translated into English by 
Frank W. Price (Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1927). 
Price's translation was later abridged and edited by 
the Commission of the Kuomintang for the compilation 
of the Kuomintang history, published in Taipei by China Publishing Company (n.d.).
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country. After the Manchus abdicated in 1911, Sun had
little to say about nationalism until the time of the 1924 
KMT reorganization when, as a result of his growing 
disenchantment with the western powers, and his new 
orientation toward the Soviet Union, he reinterpreted his 
first Principle in terms of a nationalist revolution against 
the domination of the imperialists in China. The first step 
in this revolution was the abolition of the unequal treaties 
that the foreign powers had imposed upon China.
Thus the short-term objective of Sun's nationalism was the 
furthering of China's national freedom and independence.
Its long-term objective was the realization of Confucius' 
highest political aspiration of the ideal world of Ta-t'unq, 
or T'ien-hsia wei-kunq, meaning the "Great Commonwealth".
As mentioned earlier, Sun's nationalism was directed against 
foreign aggressors. That is, Sun thought that to attain 
national independence, equality and freedom, China had to 
free itself first of all from imperialist control, to 
recover all its lost territory and sovereignty, to unify 
itself by the elimination of all separate elements and to 
create a sense of solidarity among its people. Sun looked
There were five major racial groups in China: the 
Hans, the Mongols, the Manchus, the Moslems and the 
Tibetans. The Hans regarded themselves as the 
authentic Chinese. Thus, the Mongol rule in China 
during the 14th and 15th centuries and the Manchu 
dynasty from 1664 until 1911 were considered as 
alien. Sun was not against the alien rule of the 
Manchus. What he actually opposed was their 
inability to govern China. Moreover, in view of 
their inflexible opposition to any institutional and 
social reform, Sun was convinced that China needed 
to undergo a total transformation with the abolition 
of the monarchic system.
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forward to a day when the Chinese nation would represent 
the whole people rather than certain classes, and China 
would be a melting pot for all races: all would then be 
equal.1 He believed the lack of any spirit of nationalism 
in China was due to long periods of subjection to alien 
rule, namely the Manchus, and to the traditional Chinese 
belief in universalism. 2 The Chinese people needed a 
new surge of patriotism, which would lead to a transfer of 
loyalty from the family to the state and the sacrifice of 
individual freedom for national freedom. ^
1. Sun suggested that the Hans give up their sense of 
superiority towards other racial groups in China and 
take the initiative in integrating with them so as 
to build China into a great nation. Lo Chia-lun, 
ed. Ke-minq wen-hsien (Historical Materials of the 
Revolution) (Taipei, 1954),Vol. V, p. 57.
2. The ideal of great commonwealth can be understood as 
"universal brotherhood". One disadvantage of this 
mode of thinking was that the Chinese could become 
very vague in the sense of national solidarity since 
they could not really differentiate the boundary 
between "internal" and "external"'matters. In this 
regard, Sun argued that, it was because of this 
transformation from "familyism" to "universalism" that 
the Chinese had for centuries failed to appreciate the 
importance of "nationalism". Hence, China had allowed 
itself to be ruled by the Mongols and the Manchus and
to be attacked by foreign powers. See also the following 
footnote.
3. In ancient China, the basic social units were either 
the clan or the family. Loyalty was normally given to 
these units rather than to the nation. Otherwise, 
influenced by Confucius' moral principle of "universal 
brotherhood" (see footnote above), the Chinese often 
ignored the importance of "nationalism" and placed 
emphasis on the promotion of "internationalism". 
Consequently, according to Sun, the Chinese were like 
"a pan of loose sand", not knowing how to regulate relationships among individual, family, and the state, 
and how to unify themselves into a strong force. See 
Chong Kay-ray, op.cit., pp. 72-75.
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Thus, there were two aspects to Sun’s proposed nationalism, 
one internal (nationalism) and one external (internation­
alism). Sun held that China, while fighting for its own 
equality with foreign powers (internal and external), should 
also help smaller nations in the world to attain their 
equality (external). "Rescuing the weak and lifting up the 
fallen was a traditional virtue and that," Sun said "should 
apply to China's international relations."1 Here lie the 
foundations of Sun's foreign policy doctrine— a moralistic 
and idealistic approach— which will be further explained in 
due course.
In Sun's Ta-ya-chou Chu-i ("Great Asianism"), he called on
the Japanese to become China's partner in the defence of
Oriental virtues. In his opinion, ‘the Oriental virtues were
wanq-tao, or the "kingly way", of persuasion and peace which
could successfully challenge pa-tao, or the "tyrannical way",
of force and aggression which the Western powers had adopted 
. . . . 2in dealing with weak nations. Sun however stressed the
point that his "Great Asianism" had none of the exclusiveness 
that characterized the so-called Asian Monroe Doctrine 
advocated by the Japanese militarists before the Pacific war. 
Instead, it was "a sort of regionalism aimed at the defence 
of the Asian continent against Western aggression; but 
secondarily it would promote peaceful relations with all
1 . shih Cheng-nai, Kuo-fu wai-chiao (Sun Yat-sen's Foreign 
Policy) (Taipei: Young Lion Publishing Company, 1961),
pp. 10-11.
2. Sun Yat-sen, Tsunq-li ch'uan-shu, Vol VII-B, p. 1221ff.
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countries".^ Sun's ideal was of a great commonwealth of 
nations, founded on equality and fraternity. But before 
China could become cosmopolitan, Sun stressed, it had 
first to become an independent state.
Thus, in short, there were two elements in Sun's proposed 
Principle of Nationalism--nationalism and internationalism.
On the basis of the wanq-tao spirit, China was to unite all 
its racial groups peacefully into a solid single state, and 
then it could devote itself to resisting international 
imperialism and aggression, while promoting a world of great 
commonwealth.
2. Democracy— expert administrations selected by the people
Similar to the Principle of Nationalism, Sun's Principle of 
Democracy underwent a number of modifications that reflected 
changes in his political attitudes. For example, as originally 
outlined in the "manifesto of the military government" of the 
T'unq Menq Hui in 1905, Sun’s concept of democracy closely 
resembled that of the Western democracies, particularly the 
U.S. However, taking into consideration China's monarchical 
tradition, Sun held that it would be necessary to effect
the transition to democratic government in three successive 
2stages. As Sun became more critical of the West m  later 
years, he revised and expanded his Principle of Democracy to 
include a number of concepts which he believed to be improve­
ments upon the Western systems of representative democracy.
1. Sun Ygt-spn. San Min Chu I. trans. by Frank W. Price, pp. 75-6, 147-8.
2. See Chapter One, p. 20.
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2. See Chapter One, p. 20.
101
That is, Sun c ombined the three Western democractic powers 
of executive, legislative and judicial with the two 
traditional Chinese powers of civil service examination and 
control. Sun explained the reasons for the extreme 
importance of civil service examination, which have long 
been the practice in China: "Without the examination system, 
there was no way of determining who were trained and talented 
a condition such as this resulted in many capable men not 
being employed by the government. At the same time, a 
great many ignorant and incapable people, who were anxious 
to become officials, found their way into the government 
service through corrupt m e a n s . W i t h  regard to the power 
of control, or the censoring power, Sun felt the censors in 
the past had been vested with too much power. The censors, 
appointed by the emperor, could investigate not only matters 
of law but of morals, could impeach persons not only for 
proven unlawful activities, but also on suspicion and before 
the commission of unlawful acts. They could even censure the 
actions of the emperor. Sun proposed that the power of 
officialdom in this branch of government, when exercising 
the power of consent, impeachment, censure and audit, should 
be disciplined. Namely, the Judical Yuan should be invested 
with the power to review the Control Yuan1s impeachment.
3These are the so-called five separate government branches. 123
1. Sun's lectures on the Principle of Democracy, Sun Yat-sen
op.cit., pp. 51-149. See also Howard L. Boorman,
op.cit., p. 187.
2. The China Yearbook, 1979, pp. 124-5.
3. See Chapter One, pp. 66-67.
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And this, i.e. the independence of the examining and 
censoring powers from the other three powers as generally 
practised in Western nations, is Sun’s unique contribution 
to the political theory of democracy.
Sun proposed the Principle of Democracy because he wanted 
to break the mystique of the divinity of the Son of Heaven. 
Sun believed that China's traditional mode of governing, 
though it had its merits, was principally unsound because 
it was not based on equality and practically obstructed the 
development of a modern political system. The traditional 
mode of governing placed a tremendous gap between the ruler 
and the ruled.* They were not only isolated from, but 
indifferent to, each other as long as their respective 
duties were done. In this regard, the political conscious­
ness of the people became very weak. They normally did not 
care who the ruler was. Sun felt this lack of political 
consciousness was one of the factors that had led to China 
falling under the political and economic domination of 
foreign countries. Thus, it was important to rearrange 
the relationship between the two classes.
The solution was to establish a democractic government which, 
Sun hoped, would on the one hand, give the people a full 
degree of sovereignty and enable them to control directly 
the affairs of the state; and, on the other hand, create an 
effective, powerful government which would manage all the 
nation's business. The former was popular sovereignty or 
retention of "political power" by the people; the latter was 1
1. See Chapter One, p. 11.
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Ithe exercising of "governing (or administrative) power", by 
the government. The idea behind its operation was this: if 
the people had a full measure of political sovereignty and 
the methods for exercising popular control over the govern­
ment had been well worked out, then there would be no need 
to fear that the government would become too powerful, un­
controllable and unapproachable. At the same time, it would 
raise the political consciousness of the people.
Thus, the sort of democracy Sun had in mind was one with a 
clear distinction, and yet a balance, between "governing 
power" and "political power". The former, or the Five-Power 
constitutional system, consisted of the five powers mentioned 
earlier. The latter consisted of the four sovereign rights 
of the people: election, recall, initiative and referendum. 
When the four political powers of the people control the 
five governing powers of the government, then a complete 
democratic government would be established, and the strength 
of the people and of the government would be well balanced.^"
Sun also considered that since the majority of the people 
were incapable of government work, the operation of the 
"governing power" was to be given to those qualified, i.e. 
experts, who must not be hampered by constant interference 
by the people or representatives of the people. Neverthe­
less, it was essential to a democracy that the government 
be subject to the control of the people and that its 
policies and actions be responsive to popular will. Thus, 
if the government with five powers is considered as a great
•
1. Sun's lecture six on the Principle of Democracy. See 
Sun'Yat-sen, op.cit., pp. 130-149.
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machine, the four rights of the people constitute checks 
and balances on this powerful machinery.
In short, Sun's theory of separation of power was intended 
to provide a powerful and sound government on the one hand 
and effective popular control’on the other.
3. People’s Livelihood— social well-being
Sun's third Principle--People's Livelihood— represented an 
amalgam of ideas culled over a period of years from a variety 
of western socialist writings. As it first appeared in 1905, 
it called for reorganization of China's social and economic 
system into a socialist state and for the "equalization of 
land rights", a formula based on Henry George's thesis that 
private appropriation of increases in land values was the 
cause of modern social inequities. By 1912 Sun had added 
the concept of state ownership of railways and major 
industrial enterprises, an idea which in the following years 
was restated in more general terms as the state control of 
capitalism. Although he claimed that his doctrine of the 
People's Livelihood was both socialism and communism, Sun 
averred that Marxism, while meriting study as a form of 
western socialism, was not only impracticable in China but 
also was demonstrably erroneous in its thesis of surplus 
value and the class struggle} His own doctrine, Sun 
maintained, was a special branch of socialism suitable to 
Chinese conditions--a programme by which China, in the 
course of its modernization, could avoid the social evils 
and injustices that had attended the industrialization 1
1. Howard L. Boorman, op.cit., p. 187.
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of the capitalist nations of the West.1
Thus Sun's Principle of People's Livelihood seeks to 
promote economic well-being, freedom, justice and happiness 
for all the people. The methods include "equalization of 
land ownership" and "regulation of private capital". The 
latter is to be accomplished through the establishment of 
state enterprises.
Sun held that as China was traditionally an agrarian society, 
it was essential to tackle the land problem caused mainly by 
the unequal distribution of land ownership. Thus, he 
proposed the "Land to the Tiller" programme hoping that the 
man who worked the land would also own it, and have the 
means of providing for himself and his family.
With regard to the second method— regulation of capital—
Sun recommended that the state should have some control over 
the country's essential industries, such as railways, power 
and shipbuilding, etc. and help in their development. At 
the same time all the people should be guaranteed sufficient 
food, clothing, and other necessities, and the right to 
develop their own enterprises. In other words, it aimed to 
promote economic development within a mixed economy which 
combined key features of both "capitalism" and "socialism".
(It is within this context that Sun has most severely been 
criticized as a communist.) In all, Sun hoped that the 
nation's wealth would be used to benefit the people. 1
1. Sun lectures on the Principle of People's Livelihood,
op.cit., pp. 151-212. Also Howard L. Boorman, op.cit., p. IU7.
106
To sum-up, the long-term goal of Sun's San Min Chu I
ideology, as written into the Constitution of the ROC and 
which has been mentioned earlier, is to pursue the ideals 
of "a democratic republic of the people, to be governed by 
the people and for the people”. According to Sun and his 
supporters, this ideology is identical to the French 
Revolutionary slogans "Liberty, Equality and Fraternity."1 
Ultimately, it is to pursuethe great cause of a world 
commonwealth. Thus, this is the ideology China should 
adopt in terms of foreign policy, as well as in the realm of 
national revolution and construction.
III. The Principle of Nationalism and Sun's foreign policy 
principles
Sun's foreign policy was based primarily upon the Principle 
of Nationalism which included five fundamental elements.
Some of these elements have already been mentioned 
previously but not treated systematically. They were:
(1) the principle of independence, (2) the principle of 
freedom and equality, (3) the wanq-tao spirit, (4) the 
principle of international cooperation and (5) the principle
of promoting world peace and friendly relations between
. 2 states. 12
1. Shih Cheng-nai, op.cit., p. 13.
2. Ibid., pp. 8-16.
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The principle of independence1.
In Sun's view, Nationalism was the prerequisite of 
national existence; without it, China could not conduct 
an effective foreign policy.
As mentioned earlier, Sun started the national revolution 
chiefly for the domestic goal of overthrowing the Manchus 
and establishing a republic. But he believed that this 
revolution was necessary because of the external factor 
of imperialist aggression against China, which led him to 
worry that China might cease to be a sovereign country 
under intensified aggression by foreign powers. "Our nation 
today is in a very perilous position," Sun said, "because 
we have lost our national spirit, we have opened the gates 
for foreign political and economic forces to break in, which 
would have happened if we had preserved our nationalism".^ 
Thus, only when China became independent would it be able 
to conduct an independent and viable foreign policy, and 
thus assume its rightful position in the world.
2. The principle of freedom and equality
Sun said in his Last Will, "The aim of my revolution is
to promote China's national freedom and equality." To
achieve these aims, Sun proposed two strategies: "to inspire
the public at home and to unite the people who are sympathetii
2towards our cause abroad". Whilst the former depended on 
internal support, the latter required good manoeuvring in
1 . Ibid., p . 1 7.
2. Ibid., pp. 8-17.
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foreign relations. Meanwhile Sun advocated the "freeing 
of all the oppressed people in the world".1 This principle 
implied China's great responsibility to promote international 
equality and freedom. That is, for the moment China was one 
of the oppressed awaiting to be elevated; thus, China should 
befriend others who were in a similar position so as to ease 
their way towards national freedom and equality.
3. The wanq-tao spirit
Sun claimed that Nationalism in China should be derived
from the spirit of wanq-tao, or the "kingly way". He said
it was because of this quality that China had been able to
survive the storms of foreign aggression. Other small
countries such as inn an (Vietnam), Burma, Korea and Siam
(Thailand) had benefitted from the fact that China had it.
All of them had been annexed by the Chinese in ancient time
and had been under the tributory system and yet all had been
able to preserve their national identify, i.e. they had
preserved their culture and tradition. According to Sun,
this was because the Chinese "governed" them through wanq-tao
and not pa-tao. Sun argued, that a difference could be seen
when European influence (i.e. imperialism) spread to the
Easts Annan was overthrown and then colonized by France,
2Burma by Great Britain, Korea by Japan. Even China itself 
had been downgraded from the "Middle Kingdom" to a "second 
class" colony. Sun strongly urged a promotion of the wanq-tao 12
1. Ibid.
2. Sun Yat-sen, Lectures 4-6 on the Principle of Nationalism, 
San Min Chu I, pp. 21-50.
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spirit as one of the foreign policy principles for the 
pursuit of a peaceful world order.
Sun further explained the notion of wanq-tao as the law of 
nature, or Confucius’ "peaceful ordering", a philosophy 
which could be found fully expressed in Ta-hsueh, the Great 
Learning; "Search into the nature of things, extend the 
boundaries of knowledge; make the purpose sincere, regulate 
the mind; cultivate personal virtue, rule the family; govern 
the state and keep the world in peace".*
According to Sun himself, this philosophy also coincided
with U.S. President Woodrow Wilson’s 14-Point Peace Proposal
which included such suggestions as the right of self-
determination of peoples and the abolition of secret 
2diplomacy.
The right of self-determination is identical to the Principle 
of Nationalism, because it also advocated freedom for all 
nations, big and small, in the world. In this connection, 
we can draw the conclusion that the notions of "anti- 
imperialism' and "rescue the weak and lift up the fallen" 
proposed by Sun are two inter-related aspects of this 
Nationalism. That is to say, to adopt one is to implement 
the other. To illustrate fully their relationship, Sun’s 
words are worth quoting at length; 12
1. Sun Yat-sen, Lecture 6 on the Principle of Nationalism, 
op.cit., pp. 36-50.
2. Teng Kung-hsuan, "Dr Sun Yat-sen’s View of Internation­
alism and his Foreign Policy", II, 2 Issues and Studies 
(Taipei, November 1965), pp. 2-4; see also Sun's 
Lecture 6 on the Principle of Nationalism, op.cit.
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"What should China’s foreign policy be when and if 
she does become a first-rate power?...A common 
phrase in ancient China was 'Rescue the weak, lift 
up the fallen'...We must aid the weaker and smaller 
peoples and oppose the great powers of the world.
If all the people of the country resolve upon this 
purpose, our nation will prosper; otherwise, there 
is no hope for us. Let us pledge ourselves today, 
before China's development begins, to lift up the 
fallen and to aid the weak; then when we become 
strong and look back upon our own sufferings under 
the political and economic domination of the Powers 
and see weaker and small peoples undergoing similar 
treatment, we will rise and smite that imperialism. 
Then will we be truly 'governing the state and 
pacifying the world’."1
4 . The principle of international cooperation
International understanding and cooperation were essential
to national development, Sun said. In conjunction with this
he also pointed out that "Isolation is the enemy of foreign
relations and of national development....Thus China should
carefully avoid being isolated from the rest of the world
and ally, on the basis of 'righteousness', with other
2countries who are friendly and useful to us". Regarding 
the former, Sun argued strongly that China, in adapting to 
the existing environment!
"should ally with the United States and Japan.... 
China and Japan are closely inter-related in 
security or in danger, in survival or in collapse. 
Without Japan, there would be no China, and vice 
versa. For the long-range peace and security of 
both countries, there should be no shadow of 
suspicion between the two countries. (In this 
connection Sun advocated the policy of pan-Asianism 
or great-Asianism. ) Then comes the United States. 
Though separated from China geographically, the 
United States naturally will befriend us and not 
aggress on us, because of its locality. Besides, 
both countries are republics and should be mutually 
assisting. If China has a chance for development, 
it will inevitably need the assistance of the United 1
1. Teng Kung-Hsuan, ibid., pp. 6-7.
2. Shih Cheng-nai, op.cit., p. 11-
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States and Japan. Talent, capital and materials 
will all come from these two allies....China, in 
fact, holds the position of mediator between the 
United States and Japan, and has the duty to do 
so...." 1
At the same time Sun put forward his viewpoints toward
Great Britain and Russia— they should be carefully watched
as China's formidable foes. Sun was of the view that
Britain, in protecting its interests in India, would not
hesitate to sacrifice China. As for Russia, it was a
country occupying the largest piece of China's territory
2and most cruel in persecuting the Chinese people.
It seemed logical therefore that Sun should advocate China's 
alliance with the United States and Japan to cope with 
Great Britain and Russia. Nevertheless, he insisted that 
such a policy suggestion was not to be compared with China's 
old foreign policy of "i-i chi-i". The "i-i chi-i" policy 
was a strategem of the "Middle Kingdom" in its dealings 
with "foreign barbarians". The idea was to contain the 
"barbarians" by manipulating them into fighting against each 
other. In this regard, China could avoid becoming involved 
directly in any military or coercive actions (pa-tao) and 
meanwhile secure its position within the ideal framework 
of "peaceful ordering" (wanq-tao). 1
1. Teng Kung-hsuan, op.cit., p. 9.
2. It needs to be mentioned here that this hostile attitude 
towards Russia does not conflict with Sun's later policy 
of "allying with the Soviet Russia and admitting 
Communists into the KMT". Sun's view on Russia had 
changed and the turning point of this change was the 
1917 Bolshevik Revolution. See Chapter One, pp. 22-26.
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Sun firmly rejected this ploy, contending it unwise, 
deceitful, dangerous and similar to the secret diplomcy 
which Woodrow Wilson had condemned. Because, Sun believed, 
foreign powers were very well aware of China's internal 
capacities, both strengths and weaknesses, they would 
therefore assume the right tactics to fight against China. 
They could form alliances with each other and then take 
pre-emptive action against China. Thus, to Sun, secret 
diplomacy was similar to disguised imperialism which should 
be condemned. instead, honest diplomacy should be upheld 
in international contacts.
Sun encouraged international cooperation, but his emphasis 
was on economic aspects: foreign investment and technical 
cooperation. His motive was to rebuild and strengthen China 
economically through modernization, and to promote its 
industrialization with the assistance of foreign capital. 
Nevertheless, any such economic interaction must be a 
cooperative venture, Sun said; it must be for mutual benefit 
and not a means of economic exploitation.
5. The principle of promoting world peace and friendly 
relations between states
China should never talk about using force or launching war 
lightly, Sun held. In international relations, if conflicts 
occurred, they should first of all be tackled through 
peaceful diplomacy, i.e. negotiation or conciliation. War 
should be avoided except for self-defence. Sun stressed the 
point that since the Chinese were traditionally peace-loving, 
they should perpetuate this virtue and help the world in 
maintaining peace and promoting fraternal relations.
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Finally, mention should also be made very briefly of Sun's
views on foreign policy strategy. Sun considered that
foreign policy strategies should be flexible and pragmatic.
That is, foreign policy strategies, unlike foreign policy
principles, should not be static. They should be adaptable
and responsible to the changing environment.^ This explains
why Sun denounced Russian Communism and sought alliance
with western powers at one stage whilst later adopting an 
. 2opposite course. Thus, Sun's proposed strategies of 
"pan-Asianism", "anti-imperialism" , and "alliance with the 
Russian and Chinese Communists", etc. were purely products 
of a particular time and a particular environment.
IV. Chianq Kai-shek: his view of the San Min Chu I and
their relation to the RPC's post-1949 foreign policy
Before discussing Chiang’s perception of the San Min Chu I 
ideology, it is necessary to discuss briefly the man 
himself and the factors that influenced the formulation of 1
1. Shih Cheng-nai, op.cit., pp. 16-31.
2. See footnote no. 2, p. 112.
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Chiang was born in 1887, in Chekiang Province. His father, 
a salt merchant, died when Chiang was nine, leaving the 
family almost destitute. Only the dedication and persever­
ance of his mother kept the family intact and her example 
imparted to Chiang a strong sense of self-reliance. In 1905, 
Chiang decided upon a military career, and eventually 
attended a military school in Japan. He returned to China 
in 1911 to support Sun's revolutionary cause. After that 
Chiang's affiliation with the KMT Party grew, as did his 
political career.
his political philosophy.^
Chiang’s early life with his mother had a tremendous 
influence upon his political beliefs in later years. Chiang 
often recalled: "she impressed upon my mind that to be 
merely a dutiful son does not fulfil all the exacting
conditions of filial piety; the principle also demands an
. . 2 unflinching devotion to the cause of the nation". It was
1. For biographical sketches of Chiang Kai-shek and his 
political thinking, see Howard L. Boorman, Biographical 
Dictionary of Republican China (New York: Columbia, U.P. 
1967), Vol. I, "Chiang Kai-shek", pp. 319-338; "Chiang 
Kai-shek" in China: U.S, Policy Since 1945 (Washington 
D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1980),pp. 268-270; 
Chester C. Tan, op.cit. Chapter IV, "The Kuomintang 
Leaders", pp. 162-176; Chin Hsiao-yi, "Mr. Chiang Kai- 
shek's Understanding and Implementation of Dr. Sun Yat- 
sen's Revolutionary Ideology and Programs", paper presented 
to the Conference on the History of the Republic of China 
(Taipei, 23rd-28th August 1981); Pichon P.Y.Loh, "The 
Ideological Persuasion of Chiang Kai-shek", Modern Asian 
Studies, IV, 3 (1970), pp. 211-238, also his "The Politics 
of Chiang Kai-shek: A Reappraisal", Journal of Asian 
Studies, XXV,3 (May 1966),pp. 431-451. See also B. Crozier, 
op.cit ./Hsiunq Shih-i, The Life of Chianq Kai-shek (London: Peter Davis, 1948), and Pichon P. Y. Loh, The Early Chianq 
Kai-shek, a study of his Personality and Politics, 1887- T924 (New York': Columbia University Press, 19/1J.
2. Chiang Kai-shek, "Some Reflections on My Fiftieth Birth­day", contained in Hsiung Shih-i, op»cit., p. 376.
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(Taipei, 23rd-28th August 1981); Pichon P.Y.Loh, "The 
Ideological Persuasion of Chiang Kai-shek", Modern Asian 
Studies, IV, 3 (1970), pp. 211-238, also his "The Politics 
of Chiang Kai-shek: A Reappraisal", Journal of Asian 
Studies, XXV,3 (May 1966),pp. 431-451. See also B. Crozier, 
op.citvHsiunq Shih-i, The Life of Chianq Kai-shek (London: Peter Davis, 1948), and Pichon P. Y. Loh, The Early Chiang 
Kai-shpk. a study of his Personality and Politics, 1887- T924 (New York: Columbia University Press, l^/lj.
2. Chiang Kai-shek, "Some Reflecti<?ns on My Fiftieth Birth­day", contained in Hsiung Shih-i, op.cit., p. 376.
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from his mother's teaching and a strict up-brining, that 
Chiang later developed a strong sense of partiotism and 
the quality of tight self-discipline.1 In Chiang's mind, 
his own life experience— rising from the ordinary family into 
which he was born to become the leading political figure in 
modern China— provided an example for the revitalization of 
China. He believed that all Chinese, in particular himself, 
were responsible for the rebirth of the Chinese nation.
The national salvation and unification of China thus became 
Chiang's overriding goals and to these ends he dedicated 
his life.
However, Chiang was never able to fulfil his life's ambition. 
On the contrary, the fact that he lost China to communism 
in 1949 deeply distressed him. This ambition, allied to 
the effect of his mother's teaching, made him believe that 
he alone was responsible for the loss. He had to recover 
what he had lost because it was a personal loss as well as 
a great loss for the whole Chinese nation. Thus, after 1949 
Chiang became convinced that he carried the sacred missions
1. Chiang often recalled the deep influence of his mother 
on him either in the shaping of his conception of his 
role in history or on his personal life. Among the 
deep impressions of his life, Chiang related, was the 
"indeliable memory of my mother who endured so much in 
educating and bringing up the fatherless boy" in a 
nation devoid of proper leadership. See Hsiung Shih-i, 
op.cit., p. 373. The love of his mother, however, was 
more than mere motherly love, for she was "a very strict 
disciplinarian", which made her love all the more 
precious and meaningful to him. As a disciplinarian, 
his mother told him of the importance of self-reliance 
in this world of change and uncertainty. "For a poor 
widow and a poor orphan, or anyone who is trying to support himself in this cruel world, there is nothing 
better than the strict observance of self-reliance and 
self-betterment." see Hsiung Shih-i, op.cit., p. 375.
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of resisting the spread of communism and recovering the 
lost mainland.
It was mainly against this background that Chiang, who was 
also profoundly influenced by his wife's religious faith 
of Christian Methodism, gradually formulated his own 
political thinking.1
On the whole, Chiang's political philosophy, as a combined
product of his political experience, his personality, his
childhood and influences from his mother and his wife,
consisted of a synthesis of neo-Confucianism, traditionalism 
2and San Min Chu I . In other words, San Min Chu I consti­
tuted only one aspect, but certainly the most important 
aspect, of Chiang's whole ideological system. Nevertheless, 
for the purpose of this study, while giving a brief account 12
1. Madam Chiang, born in 1896, was in her own right a 
westernizer. Educated in the U.S., with a profound 
knowledge and liking of the western world and being a 
devoted Christian, she is apparently different from 
her husband, who was an almost orthodox Confucian, and 
a traditionalist and whose religious thinking had been 
moulded by his mother's Buddish faith. Nevertheless, 
the marriage between the old and the new seemed to 
enable Chiang, to quote Pichon P. Y. Loh, "to update 
his traditional philosophy, broaden his communication 
channels, and, equally, to prevent a centrist cultural 
posture commensurate with his political centrism".
See Pichon P. Y. Loh, "The Politics of Chiang Kai-shek: 
A Reappraisal", pp. 433-6. Another thing deservers our 
attention here. It was Chiang's conversion to Chris­
tianity in 1927 that created a linkage between his 
political aspirations and his American supporters 
during the 1940s and 1950s. A large number of mission­
aries who had been to China wanted to see Chiang retain 
power rather than the Communist forces as he would 
provide them with a better chance for carrying on 
religious missions there. This group has been severely 
criticized for being connected with the "China Lobby" during the 1950s. For more information on the Lobby 
and its activities, see Chapters Three and Four.
2. For information on Chiang's political thinking, see 
footnote no. 1, p. 115.
of Chiang's ideology, emphasis will be put on the aspect of 
San Min Chu I. It is hoped that the following study will 
help to illuminate elements of differences between the 
political philosophies of Sun and Chiang.
During his schooling, possibly while in Japan, Chiang 
became a follower of neo-Confucianism, especially Wang Yang- 
ming's intutionism and activism. It was Wang's emphasis 
upon independent judgement, as well as his insistence upon 
the importance of both thought and action— Wang declared 
that "Knowing is easy and doing more difficult."— that held 
great appeal for Chiang.1 It is worth mentioning that Sun
had also been deeply impressed by Wang's thinking but he
, , , 2 had said rather "action is easy and knowledge is difficult."
Chiang retained Sun's doctrine but concentrated more on
action. Chiang then worked to embue his compatriots with
the spirit of action; for he believed it was the key to the
. 3whole psychological reconstruction of the nation.
Chiang paid high tribute to Chinese tradition. But Chiang's 
emphasis on this, perhaps influenced by his mother's teaching 
and his early learning of Chinese classics, went further than 
Sun's. He believed in the notion of "a modernized China on
a Confucian foundation". That is, in the task of rebuilding
. . . 4China, Chiang, regarded himself as a "reform traditionalist", 1234
1. Clarence Burton Day, The Philosophers of China, Classical 
and Contemporary, Philosophical Library, (New York: 1962), 
p. 219.
2. Chester C. Tan, op.cit., pp. 140-3.
3. 0. Briere, Fifty Years of Chinese Philosophy, 1898-1950. 
translated from the French by L. G. Thompson (London:
Allen and Unwin, 1956), p. 59.
4. Pichon P. Y. Loh, op.cit., p. 443.
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and was of the view that China's traditional Confucian 
ethic, based upon the four virtues,^ should assume a more 
prominent place than the programme of western modernization. 
Chiang's standpoint, as later concretely expressed in the 
New Life Movement inaugurated on 19th February 1934 and in 
the Cultural Renaissance Movement launched on 28th July 
1969, was meant to serve as a bridge or balance between the 
traditionalists and westernizers. However, Chiang's position 
was at slight variance with that of Sun. Sun, in his 
proposal to reconstruct China, tended to put more emphasis 
on western modernization, hence his concern with democracy 
and the Principle of the People's Livelihood. It was also 
here that a difference can be shown between Sun's and Chiang's 
perceptions of communism: Chiang sternly rejected communist 
ideology by arguing that it was an alien ideology and that 
therefore it should be eliminated, while Sun merely 
maintained the unsuitability and impracticality of the 
communist ideology if applied in China.
&
Without doubt, Chiang wholeheartedly adopted Sun's San Min 
Chu I as his own. Considering himself as the legitimate 
heir to Sun's ideological mantle, Chiang’s devotion can be 
seen from a statement made by himself:
"The only purpose in my revolutionary career is the 
realization of the teachings of the Tsunq-li. That 
is to say we must make our party a revolutionary and 
democratic party, our government a modern constitutional 
government based upon the exercise of the five powers 
and the principle of efficiency and integrity, and our 
country into a country where the Three Principles of 
the People prevail". ^ 12
1. For the meanings of the four virtues, see footnote no.
1, p. 93.
2. "The Situation in Asia Since the 19th Century and our 
Essential Ways of National Recovery and Reconstruction", 
a lecture delivered by Mr. Chiang Kai-shek, reprinted 
in Chin Hsiao-yi's paper, o p . cit., p. 19.
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Though Chiang demonstrated this dedication throughout his 
lifetime, such an assertion also implied that Chiang, by 
holding Sun's doctrine, could theoretically and effectively 
claim legitimacy over the whole of China.
Of the three Principles, Chiang, during the immediate post- 
1949 period, emphasized nationalism. Its purpose can be 
said to be to consolidate his and the KMT's position cn the 
Taiwan island. Or to put it more precisely, during the 1950s 
as well as the early part of the 1960s, Chiang's policies 
were directed towards arousing the people's support for his 
course, to sustain people's revolutionary zeal, to legitimize 
his authority in the remaining territory under his control 
and to integrate the peoples residing there. It was to 
create a sort of identity between himself and the people in 
Taiwan. It was only toward the end of the 1960s that Chiang 
gradually shifted his emphasis from nationalism to the 
implementation of the Principles of Democracy and People's 
Livelihood. In saying this, however, it is worth repeating 
the point that, without nationalism as the foundation, 
realization of the other Principles would be meaningless 
and impossible.
The fullest exposition of Chiang's ideology can be found in 
his book Chung-kuo chih minq-yun--China 's Destiny— published 
in 1943, although even it is to some extent still incomplete.1
1. The first complete authorized English translation of 
this book, prepared by a group of Chinese and assisted by Frank W. Price, was published in the U.S. in 1947 under the title China's Destiny. A competing, unau­
thorized translation, with highly critical notes and 
commentary by Philip Jaffee, was published in New York 
by Roy Publishers the same year.
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He sharply attacked the presence of western ideologies among 
the Chinese intellectuals, condemning western liberalism as 
well as communism. He reaffirmed his belief in the unity of 
action and knowledge, and in intuitive knowledge. He 
restated his goal of political and military unification of 
China, which was to be achieved by a five-point plan of 
national reconstruction, emphasizing psychological, ethical, 
social, political and economic reconstruction. This 
programme called for the revival of China's traditional 
culture and cultivation of scientific knowledge, a return to 
Confucian virtues, restoration of a system of group respon­
sibility and group aid (pao-chia), democracy which rejected 
19th century democratic theories of individualism, and a 
long-range plan of eonomic development based on Sun's earlier 
"Industrial Plan".^ Chaing also wrote on economic recon­
struction in his China's Destiny. Here, under the title of 
"Chinese Economic Theory" he rejected the western free 
enterprise system and advocated a system of state control of 
economic life based upon Chinese tradition. Although he 
also paid attention to science, it seems that he really saw 
it as a means of organization to direct China's industrial­
ization towards building a strong system of national defence.
China's Destiny was written and published when Chiang was 1
still the recognized ruler in China and when the interna­
tional power relationship was fluid. After 1949, particularly
1. Chiang Kai-shek, China's Destiny, by Philip Jaffee, 
pp. 167-172.
For instance, in the book, Chiang blamed most of China's
ills on the unequal treaty system and western imperialism.
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! 1
when the international Cold War was prominent, Chiang 
began to associate his domestic programme of anti-Communism 
with the world-wide anti-Communist movement. In this 
regard, it can be argued that, prior to 1949, Chiang, like 
hundreds of thousands of traditional Chinese bureaucrats, 
was less concerned with, or was even unaware of the 
importance of either the concept of foreign policy or the 
terminology of foreign relations. As Joseph W. Esherick 
described:
"While Chiang is a very astute operator in his own 
country, his statemenship and knowledge of the 
rest of the world are very limited. It is also 
a reflection of a common Chinese trait: as sophis­
ticated as the Chinese are, they have a habit, when 
confronted with an almost hopeless situation, of 
simply refusing to face it, taking refuge in 
unrealistic and blind optimism." 1
Obviously, Esherick's comment is not totally correct but 
it does contain some truth. Another explanation for Chiang• 
negligence in promoting China's external relations during 
the mainland period is that Chiang, besieged by internal 
problems, had no choice but to leave it as it was. The 
division of China into two political units forced Chiang 
to bring his part of China into the international arena, 
where Chiang had to act rapidly and skilfully so that he 
could secure his position, the survival of his Party, his 
Republic and most of all carry out his life-long ambition. 
This explains how Chiang, still little versed in inter­
national affairs in 1949, shaped his perception of world 
order (i.e. a new world order of bipolarity to replace the 1
1. Joseph W. Esherick, Lost Chance in China! The World
War II Dispatches of John S. Service (New York! Random 
House, 1974), p. 344.
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traditional order of "Sino-centricism") upon which his 
foreign policy direction was based.
Perhaps to put it more precisely, Chiang’s perception of 
world reality as well as his foreign policy direction 
gradually took shape after his retreat from the mainland.
In his view, the post-War world, like his China, had been 
split into two forces: western democracies and communist 
totalitarianism, competing against each other for world 
domination. Western democracies represented the "good 
force", or in Chinese terms, the spirit of "wanq-tao", 
whereas communist totalitarianism represented the "evil 
force" or the force of "pa-tao". In their struggle, Chiang 
no longer seemed concerned by the western democracies' 
imperialist history, and believed that the good would 
finally triumph over the evil.1 Certainly, in addition to 
this conviction, Chiang had obviously several other 
practical reasons for allying with the West, as will be 
shown in the following Chapters.
Chiang had always incorporated a strong measure of anti­
communism in his interpretation and implementation of Sun's 
San Min Chu I ideology, seeing in the latter not only 
general principles for rebuilding China but also a source 
of justification of his authority as Chinese leader and a 
powerful weapon against Communist ideology. Needless to say, 1
1. Speeches like this and Chiang’s perception of the two 
camps can be found in his presidential messages, such 
as the New Year's Day Message, World Freedom Day Message, 
and National Day Congratulatory Message, etc. A selected 
collection of Chiang's speeches is Chianq tsunq-t'unq 
yen-lun hui-pien (Collected Works of President Kai-shek) 
24 Vols. (Taipei: Cheng-chung, 1956).
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anti-Communism was also the backbone of Chiang's foreign 
policy. As Richard L. Walker remarked:
"They (the Nationalists) based many of their 
claims for support in the world against the 
communists on a contention that they stood 
within the framework of Sun Yat-sen's ideology 
for a democractic future for China." 1
Thus, like Sun, the Principle of Nationalism was the basis 
of Chiang's foreign policy. And yet in Chiang's perception, 
his Nationalism was something equivalent to anti-Communism.
ROC's current leader, Chiang Ching-kuo, inherited the
San Min Chu I ideology laid down by Sun and modified by
his father. Nevertheless unlike his predecessors, Chiang
Ching-kuo had a rather unusual personal experience of the 
2Communist system. This experience, which will be dealt 
with in Chapter Six, may have had some influence upon his 
later political conduct and hence his leadership style in 
Taiwan.
In summary, the ROC's current state ideology is the 
amalgamation of Sun Yat-sen's San Min Chu I system and 
Chiang's anti-communist sentiment. The whole system is 
based on what the Chinese believe are their traditional 
virtues of morality and humanity and is, in the realm of 
foreign affairs, directed towards pursuing a better world 
order. As the Constitution declares: 12
1. Richard L. Walker, "Taiwan's movement into political 
modernity, 1945-1972", in Paul K. T. Shih, ed. Taiwan 
in Modern Times (Jamaica, N.Y.: St. John’s University 
Press, 1973), p. 362.
2. For a biographical sketch of Chiang Ching-kuo and his 
political thinking, see Chapter One, footnote no. l,p. 37.
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"The foreign policy of the Republic of China shall, 
in a spirit of independence and initiative and on 
the basis of the principles of equality and 
reciprocity, cultivate good-neighbourliness with 
other nations, and respect treaties and the Charter 
of the United Nations, in order to protect the rights 
and interests of Chinese citizens residing abroad, 
promote international cooperation, advance inter­
national justice and ensure world peace." 1
The Constitution was proclaimed on 25th December 1947. 
Since then ROC has repeated this principle in almost all 
its foreign policy formulation, despite the fact that it 
has had no relations at all with the United Nations since 
October 1971. 1
1. Article 4, section 2, Foreign Policy, Chapter XIII, 
the Constitution of the Republic of China.
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Chapter Three
The Strategy of Military Counterattack
1. Introduction
The strategy of military conterattack refers to one, perhaps 
the most essential, of the ROC's foreign policy instruments 
during the Cold War era. The strategy was directed chiefly 
against Communist forces, notably the Chinese and Russian 
Communists, but it also needed U.S. support to be effective.
The strategy sought both to maintain the status quo and to 
prevent its consolidation. The ROC's programme to maintain 
the status quo can be defined as the need to establish the 
permanence of its jurisdiction on Taiwan and to prevent any 
weakening of American commitment. Of equal importance was 
the ROC's interest in preventing the stabilization of 
existing conditions in the Far East as long as the Communist 
Chinese sat in Peking. This was because as long as the 
situation in the Far East remained fluid, the ROC's goal of 
returning to the mainland seemed possible. As long as there 
was still some credibility in the theme of counterattack, the 
Nationalist leaders could continue to rule on Taiwan because 
they would have the support of both the mainland immigrants 
who wanted to return to the mainland and the local Taiwanese 
majority who would like to have the mainlanders leave. The 
indefinite extension of crisis in Asia also had the effect 
of persuading the U.S. to continue in its role as "policeman" 
in the area, which was of vital importance to the security 
interest, hence, the survival of the ROC. In other words, 
the policy of preventing stabilization would guarantee
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continued American military aid to the Nationalist 
government, as well as to other non- or anti-Communist 
countries in the region, and held open the possibility that 
either the U.S. or the Communists would lose patience and 
the full impact of American power would be brought against 
the ROC's enemies in Peking.
This was the so-called "strategy of military counterattack"-- 
for convenience, we will refer to it as the "military 
strategy"— which the ROC employed as the basis of its foreign 
policy after October 1949,1 particularly from the outbreak 
of the Korean War to the conclusion of the ROC-U.S. Joint 
Communiqué on 23rd October 1958, which said:
"The Government of the Republic of China considers 
that the restoration of freedom to its people on 
the mainland is its sacred mission. It believes 
that the foundation of this mission resides in the 
minds and the hearts of the Chinese people and 
that the principal means of successfully achieving 
its mission is the implementation of Dr. Sun Yat- 
sen's three people's principles (nationalism, 
democracy and social well-being) and not the use 
of force." 2
Efforts to restore and maintain American confidence, which 
the Nationalists had lost by the end of the Chinese civil 
war, extracting maximum benefits from U.S. commitment (which 
was formally expressed in the 1954 U.S.-ROC Mutual Defence 
Treaty), and/or manipulating the U.S. into another new
1. The term "military counterattack" and "political counter­
attack" are popularly used by Chiang Kai-shek, other 
Nationalist leaders and in the academic circle in Taiwan. 
See Central Daily News (CDN) (Taipei) 18th, 19th, 20th, 
21st, February, 1981, p. 2.
2 . Foreign'Policy, Current D6cuments, 1958,rWashinoton. D.C.: 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1962), pp. 1184-5;
See also Hungdah Chiu, op■cit., pp. 286-288.
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commitment, if at all possible, thus became the primary 
foreign policy objectives of the Nationalist government.
In other words, the U.S. commitment was used by the 
Nationalist government to achieve its political objectives, 
both domestic and foreign.
With this in mind, we can now proceed to the subject matter. 
The Chapter has two parts. The first part deals with the 
U.S.'s post-1949 involvement in, and commitment to the 
Nationalist government of the ROC on Taiwan. Here, mention 
will also be made very briefly of the immediate post-War 
international environment and the U.S. "containment" policy. 
The second part, on the other hand, concerns the ROC's 
policy and actions toward the U.S. Our study will concen- 
trade on the period from the release of the U.S. White Paper 
on China on 5th August 1949 to the end of 1958. I.
II. The international environment, and relations with the  - ----- --------------------------------------------
U.S.
1. The Cold War and the U.S.' "containment" policy
Immediately after the Second World War, the world was divided 
into two ideological blocss "western democracy" and 
"communism", which was generally known as the Cold War 
bipolarity, but which affected countries throughout the 
world, large and small.
128
On 12th March 1947, the U.S. Administration published the
"Truman Doctrine", which was intended to contain Communist
expansion and aggression, especially by the Russians,
through mobilization of U.S. military, economic and
political assistance abroad. The criterion for deciding
who should be granted such assistance was that those "free
people who are seeking to preserve their independence and
democratic institutions and human freedoms against
totalitarian pressures, either internal or external, will
receive top priority for American reconstruction aid."1
Reconstruction aid was essential in American's view because
"without economic health, there could be no political 
. . 2stability and no assured peace", and thus few obstacles to 
Communist infiltration.
Accordingly, the U.S. poured a very substantial amount of
military, economic and political aid into programmes overseas,
involving itself actively in other countries' national
affairs for the encouragement of a solid anti-Communist
and pro-America sentiment, and promises of security
3protection and/or national development. The ultimate goal 
of the programmes was to enhance the U.S. sphere of influence 
vis-a-vis that of the Russians, and thus lead to the latter's 123
1. Norman A. Graebner, "The Structure of Containment", in • 
Cold War Diplomacy! American Foreign Policy, 1945-1975,
2nd edition, (New Yorks D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 
1977), p. 4.
2. Ibid., p. 42.
3. During the Cold War period, the U.S. set up several 
security treaties abroad, including NATO (North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization), CENTO (Central Treaty 
Organization), SEATO (Southeast Asia Treaty Organization), ANZUS (Australia, New Zealand, and the U.S. Security Pact), and many others.
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isolation. After the outbreak of the Korean War these 
programmes were extended to include the Chinese Communists.
it was in this context that the ROC came to be included in 
the U.S. global containment perimeter, although with much 
uneasiness.1 This was because, unlike other alliance 
relationships of the U.S., the ROC's dialogues with its 
patron were rather unequal and precarious, especially 
during the initial period of the 1950s, to which we will 
now turn.
2. The U.S. policy towards the ROC2
As noted in Chapter One, U.S. support for the Nationalist 
government began during the latter period of the Second 
World War when the U.S. provided China with economic and 
military aid and made it one of the "Big Five" with veto 
power in the U.N. Security Council. At that time, U.S. aid 
to China was channelled entirely to the Nationalist govern-
1. Originally, neither the ROC nor South Korea were included 
in the U.S. security zone in the Pacific. This position 
was made clearly by Secretary of State Dean Acheson in a 
speech in January 1950. Obviously he considered neither 
of them vital to U.S. security interests at that time.
See "Acheson States Policy in 1950", in China: U.S.
Policy Since 1945, pp. 304-311.
2. For more information on U.S.-ROC relations, see e.g.
Kuan Chung, A Review of the U.S. China Policy, 1949- 
1971 (Taipei: World Anti-Communist League, China Chapter 
Asian Peoples' Anti-Communist League, December 1971); 
William J. Barnds, ed. China and America: The Search for 
a New Relationship (New York: A Council on Foreign 
Relations Book, 1977)j Norman A. Graebner, op.cit.;
Jerome A. Cohen, ed. Taiwan and American Policy: The 
Dilemma in U.S. China Relations (New York: Praeger 
Publishers, 1971); William M. Bueler, U.S. China Policy 
and the Problem of Taiwan (Colorado Associated University 
Press, 1971); Tang Tsou,American Failure in China, 1941- 1950 (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1963) , and 
many others.
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ment. Many reasons could account for the U.S. support.
Very briefly, it has been held that it was an emotional 
action, because in the U.S. executive branch of the 
government there were forces which supported and even 
acted on behalf of the Nationalist government (these forces 
later became known as the "China Lobby" in the U.S. 
Administration). Or, perhaps in more political terms, it 
was because the U.S. was of the view that China might 
become a stabilizing factor in the Asian political scene 
during the post-War era. That is, a strong and stable 
China could check Japanese militarism in Asia on the one 
hand, on the other hand, it would continue cooperation with 
the U.S. for maintaining peace and order in Asia.1 Whatever 
the motivations were, the U.S. at that time wanted a united 
and strong China, free from foreign (especially Russian) 
domination. Later, however, in view of developments in the 
Chinese civil war (i.e. the growing strength of the Communist 
forces against the weakening Nationalist government), and 
the failure of U.S. mediation efforts there, the U.S.'s 
policy toward China gradually changed. That is, the U.S., 
though it still wanted a strong and united China, was less 
concerned with who (either Chiang Kai-shek or Mao Tse-tung) 
or which political parties (either the KMT or the CCP) would 
gain final control of the whole of China. Particularly after
1. However some people held different views. Nicholas J. 
Spykman, for instance, argued that a strong China would 
be in a position to dominate much of Asia, and that the 
U.S. should seek to balance China by working with a 
defeated (but not destroyed) Japan and other Asian 
countries. Nicholas J. Spykman, America's Strategy in World Politics (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co.,
1942), pp. 469-70.
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the Soviet-Yugoslav split in 1948, the State Department 
had the hope that a Communist China might prove to be 
Titoist. This expectation was clearly expressed in the 
final pages of the Letter of Transmittal for the White Paper, 
of which D. Acheson reported that in his judgement, the 
Chinese could be expected to resist foreign domination 
whether it be American or Russian. Acheson said that 
although for the time being the Chinese people were 
controlled by the CCP in the interest of Soviet imperialism, 
the Chinese people would ultimately "reassert themselves and 
throw off the foreign yoke” . Acheson further noted, "... 
we should encourage all developments in China which now and 
in the future work toward this end".'''
Thus, when the news of the "Chiang Kai-shek Tragedy" reached 
Washington, President Harry S. Truman's reaction was to 
modify his China policy according to the existing political 
development in China, i.e. to terminate the previous U.S. 
support for the commitment to the Nationalist government 
and to prepare the way for accepting the new political 
reality on the mainland.
This was the time when U.S.-ROC relations reached their 
lowest point, i.e. from the moment of the release of the 
U.S. White Paper on China on 5th August 1949 until the 
outbreak of the Korean War on 25th June 1950.
D. Acheson, "Letter of Transmittal", in the United States 
Department of State, United States Relations with China, 
with Special Reference to the Period 1944-1949 (Wash., 
D.C.s U.S. Government Printing Office, 1949} reissued byStanford University Press, 1967), pp. xvi, xvii. also D. C. Gupta, op.cit., pp. 218-230. See
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The White Paper declared, among many other things, the U.S.
loss of confidence in, and hence its decision to abandon,
the Chiang Kai-shek government.1 The decision was
reinforced in January 1950 when President Truman announced
that the U.S. government, "in according to the Cairo
Declaration, accepts the view that Taiwan belonged to China",
and that "it will not pursue a course which will lead to
involvement in the civil conflict in China", and that "it
will not provide military aid or advice to Chinese forces 
2on Formosa". In other words, the U.S. government would not 
have prevented a Communist take-over of Taiwan, had it 
happened. This was Truman’s position with regard to the 
Nationalist government and Taiwan before the outbreak of the 
Korean War.
At this time, the Nationalist government on Taiwan was in 
an appalling state. Internally, it had not only "lost" the 
mainland, meaning the loss of territory, power and prestige, 
but also was physically under the threat of Communist attack 
and of possible opposition from the local resistance move­
ment. Externally, the Nationalist government began to 
experience assaults on its status— the question of its 
rightful place, hence its legitimacy, in the U.N. and many
1. "Publication of China White Paper", Edmund Clubb, 
section on "The Far Easts China", in Foreign Relations, 
1949, Vol. IX (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government printing Office, 1974;, pp. 1365-1409. 2
2. Department of State Bulletin (DSB), 16th January 1950, 
p. 79.
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other international agencies was raised.1
In this connection, the point needs to be emphasized that 
the U.S. post-1949 policies on China (ROC) developed 
simultaneously with its policies toward the new regime in 
Peking. From the formation of the PRC up to the outbreak 
of the Korean War the U.S. attitude towards the Communist 
government was one of "wait and see".2 At that time, two 
major issues, recognition of the PRC and its admission to 
the U.N., most concerned the U.S. administration. However, 
during the process of formulating this new China policy, the 
U.S. administration was confronted with three other 
unsettled political issues. First, could the Communist 
government maintain effective control over the vast mainland? 
Second, would the Nationalist government on Taiwan collapse 
or be overthrown by the Chinese Communists? And third, 
would there be a change in the relationship between the 
Chinese Communists and Soviet Russia? As for the final 
point, as mentioned briefly earlier, the U.S. was of the
1. Despite the fact that, under the terms of the Cairo 
Declaration, Taiwan was returned to the ROC and since 
1945 administered by the government of the ROC, several 
alternatives had been recommended in respect to the 
disposition of the island. For instance, in 1950, the 
U.S. proposed as alternatives that Taiwan: (a) continue 
as a province of and the seat of government of the ROC; 
(b) be placed under a U.N. trusteeship; or (c) become an 
independent nation. The ambiguity of Taiwan’s legal 
status became more complicated when the PRC’s Foreign 
Minister Chou En-lai filed a complaint against the ROC's 
position on the island to the President of the Security 
Council and the Secretary General of the U.N., on 24th 
August 1950. His complaint demanded the immediate 
expulsion of the ROC delegates from the U.N. and its 
associated bodies because they "illegally" occupied these places. The dispute over the "China Issue" will be dealt 
with in more detail in Chapter Five. For more information 
on Taiwan's post-War status, see Chapter One. 2
2. See footnote no. l,p. 133.
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view that the Chinese Communists would perhaps become the 
"Tito of Asia".
While these matters were still being examined, the Korean 
War began. This event, together with two other reasons, 
motivated the U.S. administration to reshape its China 
policy again. The new China policy was pro-ROC and anti- 
PRC and it lasted for the next two decades. As for the 
two additional reasons for this just mentioned, one was 
that the Chinese Communists seized the property of the U.S. 
consulate in Peking on 14th January 1950. This action 
indicated their indifference to the U.S. overtures concerning 
diplomatic relations.'*' And the other reason was the Sino 
(PRC)-Soviet Alliance Pact, signed on 14th February the 
same year. The Pact, together with two subsidiary agree­
ments, one promising eventual return to China of Soviet-held 
properties in Manchuria and the other extending to China a 
0 300-million loan for industrial equipment, indicated a 
new epoch of collaboration between the two Communist
2countries, hence an end to the U.S. "Titoist" expectation. 
Nevertheless, in the shaping of the U.S. new China policy, 
the most crucial factor was the sudden outbreak of the 
Korean War.
The War, broke out on 25th June 1950 when North Korean forces 
launched an attack on South Korea, convinced the U.S. of two 
things. One was the aggressive nature of the Chinese
1. Congressional Quarterly, ed. China and U.S. Far East 
Policy, 1945-1967 (Washington, D.C.: Congressional 
Quarterly Service, 1967), p. 48.
2. For more information on the PRC-U.S.S.R. collaboration 
during 1949 and 1950, see Michael B. Yahuda, China's Role 
in World Affairs (London: Croom Helm Ltd., 1978), pp. 43-
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Communists. The other was the strategic importance of 
the Taiwan Island to the U.S. security interests in the 
Pacific Ocean, and some U.S. senators such as W. F.
Knowland and B. B. Hickenlooper proposed increasing 
military assistance to prevent Taiwan falling into enemy 
hands. Consequently, the U.S. resumed its support for the 
ROC. Meanwhile, it abandoned its hope of either recognizing 
the Communist regime on the mainland or of favouring its 
admission to the U.N.
The situation at that time can be summarized as follows: 
immediately after the outbreak of the War, the case was 
brought to the U.N. Security Council for solution. The 
U.S., in compliance with the U.N. resolution of 27th June 
which recommended that U.N. members furnish aid to repel the 
attack, authorized on 30th June the employment of U.S. ground 
forces to repel the invaders in South Korea, the use of 
U.S. military aircraft against military objectives north of 
the 38th Parallel and a complete blockade of the Korean 
coast by the Navy.
Meanwhile, in order to prevent the War from spreading further,
on 27th June, President Truman announced the decision to
"neutralize" the Taiwan Straits by ordering the 7th Fleet
"to prevent any attack on Taiwan".'*' At the same time, he
called upon the Nationalist government on Taiwan "to cease
2all air and sea operations against the mainland". To
1. American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955, Basic Documents,
Vol. II (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1959), p. 2468, or Hungdah Chiu, op.cit. p. 221.
2. Ibid.
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justify his action, Truman declared the legal status of 
Taiwan as undetermined. That is, unlike his January speech 
which declared that Taiwan was a part of China, Truman's 
reversed position was: "The determination of the future 
status of Taiwan must await the restoration of security in 
the Pacific, a peace settlement with Japan, or consideration 
by the United Nations."1
On 7th July, the Security Council adopted another resolution, 
setting up a unified command, and named U.S. General Douglas 
MacArthur as "Commanding General, United Nations Command in 
Korea".
Truman's concern to localize the Korean War was because he 
feared that involvement of the Chinese from either side in 
this conflict might provoke a general war, involving the two 
Superpowers, and consequently lead to a third world war.
However, despite Truman’s efforts, Chinese Communist forces 
did become involved. The Chinese Communists entered the War 
in October under the slogan of "Resist America and aid Korea" 
(the North Koreans). Their explanation was that they 
considered U.S. action in Korea and its assistance to the 
Nationalist government to be evidence of interference in 
China's domestic affairs. As Communist Chinese Premier and 
Foreign Minister, Chou En-lai charged, the U.S. action was
1. Ibid.
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"armed aggression against the territory of China".^ 
He also declared that:
’...the fact that Taiwan is a Part of China will 
remain unchanged forever.... All the people of 
our country will certainly fight...to the end to 
liberate Taiwan from the grasp of the U.S. 
aggressors. The Chinese people...will surely 
succeed in driving out the U.S. aggressors and in 
recovering Taiwan and all other territories 
belonging to China." 2
The U.S. responded by taking action to isolate China. One 
such action was the imposition of a complete embargo on all 
U.S. exports to China. This embargo announced on 6th 
December 1950 lasted for 21 years until April 1971. The 
U.S. also imposed other restrictions, e.g. on travel by 
Americans to the PRC, on trade and on cultural exchanges. 
Thus, relations between the U.S. and the PRC became worse 
and that between the U.S. and the ROC improved.
American support for the ROC reached its height during the 
Eisenhower period (1953-1961). Compared to his predecessor, 
Dwight D. Eisenhower had a more positive attitude towards 
the ROC. He believed that, in view of the American security 
interests in the West Pacific area, it was imperative to 
protect and assist the Nationalist government in all respects, 
i.e. militarily, politically, economically, morally, 
logistically and psychologically.
1. Congressional Quarterly, ed. China and U.S. Far East 
Policy, 1945-1967, p. 91 and p. 93, see also Chinese 
People's Institute of Foreign Affairs, ed. Oppose U.S 
Occupation of Taiwan and "Two China" Plot, pp. 5-6; 
and "PRC Foreign Minister Chou En-lai's Statement 
Refuting Truman's Statements of June 27, 1950, and June 28, 1950" in Hungdah Chiu, op.cit.,pp. 221-222.
2. Ibid.
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Very briefly, Eisenhower's supports for the Nationalists 
can be divided into three aspects for discussion: military, 
political and economic support. Militarily, it can be seen 
in three actions taken before, during and after the first 
Quemoy crisis. The crisis, broke out in September 1954 and 
dragged on for 9 months, was caused mainly by Chinese 
Communists' attack on Quemoy and Matsu. First of all, 
shortly after his inauguaration in January 1953, Eisenhower 
reversed Truman's neutralization policy, i.e. the 7th Fleet 
would no longer prevent the Nationalists from attacking the 
mainland, thus "unleashing" Chiang Kai-shek and his 
Nationalist army. Eisenhower was of the opinion that in 
performing merely a neutralizing role, the 7th Fleet was in 
effect protecting the Chinese Communist hold on the mainland. 
In this manner, Chinese Communists could spare some military 
forces for the Korean War (in fighting against the U.S. 
forces under the U.N. Peace Keeping Forces there). It is 
necessary to point out here that Eisenhower's decision was 
not meant to be an approval of the Nationalists' programme 
of "massive counterattack". Nevertheless, in doing so, the 
decision helped the Nationalists to create a military threat 
to the enemies on the mainland. Secondly, in December 1954, 
Eisenhower signed a Mutual Defence Treaty with the 
Nationalist government. The Treaty— which pledged that, 
in case of armed attack against the territory of the one in 
the West Pacific (in respect to the ROC, the defined 
territories include Taiwan and the Pescadores— that means 
excluding Quemoy and Matsu; and in respect to the U.S., 
the island territories in the West Pacific under its 
jurisdiction), the other would act to meet the common danger
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in accordance with its constitutional processes^— showed a 
most solid U.S. commitment toward the ROC. It also gave a 
boost to its international status. Thirdly, in view of 
the persistent tension in the Taiwan Straits - during the 
first Quemoy crisis, the Chinese Communists were said to
have fired 17,243 rounds of shells at Quemoy and after the
, , 2crisis the PRC continued its bombardment, the Treaty was
ratified with the addition of the Formosa Resolution. The
Resolution enpowered the U.S. President "to employ American
armed forces as he deems necessary to protect Taiwan, the
adjoining Pescadores islands and 'related positions and 
, , 3territories'". On 23rd August 1958, the second Quemoy 
crisis broke out. This time Chinese Communist shore batteries 
launched an even heavier bombardment of Quemoy and Matsu, 
which developed over the next days and weeks into an effort 1
1. Article VI of the Treaty, signed on 2nd December 1954, 
United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. CCXLVIII, pp. 214- 
216, 226, 228. Or Treaties Between the Republic of' 
China and Fo.reian States, 1927-1961 (Taipei: Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs; 19bj;, pp. 824-827. The Treaty came 
into force on 3rd March 1955.
2. The China Yearbook, 1979, p. 88.
3. See Hungdah Chiu, op.cit., pp. 230-231.
140
to prevent by artillery fire the resupply of Quemoy.'*' More 
information on the second Quemoy crisis will be given in due 
course.
Politically, Eisenhower continued with firm resolve the recog­
nition policy laid down by his predecessor. He maintained:
"We do not recognize the authorities in Peking for 
what they pretend to be....It is not the government 
of China....We recognize the Nationalist Government of 
the Republic of China, even though the territory under 
its control is severely restricted. We believe it 
more authentically represents the views of the great 
body of the people of China....That government will 
continue to receive important aid and assistance from the United States." *
Economically, a considerable financial contribution which 
took the form of "grants", "loans" or "technical assistance"
1. During the second crisis, Chinese Communists fired about 
half a million shells in 44 days; also 571,959 rounds of 
explosive shells in all of 1958. This heavy bombardment 
was said to be attempts to blockade Quemoy's resupply 
line from Taiwan. See Chapter One, footnote no. l,p. 63. 
For more information concerning the two crises, and 
relations between the two Chinese rivals and the U.S. 
during the crises, see Melvin Gurtov, "The Taiwan Strait 
Crisis Revisited: Politics and Foreign Policy in Chinese 
Motives," Modern China, II, 1 (January 1976), pp. 49-103; 
Tang Tsou, The Embroilment Over Quemoy: Mao, Chiang and 
Dulles (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1959), 
also his article, "The Quemoy Imbroglio: Chiang Kai-shek 
and the United States", Western Political Science Ouarter- 
ly, XII, 4 (December 1959), pp. 1075-1091; John Wilson 
Lewis, "Quemoy and American China Policy", Asian Survey, 
II, 1 (March 1962), pp. 13-19; and Alexander L. George and 
Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: 
Theory and Practice (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1974), pp. 266-294, 363-389; and O.E.Clubb, "Formosa and 
the Offshore Islands in American Policy, 1950-1955", 
Political Science Quarterly, LXXIV, 4 (December 1959),
pp. 517-531.
2. DSB, 28th May 1951, p. 847. This policy was originally 
suggested by Dean Rusk, Assistant Secretary of State for 
Far Eastern Affairs.
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was funnelled through the Nationalist authorities in 
Taiwan.1 The aid was supposed firstly to put an end to 
Taiwan's post-War economic and political strains and there­
after to help develop Taiwan’s industry and modernization. 
However, in order to ease the burden, a significant sum 
from the U.S. assistance fund was re-allocated to the ROC's 
military expenditure needed for military build-up and 
moderni zati on.2
Finally, another indication of Eisenhower's support was his 
visit to Taiwan in 1960. In fact, Eisenhower was the only 
U.S. President ever to visit Taiwan. This visit, which had 
a significant psychological boast on the Nationalists, was 
marked by tremendous displeasure from Chinese Communists.
The latter fired 85,965 shells at Quemoy on 17th June, the
day of Eisenhower's arrival in Taipei; and 88,978 shells on
. 319th June, the day of his departure.
Here, one thing deserves our attention with regard to the U.S. 
large-scale support for the ROC. That is, despite his strong
1. From 1951 to 1965, U.S. economic aid to the Nationalist 
government totalled U.S. # 1,520 million, including 
#950 million in grants, and ¿220 million in development 
loans, and #350 million in farm surpluses. See The China 
Yearbook, 1965-1966, p. 3. For more information on U.S. 
aid to Taiwan, see Chapter Six.
2. Taiwan's military expenditure throughout most of the aid 
period (1950-1965) was per G.N.P. the highest in the 
world— about 85% of all Nationalist government outlay—  
although most heavy equipment, planes, ships and vehicles 
were supplied by the U.S. as a grant. An inflationary 
spiral would have resulted had not the massive U.S. 
injections begun to stabilize the economy. See F. A. 
Lumley, The Republic of China under Chianq Kai-shek; Taiwan Toaay (London! Barrie & Jenkins, 1976), p. 8b.
3. The China Yearbook, 1^79, p. 88.
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commitment, Eisenhower was very cautious not to get involved 
in the ROC's mainland recovery programme or in the defence 
of Quemoy and Matsu. For the ROC, the Mutual Defence Treaty 
had definitely a positive effect in that it protected Taiwan 
from Communist invasion. However, the Treaty had also a 
negative effect in that it put Chiang's army back on a 
leash, hence constraining its military attempts to retake 
the mainland. This was because, according to the Treaty, 
the 7th Fleet was again to operate in the Taiwan Straits. 
Furthermore, the Treaty was finalized with an inclusion of 
notes exchanged between the two sides. The notes, known as 
the Dulles-Yeh letters, committed the ROC to consult with the 
U.S. with regard to any offensive action against the main­
land.1 In other words, it committed the Nationalist govern­
ment not to attack the mainland, except for self-defence.
The U.S. further made clear that it would not support 
aggressive military action by the Nationalist government.
As a matter of fact, Eisenhower was not at all happy about
Chiang's military build up on the offshore islands— especially
on the Quemoys— the largest and closest to the mainland of
the various island groups retained by the Nationalists after
1949. Chiang increased his military buildup on Quemoy during
the second Quemoy crisis in 1958 from 50,000 to 100,000,
2nearly a third of his effective ground forces. In Eisen­
hower's view, this buildup was not only unwise but provoca-
1.
2 .
Exchanges of Notes, 10th December 1954. United Nations 
Treaty Series. Vol. CCXLVIII, pp. 214-216, 226, 228.
See also Hungdah Chiu, op.cit., pp. 229 - 230.
Dwight D. Eisenhower, The White House Years, Waging Peace, 1956-1961 (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., 
1965), p. 293. See also Tang Tsou, "The Quemoy
Imbroglio", p. 1075.
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tive. It was unwise because, as Secretary of State John 
F . Dulles pointed out at a news conference, "if there were 
a ceasefire in the area which seemed to be reasonably 
dependable, I think it would be foolish to keep these forces 
on these (offshore) islands. We thought it was rather 
foolish to put them there".1 Furthermore, it was provo­
cative because, as Eisenhower recalled in his Memoirs. 
Chiang's action of building up his offshore strength "had 
helped complicate the problem". He said, "it seemed likely 
that his heavy deployment to these forward positions was 
designed to convince us that he was as committed to the
defense of the offshore islands as he was to that of 
2Formosa". In other words, Eisenhower himself recognized
that a primary purpose of Chiang was to put pressure on the
U.S. It was "-a reflection of his hope of promoting a fight
between the U.S. and the Chinese Communists as a prelude to
3a Chinese Nationalist invasion of the mainland".
Consequently, the U.S. reached the conclusion that if Chiang
had intentionally and unwisely put himself and the U.S. into
. . 4this predicament, "he must get himself out of it", the 
U.S. was determined not to get involved in any unwanted war. 
Thus Dulles, in order to persuade the Nationalist government 
to reduce its troop deployment on the offshore islands as 
well as to minimize tension in the Straits, made plain that 
the U.S. had "no commitment of any king" in bringing about 1234
1. Tang Tsou, The Embroilment Over Quemoyi Mao, Chianq and 
Dulles, pp. 32-33.
2. D. D. Eisenhower, op.cit., p. 293-294.
3. Ibid., p. 301.
4. Ibid.
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the return of the ROC on the mainland. Later on the ROC - 
U.S. Joint Communiqué was issued which, as mentioned earlier, 
pointed out that the task to achieve ROC's mainland 
recovery programme should not rely solely on military means 
but on "an implementation of Dr. Sun Yat-sen's Three 
Principles of the People".^
The American government was then of the view that the fact 
of the ROC's continued existence on Taiwan was a source of 
inspiration to the people still suffering from Communist 
dominance on the mainland and to the vast numbers of overseas 
Chinese, as well as constituting forceful proof that the 
Chinese Communists would not be able to control the mainland 
for an extended period of time. As Dulles said: "Inter­
national Communism is merely a passing and not a perpetual
phase....and we will do all that we can to contribute to 
2that passing". Nevertheless, Eisenhower repeated the 
position that his administration had no intention whatsoever 
of overthrowing the Chinese Communist government by force, 
but hoped that the application of military pressure would 
force internal changes in the Chinese Communist regime and 
all peaceful methods were employed to deepen the internal 
crisis and encourage the mainland people to revolt.
In 1959, as a result of the ROC-U.S. Joint Communiqué, also 
as the Nationalists came to realize that their efforts to 
recover the mainland would be drawn out, the emphasis of the 12
1. See footnote no. 2,p. 127.
2. Dulles's speech entitled "Our Policies toward Communism 
in China", on 28th June 1957 in San Francisco, DSB, 15th 
July 1957. See also DSB, 8th September 1958, "Non- recog­
nition of the Chinese Communists".
countries were elevated to the ambassadorial level, in 
Warsaw, when Peking held out the prospect of releasing 
Americans imprisoned in China, but they were broken off 
in mid-December 1957. The main purpose of these talks, 
according to the U.S. State Department, was to bring about 
agreement on the return of U.S. civilians detained in 
China and facilitate further discussions and settlement of 
other practical matters involving the two countries. The 
two sides, though achieving some agreement on the first 
agenda issue, failed to compromise on the second one.
The deadlock lay in the fact that Peking demanded an 
immediate withdrawal of the U.S. 7th Fleet from the Pacific 
Ocean as well as of its military support to the Nationalist 
government, whereas the U.S. refused to enter talks at a 
higher level as long as U.S. citizens were still imprisoned 
on the mainland and as long as the latter refused to 
"renounce the use of force in the Taiwan area". Thus 
relationship between the U.S. and the PRC remained cool 
and strained. *
To sum up, under the containment policy, the U.S. had 
involved itself in various security commitments and/or 
assistance programmes abroad. In Asia, the anti-Communist 
government of the ROC on Taiwan had also been included in 
such a programme. Nevertheless, between its inception in 
the early 1950s and the end of 1958, the U.S.-ROC relation­
ship witnessed several modifications. Such modifications, as 
will be studied later, have tremendous impact upon the 
subsequent development of the ROC’s foreign policy. 1
1. Jerome Alan Cohen, E. Frideman, H.C.Hinton, A.S.Whiting, 
Taiwan and American Policy, pp. 180-181.
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ROC's mainland recovery programme as well as its anti­
communist policy gradually shifted from an all-out 
offensive military confrontation against the Communist 
enemies to a long-term political struggle. As old slogan, 
"Thirty percent military action and seventy percent 
political struggle", which the Nationalists used in their 
anti-Communist campaigns in the 1930's, was revived and 
since then used frequently by the leaders of the ROC in 
the 1960's.1 Thus, Chiang announced in his New Year's 
Message that:
"A new principle is in the making in our 'mainland 
recovery' programme... .Now it is to be accomplished 
by efforts which are *70% political and only 30% 
military'." 2
This message indicated the official turning point in the 
ROC's foreign policy strategies from a belligerent, offensive 
stance (to destroy the status quo along the Taiwan Straits) 
to a relatively moderate posture of national defence (to 
secure the status quo inside Taiwan as well as along the 
Taiwan Straits). The latter, i.e. the adjusted foreign 
policy of "political counterattack", will be discussed in 
the next Chapter.
Finally, mention should also be made of negotiations 
attempted by both the U.S. and the PRC. The negotiations 
took place from time to time, starting in the spring of 
1954. At that time, they were at consular level and carried 
on in Geneva. In August 1955, talks between the two 12
1. Hungdah Chiu, op■cit., p. 84.
2. Chiang Kai-shek's New Year’s Day Message, 1959, see 
The China Yearbook. 1959-19&Q. p. 974.
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H I  • The RPC's foreign policy strategy of military 
counterattack
Chiang Kai-shek was well aware of the fact that had it not 
been for the Taiwan Straits, and for the outbreak of the 
Korean War, the ROC might not have been saved. Consequently 
to Chiang, it was essential to defend the shores of Taiwan 
and to prevent any weakening of the U.S. commitment to 
his government.
At the same time Chiang made it clear in his anti-Communist 
position that his campaign was not a narrow one directed 
against the "Chinese Communist traitors" only, but one 
determined to crush the Russian aggressors as well. In 
Chiang’s view, the existence of Communist forces constituted 
a threat to world peace, it was this "Communist conspiracy" 
that had caused the Chinese tragedy in 1949, and he claimed 
that the Nationalist government had been too trusting towards 
the Russian Communists.^ After 1949, Russian imperialism 
continued to encroach on China, and it might spread to other 
parts of the free world. "The nation of China has become 
a slaughter house of traitors", Chiang said in his National 
Day Message on 10th October 1950s 1
1. See William L. Tung, The Political Institutions of 
Modern China (The Hagues Maritinus Nijhoff, 1964), 
pp. 216-217, and Chiang Kai-shek, Soviet Russia in 
China, pp. 148-160.
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Ill. The RPC's foreign policy strategy of military
counterattack
Chiang Kai-shek was well aware of the fact that had it not 
been for the Taiwan Straits, and for the outbreak of the 
Korean War, the ROC might not have been saved. Consequently 
to Chiang, it was essential to defend the shores of Taiwan 
and to prevent any weakening of the U.S. commitment to 
his government.
At the same time Chiang made it clear in his anti-Communist 
position that his campaign was not a narrow one directed 
against the "Chinese Communist traitors" only, but one 
determined to crush the Russian aggressors as well. In 
Chiang's view, the existence of Communist forces constituted 
a threat to world peace, it was this "Communist conspiracy" 
that had caused the Chinese tragedy in 1949, and he claimed 
that the Nationalist government had been too trusting towards 
the Russian Communists.1 After 1949, Russian imperialism 
continued to encroach on China, and it might spread to other 
parts of the free world. "The nation of China has become 
a slaughter house of traitors", Chiang said in his National 
Day Message on 10th October 1950: 1
1. See William L. Tung, The Political Institutions of 
Modern China (The Hague: Maritinus Nijhoff, 1964), 
pp. 216-217, and Chiang Kai-shek, Soviet Russia in China, pp. 148-160.
"Mao Tse-tung and Chu Teh and our people will be 
converted into slaves of the Russian imperialist 
who demands that the puppets Mao Tse-tung and Chu 
Teh supply the blood and sweat of our people as 
capital for her war of attrition in the conquest 
of the world, the Chinese Communists, with the 
backing of the Soviet Union, were avowedly seeking 
to conquer Taiwan, to eliminate Free China and to 
expell the U.S. from the Western Pacific generally, 
compelling the U.S. to abandon its collective 
security arrangements with free countries of that 
area." 1
Consequently, in order to save China and the whole world, 
Chiang declared his government's fundamental policy in these 
words: "First, concentrate all armed strength; second,
safeguard Taiwan; third, rescue our compatriots on the
. . 2 mainland, and fourth, rejuvenate the Chinese Republic."
Chiang set forth two strategies in his anti-Communist
campaign: "(military) counter-offensive upon the mainland"
(i.e. to recover the mainland through military means) and
the "modernization of Taiwan". Priority was laid on the
former. According to Chiang, it would take a good five
years to complete his task: "the first year for preparation;
counter-attack in the second year; mopping up in the third
3year;...completion in the fifth year". However, Chiang was 
aware of the fact that the strength of his armed forces in 
Taiwan alone were not sufficient to carry out the tasks. 
Chiang believed, instead, that the U.S., as the leader of 
the Free World, should come to support this "good cause". 
Accordingly, there were two complementary tactics in Chiang's 12
1. Chiang Kai-shek’s National Day message on the 39th 
anniversary of the Republic of China, 10th October 1950. 
Selected Speeches and Messages of President Chianq 
Kai-shek, 1949-1952 (Taipei: Office of the Government 
Spokesman, 1952), p. 53.
2. Ibid.
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military strategy. One suggested direct military confront­
ation with the Communist rivals on the mainland, whereas the 
other assumed an indirect military threat against inter­
national Communist forces— the Russians as well as other 
Communist countries— through an alliance with the U.S. and 
the Free World.
Chiang Kai-shek's expectation of U.S. support was in 
accordance with his perception of the world political situa­
tion and U.S. containment policy. Considering the "two- 
camps" theory of the world as valid, and considering the 
role of the U.S. as the "policeman" in this framework,
Chiang believed that as long as he could ensure that the 
ROC remained in the "democratic" camp, i.e. as long as he 
could hinge his island nation upon the U.S. security ring, 
he could eventually safeguard the political survival of 
the ROC on Taiwan, assume a return to power to the mainland, 
and preserve the traditional Chinese way of life, which was 
now threatened on the mainland by the imposition of what 
Chiang called "an alien revolutionary ideology". In return, 
he would assist the U.S. to fight against international 
Communism and to search for a better world order.
The ROC hoped to involve U.S. support in three ways. Firstly, 
there were the ROC's direct military campaigns against the 
mainland which were made independently of the U.S. but which 
subtly involved the U.S. because they could have been 
perceived as provocations by the mainland government. In 
this regard, the ROC also manoeuvred in the course of crises, 
to make the most of its opportunities, to build on American
- 150 -
fears, to widen the conflict, and to begin its massive 
counterattack. Secondly, the ROC could try to persuade 
the U.S. to join in the task of aiding the people of the 
mainland who had now been subjected to the "tyranny" of 
"Communist totalitarianism". The Nationalist government 
was trying to change some minds, to make Americans more 
responsive in supporting its armed forces. Thirdly, the 
ROC was attempting to prolong some of the major conflicts, 
such as the Korean War and the Taiwan Straits crises, in 
post-War Asia.
1. Direct military campaign; guerrilla warfare
Throughout his lifetime, Chiang never gave up hope of 
returning to the mainland and the determination of "saving 
his mainland compatriots from the Communist domination".
These thoughts were clearly and repeatedly expressed in his 
anti-Communist slogan of "Fan-kung K'ang eh", i.e. "Opposing 
the Chinese Communists and Resisting Soviet Russians".1 
Nevertheless, his actual military campaigns for such 
purposes were concentrated mainly during the 1950s and 
involved guerrilla activities and direct military assaults 
on the mainland.
Immediately after 1949, Chiang and other Nationalist leaders
declared that the Nationalist armies would stage a counter-
. 2offensive soon, perhaps within the next year. Since then 
such a proclamation was reiterated with determination and 12
1. See Chapter One, p. 59.
2. Chiang on his inauguration speech in March 1950. See also 
0. E. Clubb, op.cit., p. 517.
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only slight variation almost every year. It could be 
argued that such a theme of military counterattack was 
unrealistic because the ROC was in no position whatsoever 
to achieve such an operation alone in view of the limited 
means available. Thus it was meant to raise the 
Nationalists' morale and courage to continue their 
unfinished civil war with the Chinese Communists. Neverthe­
less, the ROC's claim had its justification in that there 
were continued guerrilla operations on its behalf on the 
mainland.
The ROC claimed that there were some 400,000 guerrillas in
June 1950 operating on the mainland against the Communist
government.^ Later in August, this number was said to have
increased to 1,600,000. Among them, it was held, 55% were
under the direction of Nationalist officers, 30% under local
militia or popular local organizations, and 15% were
2defected Communist troops. It was also reported that these 
underground guerrillas had fought 1,800 pitched battles, great
and small, with the Communists, inflicting 300,000 casuali-
4 . 3ties.
Other information was that several thousand, or even more, 
armed Nationalist soldiers were recovering from their losses 
and attempting to regroup themselves in the border region of
1. New York Times (NYT), 27th May 1950, p 5,and 17th December 
1950, p. 4.
2. Hollington K. Tong, Chianq Kai-shek (Taipei: China 
Publishing Company, 1953), p. 522. 3
3. Ibid.
Burma and Yunnan Province of China.1 Later on, in November 
the same year, a ROC report claimed that one million of its 
troops were still fighting on the mainland, and at the same
time a Communist report said that they had repulsed a
. . . 2 Nationalist landing attempt on the Chekiang Coast. The
Communist report on the opposition strength might have been
a deliberate exaggeration to instill enthusiasm in the local
militias. Nevertheless, it would be justifiable to say
that these guerrilla activities, though mainly small in
scale, were a considerable nuisance to the Chinese Communists.
From Chiang's point of view, however, they helped to relieve
frustration, boost morale, and strengthen the claim to
soveriegnty over the mainland. In this respect, the evidence
of continuing guerrilla activities on their behalf reinforced
the Nationalists' conviction that they would one day return
to power, whether through military or other means.
According to Lieutenant General Lo Fou-ning, the Military Attach« 
of the ROC Embassy in Washington D.C. from 1956 to 1964, the 
existence of the guerrillas either inside the "enemy"
territory or those based on Quemoy and Matsu, as well as
. . . . 3their anti-Communist campaigns there, were facts. "Most of
the guerrillas were either previously ROC supporters", Lo
said, "or the remnants of the ROC forces. They were either
too slow to evacuate from the troubled mainland, or they
were merely not convinced of its necessity. Consequently,
they continued their anti-Communist crusade with only limited 123
1. NYT, 6th July 1950, p. 4,and 13th July 1950, p. 4.
2. NYT, 17th November 1950, p. 3, and 3rd December 1950, p.14.
3. Interview with Lieutenant General Lo on 9th December 1980 
during his visit to London.
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weaponry left behind by the Nationalist troops and with 
the hope that one day Chiang would return with victory."
This conviction supported them in continuing sabotage for 
many years; however, they could not receive any military 
supplies or instructions of any sort from the Nationalist 
government on Taiwan. Nor could they unite into a more 
effective combat force. According to Lieutenant General Lo, 
most of the guerrillas and their saboteur actions were 
concentrated in Kwangtung province, scattered in villages 
and forever trying to set up local cells of resistance, but 
without spectacular success. There were also reports of wide­
spread guerrilla activities in Chekiang, Kiangsi, Fukien,
Yunnan and Hainan Island. "Certainly",Lieutenant General Lo 
continued, "the Nationalist government had been hoping to pro­
vide military supplies or make a direct intervention; but be­
cause of the tight control of the Communist forces on the main­
land, as well as the geographical distance between the mainland
. . 2 and Taiwan, such supplies were unthinkable". Besides, at that
time, the Nationalists themselves were preoccupied with other 12
1. Interview with Lieutenant General Lo.
2. The Nationalist government had provided limited assis­
tance to the guerrilla forces during the early 1950s.
It had parachuted teams of guerrillas and saboteurs on 
to the mainland and conducted raids tiiere. It also 
trained leaders for these guerrilla bands, and some of 
them were shipped into the mainland by boat or plane.
As Hollington K. Tong notedi "In Movember 1951, Prime 
Minister Chen (Cheng) reported that 3,000 such leaders 
had been sent singly and in small groups from Taiwan,
to take command of guerrilla bases." Hollington K. Tong, 
op.cit., pp. 522-523. Most of the guerrillas and 
saboteurs were in Kwangtung province, because the 
Nationalist air force could not drop supplies further 
than that.
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internal matters.^ Thus solid communication between the 
Nationalists on Taiwan and the guerrilla forces on the 
mainland could never be properly established. Consequently, 
instead of growing strong, the guerrilla strength began to 
fade away, especially after the second Quemoy crisis in 
1958.
Lieutenant General Lo was of the view that if the guerrillas 
could respond immediately from inside the mainland when the 
Nationalist troops struck from Taiwan (see Figure No. 1), 
then they could "encircle" the "enemies", and thus fulfil 
the policy of mainland recovery. Nevertheless, the reality 
was that, during the 1950s, neither force ever took any 
coordinated actions. Eventually what the Nationalist 
government could and obviously did try to do before the 
total collapse of guerrilla forces was to undertake provo­
cative actions, which meant either putting pressure on 
Peking or widening the hostility between it and the U.S. 
government. 1
1. Apart from integrating the mainland immigrants with the 
local Taiwanese and smoothing relationships between them, 
the Nationalist government was constrained by other 
internal problems. An obvious instance, according to 
Lieutenant General Lo, was the internal splits of the KMT 
Party which had upset it since the mid-1920s. See Chapter 
One. Even Chiang Kai-shek himself admitted the 
existence of division within the Party. He said: "We 
must make Taiwan the base for national recovery, a 
vanguard for the struggle of the people of Asia, and a 
campion of world peace. To achieve this, we must... 
do away with the conflicts between the various groups in 
the Party. We must not tolerate any longer the selfish 
behaviour and ideas which have caused the collapse on the 
mainland and may cause the collapse of Taiwan if 
unchecked." See Chiang's Address to the Standing Committee 
of the Central Executive on 22nd July 1950.
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FIGURE NO. 1: ROC's "Mainland Recovery" Policy under 
the Strategy of Military Counterattack
N
Seei Hu Pu-yu, The Military Exploits and Deeds of 
President Chianq Kai-shek (Taipei: Chung Wu 
Publishing Co., 1971), Sketch no. 14.
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One such provocative action taken by the Nationalist 
government was its decision to ignore President Truman’s 
neutralization policy. As noted earlier, Truman had 
requested that the Nationalist government comply with this 
policy by halting offensive operations by its navy and air 
force. The Nationalists agreed initially in June 1950 to 
respect Truman's request, but after a while they renewed 
their pledge to counterattack, claiming that the American 
ban on mainland attacks would probably only be temporary.^" 
Later in July when an invasion scare hit Quemoy, the 
Nationalist air force responded by bombing the Communist 
mainland near Quemoy.
The Nationalist explanation was that this action was for
defensive purposes and should not be precluded by the 
2Truman order. Within a month the Nationalist government 
announced the success of a guerrilla raid against the 
Communists near Ninghai.^ In this regard, Truman’s neutral­
ization policy enforced by the 7th Fleet was not totally 
effective because the Nationalist government seemed to 
ignore his request; repeated attacks, though small-scale, 
on the mainland demonstrated this; thus, it was not anything 
near a complete protection for the Communists. Nonetheless, 
to be fair, Truman’s neutralization policy did prevent the 
Nationalist government from attempting a massive counter­
attack.
1. NYT, 5th July 1950, p 3
2. NYT, 31st July 1950, p.
3. NYT, 24th August 1950, ]
In reality, Truman was rather critical of Chiang's 
government, pointing out many times that Chiang showed 
little interest in improving conditions on Taiwan and was, 
instead, only interested in getting the U.S. involved in 
a war with Peking which would make it possible for him to 
get back to the mainland.^
The ROC’s hopes for a military counterattack were again 
raised in October when Peking entered the Korean War. It 
can be argued that the Nationalists' expectation at that 
time was: if Truman could be persuaded to lift his ban on 
operations against the mainland, then a Nationalist invasion 
could open a second front and relieve pressure on the United 
Nations forces in Korea.
Meanwhile, Chiang continued to tell the Communists that they 
could expect to be attacked in the "near future". In 
retaliation, the Communists declared that "force will be
used to liberate Taiwan and to expel U.S. imperialism
2there". Nevertheless, it is doubtful that the Communists 
took the Nationalists' threat seriously until 1953 when 
Eisenhower decided to "unleash" Chiang's forces. This 
decision lent great credence to the ROC's slogan about 
military counterattack, despite the fact that Eisenhower 
stated explicitly soon afterwards that it was not a prelude 
to a Nationalist counterattack. For instance, the China Post, 
one leading English-language newspaper published in Taiwan, 1
1. William M. Bueler, op.cit., p. 15.
2. Congressional Quarterly, China: U.S. Policy since 1945, 
p. 91.
indicated that Chiang was prepared to hit the China main­
land "tomorrow" with "fully-trained and newly-equipped" 
combat teams of 20,000 men which involved a number of 
guerrillas. Later on, another report said that there were 
580,000 guerrillas now organized on the mainland waiting to 
support a counterattack at any time, and that Nationalist 
commando raiders had struck at 8 main bases and had destroyed 
9 Communist battalions.^- Actually, the Nationalist government 
had conducted raids and supported guerrilla units long before
the "unleashing"; but, it used this new opportunity to step
. . 2 up its guerrilla propaganda.
Another tactic of the military strategy was "psychological 
warfare". The idea was to win the hearts and minds of 
mainland compatriots rather than provoke direct fighting 
with the Communist forces. In other words, it was to 
encourage an internal rebellion on the mainland on a large- 
scale and/or provoke an internal split in the CCP before 
attempting to attack the mainland. To implement this 
project, the ROC air force went into action delivering 
"psychological warfare" blows against the mainland which 
included propaganda leaflets and— for the relief of the 1
1. The China Post, 1st February 1953, p. 3. A short while 
later the Nationalists’ estimate of guerrilla forces 
working for them on the mainland was raised to 1.6 
million, see NYT, 24th February 1953, p. 2 and 21st July 
1954, p. 1.
2 . Lieutenant General Lo suggested that the guerrilla forces were 
not necessarily supporters of the Nationalist government, 
altnougn they mignt nave had some connections with it 
during the civil war period. They were fighting against Communism as well as against the San Min Cnu I ideology. 
The Nationalist government merely used this opportunity to step up its anti-Communist campaign.
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starving masses on the mainland--tons of rice over wide­
spread areas in Kwangtuna and Fukien provinces.1
In addition, Chiang also sought to make use of the U.S. 
security commitment for his military programme of returning 
to the mainland. Evidence for this can be found in the two 
Quemoy crises.
As far as the ROC’s security interests were concerned, as 
noted in Chapter One, Quemoy and Matsu were of vital impor­
tance to the Nationalist government because, being geographi­
cally so close to the mainland, they constituted valuable 
links between Taiwan and the mainland. Moveover, by holding 
these islands (the status of Taiwan might be in dispute, but 
that of the islands of Quemoy and Matsu was not, as they 
were beyond question Chinese territory), the Nationalists 
could contend that they actually maintained the de facto 
government of China proper. They had therefore been regarded 
as the springboards by the Nationalists for either military
invasion or action of other sorts on the mainland and, more
2importantly, as a "shield" for the protection of Taiwan. 
Consequently, it was essential for the ROC to safeguard 
these islands at all costs. Thus, the Nationalist government 
had always wanted the U.S. security commitment to Taiwan and 
the Pescadores to be extended to the offshore islands, that 
is, Quemoy, Matsu, plus a few small islands nearby.
1. Since 1949, famine had affected about 40 million people in China. On 15th April 1950, Peking openly declared that 7 million Chinese were in a "most serious plight". See 
Congressional Quarterly, op.cit ■, p.,90. The situation became worse because of PeKltt'g"rs military involvement in the Korean War. Chiang seized this opportunity to drop pice tg some of the coastal provinces with the clear intention of winning "hearts and minds" of the Chinese people there. 2
2. Congressional Quarterly, op.cit.. p. 118.
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However, as noted earlier, the U.S. security commitment to 
the ROC had excluded the defence of these islands. In the 
view of the U.S., these islands clearly belonged to main­
land China, and, therefore, the question of their disposition 
was an internal matter outside the scope of legitimate U.S. 
security interests. Nevertheless, in view of the ambiguity 
of the Formosa Resolution, the U.S. feared that the 
Nationalists, in their efforts to regain the mainland, would 
use this "fatal ambiguity" over the offshore islands to 
manoeuvre the U.S. into a war with Communist China.1
Chiang's military deployments on the islands as well as any 
military operation there could be and in fact were regarded 
by the U.S. administrations as manufacturing a tie between 
the defence of the offshore islands and the protection of
Taiwan. They had even alleged that this was a "provocation"
2designed to bring the U.S. to the brink of war with Peking. 
Even Eisenhower admitted in his Memoirsi
"...the (Quemoy) crisis had forced President Eisen­
hower and Secretary of States Dulles to the 
conclusion that the loss of Quemoy to Peking would 
be so catastrophic in its 'domino' effect on Taiwan 
and subsequently on U.S. influence throughout Asia 
that it had to be prevented, even at the cost of 
using nuclear weapons." 3
This is the so-called Nationalist exploitation of U.S. 
commitment which could also be found in the American charges 
of Chiang's exaggeration of the strategic value of the 
offshore islands, and his excessive military deployments 123
1. Ibid., pp. 56-67.
2. 0. E. Clubb, op.cit., p. 526.
3. D. D. Eisenhower, Waging Peace, pp. 691-693.
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there during the crisis. For instance, it was held that 
the Nationalists had consciously devised means to exaggerate 
the importance of Quemoy in U.S. estimates. According to 
John W. Lewis, author of "Quemoy and American China Policy":
"First, they raised the military value of the coastal 
islands by committing one-third of Taiwan's armed 
strength to their defense. Second, they concocted the 
propaganda manoeuver of 'shell counting' with special 
troops assigned to small sectors to count the Communist 
shells fired and rush the daily number to central 
collection points which in turn put the total count on 
the world's news wires. Finally, the Nationalists 
played heavily on the freedom theme. Quemoy, they 
said, is the soil of free men." 1
From the American point of view, however, Chiang's military 
arguments for maintaining control of Quemoy were spurious. 
They claimed that this was clearly demonstrated by his 
policy of overcommitment of troops to defend the offshore 
islands. According to John W. Lewis again:
"The argument that Quemoy is vital to Taiwan's air 
defense is invalidated by the pattern of newly 
constructed airfields on the China mainland.... 
if air defense was even a valid argument, it 
certainly applied more to the Tachen Islands, 
which Chiang abandoned under U.S. pressure in 
1955. The contention that Quemoy could serve as 
a springboard for an invasion or even to introduce 
anti-Communist agents is false. As Chiang's command 
staff on Quemoy admits, establishing a beach-head 
or even landing a small party on the rugged, well- 
defended Fukien coast would be next to impossible."2
Nevertheless, by reinforcing the garrisons on Quemoy and 
Matsu, Chiang was able to argue persuasively that defeat on 
Quemoy would be ruinous. He was quoted as saying that, with 
the completion of the offshore islands build-up, he had cleverly
1, J. W. Lewis, op.cit., p. 14. 
2 . Ibid., p. 15.
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achieved his purpose, i.e. "to create an artifically 
manufactured tie between the defense of the offshore 
islands and the protection of Taiwan."1
In this respect, the U.S. was confronted with the dilemma 
of either defending the offshore islands by striking at the 
gun positions on the mainland or risking the loss of Taiwan 
According to Lewis, such was the situation the U.S. had 
perceived during the 1958 Quemoy crisis:
"From the American viewpoint at least, Quemoy's 
strategic position vanishes under analysis. 
Nevertheless, the military argument, the 
Communist shellings, and the moral plea 
effectively persuaded American policy-makers 
to support a Nationalist Quemoy. While 
Washington planners thought that the U.S. 
retained the initiative or at least the 
ultimate veto by not formally committing the 
U.S. to defend Quemoy, in fact both Chinese 
sides achieved the level of American involve­
ment and vulnerability desired. The U.S. Navy 
accepted the limited convoying of troops and 
supplies, and the State Department prided 
itself on 'saving' a situation which neither of 
the principal adversaries had any intention of 
change. With this material, logistical, and 
tacit political support, the U.S. lost its 
ability to manoeuver and placed its China 
policy in the hands of Chiang Kai-shek and 
Mao Tse-tung." 2
Such a sardonic assessment supported speculation about 
Chiang's attempt to manipulate the U.S. Just before the 
bombardment in August 1958, for example, a report was 
circulated at the U.N. which told of secret negotiations 
between the two Chinese rivals. The rumour was that the 
Nationalist government might in the end have to come to 
terms with Peking if the U.S. lost enthusiasm for China's 12
1. Melvin Gurtov, op.cit., p. 71.
2. J. W. Lewis, op.cit., p. 15.
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war. Despite Nationalist denials, rumours persisted that 
there were unofficial contacts between Chiang's agents and 
the Chinese Communist government to provide for the contin­
gency of a change of U.S. policy.1 It was suggested that 
these rumours of Taipei-Peking negotiations might have 
been released by the Nationalists to increase American 
fear of losing Taiwan and, thus, improve the Nationalists’ 
leverage on the U.S. While it cannot be said with 
confidence that these stories were contrived by Taipei, 
the point was made that they were useful to Chiang. Even 
Eisenhower disclosed later in his Memoirs that throughout 
the whole 1958 Quemoy crisis, he was continually pressed, 
"almost hounded", by Chiang and his own military to
delegate authority for immediate action in the case of an
2attack on the offshore islands and that "to restrain 
(Chiang) from his cherished ambition of aggressive action 
against the mainland was not always easy."'1
The Nationalists’ actions could be visualized as a ploy to 
provoke a Sino-American war, and to put paid to the American 
proposal for "renunciation of the use of force" in the Taiwan 
Straits area (which would have stabilized the status quo on 
both Taiwan and the offshore islands, frustrating Chiang’s 
hope for a return to the mainland through military means, 
and hence creating a fait accompli of "Two Chinas").
Other Nationalist actions which could be (and were) suspected 
of being directed towards provoking further confrontation and 123
1. Tang Tsou, "The Quemoy Imbroglio", p. 1082.
2. D. D. Eisenhower, op.cit., p. 299.
3. Ibid., p. 296.
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even war between the U.S. and Communist China included 
military exercises on the offshore islands and in Taiwan 
by the three services, high-level inspection tours and 
visits, propaganda leaflet drops over the PRC coastal 
provinces, sabotage missions along the coast by Nationalist 
agents, reconnaissance over-flights of PRC territory, air 
and naval clashes, and belligerent rhetoric of the 
Nationalist propaganda machine on the theme of the mainland 
recovery programme.1 Melvin Gurtov, in his article "The 
Taiwan Strait Crisis Revisited: Politics and Foreign 
Policy in Chinese Motives", compiled a Table (Table No. 1) 
which provides sources and data and brief descriptions of 
this information:
1. M. Gurtov, op.cit., p. 72.
Table No. 1
Summary of Reported KMT Military Activity in 
the Taiwan Straits Area, January - July, 1958
Source/Date
CDN, Jan. 10
Activity
Military exercise in Penghu Islands 
(Pescadores)
CDN, Feb. 8 "Full-scale" military exercise for one 
week in Matsu chain.
Fujian Ribao, 
Mar. 6 
(SCMP 1788)
Capture of 4 Chiang agents, who are named 
and who had mission of collecting 
military information; newspaper says 
such sabotage has been going on 
"constantly" in past year and repre­
sents "only a portion of similar cases 
we have smashed."
NYT, Mar. 15
CDN, Apr. 9
CDN, Apr. 11
CDN, Apr. 17
CDN, Apr. 28
CDN, May 1
CDN, June 1
CDN, June 2
CDN, June 4
CDN, June 8
cm, June 12
NCNA , Fuzbou
(Foochow) 
June 18
(SCMP 1798) 
CDN, June 19
CDN, June 22
Visit by Dulles to confer with Chiang
KMT Defense Minister and U.S. advisers 
inspect Matsu
Military exercise by Penghu Garrison 
Command
Joint military exercise by army, navy, 
air force on Matsu for first time, 
attended by deputy cmdr. US Military 
Assistance Command
KMT deputy cmdr. of navy leads inspection 
tour of Quemoy
KMT Defense Minister inspects Matsu islands
Military exercise by naval headquarters at 
a southern base for atomic defense
Armed clashes in Matsu Strait reported
KMT Defense Minister inspects Matsu 
defenses
Military exercise in Taiwan for defense 
against special weapons
Naval battle in Matsu Strait reported
One of two KMT RF-84 aircraft shot down 
over Fujian (Fukien)
KMT forces on Matsu reportedly repulse 
PRC gunboats
KMT forces on Matsu reportedly again clash with PRC gunboats
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Source/Date Activity
CDN, June 23 Third report of naval battle off Matsu
CDN, June 24 
CDN, June 25
Armed clash off Fujian coast reported
KMT Defense Minister inspects Matsu; 
naval units have entered state of war 
preparedness
CDN, July 4 Propaganda leaflets dropped over 
Guangdong (Kwangtung) and Fujian under 
heavy artillery fire
CDN, July 5 Propaganda leaflets dropped over 
Guangdong and Guangxi (Kwangsi)
NCNA, Canton, 
July 6 
(SCMP 1811)
Seven KMT agents sentenced to death for 
subversion in Guangdong
Dagong Bao, 
July 7 
(SCMP 1811)
Four more KMT agents arrested in Guangdong
CDN, July 7 U.S. assistance secretary of army visits 
Taiwan
CDN, July 8 Mobilization exercises completed in 
southern Taiwan following those in north
CDN, July 14 Visit to Taiwan of U.S. cmdr., 7th Fleet
CDN, July 18 
CDN, July 20
All military leave in Taiwan cancelled
A number of KMT jets flown to Quenioy to 
carry out patrols
CDN, July 26 KMT 6-day air defense exercise
NCNA, Canton 
July 29 
(SCMP 1825)
PRC air force reports shooting down two 
of four RF-84's, and recent sightings of 
other RF-84's over Fujian
NCNA, Peking 
broadcasts, 
July 31
Three KMT agents captured after being 
airdropped into China
Abbreviations: CDN (Central Daily News, Taipei);
?>?YT (New York Times); NCNA (New China News Agency, Peking); 
SCMP (Survey of China Mainland Press, Hong Kong)
Source: Table obtained from Melvin Gurtov, "The Taiwan 
Strait Crisis Revisited", Modern China, II, 1, 1 January 
1976, p. 73.
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2. ROC tactics in soliciting U.S. support 
for a counterattack
Evidently Chiang's direct military campaign against the 
Communist forces on the mainland was more concerned with 
the domestic issue of anti-Chinese Communists than with the 
ROC's foreign policy objective of anti-world Communists. 
Nevertheless, taking the anti-Communist stance, Chiang had 
skilfully involved himself in the global anti-Communist 
crusade. According to him, his threat to the mainland 
implied a challenge to the Russian Communists, and a 
defence of the Free World. For these purposes, Chiang lost 
no time in mounting persuasion compaigns to achieve 
American acquiescence in the counterattack.
The objectives of the campaigns were to convince the U.S. 
that the time was ripe for the "Free" Chinese to return to 
power on the mainland; that conditions were currently most 
favourable and that similar opportunities might not be 
available in the future; that the Communist army would 
mostly defect when the Nationalist soldiers landed on the 
mainland coast, and that the Soviet Union would not inter­
vene to save Peking. In order to make its appeals more 
convincing and promising, the Nationalist government had 
also declared that its proposed military operation against 
the mainland needed no help from U.S. ground forces, but 
merely U.S. "moral and material support, and sympathy".
As Madame Chiang Kai-shek claimed, "We have no intention of 
dragging the U.S. into our domestic conflict. We only hope 
the U.S. will provide us with the right tools, and we will
1do the job alone." Related to these objectives were the 
major issues such as preventing international recognition 
of the PRC, preventing it gaining U.N. membership, dis­
couraging moves towards internationalization of the so- 
called "Taiwan problem", achieving maximum American protection 
for the offshore islands, enlarging American commitment to 
counterattack, and even arranging for a joint U.S.-ROC 
invasion of the mainland. Nevertheless, if these objectives 
were to be attained, one inevitably raises the question as to 
how, and to what extent, the ROC could persuade the U.S. to 
give greater support?
s '
it
Now we will turn to the channels through which the 
Nationalist government conducted its persuasion campaign 
for policy influence and to the issues which it endeavoured 
to turn to its advantage. We will deal largely two sorts of 
channels: diplomacy through state visits (conducted mainly 
on Taiwan) and the China Lobby (conducted mainly inside the 
U.S.). The chief issue considered will be the Korean War.
(1) Channels used by the ROC to influence the U.S. 
administrations
(A) Diplomacy through state visits
George F. Kennan (an American diplomat, specializing in 
Russian politics) once declared:
"...the Chinese had, over the decades, succeeded in 
corrupting a large proportion of the Americans who 
had anything to do with them— particularly those 
who had resided for long periods in China. The 1
1. Madame Chianq Kai-shek: Selected Speeches 1958-1959 
(Taipei: Government Information Office, 1960), p. 63
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Chinese were infinitely adept at turning foreign 
visitors and residents, even foreign diplomats, 
into hostages and then, with a superb combination 
of delicacy and ruthlessness, extracting the 
maximum in the way of blackmail for giving them 
the privilege either of leaving the country or 
remaining there, whichever it was that they most 
wished to do...the Chinese had made fools of us 
all— a thousand times." 1
Kennan’s view, although it may not be totally correct, is 
not without justification.
During 1951-52, Chiang used some visiting U.S. dignitaries 
to convey his messages to the Americans. Since 1950, Chiang 
had invited a large number of Americans to visit Taiwan-- 
what he called the bastion of "Free China"— to see what they 
wanted to see there and, hopefully, in return, take good 
news back home about how the Chinese in Taiwan, under the 
Nationalists’ leadership, made such good use of American 
aid. Included in Chiang's project at that time were 
Congressmen who came on fact-finding missions, American 
military leaders who made their routine inspections of 
security arrangements, and journalists who came for interviews 
with either Chiang Kai-shek himself or other senior 
Nationalists. For instance, among the dignitaries who were 
received and entertained by President and Madame Chiang 
Kai-shek during 1951-52 were Thomas E. Dewey, Governor of 
New York; Dan Kimball, U.S. Secretary of the Navy; General 
Lawton Collins, Chief of Staff for the U.S. Army; Admiral 
Arthur Radford, Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. 7th Fleet; 
General Douglas MacArthur, and many others. Among those 
visiting in 1952, there were 3 U.S. Senators, 23 Represent- 1
1. George F. Kennan, Memoirs; 1950-1953. section on the 
Far East, (Boston; Little, Brown & Company, 1972), 
pp. 54-59.
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atives, 25 high-ranking military officials, 6 important 
envoys of the Truman Administration, 2 well-known American 
journalists, and 2 federal judges. By the years 1955-56, 
the list had grown extensively. There were 38 top military 
personnel, 8 U.S. Senators, 20 Congressmen, as well as some 
28 other well-known scholars, journalists, and organizational 
leaders from the U.S.^ In addition to this, Vice-President 
Richard Nixon toured the island in 1953, and President 
Eisenhower stopped there briefly in 1960.
The usefulness of these visits to the ROC was manifold.
They could serve either to strengthen the Nationalist
government's prestige, or to bolster the Nationalist army's
morale. Or, they could impress the visitors with Taiwan's
rapid economic recovery and capacity for growth, and thus
convince them that their support and assistance was not
being misused and that, because of this, more aid should
be given to the ROC for such a "good cause". Or they
could try to implant into the visitors' mind a picture of
what "Free China" was really like. In short, many American
dignitaries were urged, during the 1950s, to visit Taiwan
so that they could make "better" and "more objective"
appraisals either of the strategic value of the offshore
islands or "the military, political and economic strength"
2of the ROC on Taiwan. Consequently, they could influence 
the Administration back home to provide the Nationalist 1
1. China Handbook, 1956-1957 (Taipei: China Publishing Co., 
1957), pp. 265-269; see also Hollington K. Tong, op.cit., 
p. 541.
2. Free China Weekly (New York), 15th November 1960, p. 1.
(B) The China Lobby
Another important channel was the so-called "China Lobby", 
most prominent in the U.S. during the 1950s but gradually 
disappearing as such after that.
government with more solid support so that it could prevent
the "bastion of freedom in the Pacific" from collapsing.
The China Lobby of the late 1940's and the early 1950's was 
little more than a series of individuals and groups who 
applied concerted pressure on the American Congress to pass 
legislation beneficial to the Nationalist government.
Although the China Lobby was later accused of acting 
conspiratorially, this charge erred in the assumption that 
because these various groups had a common interest and 
their propaganda was mutually supportive, they must have 
been centrally directed by the Nationalist government 
through "remote control" from Taiwan. As Professor Ross Koen 
noted, there was an outer core and an inner core to the China 
Lobby.^ The outer core reassembled the amorphous and
it
Ross Y. Koen, The China Lobby in American Politics (New 
York: Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc., 1974), p. 29. The 
book was removed from sale shortly after its first publi­
cation in 1960 (by the Macmillan Co.,) when, it was said, 
persons representing the interests of the ROC threatened 
a law suit. For more information regarding the story of 
the China Lobby, its activities, rise and decline, see 
Sandra M. Hawley, The China Myth at Mid-Century! Case 
Study of an Illusion (Ph.D. thesis. Case Western Reserve 
University, 1974); Anthony Kubeck, How the Far East Was 
Lost: American Foreign Policy and the Creation of Communist 
China (London: Intercontex Publishers Ltd., 1971); Joseph 
Keeley, The China Lobby Man: The Story of Alfred Kohlberq 
(New York: Arlington House, 1969); Don Lohbeck, Patrick J . 
Hurley (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1956); Karl Lott Rankin, 
China Assignment (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 
1964); and FredaUtley, The China Story (Chicago: Henry 
Regnery, 1951); ?>id Norman Mackenzie, Conspiracy for War:
A Study of the China Lobby and of its Plot against Peace 
and against Democracy in the United States (London:
The Union of Democratic Control, n.d.)
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disconnected groups who acted in a collective capacity.
The inner core were a group of Chinese and Americans who 
acted overtly as lobbyists and provided the continuity for 
the outer core. The inner core, Koen stated, were 
undoubtedly paid by the Chinese (Nationalist) government 
and planned propaganda in order to further Chiang's cause 
in the United States.3 Similarly, Gordon Schaffer charged 
the Lobby with being "a sinister organization set up in 
America with money racketeered by the Chiang Kai-shek
regime, with the set purpose of launching a new war of
. . . 2 intervention against the Chinese revolution". Actually,
the major portion of the China Lobby was composed of
American individuals and groups who voluntarily chose to
support Chiang for reasons of politics or ideology, or
because of their ideas about the requirement of American
security. For instance, Koen later suggested that some
Christians wished to continue their religious efforts in
China and this required the ousting of the Communists.3
Others merely used the China issue for what it was worth to
. 4weaken the Democratic Party and the Truman administration. 
Furthermore, in more objective terms, the Nationalist 
government, devastated by the War, lacked the financial 
means to conduct lavish lobbying activities. Nevertheless, 
the assumption that the Nationalist government utilized the 
organization as a private diplomatic channel either to 1234
1. Ross Y. Koen, op.cit., p. 29.
2. Gordon Schaffer, Formosa; Secrets Behind the Crisis 
(No place indicated, A. Webb & Co., n.d.),p. 1.
3. Ross Y. Koen, op.cit., p. 29. See also Chapter Two 
footnote no. 1, p. 117.
4. Ross Y. Koen, op.cit., p. 29
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influence U.S. government decisions or to bring about a 
policy more beneficial to the Nationalist cause, was not 
mistaken. As Professor Koen concluded:
"The Chinese planned and executed the exploitation 
of their claims and grievances through the skillful 
use of Americans who, motivated by fear, ambition, 
missionary zeal, and the desire for profitable 
markets, were disgruntled and upset at what they 
considered the loss of China. To some extent, the 
success of the Chinese--especially with the United 
States Congress— in gaining acceptance for their 
point of view was the result of fortuitous events 
over which they had neither control nor foreknowledge. 
The important point, however, is that as each opportune 
moment arrived, the Chinese and their American 
spokesman were on hand with an explanation— an 
explanation which was emotionally satisfying whether 
or not it fitted the facts or contributed to an 
effective American policy." 1
The China Lobby was most active during the so-called 
"McCarthy era". Major figures in the China Lobby included 
Senator Joseph R. McCarthy, Alfred Kohlberg, General Douglas 
MacArthur, and Senator William F. Knowland. McCarthy's 
accusations of communist influence throughout the government 
led to investigations by the FBI and a purge of the State 
Department's Asia section, which created an atmosphere 
wherein scholars and officials who favoured improved 
relations with the PRC were reluctant to speak out. Thus, 
during this period, a large number of government officials, 
academics, and scholars were charged by the China lobbyists 
as Communist sympathizers. In the State Department, for 
instance, Philip Jessup (editor of the China White Paper), 
John K. Emmerson, Raymond P. Ludden and 0. Edmund Clubb were 
accused. Scholars like Owen Lattimore and John King Fairbank 
were also attacked. 1
1. Ibid., p . 198.
McCarthy's stern anti-communist stance did not necessarily 
mean that he was therefore in favour of the Nationalist 
government. Nonetheless, his attacks on the U.S. adminis­
tration— for instance, on 20th April 1950 he openly declared 
that "General George C. Marshall was completely unfitted to 
be the Secretary of State during the China crisis" and 
later on 7th December 1954, shortly before he lost power, 
he assailed President Eisenhower because he "on the one 
hand congratulates the Senators who hold up the work of our 
Committee, and on the other hand urges that we be patient 
with the (Chinese) Communist hoodlums who at this very 
moment are torturing and brainwashing American uniformed 
men in Communist dungeons"— certainly helped the Nationalists 
in advancing their cause in American politics.^
McCarthy's career, like the strength of the China Lobby, 
reached its climax in the spring of 1954. Up to that time, 
McCarthy had been able to create effectively a "climate of 
fear" in many government agencies. But, his power and 
actions were censured toward the end of the year, because 
many of his charges had been found to lack either evidence 
or substantiation. Even President Eisenhower remarked in 
his Memoirs :
’...Senator McCarthy's general and specific accusations 
were, from the start, so extreme, often involving 
unsupported and unjustified allegations of the gravest 
kind, that his attacks, which at times degenerated to 
persecution, became known as 'McCarthyism'. Protected 
as he was by congressional immunity, anyone could be 
irresponsibly attacked. Strong resentment against 
McCarthyism developed among the educators, the press, 1
1. Congressional Quarterly, op .cit., p. 90 and p. 105.
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and the clergy— indeed, among all informed groups.
The question was often— and justifiably — asked,
'Who is safe?'" 1 .s'
McCarthy died in 1957 but as a political force he was 
already finished by the end of 1954. McCarthy's departure 
also affected the strength of the China Lobby. After 
1954, the China Lobby, though continuing its efforts to 
campaign on behalf of the Nationalist government, became 
less and less influential in determining American China 
policy, and its decline was clearly shown by President 
Nixon's overture to the PRC in 1971-72, and finally by 
President Carter's decision to recognize the PRC in January 
1979.
Related to the China Lobby were other associations with
similar functions, such as the "Committee to Defend America
by Aiding Anti-Communist China", the "American China Policy
Association", the "Committee of One Million Against the
Admission of Communist China to the United Nations", the
"Committe of National Affairs", and the "China Emergency
Committee", and others. These organizations often published
books and issued statements denouncing American post-War
policies toward China as the cause for Communist takeover
there and impugning the loyalty and the motives of the men
2who were responsible for the policies. For instance, on 
15th September 1958, Marvin Liebman, secretary of the 
"Committee of One Million" said the organization was 
"redoubling and tripling our efforts to stem this tide of 
pro-appeasement sentiment" concerning China. Liebman said 12
1. D. D. Eisenhower, op.cit., p. 316.
2. Congressional Quarterly, op.cit. , pp. 6-7.
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the Communist shelling of Quemoy and Matsu helped the 
Committee's campaign because it "shows up the Chinese Reds
: s '
for what we always said they were; proves they are prepared 
and willing to shoot their way into the United Nations".
The strength of the Committee— formed in 1953— can be seen 
in the composition of its members, which included 23 Senators:
Paul Mansfield, Everett M. Dirksen, Jacob K. Javits, and 
A. S. Mike Monroney, etc., 4 Governors, and some influential 
news columnists and commentators.1
Other organizations, for instance, the "Committee to Defend 
American by Aiding Anti-Communist China" became active in the lfc 
latter half of 1949 and urged aid to Chiang and his govern­
ment. On 1st October 1950, it issued, over the signatures 
of 200 clergymen and missionaries, many of whom had spent 
years in the Orient, an appeal to President Truman and 
D. Acheson (who had helped Truman to formulate the Truman 
Doctrine and was charged by Republicans as the "Red Dean") 
urging them to "remain firm in not recognizing the Communist 
regime". The statement said that recognition of Communist
China would be a "moral compromise" and a "political 
2mistake". It also issued literature now and then m  support 
of the Nationalists. On the Committee's board of directors 
there were men like Frederick C. McKee, a Pittsburgh 
industrialist; ex-ambassador Arthur Bliss Lane; David 
Dubinsky, President of the International Ladies Garment 
Workers; and second vice President of the American Federation 
of Labour, James A. Farley, etc. 12
1. Ibid., p. 117.
2. NYT, 2nd October 1950, p. 7; and 16th October 1950, p. 26.
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The "American China Policy Association" was headed by 
Alfred Hohlberg. Its treasurer, Emma Delong Mills, in a 
letter to the editor of the New York Times, asserted that 
Communist China was the enemy of the U.S., and that she 
should not be recognized and be admitted in the U.N.1
Finally, in addition to the above groups, there were a few
more that were not organized for the specific purpose of
opposing Peking but did express views on issues concerning
mainland through resolutions, statements, public speeches
and reports. The theme of all these was: no admission of
Communist China in the U.N.j no diplomatic recognition by
the U.S. government; and no trade or cultural relations with
it. Included in this category were, for instance, the
"Common Cause Inc.," "American Association for the United
Nations", the "American Veterans Committee", the "American
Legion", the "U.S. Military Academy at West Point", the
"Catholic War Veterans of the U.S.A.", and the "American 
2Assembly".
Having identified ROC's channels for putting pressure on 
the U.S. government, we now turn to look at Chiang's 
attempts to use them. Our emphasis will be on the case of 
the Korean War. 12
1. NYT, 28th September 1956, p. 26.
2. For the "Common Cause" see NYT, 26th November 1950, p. 31; 
for "American Association for the United Nations", NYT, 
24th February 1951, p. 2; for "American Veterans 
Committee", NYT, 4th June 1951, p. 3; for "American 
Legion", NYT, 3rd September 1954, p. 10; for "U.S.
Military Academy", NYT, 16th November 1954, p. 1; for 
"Catholic War Veterans", NYT, 20th August 1955, p. 18; 
and for "American Assembly", NYT, 19th November 1956,
p. 22.
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(2) Chianq Kai-shek's persuasion efforts; use of the
Korean War
It would not be a mistake to state that Chiang wanted to 
use the Korea conflict for his political objective of 
mainland recovery. Nevertheless, assessments of Chiang's 
intentions and actual actions are often distorted and 
contradictory. On various occasions, U.S. and the ROC 
held opposing views in interpreting their positions, and 
such differences have often been described as the 
Nationalists' actions of "manipulation". In this section, 
we will only present some of the "incidents" that occurred 
during the period under investigation and leave the final 
judgements open.
The Korean War and the concomitant U.S. support to the 
Nationalist government provided the latter with new 
prospects for a counteroffensive - During the years of 
the conflict, the Nationalist government's persuasion 
efforts took two forms: troop contributions to the Korean 
War and lobbying of the U.S. administration.1 The two 
efforts reinforced each other.
With regard to troop contributions, Chiang offered 33,000
of his "best equipped troops" for use in Korea only 4 days
2after the outbreak of the Korean conflict. This offer was 
repeated several times afterwards during the conflict. With 
regard to lobbying, Chiang tried to influence the U.S. 
administration in the widening of the conflict. 12
1. Interview with Mr. Carl Liu in Taiwan on 29th March 1981 
Liu was the ROC's U.N. War Correspondent from 1952 to 1953 in Korea. He was also Press Attaché of the ROC embassy in Korea from 1959 to 1965.
2. Congressional Quarterly, op.cit., p. 91
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In the first phase of the Korean War, before the Chinese 
Communist "volunteers" had engaged in the fighting, the 
Nationalist government intended to convince the U.S. that 
the Soviet Union planned to involve its Chinese allies 
either in Korea or in an attack upon Taiwan as soon as 
Korea had been conquered. The rationale was that if the 
U.S. could be persuaded of this fact, the decision might 
be taken to use Nationalist ground troops against the 
North Koreans, and thus realize the policy of mainland 
recovery.
Thus Chiang offered troops to the United Nations' forces in 
Korea, with the expectation that such a proposal, if 
accepted, would turn limited U.N. military action into a 
Chinese people's war. That is, the Nationalists expected, 
if their troops were introduced into South Korea, that the 
Chinese Communists might enter the conflict on behalf of 
North Korea. Chiang's proposal was welcomed by some 
American politicians, such as Senator William F. Knowland 
and Representative Walter H. Judd. It was also hailed by 
General MacArthur, who recommended not only that Chinese 
Nationalist troops on Taiwan be used against the Communists, 
but that the U.S. should really provide "logistical support" 
for those troops.'1
The Nationalist government was very disappointed when this
offer was turned down by Truman. Even today, the Nationalists
still remark on this occasion as a "missed opportunity" for
. 2their soldiers to gain a "free ride" on to "enemy" soil. 12
1. NYT, 20th April 1951, p. 1»
2. Interview with Mr. Carl Liu.
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In conjunction with this effort, the Nationalists also 
tried to convince the U.S.— as the U.S. was trying to keep 
the war and its costs limited— that the Korean War was not 
a local incident and could not be ended with limited 
involvement. Truman, apparently in an attempt to keep 
the Korean War and its cost limited, emphasized that the 
U.S. aimed only "to restore peace and...the border". At 
the U.N., the Americans announced that their purpose was 
the simple one of restoring the 38th Parallel as the 
dividing line. The policy, in other words, was containment, 
not roll-back.1 "Limited warfare is cowardly behaviour," 
the Nationalists often asserted, "it could not settle the 
Korean problem". Meanwhile, they made a point of informing 
the American government of Communist Chinese troop move­
ments toward Manchuria which Nationalist agents had
2supposedly detected. The China Lobby made the same point, 
and it has been suggested that its propaganda attempted to 
convince Americans that "the Korean War was an unnecessary 
war fought at the wrong place at the wrong time, and that 
the U.S. had been unsuspectingly dragged into the war by 
traitors in American universities and in the government.
The way to end war and to establish permanent security in 
the Pacific was to destroy the Peking regime with the use 
of Nationalist forces".'1 123
1. Stephen E. Ambrose, Rise to Globalism: American Foreign 
Policy 1938-1970 (England: Penguin Books, 1971), pp. 
199-200.
2. NYT, 5th July 1950, p. 3.
3. Dan C. Sanford, The United States in Nationalist Chinese 
Foreign Policy: The Using and Keeping of An Ally
(University of Denver, Ph.D. thesis, August 1971), 
p. 150.
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Later, when the Communist Chinese entered the War, Chiang 
made it known that his previous offer of troops still 
stood, hoping for a change of mind in the U.S. administration 
Again, Chiang asserted that if the ROC's armed forces moved 
into Korea, they would have "an important psychological 
effect" on the Communist Chinese and would bring a quicker 
end to the war.1 Chiang's message was transmitted to the 
American administration in different fashions, and was 
given verbal support by visiting American dignitaries. For 
instance, Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., then Commanding General 
of the U.S. Marine Corps, said in Taiwan in 1952 that "the 
day when the Republic of China was carrying out its
'sacred duty', the Nationalists could be sure that their
. 2 friends the Americans would 'always' be at their side".
Also, in the same year, the Secretary of the Navy, Don
Kimball visited Taiwan and stated that the U.S. 7th Fleet
"would stand by and cheer a Nationalist invasion of the
3mainland". It is also known that General MacArthur did
have the intention of using Chiang's troops in Korea and
had advised the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff to accept
. 4Chiang's offer, but his suggestion was rejected. In this 
connection, it is necessary to point out very briefly that 
there was a marked divergence of views about the conduct of 1234
1. Chiang Kai-shek, op.cit., p. 201.
2. China Handbook, 1953-1954, p. 154.
3. Ibid.
4. Douglas MacArthur, Reminiscences (New Yorks McGraw-Hill, 
1965), p. 384; Harry Truman, Memoirs by Harry S, Truman, 
Years of Trial and Hope, Vol II, (New Yorks Doubleday & 
Co., 1956), pp. 384-385; see also B. Crozier, op.cit., 
pp. 358-361.
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the War between the General and President Truman.
MacArthur, as the U.N. Forces Commander, stuck to the view 
that victory should be the aim of any war in which he was 
engaged. President Truman took a more cautiously political 
view of the conflict. As an undeclared war, it was 
juridically a U.N. police action against aggression from 
the outside. In his exchanges with the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, MacArthur had been calling for permission to bomb 
military targets in Manchuria. MacArthur was of the opinion 
that the U.S. should stop fighting a limited engagement and 
switch to all-out war. The U.N. should accept Chiang's offer 
of troops and back Taiwan in launching a second front in 
China. Anticipating the criticisms of those who felt that 
absolute priority should be given to the European theatre, 
MacArthur further remarked that "if we lose the war to 
communism in Asia, the fall of Europe is inevitable".^ 
MacArthur's hawkish attitudes eventually cost his military 
career. On 10th April 1951», President Truman relieved 
MacArthur of his command and ordered him to return to the 
U.S.
Thus, despite the fact that the Chinese Communists were now
the principal enemy in Korea, neither the U.S. nor the U.N.
were prepared for the complications which Chiang's troops
would bring. Also at this stage, Chiang still considered
the strategy of opening a second front against the mainland
2as much more desirable than sending troops to Korea. 12
1. B. Crozier, op.cit■, p. 359.
2. ROC spokesmen declared that the South Koreans had told 
Chiang they did not need Nationalists fighting on their 
soil. The China Post, 29th June 1953, p. 2.
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Related to the Korean conflict, Chiang was also said to 
have sought a revision of Truman's neutralization policy 
which he considered as preventing his government from 
attacking the mainland. Chiang's opportunity was created 
as a result of different interpretations. In the 
Nationalists' view, they had agreed only in principle to 
Truman’s proposal and had reserved the right to seek more 
effective measures of resisting aggression if international 
communism was not suppressed within a "reasonbly short time". 
The Nationalist government spokesman declared that the ROC
had never intended to depart from its policies of resisting
. 2 the Chinese Communists and restoring unity to China.
The Nationalists seemed to understand Truman's request as 
applying to a general offensive but not prohibiting "defen­
sive" action which the Taiwan forces might wish to take.
As mentioned earlier, the Nationalists had, only a month 
after Truman's announcement, resumed their air operations 
against the Communist mainland. This action apparently had 
upset Truman because it indicated the Nationalists' hope of 
manipulating him into a revision of the neutralization 
scheme and into an acceptance of their idea of breaking the 
Korean stalemate with a Nationalist landing on the China 
coast. The message was carried in many Chinese newspapers. 
Among them, one contended that the time had come for 
President Truman to "make good" the loss of China by "dealing
1. China Handbook, 1951, p. 115.
2. Ibid.
blows" directly on the mainland.'*' Otherwise, such a two- 
sided neutralization, the Nationalists complained, was 
akin to treating "friend" and "foe" alike.
Chiang's hopes for a joint military efforts with the U.S. 
were once again boosted in 1953 when Eisenhower announced 
the "de-neutralization" decision, and in 1954 the Mutual 
Defence Treaty was concluded. With de-neutralization, the 
Nationalists' immediate response was to try to persuade the 
U.S. that if the latter now intended to support the counter­
attack, it needed only to make public its determination to 
"set free" the Chinese mainland and provide material aid 
to the Nationalist forces. The press in Taiwan further 
hailed the American move as an effective step in carrying
out the policy of "delivering" captive peoples and an
2effective way of ending the Korean War. Chiang even
suggested to South Korean President Syngman Rhee the
establishment of a ROC-South Korean alliance which might
. . 3result in a two-pronged offensive against the Communists. 
Chiang's calculation was that, in view of the existing 
conditions in the Far East, the U.S. needed him in protecting 
its security interests in the West Pacific area as much as 
he needed the U.S. Thus, even as a small ally, Chiang lost 
no time in making the most of his opportunities. Chiang's 
assessment could be found in one of his speeches in 1953i 
"Our plan for fighting Communism and regaining the mainland 
will necessarily form...an important link in the general 1
1. Kunq-shanq jih-pao (The Commercial Times). Chinese news­
paper published in Taipei, 22nd December 1952, p. 1.
2. "Chinese Press Opinion", The China Post, 4th February 
1953, p. 2; and NYT, 4th February 1953, p. 3.
3. Hsinq-tao iih-pao (Hong Kong), 29th October 1953, p. 1.
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plan of the free world to combat world-wide Communist
aggression".'*’ Such a statement has subsequently been
interpreted as Chiang's strategy of provoking a Third World 
2War.
Eisenhower immediately reponded by making his "unleashing" 
decision explicit: i.e. it was not at all a prelude to a 
Nationalist "counterattack",3 and there was no intention 
of backing a Nationalist bid to recover the mainland. As 
seen by Dulles, the recover of the mainland, if it were to
come at all, would presumably come at some indeterminate
. . 4time in the next decade or two.
As far as Eisenhower was concerned, his position was clearly 
indicated in the Mutual Defence Treaty which, accompanying 
the Dulles-Yeh Exchanges, said:
"...the use of force will be a matter of joint 
agreement, subject to action of an emergency 
character which is clearly an exercise of the 
inherent right of self-defense. Military elements 
which are a product of joint effort and contribu­
tion by the two Parties ‘will not be removed from 
the territories described in Article VI to a 
degree which would substantially diminish the 
defensibility of such territories without mutual 
agreement." *
Nevertheless, as with the previous de-neutralization 
controversy, both Eisenhower and Chiang held opposing views. 
Eisenhower was of the view that the agreement was a "written 12345
1. NYT, 4th February, 1953, p. 1; and B. Crozier, op.cit., 
p. 361.
2. 0. E. Clubb, op.cit., p. 519.
3. W. M. Bueler, op.cit., p. 24.
4. Ibid.
5. D. D. Eisenhower,The White House Years, Mandate for Change 
1953-1963 (Garden City, N.Y.: Double day & Co., 1963).
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guarantee" to keep the Nationalist government from any 
unilateral attack on the mainland. It precluded the 
offshore islands serving as "bridge-heads" for an invasion 
and applied as well to sporadic attacks against the 
mainland. But, from the standpoint of the Nationalist 
government, the Treaty carried no restrictions on counter­
attack. For instance, George K. C. Yeh, who was responsible 
for the negotiation and signing of the Defence Treaty in 
1954, "clarified" the point as meaning that the two parties 
were bound to "consult" one another, implying that full 
agreement was not entirely necessary. In other words, in 
the view of the ROC, the Mutual Defence Treaty should not 
restrict a Nationalist counterattack against the mainland. 
Self-defence should be given a broad interpretation, the 
Nationalists argued, for any treaty, including the U.N. 
Charter, does not restrict the means of self-defence. 
Consequently, the right of the ROC to self-defence against 
its enemies, the Nationalists maintained, should not be 
restricted by any treaty. Thus, Shen Chang-huan, official 
spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from 1959 to 
1961, and later from 1968 to 1971 Deputy Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, indicated at a press conference that the recovery 
of the mainland was still entirely within the jurisdiction 
of his government, that it was the basic national policy and 
that efforts to reach this objective would be continued.1
The conclusion was that the Nationalist government continued 
to launch its sporadic raids against the mainland, and to
1. A reply to a question at a press conference, 3rd 
December 1954.
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make belligerent speeches encouraging forceful encounters 
with the mainland Communists. Such a policy remained 
largely unchanged until the 1960s.
3. The policy of expanding the conflict
Another way in which the ROC could be considered to have 
been attempting to win U.S. political support was its 
policy of expanding conflict in the Far East. The 
Nationalists were of the view that as long as fighting with 
Communists continued somewhere in Asia, and as long as the 
U.S. was involved, they could maintain a realistic hope of 
becoming the government of all of China one day. Thus if 
any dispute directly or indirectly involved the Chinese 
Communists, the Nationalist government's position was always 
to oppose suggestions of cease-fire or peace negotiations.
In the view of the Nationalist government, any such 
proposal should be deferred until it (the Nationalist 
government) was restored to power in Peking. The argument 
was that China was still in a stage of civil war, and that 
the ROC still had the strength to fight, so how could it 
seek peace, especially when the "rebels" were still 
established on the mainland? For this reason, it was 
suspected that the Nationalist government had the intention 
of sustaining conflict in Asia. In other words, it wanted 
to prevent stabilization of the status quo in Asia. Never­
theless, during the 1950s there were very few chances 
available to the ROC for exploitation. Even so, the two 
occasions-the Korean armistice and the Taiwan Straits cease­
fire— when Chiang had put forward his government's position
to the Americans can only be regarded as suspected 
exploitations because there is no way that the Nationalists' 
real motives can be proved.
(1) The Korean armistice
The Korean truce talks lasted two years and 17 days, 
and included 575 separate meetings. The Korean armistice 
was finally signed on the 27th July 1953. In principle, 
the Nationalist government opposed the U.N. armistice 
negotiation with the Communists. Charging that the 
Communists were the "aggressors", the Nationalist government 
was of the view that the Communists' real intention in 
entering peace talks was to clear the way towards 
controlling all of South Korea by force.1 *I,According to the 
Nationalists, this situation was identical to the 1949 
Chinese tragedy because at that time the Nationalists had 
agreed to accept peace negotiations with the Communists 
when conflict erupted, but they had failed to realize Mao 
Tse-tung's strategem that "Peace talks are nothing but 1 
political preparations for another war". The North Koreans 
backed by the Communist forces had only this objective in 
mind. Consequently, the Nationalist government opposed the 
U.N. limited objective of cease-fire and status quo ante. 
Instead of this, the Nationalists proposed that the main 
objective of the U.N. and the U.S. should be to help unite 
the two Koreas--the South and the North— under one 
democratic (i.e. United Nations-sponsored) government.
1. Speech delivered by Foreign Minister George K.C. Yeh at
the Dr. Sun Yat-sen Monthly Memorial Service at the 
Presidential Office, 2 June, 1953, in Free China Review,
III, 7 (July 1953), pp. 53-54.
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When the news from Korea made it clear that an armistice 
was on the way, on 20th July 1953, Chiang said the U.S. 
should encourage the creation of a West Pacific Security 
Pact, to include Taiwan and all other countries bordering 
on China.'*' Similarly, Senator William F. Knowland summoned 
all Asians to fight Communism, observing in passing that 
those who failed to cooperate in the fight would receive 
no American aid. Also Senator Alexander Wiley, the 
Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, called
for a "third great pact" for the Far East, to parallel
2NATO and the Organization of American States. Both of 
these politicians were regarded as consistent and vocal 
spokesmen for the China Lobby.
As far as the Nationalists were concerned, their proposal 
was intended to further the national interest of South 
Korea, the free countries of Asia, and eventually, the 
whole "Free World". Nevertheless, this call for a united 
anti-Communist front was also taken as either "uncooperative" 
or "provocation". The Nationalists further complained that 
the peace talks disregarded the criminal nature of the "Red" 
Chinese assistance to Kim II Sung of North Korea and that 
the Communists were being offered a place in the U.N. as 
an inducement to quit the war. Moveover, North Korea was 
likely to remain in Communist hands. This, as the 
Nationalists declared was a compromise with the "aggressor" 
which contravened the wishes of the Korean people and which 12
1. O. E. Clubb, op.cit., p. 519; B. Crozier, op.cit., pp. 
361-362.
2. 0. E. Clubb, op.cit., p. 519.
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ignored the objectives of the U.N.1 Accordingly, the 
Nationalists repeated their call to the U.S. and other 
Pacific Powers to form an anti-Communist alliance.1 2 3
Nevertheless, no notice was taken of the Nationalists' 
recommendation, and the Korean armistice negotiations were 
concluded in July 1953.
(2) The Taiwan Straits cease-fire
Similar to its position over the Korean cease-fire, the 
Nationalist government refused to accept the UN-sponsored 
cease-fire proposals during the Taiwan Straits crisis. To 
understand it, the following fact must be taken into 
consideration. If the Nationalist government did accept 
the cease-fire proposals, it would mean that the injured 
party (Taiwan) would in effect be recognizing the fait 
accompli of the "aggressors". Consequently, any cease-fire 
would be rejected by the ROC, the Nationalist government 
declared, unless it first clarified the responsibility of
the aggressor (Communist China) and the justified position
3of the Nationalist Chinese.
The Nationalists further remarked that they had no guarantee 
that the Communists would accept a cessation of war in the 
Taiwan Straits. If Taiwan had first appeared inclined to 
accept the cease-fire, the Communists would have never
1. Speech delivered by Foreign Minister George K, C. Yeh 
at the Dr. Sun Yat-sen Monthly Memorial Service at the 
Presidential Office, 2nd June 1953. See Free China Review (Taipei), 7th July 1953, pp. 53-54.
2. 0. E. Clubb, op.cit., p. 521; NYT, 19th March 1954, p. 4.
3. "President Chiang Reviews World Situation", Chinese News 
Service, Special Publication, February 1955, p. 3.
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agreed to it. Or they would have used Taiwan's moderate 
position as proof that the Nationalists on Taiwan could be 
made to compromise further.^
Thus the Nationalist government had to reject a cease-fire 
because it considered the Taiwan Straits crisis not an 
international problem (although it might have severe, inter­
national repercussions) but as part of the Chinese civil war. 
This position is emphasized very frequently by the Nationalists 
even today: "Ours is not an international war". If the 
U.N. cease-fire were put into effect (i.e. by putting U.N. 
Forces between the Nationalists and mainland Communists),
Taiwan would be forced to accept separation from China, hence 
the end of any hope of being the government of all China.
As one Chinese newspaper put it, the cease-fire movement was 
not confined to a mere cease-fire over the Taiwan Straits
but, by implication, it was "a trap to 'neutralize' Taiwan and
. . . .  2to divide China into two". Consequently, Chiang remarked
on U.S. talks in Warsaw over either cease-fire or a
1 , 3renunciation of force by the Communists as "superfluous".
Finally, it is necessary to say a few words with regard to 
the military situation along the Taiwan Straits after the 
second Quemoy crisis. It is generally assumed that the 
Nationalists and the Communists had deliberately come to a 
tacit agreement to keep the Quemoy battle protracted. That 
is, after the Communists announced their intention to bombard
1. Free China Weekly, 25th January 1955, p. 2.
2. Kunq-shanq jih-pao, 30th January 1955, p. 2.
3. Chiang Kai-shek, "Answers to Questions by Some Seventy 
Members of the Chinese and Foreign Press, Broadcasters, 
and Cameramen", in Selected Speeches and Messages in 1958 
(Taipei{Government Information Office, 1959), p. 69.
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Quemoy only on odd dates of the month (so the offshore 
islands could get supplies on even dates of the month from 
Taiwan) on 25th October 1958, the Nationalists, in response, 
decided to bombard the coastal provinces on alternate days. 
In the meantime, both parties seemed to have chosen 
restricted targets for their artillery in order to 
minimize severe damage. In fact, the PRC, despite or 
because of the growing consolidation of ROC rule on Taiwan 
and the offshore islands,had not shown great eagerness to 
attempt to retake the offshore islands by force, perhaps 
because, if it succeeded, it would create a situation when 
the ROC might be driven to secede from the mainland and 
declare an independent Republic of Taiwan. Thus, the state 
of civil war has continued, preventing the U.S. or any other 
outside body from adopting a two China policy. IV.
IV. Conclusions
The strategy of military counterattack characterized the 
essential feature of the ROC's foreign policy during the 
Cold War bipolarity. The basic ideas*of the strategy were 
to utilize the American security commitment in East Asia as 
well as its global containment policy for the promotion of 
the ROC's political objectives of national survival and 
unification.
Unforunately, coincidence of national interests in anti­
communism did not always assure coordination of national 
objectives. American involvement in East Asia had indeed 
providedthe Nationalist government with tremendous strength in
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blocking Communist advances against the island bastion, in 
diplomatic campaigns overseas and in the task of national 
construction. Certainly the Nationalist government had 
taken advantage of U.S. support for its domestic and foreign 
purposes and, in return, had proved itself at times a useful 
ally to the U.S. in its programme of resisting Communism in 
East Asia. Nevertheless, such an alliance relationship was 
not evenly balanced, because while the ROC was only one of 
the U.S. many allies, the latter was beyond question the only 
major friend of the ROC and while the U.S. anti-Communist 
programme was a global issue, the ROC's was mainly domesti­
cally orientated. A clash of national interests might occur, 
and the ROC, as a small ally, might face the threat to make 
compromise over its own national interests.
Two examples were the different opinions held by the two 
governments regarding: defence over the offshore islands 
and ROC's mainland recovery programme. Another look at these 
issues will help us to assess the effectiveness of the ROC's 
military strategy.
In principle the U.S. did not want to commit itself to help 
defend every islet off the China coast occupied by the 
Nationalists. This was because the U.S. did not want to 
risk the danger of war with the PRC and/or possibly with 
the Soviet Union. Thus, in both Quemoy crises, the U.S. 
faced a perplexing dilemma, i.e. either to defend the offshore 
islands at the expense of risking war with the Communist world 
or to risk the loss of Taiwan. During the first crisis, the 
U.S. assumed a degree of moral responsibility for some of the
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islands by encouraging the ROC to strengthen their defence.^ 
The U.S. was of the view then that conquest of the larger 
islands would inflict a severe defeat on Nationalist forces 
and seriously weaken defences on Taiwan itself. The ROC 
army was indispensable to the free world position in the 
Western Pacific— especially after the departure of the French 
army from Indochina. In a letter to British Prime Minister 
W. Churchill in early February 1955, Eisenhower wrote that 
the ROC forces were held together by a conviction that some 
day they would go back to the mainland. To surrender Quemoy 
and Matsu— their stepping-stones to the mainland— would thus 
destroy the reason for their existence, which "would mean the 
almost immediate conversion of that asset (Taiwan) into a
deadly danger, because the Communists would immediately take 
. 2it over." The ROC made certain that the stakes in this 
international poker game remained high by placing one-third 
of its forces on Quemoy and Matsu, where they remain today.
The U.S. resolved its dilemma for the time being by adopting 
the Formosa Resolution. Thus, as a result, the probability 
of U.S. intervention was increased enough so that the PRC 
refrained for a time being from pressing its attack on the 
two islands. After tension in the Taiwan Straits had some­
what subsided, Eisenhower tried but failed to persuade Chiang 
Kai-shek, in exchange for a promise to station U.S. marines 
and an air wing in Taiwan, to withdraw the bulk of troops 
from Quemoy and Matsu, converting them into outposts rather 
than strongly defended territories whose loss would severely 
damage the ROC's morale and prestige.
1. Karl Lott Rankin, op.cit., pp. 168-169.
2. D. D. Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, pp. 470-471.
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It is true that the first offshore island crisis left the 
U.S. more firmly committed to the defence and support of 
Taiwan. The provision in the defence treaty granting the 
right to station forces on the island strengthened the view 
of Taiwan as a vital link in the chain of the U.S. bases or 
potential bases in the Western Pacific. However, the crisis, 
which was highlighted by conflicting interests between the 
two governments over the defence of the offshore islands, 
and which was to arise again in more acute form in the 
second crisis, certainly did not help Chiang at all to 
fulfil his mainland recovery programme. The latter 
obviously was another issue of disagreement between the two 
governments.
Whereas the ROC's intention was to establish a connection 
between the defence of the offshore islands and Taiwan so 
that it could launch military attack on the mainland, the 
U.S. tried to play down the theme of mainland recovery by 
the imposition of the 7th Fleet. The Nationalists often 
remarked that had it not been for their over-dependence on 
the U.S., they would probably have been able to realize the 
mainland recovery policy. The remark was directed mainly 
against the constraining effect of the 1954 Mutual Defence 
Treaty. Thus, however effective Chiang's persuasion efforts 
were upon the U.S. administration, and however vociferous the 
China Lobby in promoting Chiang's interests during the 1950s, 
the ROC was unable to fulfil its objective of national 
reunification. On the contrary, Communist rule on the main­
land had been slowly but steadily consolidated. Meanwhile, it 
had gained support in the world. To be fair, however, ROC's
military strategy had had its successes in that, after the 
U.S, reversed its previous anti-Nationalist and anti-Chiang 
attitudes that had dominated the White Paper in 1949, it 
had made use of the U.S. commitment which was then badly 
needed for the Nationalists to ensure their survival.
Finally, it is important to recall that the consolidation of 
U.S.-ROC relations in the mid-1950s took place during the 
brief honeymoon in Sino-Soviet relations. That is, when 
these two Communist countries appeared to be cooperating 
closely and coordinating their effort to expand the area of 
Communist control in Asia. The slogan "Learn from the Soviet 
Union" was in vogue in China. Thousands of Chinese students 
were studying in the Soviet Union. The PRC had embarked on 
its first five-year plan, based on the Soviet model, and 
Moscow had committed itself to a massive transfer of 
technology to China. The People's Liberation Army of the 
PRC was being modernized with large quantities of Soviet 
weapons. Although hidden strains existed between the 
Communist allies even then, to the outside observer the 
preponderance of evidence at that time seemed to show that 
the Sino-Soviet alliance was solidly established.
Chapter Four
The Strategy of Political Counterattack
I . Introduction
During the 1960s, the ROC's strategy for survival entered 
another stage of development. This was caused primarily by 
the transformation of the international power relationship 
and, in conjunction with this, a gradual decline in U.S. 
support.
In the international arena, relations between the two 
Superpowers had gradually been modified. Instead of the 
strident Cold War ideological confrontation, a progressive 
improvement in relations— commonly known as detente— between 
the two Superpowers had begun. A new, multipolar world, 
with the PRC, Japan, and the newly independent countries-- 
the so-called "Third World Countries", predominantly in 
Africa— as the emerging forces, came into being.
The PRC, after more than a decade’s alliance with the Soviet 
Union and isolation from the U.S., now broke away from its 
"big brother" and began to assume a new role in developing 
its own role in the international area. Similarly Japan 
had recovered from its defeat and gradually taken a more 
independent stance vis-a-vis its one-time protector, the 
U.S., wielding tremendous economic power practically 
unchallenged in Asia. Even the Third World countries had 
decided to form a power bloc for a better and safer position 
in the world. As a consequence, the structure of states' 
interactions became increasingly complicated and fluid with
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Inevitably, these developments had a tremendous impact 
upon the political structure in the Far East as well as 
upon the role of the U.S. in the region. The Far East used 
to be a Cold War battlefield during the 1950s. And the 
U.S., regarding itself as a Pacific power, was the policeman 
in this area. Now, with the emergence of the five-power 
equilibrium— the U.S., the Soviet Union, the PRC, Japan, 
the Third World countries, and later, towards the end of 
1950s, Western Europe (or more precisely the EEC countries)-- 
on the international scene (hence a four-power balance in 
the Far East), the region of the Far East experienced a 
gradual erosion of ideological bonds and U.S. support.
The U.S. responded to these developments by taking a somewhat 
different view of Communist expansion in this region. That 
is, despite the fact that Communism was still considered 
as the most immediate threat to world peace, the U.S. 
gradually modified its strategies to deal with this threat! 
from a strict policy of Truman's "containment with isolation" 
it moved to a more general and flexible theme of "containment 
without isolation".1 Finally, towards the end of 1960s, the 
U.S. position shifted to one of pursuing normalization with 
the PRC. The U.S. approach to the PRC involved two issues.
On one hand, it suggested a less hostile attitude towards 
the PRC, while on the other hand, a less committed relationship
1. The policy was originally advocated by Professor A. Doak 
Barnett. See U.S. Policy with respect to Mainland China, 
Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United 
States Senate, 89th Congress, 2nd Session, (Washington, 
D.C.i U.S. Government Printing Office, 1966), p. 14.
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with the ROC. It was argued that, although for political, 
strategic, and moral reasons, the U.S. should continue its 
defence commitment of Taiwan, it was also important that 
it encourage "self-determination by the 13,500,000 
inhabitants of Taiwan". In other words, the U.S. government 
should, in conformity with the existing political "reality", 
gradually abandon the "myth" that the Nationalist government 
on Taiwan was the government of mainland China, but only 
recognize it as the legal government of those areas over 
which it held effective control, i.e. Taiwan and the 
Pescadores, and meanwhile adopt a step-by-step approach for 
a normalization with the Communist government on the main­
land. This was the mood dominating the U.S. administrations 
and academic circles during the later period of the 1960s.
In October 1967, Richard M. Nixon, in an article published
in the journal Foreign Affairs, outlined his proposal to 
2approach the PRC. Entitled "Asia after Viet Nam", Nixon's 
viewpoint was that the U.S. "must recognize the threat posed 
by (Communist) China, and work to meet it, but not by
3direct intervention". In other words, the U.S. should try 
"to persuade (Communist) China that it must change: that it 
can not satisfy its imperial ambition, and that its own 
national interest requires a turning away from foreign 
adventuring and a turning inward toward the solution of its 
own domestic problems".^ In a foreshadowing of his later
1. Ibid. See also Richard M. Nixon, "Asia Foreiqn Affairs, No. 46, (October 1967),
after Viet Nam", 
p. 123.
2. Richard M. Nixon, op.cit., pp. 111-125.
3. Ibid., p. 121.
4. Ibid.
Guam speech of 1969, Nixon also called for the non-Communist 
nations of Asia to play a greater role in their own 
defence, and for the formation of new Asian organizations 
to replace the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), 
which he called an "anachronistic relic".1 Once this had 
been accomplished, concluded Nixon, we could then "pull 
(Communist) China back into the family of nations".^
On 5th November 1968, Nixon was elected as the 37th President 
of the U.S. In his inaugural address in January the 
following year, Nixon maintained that he would move to make
fundamental changes in U.S. foreign policy: "After a period
3of confrontation, we are entering an era of negotiation."
Thus, on 25th July the following year, Nixon announced the 
Guam Doctrine which, unlike Truman's Containment Doctrine, 
urged a gradual withdrawal of U.S. commitment abroad. The 
Doctrine, which later became the "Nixon Doctrine", was a 
concrete plan for subsequent American disengagement in the 
world, in particular from Asia.
The impact of the Nixon Doctrine was tremendous. It created 
uncertainties in the international environment probably 
unprecedented in post-War Far Eastern politics. Foreign 
policies grew more flexible and leaders appeared more 
capable of compromise. The range of options for each of 
the major powers seemed to have expanded. As for the smaller 
powers, their status as allies was meanwhile becoming less 123
1. Ibid., p . 116.
2. Ibid., p. 122.
3. President Richard M. Nixon's inaugural address on 20th 
January 1969. For the text of his address, see Interna­
tional Herald Tribune (IHT), 21st January 1969, p. 4.
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and less meaningful. On the positive side, this allowed 
greater freedom for independent action on their part. Yet, 
on the negative side, they received less security protection 
from their patrons. This made intense caution necessary, 
because smaller nations had to be quick to discover and 
make use of any new possibilities in international relations 
which seemed most likely to provide them with the prospect 
of maximum security.
The Nationalist government was not slow to realize these 
facts. Since the beginning of the 1960s, the Nationalists 
had already perceived the trend of increasing threat of 
international isolation and hostility caused by a possible 
erosion of U.S. support, by a U.S. rapport with the PRC, 
and by the unfavourable development of international 
politics. All of these factors, inter-related in some ways, 
motivated the Nationalist government to adopt a more 
effective foreign policy strategy to tackle with the issue 
of national survival. Nevertheless, in pursuing this new 
course, the Nationalist government continued to declare that 
its principal national positions-anti-Communism and mainland 
recovery— remained unchanged. In the view of the Nationalist 
government, the political world of the 1960s was still more 
or less identical to the two camps of the 1950s, and hence 
it was still unsafe because of the continued existence of 
Communist ideology. In other words, the Cold War had not 
come to an end totally, despite the fact that the world was 
now witnessing the growth of detente. This was because, 
according to Chiang Kai-shek and other Nationalist leaders, 
the Communists could use detente as a disguise to promote
their goal of world domination. The Nationalists therefore 
urged the democratic world to be aware of the Communist 
trick, and meanwhile, to continue its support for Taiwan 
as the frontline of international anti-Communism.
Seen in these terms, ROC's foreign policy seemed to be 
rather static and rigid, partly because while the whole 
world was now moving towards the tune of peaceful co­
existence with the Communist world, the Nationalist govern­
ment still held firm to the theme of "no compromise under 
whatever circumstances with Communist ideology"} and partly 
because while the existence of the Chinese Communist 
government had become more and more a political reality, 
the Nationalist government still probed for a return to 
the mainland. However, despite its belief in the two camps 
and its insistence upon these unchangeable national positions, 
if one observes carefully the actual policies taken by the 
Nationalist government, one can conclude that adjustments 
and flexibilities became apparent in the ROC's foreign 
policy during the 1960s, although such transformation were 
subtle and at times scarcely noticeable. One can even 
conclude that, similar to other anti-Communist countries 
in the Far East, the ROC delicately and skillfully balanced 
the issue of ideology with, say, a less aggressive attitude 
towards Soviet communism (as a response to the Sino-Soviet 
split), hence laying a foundation for greater policy 
flexibility in the future.
The new foreign policy strategy of the Nationalist government 
has been characterized as "Cheng-chi fan-kung" or "political
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counterattack". This period really lasted from the 
signing of the Dulles-Yeh Joint Communique in October 1958 
until the end of 1971, when the ROC was expelled from the 
U.N. The transition was reflected in President Chiang 
Kai-shek's 1959 New Year's Message. Chiang said: "Now the 
task of mainland recovery is to be accomplished by efforts
which are '70 percent political and only 30 percent
. . 2 military'".
The declared objectives of this new strategy remained more 
or less similar to those announced under the military 
strategy; but the priorities were rearranged. For instance, 
the military strategy emphasized the importance of 
destroying the status quo (through military actions), whereas 
political counterattack— or the political strategy— was more 
and more inclined toward the preservation of the status quo 
(through a long-term political struggle to win the hearts 
and minds of the Chinese people), although ultimately, they 
both aimed for a unified China under the San Min Chu I system 
and a World Commonwealth. Here, we have to stress the point 
again that political counterattack was not a strategy 
directed against the "domestic" enemy of the Communist 
Chinese on the mainland alone, but against all the Communist 
forces in the world. As Chiang often maintained: "The war 
is not a mere civil war, it is a part of the international 1
1. Chiang Kai-shek, "Revelation on Counter-Offensive 
Strategy on the Destruction of Red Calamity and the 
Founding of Perpetual Peace", in Hu Pu-yu, ed. The 
Military Exploits and Deeds of President Chianq Kai- 
shek (Taipei: Chung Wu Publishing Co., 1971), pp. 265- 
272. See also Chapter Three, footnote no. 1, p. 127.
2. See Chapter Three, footnote no. 2,p. 146.
anti-Communist war."^ Moreover, the period of its operation 
was not limited to the years, 1958-71, it was continued 
afterwards. It did, however, play a less prominent part 
in the ROC's foreign policy in other periods.
In this Chapter, in addition to a general understanding of 
the meaning of and tactics involved in the political strategy, 
we will consider two aspects of the ROC's foreign policy, 
that is, the changes and continuities of the ROC's foreign 
policy during the 1960s as compared to its foreign policy 
during the previous decade. Our purpose is to illustrate 
ROC's strategies for survival through an examination of the 
extent of the flexibility and adaptability of its foreign 
policy formulations. The continuities concern the ROC's 
intransigence, i.e. power struggle, against the "enemy" on 
the mainland; whereas the changes refer to the ROC's modified 
relationships with the U.S., with the newly independent 
countries, and with some neighbouring countries in Asia.
Also noted in the changes was the ROC's attitude toward the 
Sovi et Uni on.
We will begin with a brief review of the evolution of U.S. 
policy towards the two Chinese governments during the period 
concerned, and its interplay with the international environ­
ment, so as to examine, at a later stage, the ROC responses 
to these developments.
1 . Chiang Kai-shek, op.cit.,p. 267.
II• U .S .-ROC relations revised; 1958-71
In theory, both John F. Kennedy (presidential term 1961-63) 
and Lyndon B. Johnson (presidential term 1963-69) respected 
the policy foundations laid down by their predecessors.
That is, they continued to support the Nationalist government 
politically, militarily, economically and morally, and to 
maintain international isolation of the PRC. Nevertheless, 
both Administrations indicated their intentions indirectly 
on several occasions of considering the possibility of 
reducing the U.S. commitment to the ROC, and in the mean­
time of acknowledging the existence of the "PRC".
Kennedy’s intentions could be found in an article published
in October 1957 while he was still a Senator; in his election
debate with Nixon, then the Vice-President, of the 1960
presidential campaign; and in a speech delivered in June
1961 when he was en route to Vienna to meet with Soviet
Premier Khrushchev. Senator Kennedy's article, entitled
"A Democrat Looks at Foreign Policy", criticized U.S. policy
as "exaggeratedly military" and "probably too rigid".1 In
other words, Kennedy maintained: "these have been--and still
are--compelling reasons for the nonrecognition of (Communist)
China; but we must be very careful not to strait-jacket our
policy as a result of ignorance and fail to detect a change
2in the objective situation when it comes." With regard to 
the election debate, Kennedy held the view that defence of 
Quemoy and Matsu was not actually vital to the U.S. security 
interests. He said:
1. John F. Kennedy, "A Democrat Looks at Foreign Policy", 
Foreign Affairs, No. 36 (October 1957), p. 50. 2
2. Ibid.
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...we have never said flatly that we will defend 
Quemoy and Matsu if it is attacked...I think it is 
unwise to take the chance of being dragged into a 
war which may lead to a world war over two islands 
which are not strategically defensible, which are 
not.... essential to the defense of Formosa (Taiwan)."1
Later in a speech delivered on 2nd June 1962, President
Kennedy said: "we desire peace and we desire to live^mity
, 2 with the Chinese people (on the mainland)".
Similarly, on one occasion President Johnson was quoted as 
saying:
’...eventual reconciliation with (Communist) China is 
necessary and possible....the U.S. will persist in 
efforts to reduce tensions between the two countries... 
A peaceful mainland China is central to a peaceful 
Asia. A hostile China must be discouraged from 
aggression. A misguided China must be encouraged 
toward understanding of the outside world and toward 
policies of peaceful cooperation." 1 23
It can be seen, then, that the whole process of trans­
formation of U.S. China policy had begun well before Nixon's 
1969 Guam Doctrine, although it developed very slowly.
Next, we will discuss some of the factors that caused the 
change of mood in the U.S. administrations over China. Very 
briefly, there was (1) the Sino-Soviet split, (2) the 
growing strength and prestige of the PRC in the world, and
(3) the cost of U.S. military involvement in the Vietnam 
War.
1. Congressional Quarterly, China: U.S. Policy since 1945, 
p. 124.
2. Ibid., p . 126.
3. Ibid., p. 164.
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1. Factors that influenced America's China policy
(1) The Sino-Soviet split
During the 1950s, the PRC was a close ally of the Soviet 
Union. Nevertheless, by the end of the decade, the two 
Communist countries began to show signs of disagreement, 
and it widened to involve virtually all of the fundamental 
issues facing them. The first public indication of the 
split was revealed on 16th April 1960 when the CCP's 
journal Honqqi (Red Flag) published an article entitled 
"Long Live Leninism". The article sought to demonstrate 
the theoretical legitimacy of Chinese Communism and Mao 
Tse-tung, and the deviation and heresay of the Soviet 
Union. It argued that Mao, not Khrushchev, was the heir 
to the Communist tradition, and the logical successor to 
Marx, Lenin and Stalin. In retaliation, the Soviet Communist 
Party charged the Chinese Communists as "dogmatists" (i.e. 
adhering too rigidly to earlier communist writings) while 
claiming that Khrushchev’s tactics represented an application 
of creative Leninism.^ After that, the two countries openly 
assailed each other. In 1969, relationships between them 
reached their lowest point when serious fighting flared up 
on the Sino-Soviet border. In view of this development, the 
U.S. administrations sought to turn the situation to their 
advantage. That is, the U.S. could opt for a better relations 
either with Peking or with Moscow so as to widen the split 
between them. This can be described as playing either the 
"China card" or the "Russian card". 1
1. Ibid., pp. 122-123.
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(2) The growing strength and prestige of the PRC
There were three inter-related factors which led to the 
rise of the PRC in international politics: first, the 
changed power structure in the U.N.; second, French 
recognition of the Peking government; and third, the 
explosion of the first Chinese atom bomb in October 1964 
and of many afterwards.
During the 1950s, the U.N. power balance was in the favour 
of the U.S. The U.S. then was able to muster a majority 
for its cause in the U.N., which included diplomatic 
recognition and political support for the ROC and a 
rejection of Peking's admission into the organization. 
Nevertheless, U.S. strength in the U.N. began to deteriorate 
after 1960 when a large number of newly independent countries 
were admitted into the organization. A direct consequence 
of their admission was its impact on the U.N. voting 
patterns— voting in the General Assembly on the China issue 
showed only a very marginal victory for the U.S. after the 
mid-1960s.1 Thus, despite continued U.S. efforts to help 
the ROC win support, there was a marked decline of inter­
national sympathy for the U.S./ROC position in the U.N., 
hence an increase of support for Peking. The situation was 
reinforced by France's new China policy.
On 27th January 1964, the French government extended 
recognition to the Peking government and subsequently 
supported its seating in the U.N. This move reflected three 1
1. For detailed information on the changing patterns of 
U.N. voting on the issue, also the importance of the 
newly independent African states on this balance, see 
Chapter Five.
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important decisions taken by the French governments 
(i) The evolution of policy from hostility to the PRC 
during the French involvement in the Indochinese war and 
during the Cold War period, to a neutral position immediately 
thereafter, and subseguently to outright support? (ii) in 
conformity with this new China policy, the French government 
terminated its support for the Nationalist government. The 
French decisions included withdrawalof diplomatic relations 
and objections to the Nationalists' right to sit in the 
U.N.? and (iii) French policy toward the PRC coincided with 
President de Gaulle's moves toward an independent policy 
vis-a-vis the U.S. Since France was a traditional ally of 
the U.S., and it was also the first major western country 
to recognize the PRC after Britain in 1950, i.e. after the 
Korean War, its new China policy thus constituted a direct 
challenge to U.S. leadership in the western democracies. 
According to de Gaulle, France could no longer ignore "the 
fact that for 15 years almost the whole of China is 
gathered under a government which imposes its laws, and 
that externally China has shown herself to be a sovereign 
and independent power".1 Finally, France had been a world­
wide colonial power, and it maintained strong influence on 
its former colonies. The impact of the change on world 
opinion was therefore tremendous. That is, since guite a 
large number of the newly independent countries were 
previously French colonies, they, with little experience in 
international affairs after decolonization, had the tendency 
to follow their colonial administrator for policy formulation
1. Congressional Quarterly, op.cit., p. 141.
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in dealing with their foreign affairs. Consequently, 
French recognition of the PRC helped the latter to win 
diplomatic support from these newly independent countries.
International support for the PRC was also reinforced by 
the fact that Peking had begun an active campaign to 
achieve leadership among the newly independent countries, 
particularly in Africa. PRC's Premier Chou En-lai, seeking 
his objective, visited 10 African countries in early 1964. 
In the course of this visit, and shortly thereafter, 7 
countries extended diplomatic recognition to Peking.* Also 
in order to win more support, Peking concluded several 
economic and technical cooperation agreements with African
countries. This programme of economic and technical
, 2 assistance was also extended to some countries in Asia.
Finally, the PRC's growing strength during this period was 
related to its atomic development. On 16th October 1964, 
Peking exploded its first atomic bomb. The significance of 
this1 experiment was manifold. It indicated that the PRC, 
as the first non-white country to make such a bomb, had now 12
1. Chou's famous "African Tour" had taken him to the United 
Arab Republic (UAR), Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Ghana, 
Mali, Guinea, Sudan, Ethiopia, and Somalia. The seven 
countries that extended diplomatic recognition to the 
PRC were Tunisia, Kenya, Tanganyika, the Central African 
Republic (CAR), Dahomey, Zambia and Senegal.
2. Since 1964, Communist China had concluded economic and 
technical cooperation agreements with Algeria, Ghana, 
Guinea, Kenya, Mali, Somalia, Tanzania, Uganda and the 
UAR in Africa, and with Afghanistan, Cambodia, Indonesia, 
North Vietnam, and Pakistan in Asia. However, not all 
these agreements survived. In 1965, the upheavals in 
Africa and in Indonesia brought an abrupt end to economic 
as well as political agreements. These shifts were 
obviously felt in the subsequent U.N. votes on the China 
issue. See Chapter Five for more information on the 
impact of French recognition of the PRC, and on Communist 
China's relations with Africa.
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attained some proficiency in the nuclear field. The 
second and the third tests on 15th May 1965 and 9th May 
1966 respectively further proved its important progress in 
nuclear technology. Certainly, these explosions had 
political significance as well. On the one hand, newly 
independent countries felt proud that a country in the 
early stages of economic development could achieve as much 
as the U.S., the United Kingdom, France and the U.S.S.R.
On the other hand, however, this respect was tempered by 
disquiet since many newly independent countries felt 
anxious that Peking had refused to take part in the 1963 
test ban treaty which had been signed by the U.S., the U.K., 
the U.S.S.R. and many other nations.1 Nevertheless, many of 
these newly independent countries did not like the U.S. and 
its role in Asia (partly because they considered the U.S. 
as an imperialist power), and they viewed the Chinese 
government of the A-bomb as a beginning in creating a new 
and more desirable balance of power.
(3) The cost of U.S. military involvement in the Vietnam War
Since 7th February 1965, the U.S. had embarked on an ever­
growing programme of bombing North Vietnam. The bombing, 
which created a severe financial burden on the U.S. economy, 
approached the borders of Chinese mainland, bringing with it 
a widespread fear that the PRC would become embroiled. The 
threat of a U.S. war with the PRC was felt keenly at the 
U.N., where many countries bitterly criticized the U.S.
1. For instance, Ethopian Emperor Haile Selassie openly 
expressed his disappointment that the PRC has refused 
to sign the accord. Congressional Quarterly, op .cit. 
p. 232.
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It was also felt keenly at home, where anti-war feeling 
was high. Consequently, the war led the U.S. to weary 
of its role as world policeman and weakened American 
confidence in the justice and value of intervention in 
foreign countries. Thus Nixon, after assessing the impact 
of the U.S. involvement in Vietnam on U.S. society and 
pointing out his intention to disengage the U.S. from this 
involvement, remarked that the U.S. would be reluctant, 
after Vietnam, to become involved once again in a similar 
intervention on a similar basis:
'....The War has imposed severe strains on the 
United States, not only militarily and economi­
cally but socially and politically as well.
Bitter dissension has torn the fabric of American 
intellectual life, and whatever the outcome of 
the war the tear may be a long time mending. If 
another friendly country should be faced with an 
externally supported communist insurrection—  
whether in Asia, or in Africa or even Latin 
America — there is serious question whether the 
American public or the American Congress would 
now support a unilateral American intervention, 
even at the request of the host government...”
Also,
"For the United States to go it alone in containing 
China would not only place an unconscionable burden 
on our own country, but also would heighten the 
chances of nuclear war while undercutting the 
independent development of the nation of Asia."1
Nixon's speech also indicated the concern that the U.S.
would have no allies in a war with the PRC, a position which
2had already been mentioned by Kennedy in 1960.
1. Richard M. Nixon, op.cit., pp. 113-114, and p. 123.
2. William M. Bueler, op■cit■, p. 44.
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Against this background, U.S. China policy began to waver. 
And it was under the Nixon Administration, that a new China 
policy began to materialize.
2. The evolution of America's China policy
In November 1963, President Kennedy indicated in a press 
conference that the U.S. would not stick stubbornly to a 
policy hostile toward the Chinese Communists. If the latter 
expressed a willingness peacefully to co-exist with the U.S. 
and with other countries surrounding it, Kennedy asserted, 
then the U.S. would reconsider its China policy.1 Later, 
on 12th December, Roger Hilsman, then Assistant Secretary 
of State for Far Eastern Affairs, delivered a speech on 
an "open-door policy" toward Peking. Stating that the U.S.
was "determined to keep the door open" until changes occurred
2on the Chinese mainland. At the same time, Hilsman stressed 
that U.S. defence of Taiwan was a matter of "basic principle" 
and there could be no "basic improvement" in U .S .-Communist 
China relations until the latter accepted that fact. In 
this respect, it seems that the real intention behind 
Hilsman's statement was to probe the PRC on the "two China" 
theory— the significance of which was that if the PRC gave 
its approval to such a possibility, further negotiations 
would be facilitated. In this way, the U.S. made its first 
official move towards a rapprochement with the PRC. Thus, 
it is no exaggeration to say that Hilsman's speech was a 
milestone in the consequent transformation of the U.S. policy 
toward the two Chinese governments.
1. NYT, 15th November 1963.
2. NYT, 14th December 1963; see also Congressional Quarterly, 
op■cit., p. 139.
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Later on, this policy change was made more positive in a 
speech of Dean Rusk, Secretary of State, when he was 
touring Taiwan in April 1964. Instead of reiterating the 
U.S.'s previous support for the Nationalist government as 
"the only Chinese government which legally represents 
China", Rusk merely stressed America's treaty obligations 
with the ROC and opposed handing over its seat in the U.N. 
to the Chinese Communists.1 In other words, the U.S. seemed 
to be no longer in opposition to the Communist government's 
admission into the U.N., as long as Taiwan was not expelled.
In July 1965, the U.S. terminated its programme of economic
assistance to Taiwan on the grounds that the post-War
economic reconstruction of the island had now been completed
and that its development had now reached a level where it
could qualify for loans on non-concessional terms and
therefore no longer needed U.S. aid. In terminating this
economic aid programme, the U.S. government, however,
continued to provide military assistance and surplus farm
2products to the ROC.
After that, the U.S. move toward a new China policy gradually 
gained momentum. In December the same year, for instance, 
the U.S. government announced that the ban on travel to 
mainland China was lifted for doctors and medical scientists. 
After 1966, scholars, writers and journalists were added to 
the list and in July, the State Department announced that it 
would now allow Americans in public affairs, cultural, 12
1. CDN, 17th April, 1964, p. 1.
2. Congressional Quarterly, op.cit., p. 154. For more infor­
mation on U.S. economic aid to the ROC, see Chapter Six.
athletic, commercial, educational, and other fields to 
visit the mainland. All of these restrictions had been 
put into force during the 1950s. Moverover, in order to 
facilitate a smooth transition for the China policy, experts 
and scholars of the "China problem" were invited to take 
part in a debate over government policy. They expressed 
their opinion, with the majority advocating an improvement 
of relations with the Peking government by all possible 
means. It was against this background that the policy of 
"containment without isolation" gradually emerged.^
2On 16th March 1966 Dean Rusk proposed a ten-point policy.
Among many other things, Rusk said that the U.S. had no 
intention of overthrowing the Chinese Communist government 
by military force; that the U.S. acknowledged that the 
Chinese Communists had established a stable political force 
on the Chinese mainland; and that should the Chinese Communists 
renounce their belief that "force is the best means of 
resolving dispute", and also abandon their strategic line 
of a violent world revolution, then the U.S. would welcome 
the establishment of friendly relations between the two 
countries. Other proponents of "bridge-building" with 
Peking were, for instance, Vice-President Hubert H. Humphrey 
and President Lyndon Johnson. Humphrey shared the view that 
U.S. policy toward Communist China should be one of 
"containment without isolation". Johnson's view was similar: 
"American policy toward the Chinese Communists would be
3firm but flexible". It was apparent that the U.S. was making 123
1. See footnote no. l,p. 199.
2. Congressional Quarterly, op.cit., p. 161 and pp. 315-319.
3. NYT, 17th June 1966, p. 7; and 13th July, 1966, pp. 1-3.
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all efforts to reach a rapprochement with the Chinese 
Communists.
Nevertheless, despite all these efforts, relations between 
the U.S. and the PRC seemed to make little progress. This 
was because, after mid-1966, the latter was plunged into 
unprecedented chaos caused by the "Great Proletarian 
Cultural Revolution" (1965-69). In addition, the escalation 
of the Vietnam War slowed down the promise of a quick 
rapprochement.
The breakthrough in U.S.-PRC relations finally came during 
the Nixon administration (1969-1974). As mentioned earlier, 
President Nixon indicated very clearly in his Guam speech 
that the U.S. would reduce its military presence on the 
Asian mainland and would concentrate on providing Asian 
nations with the means to defend themselves.1 This new 
policy framework had the effect of forcing all the nations on 
the periphery of China to reappraise their positions, and 
of opening the way for the normalization of relations with 
the PRC by complying with a fundamental Chinese demand 
which dated from 1950, namely the removal of U.S. troops 
which "encircled" China.
The Doctrine obviously had a direct effect upon the ROC in 
terms of its role in the Chinese civil war, as well as upon 
its struggle for international recognition. In October 
1970, for instance, Canada extended recognition to the 
Peking government, thus terminating its relations with the
1. See footnote no. 3, p. 201. For the text of the Nixon 
Doctrine and its policies towards China, see 
Congressional Quarterly, op■cit., pp . 321-326.
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ROC. The Canadian decision was reached on the basis that:
"The Chinese (Communist) government reaffirms that Taiwan
is an inalienable part of the territory of the PRC. The
Canadian government takes note of this position of the
Chinese (Communist) government."'1 This sentence was the
result of 18 months of negotiations between the two countries,
and the handling of the "Taiwan problem" in this way later
became a model - the so-called "Canadian model" - for many 
2other countries. One month later, Italy, using the 
Canadian example, followed suit. Since both countries were 
close American allies, their actions therefore encouraged 
other western countries, who had wanted to modify their 
China policies, to approach Peking.
On 25th February 1971, Nixon in what amounted to a formal 
enunciation of the Nixon Doctrine, stressed again his 
desire for improvements in U.S. relations with the PRC.
But this time he added the very alarming statement that
"The U.S. is prepared to see the People’s Republic of China
1 • • 3play a constructive role in the family of nations." This
was the first time Nixon had used the formal name adopted
by the government of mainland China since 1949. At the
same time, Nixon also indicated that he wished the conflict
between Taipei and Peking could be resolved in a peaceful
manner. By this time a trend was developing in official
American policy towards China which contradicted Nixon’s 123
1. Congressional Quarterly, op.cit., p. 194.
2. The theme had obviously changed from a "China problem" 
to a "Taiwan problem", indicating a changed opinion on 
the nature of the Chinese civil war and consequently on 
the legal status of Taiwan and the Nationalist govern­
ment .
3. NYT, 8th October, 1960, p. 11.
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previous positions when he was the Vice-President. He 
had said:
"Recognition of Communist China and its admission to 
the United Nations have been firmly opposed by the 
Republican administration. We will continue in this 
opposition."
And,
"I think as far as Quemoy and Matsu are concerned, 
that the question is not these two little pieces of 
real estate. They are unimportant. ... It is the 
principle involved...We should not force our 
Nationalist allies to get off them and give them to 
the Communists. If we do that, we start a chain 
reaction, because the Communists aren’t after Quemoy 
and Matsu. They are after Formosa (Taiwan)." I
Nixon's new China policy clearly reflected a change of mind
with regard to the two Chinese governments. Later, on 28th
April, this policy transition was officially announced by
the U.S. Department of State in its Statement on the Status 
2of Taiwan. With regard to mainland, the U.S. took the 
vi ew that:
"Mainland China has been controlled and administered 
by the People's Republic of China for 21 years and 
for some time we have been dealing with that govern­
ment on matters affecting our mutual interest." 3
With regard to the question about who exercises sovereignty 
over Taiwan, the U.S. said:
1.
2 .
3.
Congressional Quarterly, op.cit., p. 124. See also Richard 
Nixon, "United States Foreign Policy for the 1970's, 
Building for Peace" (25th February 1971), Department of 
State Bulletin, LXIV, 1656 (22nd March 1971), pp. 382-384.
Taiwa£?Pï S M £ r ? Î  fffif lel^ S R ^ n ^ f . SM ^ fri:U.S.1971, p. 1. Or Hungdah Chiu, ed. China and the Taiwan 
Issue (New York: Praeger, 1979), pp. 244-245.
Ibid.
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"In our view sovereignty over Taiwan and the 
Pescadores is an unsettled question subject to 
future international resolution. Both the 
Republic of China and the People's Republic of 
China disagree with this conclusion. Both 
consider Taiwan and the Pescadores Islands are 
part of the sovereign state of China...Obviously 
we cannot hope to resolve the dispute between 
these two rival governments....our position has 
been and remains very firmly that whatever the 
ultimate resolution of the dispute between the 
Republic of China on Taiwan and the People's 
Republic of China on the mainland, it should be 
accomplished by peaceful means." 1
The above statement implied that there were two ways this 
issue could be resolved— either through international 
resolution or through direct negotiations between the two 
Chinese governments. With regard to the Nationalist govern­
ment, the U.S. now stated thati
"We regard the Republic of China as exercising 
legitimate authority over Taiwan and the Pescadores 
by virtue of the fact that Japanese forces 
occupying Taiwan were directed to surrender to 
the forces of the Republic of China." 2
The U.S. was now clearly treating the Nationalist government
and the Communist government as two separate nations.
Afterwards, as part of a policy of seeking improved relations
with the PRC, the U.S. avoided adopting any action which
could be interpreted by the Communist government as hostile,
and made a large scale reduction in military aid to Taiwan.
This included casting aside proposals to supply weapons that
3would increase the offensive strength of Taiwan, reducing 123
1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
3. For example, a bill submitted by various Congressmen to 
supply Taiwan with a squadron of Phantom jets and three 
submarines was vetoed by the White House, see NYT, 10th 
July 1966, p. 13.
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and finally halting altogether patrols of the 7th Fleet 
in the Taiwan Straits,1 and consequently blocking commando 
raids on the mainland by Taiwan.
On 15th July 1971, Nixon officially announced his proposed
. 2trip to the mainland. Despite the fact that Nixon, in an 
effort to reassure Taiwan, had said that "Our action in 
seeking a new relationship with the People's Republic of 
China will not be at the expense of our old friends", the 
repercussions of this "shock" on the ROC were profound.3 
On 2nd August, the U.S. secretary of State William Rogers 
declared that the U.S. "will end its 20-year opposition to 
the seating of the People’s Republic of China in the U.N.,
and will therefore support action at the General Assembly
. 4this fall calling for seating the PRC...." On the subject
of which government should have China’s seat on the Security
Council, Rogers said that the U.S. would abide by the
majority decision of the U.N.
The repercussions of .these statements and U.S. pro-Peking 
actions were clearly felt in the October U.N. vote which 
was the last on the China representation issue. That is, 
despite the fact that the U.S. continued to make efforts to 
retain the ROC membership at the U.N., in the 26th session 
of the U.N. General Assembly, many delegates of other 1234
1. On 7th November 1969 the U.S. ended the 19-year presence 
of the 7th Fleet in the Taiwan Straits. Since its 
assignment to patrol the Taiwan Straits, the 7th Fleet 
had become a symbol of U.S. commitment to the ROC. At 
the same time, it indicated an open hostility between 
the U.S. and Communist China.
2. For the text of Nixon's announcement of his trip to the 
PRC, see U.S. News and World Report, LXXXI, 41 (26th 
July 1971), p. 14.
3. Congressional Quarterly, op.cit., p. 198.
4 . ibid., p. 200. See also Jerome A. Cohen, op.cit., p. 185
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nations, especially those from the Third World, considered 
the U.S. position on the issue self-contradictory and its 
efforts to save the ROC seat merely halfhearted. For on 
the very day when George Bush, U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., 
was trying to win votes to support the U.S.-initiated 
"Important Question" resolution, which required a two-thirds 
majority vote for the expulsion of the ROC, Henry Kissinger, 
then National Security Adviser, was in Peking, making 
arrangements for Nixon’s visit to the PRC. Consequently, 
by the switch of a few votes, the "Important Question" 
resolution was defeated in the General Assembly on the 
evening of 25th October 1971.^ Facing almost sure passing 
of the Albanian proposal, which called for the seating of the 
PRC in the U.N. and the expulsion of the ROC, the delegation 
of the ROC, led by Foreign Minister Chou Shu-Kai, walked out 
of the General Assembly, after declaring the withdrawal of 
the ROC from the U.N. membership. Thus, after 21 years of 
controversy in the U.N., the problem as to who should 
represent the State of China in this world organization was 
finally settled with the PRC replacing the ROC in both the 
Security Council and the General Assembly.
After that, the triangular relationship among the ROC, the 
U.S., and the PRC entered a new phase. With the Chinese 
Communist government gradually replacing the Nationalist 
government as the legal Chinese government, having relations 1
1. For a discussion on the seating of the PRC in the U.N., 
see "Why Majority in U.N. Turn on the U.S.", U.S. News 
and World Report, LXXI, 19 (8th November 1971), pp.
17-19. See also Chapter Five. For the texts of the 
"Important Question" resolution and the Albanian Proposal, 
see Appendix No. 1.
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with the U.S. government as well as with the majority of 
states in the world, and with a gradual consolidation of 
the PRC's national status and international prestige, the 
ROC's status became less and less certain. Thus, the term 
"pariah state" has often been used to describe the ROC's 
ambiguous status during the post-U.N. period.1 It was 
because of this growing uncertainty and ambiguity that the 
name "Taiwan" has been used increasingly to describe the 
Nationalist government of the ROC on Taiwan, or in 
references to the two-China's confrontation. Thus, in order 
to avoid confusion, it is necessary to point out that in the 
remaining part of this thesis, "Taiwan" will be used 
interchangeably with the ROC to mean the same Nationalist 
government of the ROC on Taiwan.
Confronted by these unfavourable developments in the 
international environment, one immediately raises such 
questions as: How did the ROC cope with the situation?
Could it continue to depend on the U.S. and on the policy 
of "western alignment" as in the 1950s for the purpose of 
national survival? If not, what policies did it adopt?
Were these new policies successful? 1
1. Joseph Frankel, op.cit ..P27.Frankel defines the term
"pariah states" as "states whose recognition had been 
withdrawn or was threatened." See also Leonard Unger, 
"Taiwan: The Prosperous Pariah (1): Derecognition 
Worked", Foreign Policy, No. 26 (Fall 1979), pp. 105- 
121; and Frank Chang, "Taiwan: The Prosperous Pariah 
(2): A Most Envied Frovince", ibid., pp. 122-146.
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3. The RPC's foreign policy towards the U.S.; the use
of an ally
During the 1950s the ROC had depended on the U.S. almost 
entirely for its security protection, and national 
development. Foreign policy was pre-occupied with the 
twin issues of "mainland recovery" and the "survival crisis". 
The Nationalist government did little to promote relations 
with countries other than the U.S. American support was 
granted to the ROC mainly as part of its strategy of 
containment, and partly out of moral considerations.
Indeed, for the purposes of containment, Taiwan and the 
offshore islands did at one time assume a strategic value 
in the Pacific. Thus, Chiang Kai-shek had been able to 
"manipulate" U.S. protection for maximizing his policy 
objectives. Nevertheless, since the early 1960s, with the 
international power structure so changed, the utility value 
of Taiwan to U.S. strategy began to dwindle. Correspondingly, 
the U.S. support for the Nationalist government decreased.
As a consequence, Chiang Kai-shek's bargaining position 
vis-a-vis the U.S. became weaker. In spite of this, Chiang 
still retained faith in the recovery of the mainland, if 
not through military means, then through non-military 
means, and this led him to search continuously for new 
opportunities in his foreign policy, however difficult the 
situation.
Chiang's new strategy was to de-emphasize Taiwan's total 
dependence on the U.S. and yet at the same time consolidate 
the ties already established between the two countries. The 
former indicated the need for Taiwan to look around for other
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foreign policy options, whereas the latter indicated 
the necessity for Taiwan to preserve the established 
dependent relationship with the U.S., and meanwhile, to 
search for chances to exploit it to its advantage whenever 
possible. It is important to bear in mind that however 
modified the ROC's foreign policies were, the U.S. was 
always regarded as its most valuable foreign friend and 
that the ROC's changing course of foreign policies was 
mainly a response to the evolution of U.S. China policy 
and to the existing international political reality.
During the 1960s, Taiwan attempted on several occasions to 
exploit its alliance with the U.S. Two most notable 
instances were the Vietnam War and the "Great Cultural 
Revolution" on the mainland. In the remaining part of 
this Chapter, we will first outline Taiwan's foreign policy 
toward the U.S., then its foreign policy strategy of 
political counterattack and other foreign policy options.
It is hoped that this study will explain how the Nationalist 
government gradually came to distinguish between its 
internal struggle against Chinese Communists and its 
over-all resistance to international Communism.
(1) The opportunity of the Vietnam War
"....the Vietnam crisis offered renewed hope to those 
seeking to invigorate the mainland return philosophy.
In recent years, the Nationalists have been realistic 
in emphasizing that their opportunity will come within 
the context of a larger international confrontation. 
Could the Vietnam crisis be such a confrontation?.... 
The Vietnam crisis, however, will serve to reinforce 
those factions on Taiwan who oppose the mounting costs 
of a ongoing modernization program on the island, and 
in the future may lead the Nationalists to a more 
direct participation in the Southeast Asia crisis."1
1. Joyce K. Kallgren, "Vietnam and Politics in Taiwan", 
Asian Survey, VI, 1 (January 1966), p. 28.
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This description indicates clearly the fact that, as with 
the Korean War, the Nationalist government wanted to 
utilize U.S. military involvement in Vietnam for a 
possible realization of its foreign policy objectives of 
military counterattack. The process by which this intention 
could be realized was either to manoeuvre a direct tie 
between Nationalist power and South Vietnam or to urge the 
U.S. to more intensive military involvement in the Vietnam 
crisis. Nevertheless, by the end of the War in 1975, such 
efforts had proved fruitless.
As in the Korean case, the war in Vietnam was coloured by 
the Cold War hostility. The Nationalist government's 
position was that the Vietnam War was not a local struggle 
but rather a part of the Asia-wide or world-wide life-and- 
death battle of the "Free World" against "Communist totali­
tarianism". In other words, the traditional U.S. policy of 
containing Communism through limited warfare, as in the 
case of Korea, was, at the most, only a minimum strategy.
This was why the U.S., according to the Nationalists, had 
been unable to insure against any further Communist 
aggression, despite the fact that it had been able to halt 
their expansion at various points in Asia. Moreover, to 
fight an "unwinnable" war was meaningless, Nationalist 
officials asserted, instead the way to win the war was to 
widen it with combined assaults on the Communist forces in 
North Vietnam and on the mainland.
The Nationalist government’s position was clearly disclosed 
in a policy suggestion made by Hu Lien, the ROC's Ambassador 
to South Vietnam, i.e. the Republic of Vietnam (RVN). He said:
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"The U.S. army should first of all have a clear 
view of the geographical features of Vietnam 
before entering into the country. Confining the 
war to South Vietnam alone could actually help 
nothing and thus could not at all resolve the 
Vietnam problem. Rather, it is essential to occupy 
Hainan Island first, then talk about the prospects 
of advancing into North Vietnam. Meanwhile, it is 
necessary to secure Cambodia so as to protect 
Saigon from attack from the rear....With regard 
to the task to gain the winning position in the 
battlefield and thereafter to control Hainan 
Island, nobody is better qualified than the 
Nationalist forces on Taiwan....-" I
This suggested two things. First, it was essential to 
involve the Nationalist forces physically and militarily 
in the War; and second, it was necessary to enlarge the 
conflict and to encourage further American military 
engagement there. The interesting point here is that Hu 
Lien was originally an army General. He had been also 
strategic adviser to President Chiang Kai-shek, and 
Commander-in-Chief of the Nationalist army. Whether or not 
his appointment as the Ambassador to the RVN was merely a 
matter of coincidence, it can be argued that Hu's 
military assessment of the Vietnam situation had inten­
tionally been linked with his concern for his own govern­
ment's military counterattack policy.
Therefore, as with Korea, the Nationalist government offered
troops to Saigon with the intention of spreading the anti-
2 . . .Communist war northward. Or, as mentioned earlier, it was 1
1. Hu Lien, Ch'u Shih Yueh-nam Chi (Missions to Viet Nam) 
(Taipei: Central Daily News, January 1978), p. 83. 
Hainan island located in southwest Taiwan, south of 
mainland China, east of Vietnam and under the PRC's 
control. Emphasis added.
2. Ibid., p. 113. Also members of the Legislative Yuan 
had passed resolutions to send "volunteers" to Vietnam, 
see Hsin-shenq pao (New Life Daily), 24th October 1966, 
p. 1; and P. H. M. Jones, "Crusaders All", FEER, IL, 10 
(2nd September 1965), p. 30.
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suggested that Taiwan could land troops near the border 
region between North Vietnam and the China mainland to 
assist the Saigon government. The Nationalist government 
even indicated support for an air strike on mainland China's 
nuclear installations. Otherwise, it was claimed, "the U.S. 
will be repeating the same mistake it made in the Korean 
War, because it failed to....use Formoa-based forces in a 
multi-pronged counter-blow to Communist aggression."'*' The 
Nationalists tried to convince the Americans of the above 
viewpoints, so that the U.S. would allow Nationalist soldiers 
to join the allies in South Vietnam. (The Nationalists 
could not intervene in the fighting militarily because 
according to the 1954 Mutual Defence Treaty, any such 
actions would require the U.S. consent and, except for 
self-defence purposes, the latter would not provide military 
assislaice.) In any case, the prospect of finding a new 
pathway for counterattack was better than being just confined 
to Taiwan waiting indefinitely for an opening on the China 
coast— which had become more and more illusory since the 
second Quemoy crisis. After all, the Nationalists maintained, 
Peking was the source of aggression in Vietnam, and, either 
in Vietnam or elsehwere in Asia, no problem could be 
settled until the Chinese Communists had been totally
defeated. Thus, "it was better to attack the centre than 
2the periphery". 1
1. Hu Lien, op.cit., p. 82.
2. Ta-hua wan pao (The Great China Evening News), (Taipei), 
18th May 1964, p. 11.
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Thus, the Nationalist government still believed that 
military counterattack directly across the Taiwan Straits, 
accompanying the war in Vietnam, remained a practical 
strategy for mainland recovery. However, in view of the 
overall situation in Asia, and in order to bring peace to 
Asia and to the whole world, a direct attack on North 
Vietnam would be even more effective, because in so doing 
not only could the Vietnam unification problem be resolved 
but also the China problem. Thus, the Nationalist govern­
ment was very willing and anxious to make available air-base 
and many other military facilities on the island to the 
U.S. for its military operations in Southeast Asia.''' Such 
an offer, although less direct and dramatic than actually 
sending "volunteers" to Vietnam, had a double value for 
Taiwan, because it could boost the Nationalist morale for 
a continued programme of military counterattack in the 
future on one hand; on the other hand, it could inspire the 1
1. During the war period, the U.S. stationed a wing of 
C-130 transport aircraft and a KC-135 tanker squadron 
at Ching Chuan Kang (formerly Kung Kuan) airfield.
The U.S. also made use of the runway at this air base. 
The C-130s provided tactical airlift support for U.S. 
forces in Vietnam, while the tanker refuelled B-52s 
carrying out bombing missions there. U.S. military 
personnel attached to these two units numbered nearly 
6,000, bringing total U.S. military personnel stationed 
in Taiwan in the latter 1960s close to 10,000. Also 
beginning in 1962, the U.S. stationed Detachment One of 
the 405th Fighter Wing (part of the 13th Air Force, 
based at Clark Air Base in the Philippines) on the air 
base at Tainan and in 1969 added Detachment Two. 
Meanwhile, Taiwan had also provided overhaul and repair 
facilities for U.S. fighter aircraft, tanks, and 
personnel carriers. See U.S. Security Agreements and 
Commitments Abroad, Republic of China, Hearing, 91st 
Congress, November 24th, 25th and 26th 1969, and May 8th 1970 (Washington, D.C.i U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1970), especially pp. 1113-1130. See also 
"Support for the War in Vietnam", in the China Yearbook 
1965-66, pp. 10-11.
U.S. to reassess Taiwan's strategic value as long as the 
conflict was prolonged.
Nevertheless, despite its intensive military involvement in 
the Vietnam conflict, the U.S. had no intention whatsoever 
of allowing Nationalist troops to become involved. On the 
contrary, as noted earlier, towards the end of 1960s, the 
American government was looking for a way to disengage 
from the conflict. The U.S. position regarding the 
Nationalists' scheme can be seen in the fact that the 7th 
Fleet continued to patrol the Taiwan Straits during this 
period, and that, at the same time, U.S. military assistance 
to the ROC was limited to items essentially defensive in 
nature.1 Moreover, the U.S. turned down a proposal made by 
Senator Everett M. Dirksen, who called for an increase of
one hundred million dollars in the foreign aid bill to
. . . . , 2 modernize the Nationalist military establishment.
Gradually, the ROC's hopes of linking its military programme 
with the Vietnam War were dissipated by the American policy 
of "Vietnamization" and the overall promotion of the Nixon 
Doctrine. Indeed, the U.S. decisions did more harm than 
good to the Nationalist government, because they facilitated 
a rapprochment between the U.S. and the PRC.
After President Johnson's sustained bombing of North Vietnam, 
the U.S. administration was deeply disturbed by anti-war 
sentiment. The Nationalist government was careful not to
1. The Nationalist air force therefore received F105 
fighter planes in 1965 to replace their older F86's, 
but their bombers and transports remained antiquated.
2. Congressional Quarterly, op.cit., p. 29.
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join in any criticism. On the contrary, in order to sustain 
U.S. involvement there, it proclaimed that the U.S. could 
not shed its responsibility in Asia, and that regardless 
of what the "doves” said, the U.S. simply had to police 
the area.^ Moreover, since the Communists' final goal was 
to overthrow the status quo in Asia so that they could 
communize the whole world in the long run, and while U.S. 
interests demanded that the status quo be maintained, the 
Nationalists argued such a divergence of objectives meant 
that a clash between the U.S. and Communist China was 
unavoidable. Another point emphasized was that, however 
conciliatory the U.S. might be, the Chinese Communists 
would continue to believe that world revolution would never 
be successful until "American Imperialism" was exterminated. 
That is to say, the Americans had to realize the facts 
before it became too late— world peace and American 
security were indissolubly linked with peace in Asia, and 
a free and peace-loving China (i.e. the ROC) was the key 
to such a new world order.
The above arguments were based mainly on the "domino theory" 
which held that the loss of a single country of Southeast 
Asia would lead to the fall of the whole region into 
Communist hands. Thus, in the view of the Nationalists, if 
Communist advances were not stopped in Vietnam, the whole 
of Asia would be overrun one day, and if the U.S. withdrew 
from Asia, there was bound to be a power vacuum which either 
the Russians or the Chinese Communists would hasten to fill. 1
1. Editorial in the China Post, 4th July 1968, p. 2.
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Had this been the case, the argument went on, even 
nationalism— as a new force in small Asian countries--would 
not be sufficient to resist the Communist grab for power. 
Despite American assurances to the contrary, Asian countries 
would fear the prospect of being abandoned. Withdrawal 
from Vietnam would therefore mean that the U.S. was in 
effect "delivering the lives of countless Vietnamese into 
the hands of the enemy", and the burden of this terrible 
act might destroy the spirit of the U.S.1 This implied that 
other small nations, including the ROC, would inevitably 
suffer the same fate eventually. And this danger might 
"spill over" to other parts of the world. As Madam Chiang 
Kai-shek pointed outs
"Should South Vietnam fall to the Communists,
Thailand and Malaysia would be next followed by 
Indonesia, Australia and Japan. Once the 
Communists had these areas under their control, 
who would say that the U.S. would not be in 
serious danger or that the Communists would not  ^
next try to reach Hawaii, Guam and San Francisco?"
Thus, the Communist invasion of Vietnam was seen really as 
an attack on one of the peripheral points of the U.S. 
defence. By fighting in Vietnam the U.S. was not only 
protecting the security of Asia, but also, in the long run, 12
1. It had been argued that by withdrawal from Asia, the U.S. 
would open itself to the accusation that it sought to 
pit Asians against Asians, which would be considered a 
sinister racist plot to control the "yellow peril”. Also had been mentioned was the prediction that U.S. withdrawal 
would precipitate a third world war. See Ho Hao-jo,
"Why I Bring Up My Criticisms of American Appeaser Fair- 
bank", China Magazine (Taipei), 20th April, 1968, p. 9.
2. Madame Chiang Kai-shek, Selected Speeches, 1965-1966, 
(Taipei: China Publishing Company,1968), pp. 138-9.
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that of the U.S. itself.* It is evident therefore that 
the Nationalist government’s strategy was to try to make 
the most of the American fear of Communism and their 
security concern in the West Pacific— although both were 
gradually diminishing— for its own political purposes.
With regard to the criticism that the U.S. by its policy of
intervention in Vietnam was imperialistic, the Nationalists
replied that the U.S. had no territorial ambition in Asia
at all# Rather, such an "intervention" was a responsibility
which destiny had thrust on to the American nation; it was
the natural and inevitable outcome of international
2developments in the post-War period. As one editorial in 
the China Post put it, America's crucial role in the world 
was the "will of God". "Almighty God should be given credit 
having brought into being a nation with such a high 
sense of justice and prosperity."'*
Later on, when the U.S. began to show signs of wanting to 
withdraw from Vietnam, the Nationalist government1 put forward 
its recommendation for the establishment of an effective 
anti-Communist alliance, similar to NATO, backed by the
1. Hsin-shen pao, 7th February 1968, in PPS 68/2677 (9th 
February 1968), p. 10. To complete the domino argument, 
spokesmen from Taiwan had also argued that the North 
Vietnam Communists were agents of the Chinese Communists. 
As Chiang said in 1966, the Chinese Communists were not 
only behind the Vietnam war, they were "exercising full 
control of it". Free China Review, XVI, 2 (February 
1966), p. 89.
2. Chen C. J., "U.S. Policy and the Free World's Security", 
Issues and Studies, VI, 1 (October 1969), p. 28; and Wu 
Chen-tsai, "American Policy in Asia As an Asian Sees 
It", Issues and Studies, VI,3 (December 1969), p. 21. 3
3. Editorial in the China Post, 4th July 1968.
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U.S.3 The argument was that, if the U.S. was not willing
to deepen its military involvement in Asia, then, at least,
for the sake of morality, it should encourage the formation
of a collective security organization of some sort in the
Far East such as, say, a "Pacific Treaty Organization" or
a "North-east Asia Treaty Organization". Although the U.S.
had already set up SEATO, the argument went on, it was not
and could never be an effective organization to resist
Communist aggression because the two strongest anti-Communist
nations in this region— the ROC and the Republic of Korea
(ROK)--had been excluded. Thus, an important condition of
any such organization was that it should include these two
countries. Shen Chang-huan, then Foreign Minister of the
ROC, on a tour to Australia and New Zealand in 1965 had also
suggested in a similar proposal that these two countries
join Japan, "Free China", and the ROK in forming an 
2alliance.
In this connection, it is worth mentioning that, in fact, 
Chiang Kai-shek's hope to set up an anti-Communist military 
alliance of Asian nations was originally conceived in 
mid-1949. And his idea derived from Sun Yat-sen's proposal 
of regionalism.3 In 1949, Chiang flew to the Philippines 
and the ROK on 10th July and 2nd August respectively. The 
main purpose of his trip was to encourage these countries to 123
1. An appeal made by President Chiang, see CDN, 13th April 
1965, p. 1; see also Teng Kung-hsuan, "Problems Concerning 
the Formation of an Anti-Communist Asian Alliance", Issues 
and Studies, I, 10 (July 1965), pp. 13-19.
2. Free China Weekly, III, 22 (25th July 1965), p. 33
3. See Chapter Two, pp. 100-101.
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form an anti-Communist alliance. Nevertheless, although 
Chiang had obtained agreement from both countries, his 
idea had never been materialized. This was because the 
U.S. did not show any enthusiasm to back it up. Thus, it 
was understandable that, in view of the mounting crisis in 
Southeast Asia, Chiang would again propose the formation of 
such a security organization.
However, this idea faded because the U.S. remained deaf to 
it. Consequently, the ROC's aggressive stance of military 
operations vis-a-vis the mainland gradually turned into a 
matter of speech-making.
(2) The hope of using the "Great Cultural Revolution" on 
the mainland (1965-1969)
The development of the Cultural Revolution on the mainland 
seemed to offer the Nationalist government another avenue for 
strengthening its alliance with the U.S. But this hope 
lasted only for four years. The Nationalists sought to 
convince the U.S. that the internal turmoil on the mainland 
caused by the Cutural Revolution was a rare opportunity for 
the "Free World" to bring the vast continent back to peace, 
humanity and prosperity. The central theme of the argument 
was that the Revolution had brought unprecedented chaos to 
the people on the mainland. It was a reflection of the 
continued power struggle among the Communist leaders, and 
it could possibly lead to internal revolt of some sort or 
even the total collapse of order and stability there. In the 
case of such a collapse, the Nationalists should be ready to 
take sufficient military action, with U.S. approval, to put
an end to Communist rule there.
The connection between this "altruistic" argument and the 
ROC's hopes for mainland recovery could be found in a speech 
delivered by Chou Shu-kai, then Ambassador to the U.S., in 
a press conferences "Due to the present chaos on the Chinese 
mainland, 1967 may be a decisive year for the ROC to recover 
the mainland."^ Also, in order to provoke the U.S. to 
"intervene" in the crisis on the mainland, the Nationalists 
asserted that one political objective of the Cultural
Revolution was to "declare war on the United States and the 
2Soviet Union". The response of the U.S. was simply to 
remind the Nationalists once again of the restrictions 
imposed in the 1954 Mutual Defence Treaty.^ Thus, the 
Nationalist government could do no more than merely try to 
prevent further U.S. disengagement from Asia.
By 1969, the Cultural Revolution had come to an end, and so 
had Chiang's hopes of taking advantages of the opportunity. 
Increasing American reluctance to support the ROC together 
with the changing course of international power relationships 
caused the Nationalist government to reconsider the validity 
of its foreign policy strategies. Was continued, total 
reliance upon the U.S. for the ROC's political objective of 1
1. CDN, list January 1967, p. 1*.
2. Ibid.
3. See Hsinq-tao iih pao, 12th January 1967, p. 1. In fact, 
the Nationalists often assert that the restriction of 
the Treaty had cost them three excellent opportunities 
other than the Quemoy crises to counterattack the main­
land. The first was during the "hundred-flowers move­
ment" in 1958, the second during the "May exodus of 
refugees" in 1962, and the third during the "Great 
Cultural Revolution" in 1966. See editorial, "It's Time 
to Revise the Mutual Defence Treaty— The Major Mission
of Rusk's Visit to China Next Week", in Kunq-shanq Daily 
News (Hong Kong), 28th June 1966, p. 1.
national survival still prudent? Was an offensive military 
policy vis-a-vis the Communist world still practical? There 
were arguments both for and against each question. With 
regard to ROC's future relations with the U.S., some people, 
mainly the Nationalists officials or the Chinese emigres» 
held the view that, despite waning U.S. support, the ROC 
should still work hard to convince the U.S. not to abandon 
its faithful ally— American support was considered as a 
prerequisite for the ROC's continued survival in the world, 
as, otherwise, losing U.S. support was like losing the means 
to obtain international assistance, and would imperil 
national survival. Conversely, some people, mainly the young 
generation who were born either shortly before 1949 or in 
Taiwan, seemed to have become irritated with the ambiguous 
American attitudes. Arguing that the U.S. was not at all 
trustworthy, because if the U.S. could abandon Vietnam, it 
could and would one day abandon Taiwan, they proposed that 
the ROC be prepared in advance for the worst, i.e. it should 
look around for other sources of support.
Nonetheless, whatever divergent domestic opinions were, the 
Nationalist government had demonstrated its intention to 
modify its foreign policy strategies, to which we will now 
turn.
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Ill. Changes and continuities in the RPC's foreign policy
ROC’s new foreign policy strategy was "political counter­
attack". As mentioned earlier in this Chapter, the period 
of political counterattack lasted from 1958 Dulles-Yeh 
Communiqué until the end of 1971; and the declared 
objectives of this new strategy remained more or less 
similar to those announced under the military strategy, 
except the priorities were rearranged. Our purpose in the 
remaining part of this Chapter is to explore the changes and 
continuities, i.e. the extent of flexibility and adaptability, 
of the ROC's foreign policy during this period through a 
comparison of the two foreign policy strategies. We will 
first define the meaning of political counterattack, then 
discuss the continuities and changes.
1. The meaning of political counterattack
The overall meaning of the strategy of political counter­
attack was given by Chiang Kai-shek as follows:
"In the process of our counter-offensive and 
restoration of the Republic, military operations 
shall always be subordinate to politics which will 
play the main role, principles will be the pioneers 
backed up by armed forces and mainland China will 
be our main battlefield with the Taiwan Straits as 
a branch one. Militarily, the guidance must be so 
applied that the military undertakings in the 
Taiwan Straits shall be so directed as to keep 
pace with the revolutionary movement on the main­
land." 1
Later on Chaing further elaborated his position:
1. Chiang Kai-shek, op.cit., p. 166.
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"(1) The counter-offensive war of our national 
restoration is militarily a revolutionary war 
to defeat the many by the few and, politically, 
a war of free will which by nature is to defeat 
the few by the many...In other words, the war 
will be a war of 'humanity vis-a-vis tyranny' to 
'free the people and to punish the rebellious'.
(2) The counter-offensive war of national 
restoration is a double-fronted war of both 
internal uprising and external attack. It will 
be conducted by way of supporting the tyranny- 
resisting revolt on the mainland with counter­
offensive actions from the Taiwan Straits.
(5) The war is not a mere civil wars it is a 
part of the international anti-Communist war and 
the principle of '30 percent military and 70 
percent politics' must be applied..." 1
2. The continuities of the RPC's foreign policy
(1) Counterattack on the mainland
Despite the fact that the ROC had now modified its foreign 
policy strategies, the theme of counterattack (on the main­
land) continued. Chiang's above definition on political 
counterattack made clear that the basic strategy of anti­
communism did not merely depend on armed strength, but more 
and more on political strength and influence too and that 
his domestic programme of anti-Chinese Communism continued 
to play a part in the international anti-Communist war.
Thus, despite the 1958 Dulles-Yeh Joint Communique and 
numerous statements made by Chiang himself on the theme of 
political counterattack, Chiang had not totally abandoned his 
earlier strategy of military counterattack— this can be seen
from the moves made by the ROC during the Vietnam War and 
the Cultural Revolution on the mainland. Rather, in view of
1. Ibid., 265-272.
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unfavourable situation for a direct, offensive military 
operation against the Communists, Chiang's emphasis on the 
counterattack programme assumed more and more a defensive 
character. Thus, the short-term objective of this modified 
strategy was to build up Taiwan into a modern province of 
China based on Sun's San Min Chu I. The long-term goal was 
to demonstrate to Peking and to the whole world that Sun's 
ideology was indeed more suitable for China than Communist 
ideology, and that, consequently, the Communist system on 
the mainland would peacefully collapse ready for the 
adoption of Sun's ideology.
Thus, Chiang never ceased to call for a counterattack. 
Nevertheless, as a result of detente between the U.S. and 
the U.S.S.R. and of the development of Sino-Soviet split, 
Chiang's counterattack programme during the 1960s became 
less concerned with the Russian Communist threat but 
continued to focus on the Chinese Communists. Chiang's 
hostility towards the latter was fully expressed in the 
following statement! "Either we exist to return to the main­
land or we have no existence worth mentioning at all."^
Chiang's insistence on the mainland-return policy, though it 
had become more and more illusory, had its reasons. As 
mentioned in the earlier Chapters, the Nationalists government 
could not abandon the counterattack theme however unfeasible 
and unrealistic it was because, in theory, it was the raison 
d ’etre of the ROC's legitimate existence. The dilemma for 
the Nationalist government was therefore that it had to
Congressional Quarterly, China and the United States Far 
East Policy, 1945-1967, p. 236.
1 .
continue the futile counterattack theme against the Chinese 
Communists at the expense of modernizing Taiwan.
(2) Objections to the "two Chinas" idea
Closely related to the ROC's counterattack against Chinese 
Communists was its continued insistence on the "one China" 
principle. Any formula suggesting the "two Chinas" idea 
would be resisted. Similar to the theme of counterattack, 
abandonment of the insistence of the "one China" thesis 
would mean a recognition of the existing status quo (i.e. a 
Communist-controlled mainland and a Nationalist-held Taiwan) 
or, even worse, an admission of Communist China into the 
U.N., or a termination of the Nationalist rule on Taiwan. 
Thus, similar to the ROC's position on the counterattack 
theme, the Nationalist government was torn by the dilemma 
that, in theory, it had to continue the theme of "one China" 
by insisting that it was an unchangeable national position 
and that, therefore, it would break diplomatic relations 
with any country that recognized the PRC; but, in reality, 
its policy from the late 1950s was to preserve the status 
quo along the Taiwan Straits and inside Taiwan island. The 
latter meant to preserve and to modernize Taiwan into a 
permanent power base for the ROC. This indicated a tacit 
acceptance of the two Chinas reality.
Nevertheless, in official terms, the Nationalist government 
never openly agreed with the two Chinas reality and 
regularly protested when others suggested it did exist. For
instance, in 1961, during the U.N. General Assembly debate, 
the Nationalist delegates maintained! "In the course of this
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debate some speakers have, directly or indirectly, suggested 
a solution along the line of 'two Chinas'. Such a solution 
is not acceptable to my government."'1' Also, in 1966, 
Nationalist delegates openly criticized a proposal for 
permitting representation of both Chinese governments in 
the U.N. as "ill-timed" and "unrealistic".2 They maintained 
that the proposal would "encourage the extremists in the 
Chinese Communist Party to believe that their policy has
proved effective and that Peking is to be accepted into the
. 3U.N. because of that policy". Two further instances— the 
Outer Mongolia incident and the French recognition— indicated 
the ROC's intrasigence on this issue during the 1960s.
After 1946, Outer Mongolia— or the Mongolia People's 
Republic, the MPR— began to apply for U.N. membership, but 
it was not accepted until 27th October 1961. The issue was 
debated ’in the U.N. annually. According to the Mongolians 
themselves, the delay was caused primarily by "the irrational 
'cold war' policy of the Western powers which were backing
the allegations of the Chiang Kai-shek clique regarding the 
4MPR". Here, it is necessary to say a few words concerning 
the background of the issue. At the end of the 17th century 
Outer Mongolia came under nominal Chinese control. As far 
back as the 18th century its borders were in dispute between
1. Mr Tsiang, General Assembly, 14th December 1961; U.N. 
Document A/PV 1079, p. 52.
2. Congressional Quarterly, China; U.S. Policy since 1945,
p. 166.
3. Ibid.
4. Unen, Ulan Bator Editorial Board, The 60th Anniversary 
of People's Mongolia (Moscow; Novosti Press Agency 
Publishing House, 1981), p. 141.
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Russia and the Chinese Empire; later Japan joined in the 
attempt to control or take over the weakly governed country. 
In 1920, a Japanese-White Russian expedition seized the 
capital, now called Ulan Bator, and set up a puppet 
government. The next year a Soviet-inspired revolution over­
threw the regime and in 1924 the MPR was proclaimed. The 
Treaty of 1950 between the PRC and the Soviet Union 
recognized the "independence" of the Republic. But the 
PRC has its own treaty of friendship and economic aid with 
Mongolia, and has made efforts to strengthen its influence 
there. Chiang Kai-shek strongly rejected international 
recognition of the MPR or its admission into the U.N. 
because in his opinion, the MPR was a client of the U.S.S.R. 
and if it were to be admitted, it would possibly increase 
the vote in favour of Communist China's pending application 
for membership, hence facilitating the creation of two 
Chinas, or even worse, undermining the ROC's status in the 
organization.1 Thus, the Nationalist government strongly 
protested against Mongolia's application even at the risk 
of using the veto. The repercussion of the veto was that the 
issue of Outer Mongolia's admission was then subtly linked 
with that of Mauritania, a newly independent state in 
Africa. The linkage was deliberately arranged by the Soviet 
Union. That is, should Nationalist delegates veto Mongolia, 
the Soviet Union would presumably retaliate by vetoing the
1. For a detailed account of the ROC's position towards
Outer Mongolia, see articles on CDN, 17th June 1961, p. 1; 
23rd June 1961, p. 1; and 9th July 1961, p.l. See also 
Kunq-shanq iih pao, 28th March 1967, p. 1; and Richard 
P. Stebbins, "The Two Chinas and Mongolia", in his The 
United States in World Affairs 1961, published for the 
Council on Foreign Relations (New York: Harper & Brothers, 
1962), pp. 219-226.
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parallel application of Mauritania; and the two dozen or 
more African states in the Assembly could then be expected 
to vote in favour of Communist China's participation as a 
matter of revenge against the Nationalist government.'*'
This was a dilemma for the ROC because whatever its 
decision, the admission of Communist China into the world
organization was only a matter of time. Nonetheless, with
2great reluctance, and under strong U.S. pressure.
Nationalist delegates finally absented from the vote in the
3Security Council on the MPR's application.
Another example was the French recognition of the Peking 
government in 1964. The French decision was reached not on 
the premise that it would have to, as it did eventually,
1. Eleven states which sponsored Mauritania's membership, 
Dahomey, Cameroon, the Central Africa Republic, Chad,
Congo, Grabon, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Niger, Senegal 
and Upper Volta, told the ROC that if it provoked a 
Soviet veto of Mauritania by blocking Outer Mongolia, 
they would vote for Peking on the "Chinese Representation" 
issue. See Free China Weekly, III, 17 (20th July 1965),
* p. 1; see also the China Yearbook, 1965-1966, p. 243.
2. The U.S. initially supported the ROC's position regarding 
the MPR. Nevertheless in 1960, Washington began to con­
sider the possiblity of according diplomatic recognition 
to the MPR. The U.S. decision was reached because since 
the mid-1950s the MPR had gradually emerged as an important 
element in the Sino-Soviet rivalry (see Richard P. Stebbins, 
ibid., p. 225). In view of the fact that Mongolia had been 
Chinese for so many centuries, it was therefore under­
standable that the two Communist powers were vying for 
dominant influence in Outer Mongolia. (See Harrison E. 
Salisbury, "Soviet and Red China Compete for Power in 
Outer Mongolia", Special to the NYT, 4th August 1959, 
reprinted in O.E.Clubb, ed. China; The Great Contemporary 
Issues (New York; The New York Times Company, 1972),pp. 
343-345.) Thus, for the U.S., the establishment of a 
diplomatic listening post at China’s backdoor would have
obvious .advantages. The ROC opposed the U.S. plan but in vain. (See ThoMas j. Hamilton, "The Chinese Problem:
Pitfalls Are Seen in Washington's Plan to Again Bar Peking 
from U.N.," NYT, 29th October 1961, reprinted in O.E.Clubb, 
ibid., pp. 375-376.
3. Richard P. Stebbins, op.cit., pp. 221-222.
terminate its bilateral relationships with the ROC.1
Actually, despite its new relations with Peking, and despite
the "one China" thesis, the French government would have
preferred to retain ties with Taipei. Nevertheless, the
Nationalist government refused to accept this idea and
denounced it as a "most unfriendly act", and "a plot to 
. "2create two Chinas. Furthermore, it demanded that all the 
French leave Taipei and it severed ties with France, in 
spite of the impact this would have upon the ROC's future 
status. This connection and its impact will be examined 
again in Chapter Five, the strategy of foreign aid.
Thus, prior to ROC’s departure from the U.N. in 1971, it 
had showed only very slight evidence that it was preparing 
for a shift of policy. The official pronouncements still 
insisted on the theoretical validly of the "one China" thesis 
despite the fact that the Nationalist government had already 
begun to show signs of recognizing of the fact that its 
interests would be best served if it recognized the status 
quo and set about living in peace permanently separated from 
mainland China. Another example was that, although the 
Nationalist government broke relations with almost all 
nations that sent ambassadors to Communist China, it continued 
to tolerate private business exchanges with some of those 
nations. Britain, for example, had recognized the PRC in 
1950 but had since then conducted two-way trade with Taiwan.
In fact, as an exception, there was even a British consulate 
in Taiwan until 1972. Similarly, Japan, which did not
1. Drew Middleton, "de Gaulle Sets Up Tie to Red China;
Keeps Taipei Link", special to the NYT, 28th January 
1964, p. 1 and p. 12,reprinted in O.E.Clubb, op.cit., 
pp. 379-380.
recognize the PRC until 1972, had engaged in "private" 
business transactions with the latter, and at the same time, 
enjoyed official bilateral relations with the Nationalist 
government. (This will be further elaborated shortly in 
the section on the changes of the ROC's foreign policy, 
also later in Chapter Six.)
In short, the Nationalist government opposed as strongly as 
during the 1950s the "two Chinas" proposal and any other 
similar suggestions. Even in 1971 when the Nationalist 
delegates were expelled from the U.N., they still insisted 
on the "one China" principle. In fact, it may well be argued 
that it was because of this principle that the Nationalist 
delegates had no alternative but to leave. Nevertheless, 
the ROC could hardly ignore international political 
reality.
3. The changes in the RPC’s foreign policy: the search 
for new foreign policy options
(1) The Soviet option
After the Sino-Soviet split became evident, western political 
observers often suggested that the ROC had the intention of 
establishing some kind of rapport with the Soviet Union 
(just as the Soviet Union might have wanted to establish a 
rapprochement with the Nationalist government).
During the 1950s, the Nationalist government regarded the 
Soviet Union as one of its chief enemies. But this position 
subtly altered during the 1960s. In this section, we will 
deal with three things. First of all, we will analyze the
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ROC's motivations in playing the "Russian card"; secondly, 
we will outline some of the ROC's anti-Russian attitudes 
during the 1950s; and thirdly, we will examine the evolution 
of the ROC's modified attitudes toward the Soviet Union 
during the 1960s. Our purpose is to establish the fact 
that the ROC did indeed modify some aspects of its foreign 
policy strategies during the 1960s.
(A) The ROC's motives in approaching the Soviet Union
The ROC's changed posture towards the Soviet Union could be 
considered as a response to: the new American policy of 
détente with the Soviet Union; the new American policy of 
"bridge-building" with Communist China; and the Sino-Soviet 
split. The ROC's calculation can be summarized as follows: 
if the U.S. planned to ally with the Russians against 
Communist China, and if such an intention was promising, 
this would be the best policy option for the Nationalist 
government. Otherwise, an anticipated improved relationship 
betwen “he ROC and the Soviet Union might help somewhat to 
prevent the U.S. from creating a prompt rapport with 
Communist China, meanwhile, preventing the U.S. from any 
weakening of its Taiwan commitment. As one writer observed:
"Taiwan obviously hopes to use such a belief to deter 
the U.S. from extending full recognition to the PRC, 
or at least to insure that normalization is carried 
out on terms which the ROC can live with. Taipei 
hopes that the belief in Washington in Taiwan's 
'Russian option’ will keep the U.S. from abandoning 
Taiwan to attack or pressure from the mainland....
Taipei also feels that concern in Peking over 
Taiwan's 'Russian option' might make the PRC more 
willing to compromise with the U.S. over the Taiwan question or, if that failed, make Peking more
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hesitant to apply military pressure on Taiwan 
because of fear of forcing Taiwan into Soviet 
arms." 1
Nevertheless, whatever the Nationist government's motiva­
tions were, it did not want military ties with the Russians. 
As far as the Nationalist government was concerned, Taiwan 
could enhance its bargaining positions vis-a-vis either the 
U.S. or Communist China if it could promote a rapport with 
the Soviet Union on the level of political, economic and 
cultural exchanges. Military collaboration was too much of 
a risk. It would have broad effects on the current system 
of international relations in East Asia. Or, even worse, 
it might have countereffects on the ROC in that it might 
escalate tension between the two Chinese rivals; it might 
arouse American antagonism, hence leading to a reduced 
commitment towards Taiwan; or it might even speed up 
American normalization with Peking. On top of this, the 
Nationalists still had a vivid memory of their military
2collaboration with Russian Communists during the 1920s. 
According to them, this memory was bitter and unforgettable, 
and military ties with the Russians was therefore like a 
prelude to "inviting wolves into the chamber". 1
1. John W. Garver, "Taiwan's Russian Option. ; Image and 
Reality", Asian Survey, XVIII, 7 (July 1978), p. 752.
At that time, Communist China’s three conditions for 
the full normaxization of U.S.-PRC relations were;
(1) the severance of diplomatic relations between the 
U.S. and Taiwan; (2) the complete withdrawal of U.S. 
military personnel from Taiwan and the Taiwan Straits; 
and (3) the abrogation of the 1954 Mutual Defence Treaty 
between the U.S. and Taiwan.
2. See Chapter One.
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1. John W. Garver, "Taiwan's Russian Option.* Image and 
Reality", Asian Survey, XVIII, 7 (July 1978), p. 752.
At that time, Communist China's three conditions for 
the full normalization of U.S.-PRC relations were:
(1) the severance of diplomatic relations between the 
U.S. and Taiwan; (2) the complete withdrawal of U.S. 
military personnel from Taiwan and the Taiwan Straits; 
and (3) the abrogation of the 1954 Mutual Defence Treaty 
between the U.S. and Taiwan.
2. See Chapter One.
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(B) The ROC's anti-Soviet attitudes during the 1950s
During the 1950s, both the Soviet Union and Chinese Communists 
were regarded by the Nationalists as their "No. 1" enemies. 
They were also the "No. 1" enemies of the "Free World". 
According to the Nationalists, the Communists were untrust­
worthy, evil, treacherous, "bandits", and aggressive.
Moreover, it was because of their conspiracy, the Nationalists 
asserted, that China was lost to Communism in 1949. The 
Communists were therefore dangerous because their aim for 
world domination would never change.
Chiang Kai-shek published two books, The Basic Essay on 
Anti-Communism and Resisting Russia (1951) and Soviet Russia 
in China (1957), as well as many articles dwelling on his 
personal experience of the horror of Communist conspiracy 
and his determination and dedication to overthrow this 
conspiracy.
The Basic Essay on Anti-Communism and Resisting Russia 
contained eight chapters and about 40,000 words. It pointed 
out firstly Soviet Russia's aggressive tradition and explained 
the special features of the ROC's anti-Communist war, and 
then finally declared "that traitors are destined to be 
exterminated; that the anti-Communist war is to win: that 
aggression is to fall: and the deed of resisting Russia 
ought to succeed".1
In 1957, Chiang published Soviet Russia in China, which was 
said to be based on his 30 years of bitter anti-Communist
1. Chiang Kai-shek, Fan-kunq K'anq-eh chi pen lun (The Basic 
Essay on Anti-Communism and Resisting Russia), (Taipei:
Far East Book Co., Ltd., 1951).
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experience. The book, originally in Chinese, contained 
some 300,000 words and was divided into three parts. Its 
prime purpose was likewise to bring to the attention of the 
world the history of China's prolonged struggle against 
Russia's constant aggression as well as the basic strategy 
and operational outline of anti-Communist warfare. For 
instance, in the Introduction, Chiang said:
"In presenting this record to the public, though 
I am filled with mixed feelings, my confidence in 
the future of the Republic of China is absolutely 
unshaken. On the other hand, China is the first 
nation to taste the bitterness of 'coexistence' 
with Communists, and our experience of dealing 
with them is also the longest. Though we had a 
clear idea of the intrigues and subversive designs 
of International Communism, and though our anti­
communist policy was firm and clearcut, yet we 
failed to win the support of people at home or to 
enlist the sympathy of friendly powers abroad. We 
were thus condemned while we were on the mainland 
to reverses on the way and failure at the end.” 1
During the 1950s, Chiang constantly made the point that had 
it not been for the Russians, he would not have lost his 
"mandate", and that post-1949 Chinese history would have 
had to be rewritten. Six months after the publication of 
this book it had been translated into more than ten 
languages and reprinted several times to a total over 10 
million copies. Such a massive publication was meant to 
alert the "Free World" and put it on guard against Communist 
movement.
In addition to these two books, Chiang made hundreds of 
speeches and messages, all on important occasions both at 
home and, through propaganda, abroad. The most popular 1
1. Chiang Kai-shek, Soviet Russia in China, (New York: 
Farrer Straus and Cudahy, 1957), p. 7.
occasions for Chiang's anti-Russia speeches were his annual 
messages to the Chinese people on New Year's Day, National 
Day (10th October), Freedom Day (23rd January), Youth Day 
(29th March),and Constitution Day (25th December). Also 
popular were his addresses to, or "Answers to Questions" 
submitted by, the foreign press.^  Like his books, most 
of Chiang's speeches were devoted to "ideological exhorta­
tion", which described China's contemporary suffering caused 
by the Communist evil and the need to have it eliminated, 
and to the notion of "spiritual determinism" in that world 
interest would be better served by spreading the teaching of 
Sun's Three Principles of the People, and eliminating 
Communist ideology.
The foregoing may serve to explain Chiang's (personal) 
resentment against Communism and his determination to 
destroy both the Chinese and Russian Communists during the 
1950s. Nevertheless, when the Soviets were no longer 
America’s number one enemy, and when the Soviets were no 
longer on good terms with the Chinese "brothers" on the 
mainland, Chiang's attitudes altered accordingly, fors 
(1) the promise of fighting together with the U.S. and the 
"Free World" against the "common enemy" of Communism was 
gradually diminishing, and (2) the ROC could play a "Russian 
card". 1
1. Most of these speeches are compiled in the China Year­
book (Taipei: China Publishing Co., annually).
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(c ) The RPC's modified attitude towards the Soviet Union
during the 1960s
The evidence of the ROC's intention to promote a link with 
the Soviet Union could be found in a few newspaper editorials 
The Nationalist government never declared such an intention 
in any official sources. In fact, it was still taboo to 
talk about this "Soviet option" openly. Nevertheless, one 
needs to realize that, at this time in Taiwan, almost all 
the press and the mass media were (and still are, although 
in a slightly more relaxed manner) under government censor­
ship. Hence any publications containing these sorts of 
articles could be regarded as the "correct" expression of 
the government position, and this will be the information 
on which this study of Soviet option is based.
For instance, in 1963, one editorial in an evening newspaper 
remarked that the two Communist powers were definitely split 
and that there was even the possiblity of an outbreak of 
war between the two. It then suggested that perhaps the 
Russians really were prepared to compromise with the "Free 
World" and it implied that just as the U.S. might now be 
planning to ally with Russia against the Chinese Communists 
so, likewise, the Nationalist government should lose no time 
in taking advantage of this new situation.1 Also, 1
1. Editorial in Ta-hua wan pao, 7th January 1963. It said: 
"The Moscow-Peiping split has made international relations 
so complicated and difficult that our traditional view of 
the world situation will be no longer applicable to the 
changes to come. What is more important to us is that the 
United States and the West have already begun to study the 
possibility of allying with Russia against the Chinese 
Reds. If Khrushchev should repeatedly give in as he did 
in the Cuban crisis, the possibility could be translated 
into reality. To meet the great change satisfactorily, 
we must ourselves be well prepared and should not remain 
hard-headed." 252
"In the future, we must make a new appraisal of 
international relations since the policy of the 
U.S. and other democracies definitely will be 
affected by this new factor (i.e. the Sino-Soviet 
split). Although we are not yet able to decide 
how to make use of this new situation, we must 
not overlook its importance." 1
And,
"If the ’Free World' were to take advantage of this 
'major development'...the U.S. should strive for a 
temporary compromise with the right-wing of the 
international Communist bloc while concentrating 
its force to deal blows against the left-wing 
Communists." 2
Accordingly, the editorials recommended that the "Free World" 
should seek temporary friendship with the Soviet Union in 
order to isolate the Communist forces on the mainland. The 
message was that the policy of anti-Communism should now be 
redefined as "anti-Mao first and anti-Communist next". This 
was not because the ROC now assumed that Russian foreign 
policy had become harmless or less aggressive, or was now 
in tune with that of the "Free World", but because Communist 
Chinas war-mongering behaviour against the Soviet Union put 
the Russians and the "Free World" into a more or less 
similar situation.
"The Communists are used to the employment of the 
united front operation against the 'Free World'.
We (i.e. the ROC and other democratic countries) 
may also use a united front operation against the 
same tactics of Communists. In doing so, we must 12
1. Editorial in Chenq-hsin hsin-wen pao (Financial and 
Economic News, Taipei), 7th January 1963, in PPS, 63/1342 
7th January, 1963, p. 12. The editorial then suggested that the Sino-Soviet split called for creative, new 
action on the part of the Nationalist government in Taiwan
2. Editorial in Tsu-li wan pao (The Independent Evening Post) 
(Taipei), 6th December 1962, p. 2.
pool our strength to defeat the enemies one by one.
If our temporary 'association' with the enemy 
should damage our solidarity, we would be trapped 
by the enemy's united front operation.” 1
Even Chiang was said to have approved this plan of making
2use of the Sino-Soviet schism for a counterattack.
In 1965, Chiang made an interesting remark. He said in the 
National Day Message that the Chinese Communists (and not 
the Soviet Union) were the chief offenders against world 
peace, although they were (including the Russians) the public 
enemies of all mankind.^ Here, for the first time Chiang 
introduced the accusation that now Chinese Communists were 
intent on stirring up a racial war, which would have to be 
anti-Soviet as well as anti-American. Chiang even referred 
to the nuclear testsof the Chinese Communists (in 1964) as 
a contravention of the spirit of the partial nuclear test 
ban treaty which had already been signed by many nations 
including the Soviet Union. By conducting their tests, the 
Chinese Communists were making a mockery of all those nations 
which were trying to restore sanity to the world; consequently, 
Chiang said, they stood condemned not only by the "Free
4World" but also by nations in the Communist bloc. Later on 
in 1967, then Premier Yen Chia-kan made the statement "those 
who are not our enemies (implying the Russians and other 1
1. Ibid., 8th July 1963, p. 2.
2. Chiang Kai-shek's New Year's Day Message, Free China 
Review, XIII, 2 (February 1963), pp. 103-106.
3. "President Chiang Kai-shek’s Double Tenth Message, 10th 
October, 1965", Free China Review, XV, 11 (November 1965), 
p. 87; for the text of the speech, see The China Yearbook 
1965-66, pp. 871-880.
4. Ibid.
Communist countries) are our friends", a position which 
clearly contradicted his government's previous assertion 
that "those who are not our friends are our enemies".^
Conversely, the Soviet Union also made some "friendly" 
gestures. According to John W. Garver, there were three 
types of such actions which could be interpreted as possible 
Soviet intention to create a link-up with Taiwan. First,
Soviet publications had intentionally printed the ROC flag 
on several occasions, for instance, in 1965 the magazine 
For the People of the World and in 1967 Newbooks. USSR.2 
These actions were taken by the PRC as tacit acceptance of
the notion that "Taiwan is a separate country and not a 
3province of China".
Second, Taiwan was mentioned openly in the Soviet press 
as either a "country" or a "state". Here, John W. Garver 
provided three evidences: Taiwan was referred to as a "state" 
in two issues of the Soviet magazine Abroad in 1966 and in a 
Tass news item in 1967, and it was referred to as a "country" 
and as "the government of the Republic of China" in the early
1970 when the U.S. Vice-President Spiro Agnew was touring
_ . 4in Asia.
Third, the Soviet Union had indicated intention to accept 
the notion of "two Chinas" in the United Nations, namely, it 
might support the admission of both the PRC and the ROC to 
the United Nations. This action was different from its pre­
vious position that admission of the PRC required the immediate•
1. CDN, 21sr February 1969, p. 1.
2. John W. Garver, op.cit., p. 755.
3. Ibid. —
4. Ibid. 255
removal of the Chiang Kai-shek delegates. In this connec­
tion, John W. Garver suggested two examples. One example 
was the Soviet representative's indirect suggestion in the 
1967 U.N. General Assembly session that the solution of the 
China problem could be related to that of the German 
problem to admit both Germanies into the organization. 
Another example was a quotation of a U.S. official in 
Pravda in February 1969 which said "both Taiwan and Peking 
should be members of the U.N."^
This informal rapprochment became more pronounced in the
later 1960s and early 1970s. A crucial symbolic move was
the visit by a Soviet journalist to Taiwan in October 1968.
Victor Louis, Moscows correspondent for the Evening News
published in London, paid the first visit by a Soviet
citizen to Taiwan since 1949 and there was speculation that
he also acted as an unofficial envoy of his government.
There were reports that Louis had talks with Chiang Ching-kuo,
2then Defence Minister. Concurrently with this Russian's 
unprecedented appearance in Taiwan, in May 1969, a member 
of the ROC's National Assembly and former Deputy Minister of 12
1. Johy W. Garver, op.cit.. p. 755.
2. Harold Munthe-kass, "Rosy Glow", FEER, LIV, 13 (3rd 
April 1969), p. 7. In 1969, Taiwan confirmed the fact 
that V. Louis had indeed visited Taipei the previous 
year and had held conversations with Chiang Ching-kuo, 
but it refused to confirm rumours that the journalist had 
returned to Taiwan several times since then. For more 
information about possible links between Taiwan and the 
Soviet Union, see also Ralph N. Clough, "The Soviet 
Option", in his Island China, pp. 168-170; and Chan Wai- 
wang, "What is the relationship between Taipei and 
Moscow", in his Hong Kona. Taipei, Peking; A Trilateral 
Relationship (Hong Kong: International Affairs College 
Press, December 1980) .
Education, Professor Ku Yu-hsin, visited Moscow. It was 
also revealed that in June 1969, three Nationalist officials 
had visited a World Intergovernmental Conference on Tourism 
in Sofia, Bulgaria. Moreover, in 1969 and 1970, increasing 
informal contacts were said to have taken place between 
Soviet and ROC diplomatic personnel in Tokyo, Washington, 
and elsewhere.1 Although the reasons for such exchanges 
have never been disclosed officially by either side and the 
Nationalist government has denied from time to time that they 
had any political implications, specualation continued on the 
possibility of a possible Soviet-ROC rapprochment, if only 
at a low level.
By and large, during the 1960s, the ROC had wanted to develop 
a rapport with the Soviet Union as one of its foreign policy 
options. However, it is still unknown whether the Soviet 
Union had the same calculation in mind, or whether Soviet 
"responses" were merely coincidence. By the end of the 
decade, a Soviet-ROC rapprochment had failed to materialize. 
(This theme however has been continued and expanded since 
1971, and will be examined in Chapter Six.) In conclusion, 
a point to be made here is that however conciliatory the 
ROC's attitude might have been towards the Soviet Union, it 
never officially and entirely dropped its charges of the 
Soviet conspiracy towards China. Its approaches to the 
Soviet Union were very cautious and no direct formal ties 
were established at all during the 1960s.
1. John W. Garver, op.cit., p. 756.
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(2) Approaches to the newly independent countries
After 1960, the Nationalist government began to approach the 
newly independent countries, mainly in Africa. It also paid 
more attention to improving relations with its neighbouring 
countries. The former can be understood as the ROC's 
foreign policy strategy of "foreign aid" or "agricultural 
diplomacy" which will be discussed in the next Chapter, 
whereas the latter can be considered as the strategy of 
the "pan-Asian movement" to which we will now turn.
(3) The pan-Asian movement
This movement was originally initiated by Sun Yat-sen who 
proposed that all the Asian countries in their search for a 
peaceful and prosperous Asia for the Asians should unite to 
fight against their "common" enemies.^ In a slight variation, 
Chiang Kai-shek's proposal for a pan-Asian movement was to 
arouse Asia's non- and anti-Communist countries' sentiment 
through a strengthening of their mutual understanding and 
cooperation (militarily, politically, economically, ideologi­
cally and culturally). Chiang's proposal was not only to 
win support from governments in Southeast Asia but also from 
the large number of overseas Chinese who lived there. Most 
of Chinese overseas lived in Thailand, Vietnam, Laos,
Cambodia, the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia 
and Burma. Their support could be a decisive force in 
winning the Chinese civil war. 1
1. At that time, the common enemies were the imperialists.
(A) Relations with Chinese overseas
Sun Yat-sen frequently said: "Chinese overseas are the 
mother of our revolution".1 As mentioned earlier in Chapter 
One, this was because Sun had depended substantially upon 
Chinese overseas for financial and moral support for the 
Chinese Revolution. Thus, with China now divided into two 
parts, the contest for the support, loyalty and patriotism 
of overseas Chinese has become an essential part of the 
national policies of the two Chinese governments.
The competition for the loyalty of overseas Chinese focused
principally on Southeast Asia where more than 95 percent of
2the 20 to 24 million overseas Chinese live. The importance 
of overseas Chinese, in addition to the above-mentioned 
contributions to their homeland, are manifold. First, 
they provide a valuable link between their host countries 
and the Chinese governments. In Southeast Asia, there was 
almost no fixed line between Communists and anti-Communists 
among overseas Chinese. Even governments in this region 
changed their political stance at times owing to the fluid 
political situation in the area. Generally speaking, 
countries in this region were rather unstable, with almost 
no local initiative or will to resist either Communist 12
1. Kuomintang— Key to China's Future (Taipei, Department of 
Overseas Chinese Affairs, Central Committee of the Kuomin­
tang, August 1970), p. 64.
2. For a detailed study on the ROC-PRC competition for the 
overseas Chinese, see Douglas Darby, Trust the Two Per 
Cent (London: Cambray, Printing Services, 1982), pp. 67- 
75; see also Stephen Fitzgerald, "China and the Overseas 
Chinese: Perceptions and Policies", The China Quarterly, 
No. 44 (October-December 1970), pp. 1-37. See also 
Chapter One, footnote no. 1, p. 74.
influence or political changes. Under such circumstances 
overseas Chinese tended to align themselves, at least 
outwardly, with the diplomatic relations of the host 
country. As a result, until the 1970s, Taiwan was protected 
against more serious losses by the continuance of diplomatic 
relations with the ROC by most of Southeast Asia, and if 
diplomatic relations did not exist between the host 
countries and either of the two Chinese governments, overseas 
Chinese could be used as important middlemen for either 
trade or financial transactions. This was particularly true 
during the 1970s, because after 1971 Taiwan's survival 
depended more and more on foreign trade and industrial 
growth. Since the Nationalist government has been deprived 
of official channels for dealings with most foreign govern­
ments, friendly overseas Chinese were valuable not only as 
traders, investors, but also as go-betweens.
Secondly, overseas Chinese might serve as suitable go-betweens 
if talks between the two Chinese governments were contemplated. 
Thus, both governments have devoted substantial resources to 
the competition for the loyalty of overseas Chinese. But 
only a small fraction of them, at least so far, have been 
willing to involve themselves in the political struggles 
between the two Chinese governments. This was mainly 
because for the vast majority of overseas Chinese, their 
principal concern was to protect their interests and improve 
their livelihood in the host country. They were either not 
politically motivated or afraid to get involved. In this 
regard, it seemed rather unlikely that they would have a 
significant influence on its outcome. Nonetheless, their 
support, however minimal, did serve to give a psychological 
boost.
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Thirdly, overseas Chinese had an economic function. Most 
of the overseas Chinese were businessmen or industrialists. 
In this respect, they were also potential investors. For 
years, overseas Chinese investment in Taiwan made an 
important contribution to the island's foreign trade 
development and economic growth. Their importance was 
only second after Taiwan's two major trading partners, the 
U.S. and Japan. Equally, the Chinese Communist government 
regarded the overseas Chinese as a potential source of 
enormous foreign exchange for China.
Finally, it has been suggested that some branches of the 
two Chinese governments, such as intelligence and propaganda 
agencies, attempted to use the overseas Chinese to gather 
information and to influence the politics and policies of 
local Southeast Asian countries. Nevertheless, even if 
this were so, these efforts were not effective because the 
majority of overseas Chinese were afraid of creating tension 
or hostility either between themselves and their countries 
of residence or between themselves and the local populace.
In all, the objectives of the Nationalist government's 
policies on overseas Chinese were to win the support of, 
and to unite, overseas Chinese, in particular in Southeast 
Asia, for the fight against Chinese Communists first and 
international Communists next, and for the struggle for the 
survival and restoration of Chinese Republic. The emphasis 
on overseas Chinese after 1949 can be contrasted with the 
vagueness of the Nationalist government in its policies on 
overseas Chinese during its rule on the mainland. In fact,
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it did not then have any constructive policy at all. Chiang 
Kai-shek began to pay attention to overseas Chinese only 
after 1950, and on 18th -October 1952, the ROC officially 
adopted policies for dealing with overseas Chinese affairs. 
Chiang's position was indicated in his speech, "Defend our 
Fatherland". He said:
"My fellow countrymen in Malaya, the Philippines, 
Indo-China, Burma, Thailand and Indonesia! Abide 
by the laws and orders of the governments in the 
countries where you reside, and participate 
directly or indirectly in any work that will help 
resist Communism and save your country. Call 
attention of the people in the places where you 
live to the atrocities committed by the Communists 
in your own country and in your own home town and 
villages. Let them understand the significance of 
the anti-aggression war in which your country is 
now engaged, thereby promoting all solidarity among 
all democratic countries. Create a chance that will 
be of advantage to all of us, and prepare yourselves 
for the moment when you will be able to play your 
part in the coming offensive against the mainland 
and for the restoration of the country. The time 
of uncertainty furnishes a golden chance for all 
of us to fulfill a historic mission." 1
The ROC's overseas Chinese policies adopted at the 7th 
National Congress of the KMT, held on 18th October 1952, 
can be summarized as follows:
(a) Protect the rights and interests of the 
overseas Chinese, especially those living in 
countries which have recognized the Communist 
regimes
(b) Promote cooperation among the various 
overseas Chinese organizations so that they may 
be able to solve their own problems, develop their 
respective enterprises, and more effectively combat 
Communism and Soviet imperialism;
(c) Encourage education for overseas Chinese 
and promote cultural work among them. Also 
provide special facilities for young Chinese 
abroad who return to China (i.e. Taiwan) to 
study or works and 1
1. Chiang Kai-shek's speech, "Defend Our Fatherland", abroadcast on 21st June 1950^ in Chianq Kai-shek's Speeches, 
1949-1952 (Taipei: China Publishing Company, 1953), p. 41
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(d) Give every possible assistance and facility 
to overseas Chinese who return home to undertake 
productive enterprises in the matter of importation, 
financing, remittance, electric power supply and 
technical skill. Also encourage them to come home 
to work and take up public office. 1
In addition, an Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission was set
up to carry out the aforementioned decisions. The appeal to
overseas Chinese became more pronounced during the 1960s
when the whole of Southeast Asia was threatened by Communist 
infiltration and when people on the Chinese mainland were
deeply disturbed by the Cultural Revolution.
Nevertheless, what deserves our attention here is that the 
Nationalist government, despite its appeals to overseas 
Chinese, has never made any particular effort to encourage 
large numbers of overseas Chinese to leave their (host) 
countries of residence and resettle in Taiwan. Apparently, 
this was and still is because of the population pressure 
already existing on the island.
(B ) Relations with the Republic of Vietnam (RVN)
The ROC's relations with the RVN focused on trade and 
technical assistance, although on top of every thing was the 
Nationalists' political support for RVN's battle against 
Communi s m .
Until 1961, the ROC's relations with the RVN were hardly 
worth mentioning. It was the war in Vietnam and their 
common cause to resist Communism that brought the two 
countries together, and, because of the war, the RVN became 1
1. Chang Chi-yun, op.cit., pp. 101-104.
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Taiwan's third most important export market (behind the
U.S. and Japan) during the 1960s. For instance, in the
spring of 1958, only one Chinese was sent from Taiwan to
the RVN for a technical assistance programme, and, between
1956 to 1960, average trade was valued at # 3 million
annually.^- In 1961, Taiwan's exports to the RVN, mainly
light industrial, textile and construction materials, came
to #12 million and this figure continued to increase in the
following years. Paralleling the dispatch of 125 technicians
in 1962, Taiwan's exports to the RVN had climbed to 022
million, #33 million in 1963, #38 million in 1964, and
2#41.5 million in 1965. It was apparent that the war had
its effect upon Taiwan's trade, as in 1966 (possibly as a
result of the escalation of the War) its exports rose to
. 3#89.7 million, or 16 percent of Taiwan's total export trade.
In fact Taiwan's trade to the RVN was almost one-way as 
between 1960 and 1966 RVN exports were only approximately 
#1 million annually. In this regard, it is necessary to 
point out that, although the RVN had become an important 
export narket for Taiwan, it was the U.S. who actually 
assisted the RVN to purchase goods from Taiwan. Nevertheless, 
technical cooperation was mutually beneficial. About 250 
Chinese came from Taiwan to work in transport (especially 
air services), civil engineering (construction materials),
1. CE»J, 22nd August 1966, p. 1; see also M. Gurtov, "Recent 
Developments on Formosa", The China Quarterly, No. 31 
(July-September 1967), p. 63.
2. The China Post, 5th July 1966, p. 6j see also M. Gurtov,
ibid.
3. See M. Gurtov, ibid.
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industry and trade: in exchange about 6,000 Vietnamese 
visited Taiwan for special training in the sugar industry, 
electric power, electronics, agriculture, education, etc.1
As noted earlier, Taiwan also offered to assist the RVN 
with war-related aid (such as troops), but this offer was 
rejected. Consequently, the Nationalist government assisted 
the RVN only indirectly through offering to the U.S. some 
air transit facilities in Taiwan. Meanwhile, it provided 
a military advisory group and a medical team to the RVN, 
and it accentuated its anti-Communist propaganda so as to 
encourage the Vietnamese soldiers’ morale and the "spiritual 
cooperation" between the two countries.
(C) Relations with the Philippines
The Nationalist government approached the Philippines, hoping 
that a minimum offer of technical assistance would help to 
cement ties between the two countries and the latter's 
anti-Communist fervour. The Philippines were considered a 
useful friend to the ROC in that they had a security pact 
with the U.S., that they wereanti-Communist, and that they 
had a large number of overseas Chinese. Otherwise, at this 
stage, the ROC had rather limited trade and technical know­
how exchange with the Philippines. In 1966, for instance,
the ROC sent 7 experts to help Philippino farmers increase
. 2rice and corn production and to establish model farms; 
in the same year, Philippine exports to Taiwan exceeded
3imports by #6 million in a total trade of only ¿23.4 million. 123
1. CDN, 22nd August 1966, p. 1; see also M. Gurtov, ibid.
2. CDN, 3rd July 1966, p. 3; see also the China Yearbook, 
1966-67, p. 193.
3. M. Gurtov, op.cit.
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Apparently the ROC was willing to accept the shorter end of 
the deal so long as Manila remained anti-Communist.
(D) Relations with the Republic of Korea (ROK)
As noted in Chapter One, "China" and "Korea" were histori­
cally brotherly nations— Korea used to be one of the "Middle 
Kingdom's" tributaries. Now with these two countries 
politically and ideologically divided, and physically under 
the threat of Communist aggression, the ROC and the ROK felt 
that they had only too much in common. Besides, the ROC 
still had a vivid memory concerning the significance of the 
Korean War in its survival struggle.
On 27th November 1964, the two countries signed a treaty 
which called for closer economic political and military 
cooperation. As a result, frequent high-level contacts took 
place through a series of exchange visits. The two most 
important visits were the ROK President Park Chung-hee's 
state visit to Taiwan in February 1966 and, in return, a 
visit by Chiang Ching-kuo, then Defence Minister, to the 
ROK in the following April.1 The outcomes of these exchanges 
included an agreement to assist the RVN so as to restore 
peace and social order in that country, to protect other 
Asian countries from Communist influence, and to assist 
each other if a common enemy were to attack. Also mentioned 
during the meetings were the issues of broadening their 
mutual economic, cultural and scholarly exchanges, and 
trade relations such as removing trade barriers, and of 
solving economic problems without direct U.S. involvement 12
1. The China Yearbook, 1966-67, p. 191
2. The China Post, 29th Kay 1966, p. 6
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(E) Relations with Japan
Japan was an exceptional case in the ROC's diplomatic 
history. This was not only because Japan had a colonial 
relationship with Taiwan and had fought an 8-year bloody 
war with the Nationalist government, but also because Japan 
was neither a very strongly anti-Communist country nor a 
Communist sympathizer. Moverover, its post-War foreign 
policy line was predominantly concerned with economics.
Thus, although in appearance Japan supported the ROC's 
position during this period and had extensive trade relations 
with it, in reality, Japan also conducted trade relations 
with the Communist mainland.
Japan's two-pronged "China" policy put Taiwan in an awkward 
position, because on the one hand, it could not afford to 
lose Japan as a powerful political supporter and a potential 
trading partner in Asia; on the other hand, Japan's continued 
relations with the two Chinese governments conflicted with 
the ROC's insistence on the "one China" principle. One of 
the fundamental conditions of this principle was a clear 
division between "friend" and "foe", which could be made 
according to the following criteria put forward by a news­
paper editorial in 1966s
"Opposing the Communists and recovering the Mainland 
constitute the basic national policy of the Republic 
of China. Any nation which, by its actions, helps 
or does not hinder our basic national policy is our 
friend; those acting to the contrary are not our 
friends. We use this standard to distinguish friend 
from foe, and our attitude is thus clear." 1 1
1. Editorial, CDN. 18th July 1966, p. 2
(E) Relations with Japan
Japan was an exceptional case in the ROC’s diplomatic 
history. This was not only because Japan had a colonial 
relationship with Taiwan and had fought an 8-year bloody 
war with the Nationalist government, but also because Japan 
was neither a very strongly anti-Communist country nor a 
Communist sympathizer. Moverover, its post-War foreign 
policy line was predominantly concerned with economics.
Thus, although in appearance Japan supported the ROC's 
position during this period and had extensive trade relations 
with it, in reality, Japan also conducted trade relations 
with the Communist mainland.
Japan's two-pronged "China" policy put Taiwan in an awkward 
position, because on the one hand, it could not afford to 
lose Japan as a powerful political supporter and a potential 
trading partner in Asia; on the other hand, Japan's continued 
relations with the two Chinese governments conflicted with 
the ROC's insistence on the "one China" principle. One of 
the fundamental conditions of this principle was a clear 
division between "friend" and "foe", which could be made 
according to the following criteria put forward by a news­
paper editorial in 1966;
"Opposing the Communists and recovering the Mainland 
constitute the basic national policy of the Republic 
of China. Any nation which, by its actions, helps 
or does not hinder our basic national policy is our 
friend; those acting to the contrary are not our 
friends. We use this standard to distinguish friend 
from foe, and our attitude is thus clear." 1 1
1. Editorial, CDN. 18th July 1966, p. 2.
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Accordingly, Japan's "two separate channels"— one wit>> the 
ROC and the other one with the PRC— constituted a violation 
of this friend-and-foe dichotomy. Nevertheless, the ROC 
remained quiet on this matter. In this respect, the ROC's 
attitude can be considered as rather tolerant and flexible.
A fuller description of the ROC's relations with Japan will 
be given in Chapter Six.
In addition to the above, the ROC approached other non- 
Communist (but not necessarily anti-Communist) countries in 
Asia, such as Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia (all of them 
had a large number of overseas Chinese), Australia and New 
Zealand. But no substantial results in terms of political, 
security or economic agreement came about. It can be argued 
that perhaps the Nationalist government did not work hard 
enough to convince these countries? or perhaps, it was 
difficult for the ROC to get access to them due to their 
individual attitudes; or perhaps, ROC's friendly gestures 
were not appreciated. Nonetheless, in all, during the 
1960s, the ROC was indeed more active ip pursuing a better 
relations with its neighbouring countries.
IV. Conclusion
erv
- JH
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To sum up, ROC's foreign policy was not entirely static and 
unrealistic. The 1960s had witnessed both changes and conti­
nuities in its policy for survival and in its external relations. 
What could be changed and where compromises had been made had 
been over those issues concerning the ideology of anti-
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Communism, and what could not be changed had been the 
power struggle between the two Chinese governments. Conse­
quently, when the 1960s came to an end, the ROC’s new 
foreign policy strategy of political counterattack showed 
both strengths and weaknesses in coping with the issue of 
national survival. The strengths were that the political 
strategy allowed the Nationalist government to concentrate 
more energy on its internal development and, with less 
military expenditure, to conduct an active foreign aid 
policy. In this respect, the strategy had also effectively 
safeguarded the status quo inside Taiwan and along the 
Taiwan Straits. However, the weaknesses of the strategy 
were its limited success in countering the increasing 
influence of Communist China in international politics, as 
well as in ensuring continued U.S. support. In this regard, 
the ROC failed to secure its right to membership in the U.N., 
as well as its international status. Concomitantly, its 
objective to isolate Peking internationally was also 
unsuccessful.
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Chapter Five
The Strategy of Foreign Aid
I. Introduction
The ROC’s strategy of foreign aid was developed during the 
1960s as an adjunct of its overall political strategy with 
the aim of countering Peking's pending application for U.N. 
membership. The targets were the newly emerging countries 
in Africa. The ROC's foreign aid programme also reached 
other areas such as Southeast Asia and Latin America, but in 
terms of priority and the volume of aid during the 1960s, 
Africa was the most important.^
In this Chapter, we will introduce the ROC's aid relations 
with Africa, that is, the motivations, objectives, and 
tactics involved in these relations. Our purpose is to find 
out the effectiveness of such aid, namely, how far did it 
protect the ROC's membership of the U.N. and prevent Peking's 
admission? In all, it proposes to look at the instrumental 
value of the ROC's aid strategy in the promotion of its 
foreign policy objectives. Also to be included in our study 
are a general understanding of the so-called politics of 
"foreign aid", a brief background on the ROC's legitimacy 
struggle in the U.N., and the role of the newly independent 1
1. In Southeast Asia, ROC development assistance programmes 
reached Vietnam, the Philippines, Thailand, Singapore 
and Indonesia. In Latin America, they included the 
Dominican Republic, Brazil, Chile, Panama, Peru, and 
many others. ROC programmes were conducted either 
unilaterally or through some sort of joint venture. For 
detailed information, see "Tables of Development Assis­
tance", in Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of China, 
1979 (Taipei: Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting 
and Statistics, Executive Yuan, 1980), pp. 504-508.
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countries in international politics. To do this, however, 
we will also touch upon the role of the PRC in Africa.
1. The politics of "foreign aid": aid as an instrument of 
foreign policy
Philip Babcock Grove defines foreign aid as "economic or 
other assistance provided by one nation to another especially 
as a tool in molding opinion in the recipient nation".* In 
a slightly different manner, Jess Stein defines foreign aid 
as "government assistance, usually on a large scale, from a 
great power to a war-devastated or underdeveloped nation, 
consisting of economic, technical, or military aid, given 
primarily in the form of monetary or material grants or
financial loans, for purposes of relief and rehabilitation,
. . . . 2 for economic stabilization, or for mutual defense". Put
together, foreign aid can be regarded as actions taken by
people or institutions in one country towards people or
institutions in another country, which help, or are at
least intended to help the latter."* It is a form of transfer
of resources from the "have", the "developed", or the "richer"
countries to those "have not", "less-developed", or "poorer"
countries. 1
1. Philip Babcock Grove, ed. Webster's Third New International 
Dictionary of the English Language Unabridged (Massachu­
setts! G & C Merriam Company, Publishers, 1976), p. 889.
2. Jess Stein, ed. The Random House Dictionary of the English 
Language (New Yorki Random House, 1966), p. 555.
3. Foreign aid also takes place on the international level.
For instance, international bodies like the International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the Inter- 
American Development Bank, and the specialized agencies 
of the United Nations, e.g. UNESCO, have been set up to 
provide aid or deal with matters relating to aid activities.
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This phenomenon of foreign aid gradually became an important 
aspect of international relations during the Cold War period 
of the 1950s when a large number of economic assistance plans 
and security pacts were set up by the two Superpowers, i.e. 
the U.S. and the Soviet Union.
In the immediate post-War period, U.S. aid was largely 
granted to repair war damage and to support economic recon­
struction, such as the Marshall Plan to Western Europe. In 
1949, however, the first major post-War programme of military 
assistance, the Mutual Defense Assistance Act, was passed by 
the U.S. Congress to provide military aid to the Western 
European countries that had become members of the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Under this Act such 
aid could also be made available to non-member countries.
From the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, however, the 
lines between different kinds of aid were blurred, and 
defence became the umbrella for most forms of U.S. foreign 
assistance. Meanwhile, although military aid continues to 
be provided, with few exceptions, on a grant basis, U.S. 
aid for economic development has increasingly taken the 
form of loans. The geography of U.S. aid distribution has 
also changed. From the end of World War II until the middle 
1950s, Europe, receiving 75% of all U.S. aid, was the first 
aid priority of the U.S. With the implementation of the 
Marshall Plan which eliminated the need for aid to Europe, 
the U.S. began to channel an increasing share of foreign aid
to the underdeveloped countries of Africa, Asia and Latin 
America. As a matter of fact, the main reason for this
growing U.S. concern for the underdeveloped world was that
the latter, in particular the African continent after the 
process of decolonization, had gradually become an area of 
competition between itself and the Soviet Union. In other 
words, the underdeveloped world had become the focus of 
East-West confrontation. The reasons for the growing 
importance of the African countries in international politics 
will be dealt with later.
In the early 1950s, the Soviet Union, followed by other 
Communist bloc countries, already began a programme of 
technical and economic aid to the underdeveloped countries 
for reasons just mentioned above. Thus, its original 
objectives were to expel western influence in the under­
developed world and to replace it with Soviet influence and 
presence there. Nevertheless, during the 1960s, when the 
Sino-Soviet split.became a reality, Soviet objectives in 
the underdeveloped world expanded. That is, it sought not 
only to destroy western leverage and influence in the under­
developed world, but also to check Communist China's bid for 
a leadership role there.1
The PRC embarked on a foreign aid programme officially in 
1953 and, since then, has used foreign economic assistance 
as an important tool of diplomacy. Nevertheless, the PRC 
has used foreign aid as an instrument of its foreign policy
1. For more information on Sino-Soviet competition in Africa, 
see Walter F. Hahn and Alvin J. Cottrell, Soviet Shadow 
over Africa (Washington, D.C.: University of Miami, 1976), 
pp. 15-17; W.A.C.Adie, "China, Russia and the Third 
World". The China Quarterly, 11 (July-September 1962), 
pp. 200-213; Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, ed. Africa and the 
Communist World (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1963); and Robert A. Scalapino, "Sino-Soviet Competition 
in Afria", Foreign Affairs, XLII, 4 (July 1964), pp. 
640-654.
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slightly differently from the two Superpowers. In this 
regard, John Franklin Copper has given an almost complete 
description. He said:
"Mao found that foreign aid was a useful tool of 
foreign policy for a variety of reasons. It was 
a way of competing with the Western 'imperialists' 
without risking nuclear war. Later this applied 
to the Soviet Union as well. Aid-giving allowed 
Peking to relate to a number of Asian countries as 
it had prior to the era of Western imperialism.
Also China's economic aid made it possible for 
Chinese leaders to embarrass the richer countries 
and maintain an attitude of moral superiority—  
which in the past was a Chinese custom in dealing 
with foreigners. Frequently aid-giving served as 
a convenient means for Mao to manipulate, or further, 
revolutionary movements or wars of national liber­
ation that China, because of its strong anti-status- 
quo feelings, but weaker capabilities, found 
compatible with its own views of the world.
Chinese leaders also discovered that many of the 
underdeveloped countries were dissatisfied with 
Western aid, and many were disappointed equally 
with Soviet efforts in the realm. They were 
receptive to Chinese aid, China found diplomatic 
recognition difficult to attain in an arena of 
world politics dominated by a United States' 
effort, and later a Soviet effort as well, to 
keep China isolated. A little aid often paved the 
way for better relations, including eventually 
diplomatic recognition." 1
The only objective to be added to this list was that of 
eliminating Taiwan's chance to win friendship and support in 
the underdeveloped world. Since its inception, Communist 
China's aid had reached Communist bloc countries, non-Com- 
munist Asian countries, Middle East countries, and African 
countries.
Thus, in the immediate post-War period and during the 1950s, 
foreign aid was largely the preserve of the developed
1. John F. Copper, China's Foreign Aidi An Instrument of
Peking's Foreign Policy (Massachusetts: Lexington Books 
1976), Preface, p. xii.
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countries. Nevertheless, during the 1960s, an unusual
phenomenon occured. In addition to the aforementioned
case of the PRC, some countries, themselves still developing
and in great need of assistance from others, also began to
undertake foreign aid. Taiwan was one of these countries;
on one hand, it still required U.S. material and military-
support, and yet, on the other hand, it took steps to
"penetrate” Africa. (The motivation for Taiwan's aid to
Africa will be introduced shortly.) Other instances were
Israel, Yugoslavia, Tunisia, etc. All of them were less
developed countries in comparison to the Superpowers and
yet, for varying political reasons, all became involved in
aid activities abroad. D.V.Segre described these countries
as the "marginal states" since they were located at the
periphery of large ideological "empires" and that they
constantly felt the threat of either war or elimination.
"For marginal countries of this type", D.V.Segre maintained,
"to engage in aid activities means, first and foremost, an
attempt to transform the liability of their being a border
state into an asset. This is particularly true when the
situation of marginality is not a temporary one but is
2permanent and rooted in history." As far as Taiwan was 
concerned, its foreign aid programme to Africa was initiated 
to try to ensure their recipient states supported its claim 
for legitimacy at the U.N.
Besides these two Superpowers, there were other donor 
countries such as Great Britain, France, Australia,
Canada, Japan, New Zealand and some of the countries of 
Eastern and Western Europe. Nevertheless for the purpose 
of this study, we will not include them here.
D.V.Segre, "The Philosophy and Practice of Israel's Inter­
national Cooperation", in Michael Curtis and Susan 
Aurelia Gitelson's Israel in the Third World (New Jerseyi 
Transaction Books, New Brunswick, 1970), p. 8 .
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According to Article 23(1) of the U.N. Charter, the 
"Republic of China" was one of the founders of the United 
Nations, and one of the five permanent members of the 
Security Council. There probably would not have been a 
"China Issue" in the United Nations if the ROC had either 
won the Chinese civil war or had been totally defeated. 
Instead, the ROC lost most of China but retained the island 
of Taiwan, and thus survived as a functioning government 
for millions of Chinese, rather than as a povrerless govern­
ment in exile on foreign soil. Although this division of 
China between two governments had rough parallels in 
Germany, Korea, and Vietnam, none of those countries had 
been United Nations members before the division. The 
partition of China therefore created a unique dilemma: not 
whether "China" should be admitted to the United Nations, but 
which government— the Nationalist Republic on Taiwan or the 
Communist People's Republic on the mainland— was entitled to 
represent China in the United Nations. Thus, from 1949 
until October 1971, a vote was taken almost every year in
the General Assembly on the question of which government
2should be the "rightful" representative of China. At 
first, during the 1950s, the dispute was dominated by two 
opposing forces: the majority pro-Taiwan, anti-Mainland 
group, which was sponsored by the U.S. and its western allies 1
1. For a full account of the development of the "China 
Issue", see United Nations, General Assembly Official 
Records (GAOR), 1949-1971, and United Nations Yearbook, 
same period.
The same issue was debated in other United Nations 
agencies, for instance, the FAO, UNESCO, and WHO, etc.
The "China Issue" at the United Nations^
2.
and the minority pro-Mainland, anti-Taiwan group, backed 
by the Soviet Union and its Communist associates. (Communist 
China's application for membership was made on the express 
condition that Taiwan be expelled from the Organization.)
Thanks to the U.S. "moratorium" device which called for
postponement of all debate on the China Issue, this power
relationship was more or less stable at the U.N. during the
1950s, so Taiwan was assured of a comfortable majority.^
Nevertheless, after 1960, when a large number of new
African and Asian countries had been admitted into the U.N.,
this power relationship was upset by the fact that the
number of countries favouring Communist China's admission
increased every year. The U.S. then retreated to a
procedural defence of Taiwan's position. From 1961 onwards,
the U.S. and a group of allies (Australia, Colombia, Italy
and Japan) annually submitted a resolution making any
proposal to change the representation of China an "Important
Question", that is, one which (under Article 18 of the U.N.
Charter) required a two-thirds majority of the General
2Assembly for approval. In other words, while the moratorium 12
1. From 1951 until 1955, the moratorium resolution was
approved by at least a two-thirds majority in the General 
Assembly. In 1956 it gained only 59 percent of the votes; 
thereafter, the percentage dropped steadily to a low 
point of 42 percent in 1960, well below a simple majority
of total UN membership. The 1960 resolution was adopted
only because 23 countries abstained, leaving a margin of 
42 votes in favour, 32 opposed. Fourteen of the 23 abst­
entions were by new African members. For a more detailed
description of the votes on the moratorium resolution 
1951-1960, see Sheldon Appleton, The Eternal Triangle? 
Communist China, the United States and the United Nations 
(East Lansings Michigan State University Press, 1961),
pp. 7-10.
2. The General Assembly approved the U.S. proposal— the 1960 
5-power resolution 1668 (XVI)— by 61 votes to 34, with 7 
abstentions. GAOR, 16th Session, II, 1080th Plenary 
Meeting, 15th December 1961, pp. 1068-1069; and UN Yearbook
1961. pp. 128-129.„
resolutions of 1951-1960 postponed a direct vote ©n the 
question of replacing Taipei with Peking, the important 
question resolutions of 1961-1971 permitted a direct vote 
annually on this question (i.e. the proposal of seating the 
PRC and ousting Taiwan), but required a two-thirds majority 
on it. Thus, as long as the U.S. could muster a simple 
majority for the first vote (i.e. the "Important Question" 
Resolution), it could then block the PRC by mustering 
one-third plus one votes on the second (i.e. the Proposal 
of "Seating the PRC and Ousting Taiwan"). (For texts of 
the Resolution and the Proposal, see Appendix No. 1.) 
Nevertheless, this delaying tactic to prevent the seating 
of the PRC in the U.N. also gradually became less effective 
as the U.S. found it more and more difficult to obtain 
majority support.1 As a matter of fact, as noted in Chapter 
Four, towards the end of 1960s, the U.S. was in any case less 
enthusiastic about supporting Taiwan’s cause. As a conse­
quence of this, the PRC became increasingly popular in the 
U.N. at Taiwan's expense. It is this that explained Taiwan’s 
need to intensify its diplomatic efforts in African and other 
newly independent countries so as to win their voting support 
at the U.N.
However, the tide of pro-Peking votes receded in 1966, 1967, 
and 1968. This probably was due less to the ROC's efforts
1. In the first 3 years of the "Important Question" strategy 
(1961-63), the ROC actually gained ground in the voting 
on the pro-Peking resolution. This was why there were 
no votings on the "Important Question" resolution in 1962 
and 1963. There was no vote in 1964 because of financial 
crisis in the U.N., but the 1965 vote alarmed the ROC« 
for the first time, Peking received as many votes as 
Taipei (47 for, 47 against and 23 abstentions). See 
Appendix No. 2.
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than to the PRC's preoccupation with its Cultural Revolution. 
As soon as Peking renewed its diplomatic efforts after the 
Cultural Revolution ended in mid-1969, the voting trend was 
again reversed in favour of the PRC. In 1970, for the first 
time, Peking received more votes than Taipei, although not 
a majority, because of 27 absententions (including 1 absent 
and 1 not participating). In the 1971 voting, Peking at 
last received a majority of the votes (58 percent). Although 
not a two-thirds majority, this was sufficient to decide the 
issue, because the "Important Question" resolution was for 
the first time defeated by 59 votes to 55, with 15 absten­
tions.1 After the rejection of this resolution, and before 
the vote on the pro-Peking resolution, ROC Foreign Minister 
Chou Shu-kai, in view of the then critical situation, decided 
to withdraw. Without the presence of the ROC delegation, the
General Assembly then adopted the pro-Peking resolution by
276 votes to 35, with 17 abstentions and 2 absent. Hence 
the so-called "China Issue" on which the United Nations voted 
in 21 years had finally come to an end. Also ended was the 
ROC’s relations with the United Nations. On 26th October 
1971, the PRC delegation declared its entry into the United 
Nations. Shortly afterwards, Chou Shu-kai issued an official 
statement declaring that the ROC "has now decided to withdraw 
from the organization which it helped establish" 26 years 
before.^
1. GAOR, 26th Session, 1976th Plenary Meeting, 25th October 
1971, pp. 18, 33-35.
2. ibid., p. 41. For more detailed treatment of the "China 
Issue" and the 26th Session of the General Assembly, see 
Chao Hui-mu, "Wo-kuo i-jan tui-ch'u lien-ho-kuo ching- 
wei" (The Withdrawal of the Republic of China from the 
United Nations’), Wen-ti yu yen-chiu (Issues & Studies)
XI, 3 (December, 1971), pp. 61-70.
3. For full text of Chou's statement, see Asian Outlook 
(Taipei), VI, 11 (November 1971), pp. 9-11.
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3. The role of African states at the United Nations and
their connection with the "China Issue"
When the China Issue first came up for debate at the U.N.
in 1950, the African countries as a whole were not at all
a significant force in the Organization. At that time,
there were only four of them— Egypt, Ethiopia, Liberia, and
South Africa— in the U.N., accounting for only 6.8 percent
of the total U.N. vote (see Table No. 2).* The rest of the
continent was split up under European rule. Even among these
four states, there was no diplomatic cohesion. As one
author put it: "Africa did not constitute an important
2identity and was not a force to reckon with." Indeed, on 
the basis of U.N.'s "one state one vote" rule in the General 
Assembly, the African continent had no effective weight on 
the China Issue during the 1950s in terms of its voting 
strength.
Nevertheless after 1960, when the number of African states 
began to increase in the U.N., their importance increased 
correspondingly. Not only did they constitute a much larger 
bloc of votes, but also, as a direct consequence, they could 12
1. All of them were original members of the U.N. Egypt 
obtained independence on 28th February 1922. The others, 
Ethiopia, Liberia and South Africa, on 5th Kay 1941,
26th July 1847 and 31st May 1910 respectively. Egypt 
represents an unusual case. Egypt and Syria were both 
original members of the U.N. from 24th October 1945. 
Following a plebiscite on 21st February 1958, the United 
Arab Republic (UAR) was established by a union of Egypt 
and Syria and continued as a single member. On 13th 
October 1961, Syria resumed its original status as an 
independent State and simultaneously its U.N. membership. 
On 2nd September 1971, the UAR changed its name to Arab 
Republic of Egypt. Since Syria is not geographically in 
Africa, our study will not include it.
2. Nwugo Jude-Cyprian Akanezi, African Responses to An 
Issue of Disputed Representation in the United Nations: 
The Case of China in the General Assembly (Washington 
D.C.: Howard University, Ph.D. thesis, 1977), p. 115.
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press for influence in the voting patterns in the U.N. This 
is because, after de-colonization, the newly independent 
states felt the need to assert their new national identity. 
Most of them therefore adopted the "non-aligned" stance as 
the political philosophy for their foreign policy, i.e. 
avoiding commitment to either camp of the Cold War antagon­
ists, In doing this, however, African countries often used 
their non-alignment for political bargaining. For instance, 
African countries attempted, sometimes successfully, to 
influence U.N. voting on various issues through voting as 
a bloc--for, or against, or abstention. Another point with 
regard to African countries' foreign policy was that, as a 
consequence of a prolonged colonial history, most of them 
had had relatively little experience in diplomatic practice. 
Thus, despite their position of non-alignment, during the 
intial period of participation in U.N. voting on the China 
Issue they tended to abstain from voting. In 1960 more than 
half (14) of the total African voters (26) preferred to 
abstain.1 On the other hand, their votes were sometimes 
based on their previous "colonial connection". That is, 
they tended to relate themselves either with the French or 
with the British. An example of this can be found in the 
1964-1965 U.N. voting results when some of previous French 
colonies changed their voting patterns because of France's 
new China policy. This "French connection" will be dealt 
with again in due course.
Even so, however, the African countries were divided among 
themselves. Roughly speaking, judging from their voting
1. See Appendix No. 2.
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patterns on the China Issue, they could be divided into 
three main categories. Category A were those African 
countries that always voted for or at least never against 
Taiwan (hence against Communist China's admission).
Category B were the states that always voted against, or 
at least never, for Taiwan (hence always for Communist China's 
admission). Category C were the states that were inconsis­
tent in their support. They switched their votes from 
either of the claimants as they saw fit, or abstained from 
voting. Further elaboration of these groups and the effect 
of their voting upon the China Issue will be given later in 
this Chapter.
The foregoing suggests the complication and fluidity which 
the newly independent African states had introduced to power 
relations in the U.N. With the number of African states 
increased by more than ten times in 1971 compared to 1950, 
and constituting 32.1% of the total U.N. members in 1971 
(see Table No. 2), Taiwan and its main supporter, the U.S., 
faced more problems in mustering a simple majority. In other 
words, African states constituted the gap between the solid 
Taiwan supporters of the 1950's in Western Europe and Latin 
America and the majority needed to keep the China Issue as 
"Important Question" in the 1960's. Here lay therefore the 
importance of the African countries, either individually or 
collectively, in that they could deliberately and easily 
upset the U.N. power pattern, hence influence the voting
outcomes, not because of their national capabilities, but 
because of their numbers. In this regard, the connection of 
the African countries with the China Issue in the U.N. was 
thus established.
II. Foreign aid as the RPC's foreign policy strategy
1. The role of the government
As mentioned earlier, foreign aid is generally conducted 
either through governmental or international channels, but 
some is also conducted through private channels. In many 
countries, international technical cooperation, as one aspect 
of foreign aid, is mostly reserved for the private sector. 
However, the case of Taiwan is different. The government 
in Taiwan is generally involved in most of the economic and 
technical activities and this includes "international 
technical cooperation".^ To understand this, we need to 
emphasize a few points about Taiwan's economy under Nation­
alist rule after 1949.
The Principle of People's Livelihood suggested that China's 
economic system should assume a mixed character in which 
private industry and state-owned enterprises would complement 
each other. Thus, in Taiwan, the government involves itself 
in many large projects. Typical examples of such govern­
mental activity are to be found in energy, water control and 
irrigation; large-scale agricultural production and processing 
of sugar; telegraph, telephone and radio communications, 
transportation, and many others. These activities are 
usually organized under large and well-staffed corporations 
which normally develop with full governmental support and 
without problems of competition. 1
1. See Chapter Two, "Principle of People's Livelihood".
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To some extent, this can provide automatic access for the 
government to the best quality technical personnel and 
expertise for any and all of its purposes, including the 
planning and operation of international technical cooper­
ation programmes. Furthermore, it can be argued, such an 
arrangement serves political purposes too. That is, 
internally, it enables the government to control such 
corporations indirectly but effectively (as noted in Chapter 
One, it also helps to legitimize Nationalist authority on 
Taiwan island); externally, where no diplomatic relations 
exist between Taiwan and the foreign country requiring such 
work (which is often the case), the necessary agreements 
relating to the conduct of the work can be negotiated 
between the foreign governments involved and one of these 
"private" corporations in Taiwan. Corporation representatives, 
therefore, instead of official diplomats from Taiwan, can 
negotiate the necessary agreements, finance the work, 
recruit the personnel from their own ranks, train them, and, 
in fact, operate the entire technical cooperation project 
in the foreign country involved, under the legal fiction 
that no actual inter-governmental relationships are involved. 
This convenient device has been widely used by the government 
in Taiwan since the need to "open" a dialogue with the non- 
aligned African countries became urgent during the 1960s.
The utilization of this tactic developed further after 1971—  
this will be discussed again in Chapter Six— when Taiwan's 
diplomatic life deteriorated. This explains why Taiwan 
wanted and was able to undertake the aid strategy without 
revealing too explicitly its real political motivation, and 
hence without encouraging too much resistance from the
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aligned African countries became urgent during the 1960s.
The utilization of this tactic developed further after 1971—  
this will be discussed again in Chapter Six— when Taiwan's 
diplomatic life deteriorated. This explains why Taiwan 
wanted and was able to undertake the aid strategy without 
revealing too explicitly its real political motivation, and 
hence without encouraging too much resistance from the
recipients. Here, we only need to take a very brief look 
at the administrative and organizational aspects of Taiwan's 
international technical cooperation, for example, the 
"Operation Vanguard" project— a code name given by the 
Nationalist government in referring to its aid to Africa—  
to understand that the over-all policy direction of the 
programme actually centred in the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs.1
In Taiwan, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has primary 
responsibility for the making of general policy in this 
field. The responsibility includes the development of any 
project for technical cooperation with foreign countries, 
the carrying through of the negotiations, the formalization 
of agreements with the individual countries involved, and 
the overall administration of the projects in the countries 
themselves. This is not only because the private sectors 
are less interested in making such long-term projects, but 
also more importantly, they are actually not financially 
capable of it. On the other hand, however, it is difficult 
for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs alone to p] ay a leading 
role in working out and implementing such technical expertise
1. Initially the Nationalist government thought to call 
the project "Operation Safari", but in January, 1961, 
it was given the name "Hsien-feng-an", i.e. "Operation 
Vanguard", an English name proposed by Yang Hsi-k'un, 
the major architect of the aid project. Chung-Fei 
chi-shu ho-tso (hsien-fenq-an) ti yang-chi yu fa-chan 
(Sino-African technical cooperation— "Operation 
Vanguard"— its origins and development), (hereafter 
referred to as Hsien-fenq-an)(Taipei, 1975), pp. 2-3.
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required.^- Thus, the Sino-African Technical Cooperation
Committee (SATCC) was specially set up in 1961 in Taiwan
to assist with projects in Africa. On this Committee were
represented all the various elements of the government of
Taiwan which were likely to be involved with the work.
Here the actual coordination could take place between major
elements of the government, such as the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, the Ministry of National Defence, the Council for
International Economic Cooperation and Development, the
Sino-American Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction 
2(JCRR ), and the Taiwan Provincial Government's Department 
of Agriculture and Forestry. The SATCC is still in function 
today although its significance has declined considerably 
since 1971.
1. Interview with Yang Hsi-k'un on 21st May 1979. Yang was 
then Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, also Director of 
the Department of Western Asian Affairs. Yang had been 
the ROC's delegate to the U.N.; a member of the U.N. 
Visiting Mission to West Africa Trust Territories in 
1963; a member of the Goodwill Mission to West and East 
Asia in 1971. In Taiwan, Yang is a leading expert on 
African affairs. He had personally conducted more than 
10 ROC goodwill missions to Africa during the 1960s. 2
2. JCRR— Joint Commission of Rural Reconstruction— is an 
institution originally set up by the U.S. and the Nation­
alist government during the early 1950s to help Taiwan's 
economic construction. Nevertheless, it also covered a 
wide range of activities other than economic promotion. 
For more information on JCRR, see China Yearbook, 1965- 
66. pp. 320-338; also Neil H. Jacoby, U.S. Aid to Taiwan 
(New York: Praeger Publishers, 1966).
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2. The "Operation Vanguard" project; motives and objectives
Operation Vanguard project began in January 1961.1 Its 
declared motivation was humanitarian. However, there should 
be little doubt that its real aim was essentially political 
and to a lesser extent economic.
From the humanitarian point of view, the decision to offer 
aid to Africa stemmed from Sun Yat-sen's ambition that the 
"wanq tao” spirit of China, "having achieved its own
national independence and freedom should also ’rescue the
2 .weak and lift up the fallen'". According to the Nationalistsi 
"Our own anti-colonial tradition stemming from bitter 
experience with foreign encroachment during the Manchu 
period, is somewhat identical to the African aspirations.
Thus, it is our 'divine obligation' to assist the Africans."^
In other words, as far as Taiwan was concerned, the Operation 
Vanguard project was just a "simple desire to assist friendly 
neighbours in developing agriculture and accelerating economic
4growth." It consisted of helping Africa's rural population 1234
1. As a result of a series of meetings among government 
officials between late 1960 and early 1961, an Executive 
Committee for "Operation Vanguard" was founded in October
1961. However, "Operation Vanguard" proceeded rather 
rapidly after its first mission to Liberia and soon grew 
beyond the administrative capacity of its initial 
executive committee. To cope with the rapid development 
and to facilitate cooperation between its components, the 
Executive Committee was expanded and renamed the Sino- 
African Technical Cooperation Committee on 18th April
1962. Hsinq-feng-an, p. 4.
2. See Chapter Two, pp. 110-111.
3. Teng Kung-hsuan, "Dr. Sun Yat-sen's View on Internation­
alism and His Foreign Policy". Issues and Studies. 11,2 
(November 1965), p. 12.
4. Yang Hsi-k'un speech, CDN, (16th June, 1970), p. 1; 
also interview on 21st May 1979.
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to "increase their agricultural production, to work to 
improve their lot and to build up their self-confidence 
through self-reliance."1 The Nationalists therefore declared 
that the objectives of the Vanguard project were to:
(i) introduce Taiwan's agricultural technical 
know-how and experience to "friendly" 
countries,
(ii) assist the Africans in the training of 
farmers and agricultural technicians,
(iii) aid the Africans in agricultural extension 
work, and,
(iv) help the Africans to attain self-sufficiency 
in food production. 2
All these, they believed, would eventually lead to the 
realization of Sun's aspiration of a world of great common­
wealth based upon universal independence, freedom and 
equality.
Nevertheless, whatever the motives and objectives were said 
to be, Taiwan's aid effort in Africa was also undoubtedly a 
manoeuvre to trade for more votes in the U.N. General 
Assembly which would protect Taiwan's position in this 
world organization as well as in the world in general. It 
was therefore designed to improve Taiwan's "marginal" status, 
Consequently, when Taiwanwithdrew from the U.N. in 1971, its 
aid activities in Africa seemed to become less meaningful, 
Thus, regardless of the claim of Yang Hsi-k'un,
■
Sino-African Technical Cooperation (SATC), (Taipei: 
Committee on Sino-African Technical Cooperation (CSATC) 
September 1965), p. 4.
Some Highlights of the International Technical Coopera­
tion Programme of the Republic of China. (Taipei: Com­
mittee of International Technical Cooperation, 14th 
March 1979), p. 3.
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1 that Taiwan's
policy to Africa was "to be sympathetic with legitimate
political aspirations of emerging countries; 'whenever
possible' to give wholehearted support; and to welcome
diplomatic contacts with as many African countries as desire 
2them", Taiwan’s real intention was to solicit African 
3votes and support. Indeed, by establishing a Taiwanese
presence in Africa, however modest, Taiwan would have the
opportunity to "tutor" the Africans in the horror of
international Communism. Meanwhile, by furthering African
economic development based on its own model, Taiwan could
expect to discredit Chinese Communist blandishments of an 
. 4"economic shortcut". These political and economic objec­
tives need further elaboration.
In conjunction with the strategy of political counter­
attack, the political objective of Taiwan's aid to Africa 
was to create Taiwan's presence and influence in the African 
continent (i.e. to create a good political image) as a peace­
ful method of counteracting Communist China's approach to 
Africa. In the view of the Nationalists, the emergence of 
the African countries offered Taiwan a challenge, and also 
potentially a problem, for its legitimacy struggle at the 
U.N. Since the PRC had already taken the initiative to 
develop relations with Africa in 1956 through the methods of 
aid and promises of technical cooperation, Taiwan could not 1234
1. See footnotes no. 1, p. 286 and no. 1, p. 287.
2. Ann P. Munro, "Taiwan's Objectives in Africa", Africa 
Report, VIII, 7 (July 1963), p. 8.
3. Yawsoon Sim, "Taiwan and Africa", Africa Today, XVIII,
3 ( Jily, 1971), p. 7.
4. Ann P. Munro, op.cit., p. 7.
the chief architect of the Vanguard project,
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In thisoverlook the importance of such a connection.* 
regard, Africa seemed to become an extension of the Chinese 
civil war "battlefield". George T.Yu, an Assistant Professor 
in the Department of Political Science, University of North 
Carolina, once described this phenomenon of "Chinese rivalry 
in Africa" as follows:
"Except for token artillery exchanges along the 
Fukien Coast today, the major theatre of conflict 
between the Chinese Communists and the Chinese 
Nationalists has been transferred from China soil 
onto foreign territory. The world now provides 
the arena in which these two contenders compete 
for supremacy. The Middle East, Latin America, 
South Asia, Southeast Asia, and other regions 
have all experienced Chinese competition, but 
nowhere has the rivalry become more intense than 
in Africa." 2
This helps to explain the political motivation behind Taiwan's 
aid activity in Africa. Indeed, as far as Taiwan's interests 
were concerned, it would call for immediate and intensive 
efforts to develop diplomatic relations with Africa. However, 
our next concern, before dealing with the realization of its 1*V,
1. The PRC entered Africa in 1956, four years earlier than 
the ROC. Its aid activities covered more than 30 African 
countries until the end of 1979. The programme also 
spread to other Asian and Communist countries. The 
nature of the PRC's aid was different from that of the 
ROC's. As will be seen in this study, in addition to 
railroad construction projects (for example, the Tanzania- 
Zambia railroad project, etc.) and more sophisticated 
military support (for example, to Ghana, North Vietnam, 
Cambodia and Pakistani guerrillas), the PRC also granted 
interest-free loans (for example, to Albania, Romania,
Pakistan, etc.)- See John F. Copper, op■cit.
2. George T. Yu, "Peking Versus Taipei in the World Arena:
Chinese Competition in Africa", Asian Survey, 3 (September 
1963), p. 439; also his "Chinese Rivalry in Africa", Race,
V, 4 (April 1964), p. 35. For more information on the 
ROC-PRC aid competition in Africa, see Lewis Gilbert, "Peking and Taipei", The China Quarterly, No. 15 (July- 
September 1963), pp. 56-64; and Leon M.S. Slawecki, "The 
Two Chinas in Africa", Foreign Affairs, XLI, 2 (January 
1963), pp. 398-409.
political objectives, will be: How did Taiwan approach the 
Africans? The Chinese in Taiwan entered the African continent 
under the agricultural programme of Operation Vanguard. But 
why did Taiwan concentrate its aid effort on the agricultural 
aspect and its related fields? Could something else have 
been more effective than agriculture, requiring less time 
and effort to achieve concrete results, and hence appealing 
more to the Africans? All these questions are inter-related.
■
Taiwan's position was as follows. For those African countries 
who had obtained their political independence, the next 
immediate concern was to attain economic independence. 
Nonetheless, since they had only just thrown off their 
colonial status, any political actions, or even direct 
economic involvement, taken by a foreign country, would 
probably be suspected by the Africans of being political 
infiltration, or another face of imperialism. More 
importantly, direct economic cooperation with the African 
seemed premature at that stage since the latter could offer 
very little, except unskilled labour, uncultivated land and 
natural resources. In fact they were not yet ready for 
active, bilateral economic relations or intensive cooperation 
of any sort with the outside world. Consequently, the 
Nationalist government reached the conclusion that aid 
relations based on agriculture, less sensitive than formal 
political or economic relations, could be a proper and 
practical means of approaching the Africans. Moreover, 
foreign aid based on agricultural and technical assistance 
was less risky because, since foreign aid could be anything, 
and since it could be operated either officially or privately,
M r
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individually or collectively, it could therefore facilitate
Taipei's entry onto the territory of its African
recipients. Finally, foreign aid can be a long-tern
investment. The Nationalists hoped that "Africa would
look to Taipei, not Peking for an economic development
model". ^  Also, when the African economy reached the scale
of self-sufficiency, it could perhaps provide Taiwan with
2valuable foreign markets. Or, even more significantly, 
such economic interactions could perhaps promote a more 
solid political relationship.
Accordingly, the Vanguard project in Africa, emphasizing
agriculture and related projects, was established.
Nationalist officials further explained their position
concerning the project by saying that: "in the field of
agriculture its (Taiwan's) experience gained under difficult
conditions in the past ten years would be of use to similar
3developing countries in Africa". The term "similar" referred
to "small units" and "labour-intensive" types of farming
because in Africa, as in Taiwan, labour was not a problem 
4at all in itself.
To sum up then, the primary objectives of the ROC's aid were 
to persuade African countries to vote for its claim to the 1
1. Ann P. Munro, op.cit., p. 7.
2. Interview with Yang Ksi-k'un on 21st May 1979 in Taipei. 
This however was a very long-term goal. Even until the 
end of 1979, the relationship was still basically one-way.
3. SATC, (August 1966), p. 2; also see footnote no. 2, 
p. 289.
4. The Nationalist government regarded "small unit" and 
"labour-intensive" as common features of both Taiwanese 
and African agricultural structures.
Chinese seat in the U.N. (i.e. to preserve the status quo 
in the U.N.), and to extend diplomatic recognition to the 
ROC. The secondary objective was economic investment in 
order to open up African markets for mutual commercial 
interests in the very long-run. Although the political 
motivation of this aid policy was not openly declared by 
the ROC, on one occasion, Yang Hsi-k'un was guoted as 
saying :
"Politically, while nationalism is roaring over 
Africa and it (Africa) is very vulnerable to the 
penetration of Communists, we offer our most 
painful experience from the aggression of inter­
national Communists and our most valuable experi­
ence in fighting them. We want to tell 
(Africans) about our experience so that our African 
friends can escape what we have suffered." 1
Also in another occasion, in 1962, Chou Shu-kai, then ROC's 
delegate to the 17th U.N. General Assembly meetings, 
declared: "the good results of the technical assistance
programmes lead to the support of the African countries(for
2Taiwan) in the United Nations".
3. Measures to approach the Africans
The Nationalists initially believed that the vast majority 
of the new African countries entered the international 
community with little or no predetermined preference for 
either Taipei or Peking, and that therefore "they (the newly 
independent African countries) are likely to turn to those 
Chinese who first come to their attention".3 Thus upon
1. See Yang Hsi-k'un, "Wo kuo tui fei-chou wai-chiao cheng- 
tse" (bur country's foreign policy toward Africa"), CDN, 
(14th August 1960), p. Is see also Ann P. Munro, op.cit 
p. 7.
2. George T. Yu, "Peking Versus Taipei", p. 449.
3. Interview with Yang Hsi-k'un, 21st May 1979.
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gaining their independence, almost every African country 
received immediately a message of congratulation from 
Taipei (also from Peking), together with an offer to extend 
diplomatic recognition and of establishing formal bilateral 
relations. Such gestures were expected by the Nationalist 
government to be reciprocal.
Following this, the ROC began to develop what is called 
"personal diplomacy", which operated on two levels. On one 
level, the ROC would dispatch numerous government leaders 
and official delegations as so-called "goodwill" or "survey" 
missions, to Africa. One of the first such missions, led 
by Yang Hsi-k'un, visited 11 African countries on one trip in 
I960.1 At that time, Yang was the Director of the Western 
Asian Department, which was then in charge of all African 
affairs. But this Department was soon expanded to set up 
the SATCC to deal with the increasing demands of relations 
between the ROC and Africa. In 1962, Yang toured 14 African 
countries. The trend progressed until by the end of 1971,
the ROC had in all conducted 87 such missions to 25 African 
2countries.- In 1963, an African Affairs Department was 
especially established, independent of the Western Asian 
Department. This indicated the increasing importance of the 
African countries in the ROC's foreign relations.
The second level of "personal diplomacy" was to invite 
African leaders to Taiwan, to "see what they want to see". 
Several took advantage of the opportunity, including 
President Hubert Maga of Dahomey in 1962, President Hamani
1.Chang Li-hsin, Vice Foreign Minister H.K. Yana and Africa 
(Taipei: Chung-hwa wen-wu Publishing, 1975), pp. 35-36.
2.See Appendix No. 3.
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1. SATCi (October 1971), pp. 4-9.
Diori of Niger in 1969, President Philbert Tsiranana of the 
Malagasy Republic in 1962, President Hastings Banda of 
Malawi in 1967, President Jean-Bedel Bokassa of the CAR in 
1970, President Joseph Mobutu of Zaire in 1971, and many 
others.'*' In this respect, it seemed that the door to Africa 
had opened, as more African dignitaries— until mid-1971, 
about 881— visited Taiwan.
In conjunction with this "personal diplomacy", the ROC 
introduced the system of Vanguard projects, each of which 
was intended to develop through a sequence of five stages:
(1) General survey— In order to identify promising projects, 
Taiwan would send agricultural specialists to Africa on a 
survey mission.
(2) Demon s tration teams— These were made up of farmers and 
agricultural technicians who went to start new farm projects 
in Africa.
(3) Seminar exchanges— Taiwan invited African agricultural 
technicians to participate in seminars and "on-the-job- 
training" in Taiwan.
(4) Invitation programmes— Selected African leaders were 
invited to visit and observe Taiwan's agricultural methods 
and development. To some extent, this programme overlapped 
with the programme of "personal diplomacy".
(5) Technical assistance— This included the signing of the 
Technical Cooperation Agreements and the dispatching of 1
M
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agricultural and other related technical missions to 
African countries. The sending of the missions could be 
regarded as the most concrete expression of Taiwan's aid 
operation.*
Finally, Operation Vanguard was also supposed to strengthen
friendship and improve mutual understanding between the ROC
and various African countries by (1) establishing news
agencies or branch offices of the ROC Government Information
2Office at strategic locations in Africa; (2) increasing
book, magazine and audio-visual propaganda directed toward
Africa; and (3) sending acrobatic and other performing
3troupes to visit Africa. However, none of these methods 
had been appropriately promoted. In fact, propaganda was 
the weakest link of the whole Vanguard project.
In 1961 Liberia, a traditional ally of the U.S. in Africa, 
was the first country to sign an assistance pact with Taiwan. 
By 1971 the number of African countries which had parti­
cipated in at least one of the above-mentioned Taiwan aid 
programmes had reached 31. These included Botswana*, 
Cameroon*, Central African Republic (CAR)* (now Central 
African Empire), Chad*, Congo , Dahomey* (now Benin), 
Ethiopia*, Gabon*, the Gambia*, Ghana*, Ivory Coast*, Kenya, 
Lesotho*, Liberia*, Libya*, Malagasy Republic* (now Madagas­
car), Malawi*, Mauritius*, Niger*, Rhodesia, Rwanda*, 123
1. Hsien-fenq-an, p. 3.
2. For example, the ROC official Central News Agency (CNA) 
once opened an office in Addis Ababa in Ethiopia in 
March 1965.
3. Hsien-fenq-an, p. 3.
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Senegal*, Seychelles, Sierre Leone*, Somalia, Swaziland*, 
Tanzania, Togo*, Upper Volta*, Zaire* and Zambia, totalling 
583 participants. Nevertheless, among these 31 countries 
only 24 (denoted by *) had actually been involved in 
Taiwan's aid projects to the point of assistance missions 
(stage (5)) being sent to the countries concerned. The 
other 7 countries were merely involved at a very prelimin­
ary stage, for instance, stage (1) or (2), with no 
subsequent bilateral agreements reached.^
Having reviewed Taiwan’s aid programme to Africa, now we 
turn to assessing the effectiveness of its operation.
III. Effectiveness of the aid diplomacy
It is very difficult to evaluate an aid programme objectively 
in terms of absolute success or failure. This is because 
since most of the declared objectives of the aid programme 
are so grandiose, and vague, the specifics ‘of the programme 
are sometimes hard to relate to these objectives. In most 
cases the gap between the technologies and economies (let 
alone the socio-political system) of donor and recipient is 
so great as to preclude any final assessment as to success 
or failure except in very general terms. Nevertheless, we 
will attempt a provisional assessment of the effectiveness 
of Taiwan's aid strategy. Our study will emphasize the 
political aspect since the main purpose of the Vanguard 
project was political, i.e. to obtain African voting support 1
1. See Appendix No. 3.
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in the U.N.j however we will begin with a general assess­
ment of the humanitarian objectives.
Taiwan's declared aim in its aid efforts was to assist the 
agricultural and/or economic development of the African 
countries. As time went on, up to 1971, Taiwan's programme 
was extended to include developments other than agriculture 
such as veterinary medicine, sugar refinery, edible oil 
plants, highway engineering, fishing, handicrafts and many 
others.1 From the inception of the Vanguard project in 1961 
to the end of 1971, Taiwan dispatched over one hundred 
agricultural teams to 24 African countries, all registering 
promising results. Other forms of technical cooperation 
such as veterinary teams in Chad and Ethiopia for the control 
of animal deseases, an edible oil plant (peanut and cotton­
seed) in Chad, handicraft teams in Madagascar and the CAR, 
building a small sugar mill in Rwanda, a seed multiplication 
and supply centre in the Ivory Coast, etc., although rather 
modest in scale, all had impressive outcomes. There were 
altogether about 1,000 technicians from Taiwan working in 
African countries at that time including some 250 medical 
doctors and nurses employed by the government of Libya.
In Cameroon and Gabon, for instance, model villages financed 
by Taiwan were established to help local peasants start a 
new life as settled farmers working small land holdings under 
the supervision of technicians from Taiwan not only for 
self-sufficiency, but also to produce a surplus for sale. 1
1. Ibid.
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Furthermore, as training constituted an important aspect of 
the Vanguard project, training centres were established at 
the headquarters of many Taiwanese agricultural teams; at 
places where the establishment of a centre was not justified, 
training facilities would then be provided in order to make 
sure that the work which was being done in one area would 
eventually be extended to other areas.
In addition, the SATCC organized 12 agricultural seminars 
in Taiwan during the 12 years 1960-1971, involving the 
above-mentioned 31 African countries and 583 African 
participants.1 As mentioned earlier, such seminars were 
directed towards training and exchanges of know-how.
Other results achieved by Taiwan's aid programme can be
discovered in facts and some statements made by African
leaders. For instance, most of Taiwan agricultural
demonstration teams achieved their scheduled objectives in
the host countries and set impressive records. In almost
every African country with an ROC agricultural mission, the
average rice yield was increased several times. In Togo,
2the increase reportedly reached nearly 2,000 percent. In 
Zaire, where only a few varieties of vegetables were grown 
before the arrival of ROC agricultural technicians, by
1969 53 different vegetables were produced, while the rice 
3yield had tripled. Also, the Premier of Cameroon once 123
1. SATC, (October 1971), p. 58.
2. William Glenn, "Taipei Friends on the Farm", FEER, LXIII, 
28 (10th July 1971), p. 30.
3. O.K.Armstrong, ¡'Free China Gives Africa a Helping Hand", 
Reader's Digest, XCV, 571 (November 1969), p. 188.
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claimed that Taiwan's aid was "the most useful aid that 
anybody was giving to his country".1 Likewise, the 
Malagasy ambassador in Taiwan was quoted as saying that 
"China (i.e. Taiwan) is our greatest friend because it is
helping us in the agricultural field, and there are evident
. . . 2achievements in such activities" . Moreover, in an article
"Whatthe Chinese of Taiwan did for Botswana", the author
openly praised the fact that "...one of the countries which
contributed much to our development is the ROC...The ROC
has realized the need of Botswana in its struggle to mount
self-help projects in terms of ppverty and starvation..."
Also, the Malawi News Agency recounted that "the ROC mission
introduced new agricultural methods especially in the field
of rice growing, increased the farmers' productivity and
thus improved the agricultural output and economy of 
4Malawi". There were numerous similar reports indicating 
the achievements of Taiwan's aid programme in increasing 
agricultural production in Africa and its consequent 
contribution to developing national economies. Even U.S. 
President R. Nixon declared approvingly in 1969 that "the 
ROC Vanguard Program has been highly successful in getting 
developing countries to increase food production".^ 12345
1. William Clifford, "Free China's Dirt Farm Diplomacy",
The Lion, L, 4 (October 1967), reprinted by CSATC, p. 4.
2. Ibid.
3. The article was originally published in Kutlwano magazine 
(Botswana), later reprinted by CSATC in November 1971.
4. CDN, (12th August 1967), p. 1.
5. The China Post, 30th April 1969, p. 1.
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Seen in these terms, the ROC's aid programme seemed rather 
successful. Up to its gradual decline after 1971 it had 
partially fulfilled its declared objectives of assisting 
the Africans in agricultural and economic development. 
However, such accounts are not sufficient to answer our 
second question: Did this aid strategy achieve the ROC's 
political-economic, especially political, objectives, of 
increasing African pro-ROC votes at the U.N. during the 
period concerned, and promote an African commercial market 
in the long run? Was it effective in improving the ROC's 
"marginal" international status? Was it effective in 
deterring, or at least restraining Communist influence in 
Africa? Was it effective in winning African sympathy and 
friendship (i.e. diplomatic ties)? If not, what were the 
reasons? The remaining part of this Chapter will be devoted 
to answering the above questions.
The answer with regard to the "effectiveness" of the ROC’s 
foreign aid strategy, in all, is only partially positive. 
This conclusion will be shown mainly through an analysis of 
empirical data, i.e. the General Assembly voting records of 
the African countries on the China Issue during the 11 years 
concerned, 1961-1971.*
However, before proceeding to the subject natter, it is 
necessary to emphasize very briefly some of the reasons 
that affected the general attitudes of the African countries 
towards the China Issue. Generally speaking, African 
attitudes can be divided into 4 categories corresponding to 1
1. See Appendix No. 2.
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their voting patterns: pro-ROC, pro-PRC, non-aligned, and 
inconsistent. The reasons which determined these (changing) 
attitudes were complex. There were either domestic reasons, 
notably a change in the head of state, usually by a coup; 
or external reasons, such as ideological differences, or 
external influence in a state’s internal affairs, notably 
the involvement of the PRC in the secessionist movement in 
Africa, or the aid factor, or the Sino-Soviet split, or the 
PRC’s "Cultural Revolution"; or reasons still unknown. Here 
we will only point out the ideological factor as this 
influenced the overall African attitudes towards the China 
Issue and leave the others to be dealt with later in 
individual cases.
As a whole, African attitudes were determined by the broader 
issue of ideological confrontation between the East and the 
West. Despite their declared foreign policy stance of non- 
alignment, African countries were split ideologically into 
the pro-West (i.e. the conservative or moderate) group and 
the pro-East (i.e. the radical) group. The pro-West group, 
which was also generally pro-ROC (hence anti-PRC), were 
largely former French colonies. Located south of the 
Sahara, they were also known as the Union Africaine et 
Malqache (U.A.M.), consisting 12 countries, Cameroon, the 
Central African Republic (CAR), Chad, the Congo (Brazza­
ville), Dahomey, Gabon, Niger, Senegal, Upper Volta, Malagasy 
Republic, Ivory Coast and Mauritania. Ideologically they 
were oriented towards France. Since France also supported 
the U.S. position (though only until January 1964), it would 
seem that French and the U.S. influence contributed to the
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voting behaviours of these states. The pro-East group, 
which was generally pro-PRC (hence anti-ROC), was ideo­
logically more inclined to the Soviet Union. It was 
concentrated mainly in East Africa, but was also scattered 
throughout North and West Africa. These were largely 
connected with the British Commonwealth, such as Ghana, 
Uganda, Tanzania, Kenya and Nigeria, or with the Arabs, 
such as Algeria, Mauritania and Libya. Thus, in between 
these groups, there were the non-aligned and the inconsis­
tent. And their attitudes, or changes of attitudes were 
due to either domestic reasons, such as a change of govern­
ment, or to external issues, such as concern about subversive 
activities of the PRC against various African governments.
In this regard, African attitudes towards the two Chinese 
governments were also influenced by any changes of relation­
ships between the latter and the two Superpowers. A pro-ROC 
U.S. might result in more African support due to the latter's 
pro-West bias. At the same time, however, some African 
countries would oppose the ROC's position simply because 
of this imperialist connection. Similarly, the PRC might 
benefit from its collaboration with the Soviet Union, on 
the one hand. On the other hand, when relationships between 
the two Communist powers turned sour, African support tended 
to become more diversified. Most of the African countries 
would try to ally with either side or to remain neutral so 
as to gain more profit from big power disputes. "The most 
important thing for Africans", as one African leader stated, 
"is to have a feel for events and know how to exploit them".^
1. Tunis, Tunisian Home Service in French, 0940 GMT, 25th
January 1960. U.S. Foreign Broadcast Information
Service, Daily Report, no. 17 (26th January 1960),
pp. 4-5. 304
Toward the end of the 1960s, the non-aligned group gradually 
became a minority group, and so did the inconsistent 
countries. More detailed study of these factors that 
influenced African China policy will be dealt with later.
Let us now turn to discuss the effectiveness of the ROC's 
aid strategy in Africa.
1. The African responses; a review of the U.N. General
Assembly voting records of the African aid recipients 
on the China Issue, 1961-1971
From the perspective of the ROC, foreign aid was politically 
effective only ifi (a) it increased the African recipients' 
votes at the U.N. to keep the ROC in and the PRC out of the 
organization, (b) it transformed the ROC's marginal status, 
and promoted PRC-African diplomatic ties, and (c) it 
protected the African continent from Communist influence.
All of these issues are inter-related. The first issue
(a) will be examined independently whereas (b) and (c) will 
be treated simultaneously.
Foreign aid was only partially effective in terms of RPC’s 
legitimacy struggle in the U.N. Our conclusion is reached 
on the basis of the voting records of the 24 African aid 
recipients on the China Issue at the U.N. in comparison to 
those 18 remaining African countries (i.e. those that 
normally did not have aid relations with the ROC). The 18 
countries were Algeria, Burundi, the Congo (Brazzaville),
Equatorial Guinea, Guinea, Kenya, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, 
Nigeria, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, Tunisia,
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United Arab Republic (UAR), Uganda and Zambia. Except for 
the Congo, Mauritania and South Africa, none of them had 
diplomatic relations with the ROC. But except for South 
Africa, all of them have diplomatic relations with the PRC. 
Also all of them, except Nigeria and South Africa, received 
aid from the PRC at different times during the 11 years.^
The importance of the African votes as a whole in determining 
the UN voting outcome has already been mentioned. Our task 
now is to show that the voting patterns of the 24 African 
recipients were different from, i.e. more favourable to the 
ROC than, the above-mentioned 18 African countries, and 
consequently, to establish a correlation, if any exists, 
between the 24 African recipients and their pro-ROC votes. 
Here 6 Tables will be provided to support our hypothesis, 
namely that African voting support to the ROC was partially 
determined by whether or not aid was granted. Tables Nos. 
3 - 6  are about the voting patterns of the two groups on 
the China Issue for the 11 years after 1961. In conjunction 
with these Tables, Tables Nos 7 and 8 indicate the percen­
tage of African voting support on the Issue for either of 
the claimants. 1
1. One of the factors why Nigeria did not receive aid from 
the PRC was that Nigeria was one of the richest countries 
in Africa, both in terms of petroleum and in terms of 
number of educated citizens. Therefore it had less need 
of PRC assistance than poorer and more backward countries. 
Another reason was probably Nigeria's suspicion of PRC 
involvement in aid to the attempted secession of the 
Biafran province from Nigeria. In the case of South 
Africa, the reasons were more complex. Not only was 
South Africa ideologically anti-Communist in general, 
but also it was hostile to Peking in particular due to 
the latter’s involvement in its domestic affairs. More 
details will be given later in the main text.
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Looking at the Tables, we notice that most of the African 
aid recipients voted in favour of the ROC's position, although 
a few exceptions (notably Ethiopia and Ghana) always cast a 
negative vote. In other words, the voting pattern of these 
24 recipients can be divided into the majority pro-ROC (or 
anti-PRC)group (the category A countries) and the minority 
anti-ROC (or pro-PRC) group (the category B and/or C countries)
African voting records do indicate that there existed a 
correlation between their voting patterns and ROC’s aid 
because the aid recipients tended to vote for the donor's 
position on most occasions, whereas those countries that did 
not received aid from the ROC, except for South Africa, tended 
to vote for the reverse. However, this does not suggest that 
ROC's aid programme alone brought about the African vote 
changes. One could always argue that most African countries 
had no real reason to change their votes: they could have 
continued to abstain on the China Issue as they did in 1960, 
or to vote for or against as they had done previously. 
Nevertheless, empirically speaking, the majority of the 
African recipients voted in the ROC's favour. Libya, for 
example, which abstained in 1960, voted for the ROC after 
1961 (until 1969), after the latter began rendering technical 
assistance. Other examples include Dahomey which abstained 
in 1960 and 1961, but voted for the ROC from 1962 after 
promises of assistance programmes, as well as Rwanda which 
voted against the ROC in 1965, but after agricultural aid 
was launched always voted in its favour.^ Eleven countries, 1
1. Rwanda began to receive aid from the ROC after 1964, 
but it did not vote for the latter in the following 
year. Its support for the ROC resumed in 1966 until 
1971.
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Zaire, Gabon, the Gambia, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Lesotho, 
Malawi, Malagasy Republic, Niger, Swaziland, and Upper Volta 
never cast an anti-ROC vote on both the "Important Question" 
Resolution and the Proposal (these were the category A 
countries). Undoubtedly, the ROC’s aid programme did 
contribute to promoting African's economic advancement. 
However, we can also conclude that the ROC's aid programme 
constituted a practical method of purchasing political favours 
from the Africans, namely, to increase African support for 
the ROC's struggle against the PRC. This could be demon­
strated by the positions the aid recipients took in explaining 
their votes or in defending the ROC's position in the U.N.
For instance, Niger, when arguing in favour of the ROC's 
retaining its seat, told the Assembly in 1966 not to "deliver 
up 12 million people living in Formosa to the fury and the 
hatred of the Red Guards in Peking".'1' At the same time, the 
Malawi delegate maintained: "the PRC has not demonstrated 
that it has accepted the rules of the United Nations. More­
over, its participation should not result in the eviction of
2the Taiwan government." Lesotho, on entering into the U.N. 
in 1966, took the stance that it could not accept the 
expulsion of Taiwan so that Communist China could rejoin the 
organization. It favoured the U.S. position, i.e. that 
Communist China had not applied for membership. Rwanda's 
attitude was even more extreme when it stated in 1968 that 
only the Nationalist government in Taiwan was qualified to be 12
1. Twenty-first Session, Plenary Meetings 1478th Meeting,
(25th November 1966), p. 10.
2. Chen Ying-chien, "President Banda Visits Taiwan", Free 
China Review, XVII, 9 (1967).
in the U.N.1 Furthermore, it said that it would not
consider the idea of "Two Chinas", a notion rather popular
2among some African countries since the early 1960s. Even 
Ghana, which never established diplomatic ties with the 
ROC, also argued once in favour of the ROC. The representa­
tive of Ghana said in 1970 that Taiwan had as valid a claim 
to represent China as Communist China. In fact, "both should 
be represented and the 18 power draft resolution should drop
the request that sought to expel Taiwan from the Organiza- 
. 3tion". This statement, in effect, was inclined to creating 
a "Two Chinas" solution. Although the ROC was principally 
opposed to this idea, at a stage when the PRC’s admission was 
clearly inevitable, such a statement could be considered as 
rather sympathetic towards the ROC.
Seen in these terms, ROC aid did register some sort of 
political effectiveness. It did achieve its political 
objectives by increasing African support both in words (verbal 
support) and in deeds (voting support). In addition, in view 
of the lengthy period of time involved, this support did 
serve to keep the ROC in, and hence prevent the PRC from 
entering into the world organization. Yet even so, to what 
extent can we assert our conclusion? That is, to what extent 
did this aid instrument fulfil its desired policy objectives? 123
1. Interview with Chou Honq-ben, Executive Secretary of the 
Committee of International Technical Cooperation,in Taipei on 26 May 1979.2. For example, Nigeria, GAOR, 1065th-1121st Plenary Meetings 
(1961-1962), p. 926. Sierra Leone, General Assembly, 12th 
December 1961, UN Document A/PV, 1076, pp. 33-37.
3. GAOR 25th Session--Plenary Meetings, 1913rd (1970), p. 10.
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In this regard, one can easily argue that the changes in the 
African votes, before and after receiving aid from the ROC, 
do not explain neatly the existence of such an aid-voting 
support correlation. There were two reasons. First, some 
African recipients, whose voting patterns had always been 
consistent with the ROC's position (category A countries) 
such as Liberia, Upper Volta, etc. might have voted for the 
latter even without receiving aid from it. Secondly, and 
on the contrary, some recipients such as Cameroon in 1970 
and 1971, Libya from 1969 to 1971 and Togo in 1971, might 
still cast a negative vote, or change their voting patterns 
totally, regardless of their aid relationships with the ROC. 
The question remaining then is how we know exactly why the 
African recipients voted as they did, and if they would 
still have supported the ROC's cause as they did during the 
11 years if they had not received any aid from the latter 
at all. As we have already noted, some recipient countries 
actually voted for the ROC before aid operations were 
established. Does this indicate that the ROC's aid-initiation 
to those countries was based primarily on their "friendly 
attitudes" or "quasi-friendly gesture" as perceived during 
its goodwill missions of the pre-aid period?
It seems impossible to come to a definite conclusion as to 
whether aid was indeed the only, or indeed the prime cause of 
the African pro-ROC vote, or whether it was the other way 
around. A pro-ROC vote, or even a change of it, can be 
attributed to other external factors such as relationship 
between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., between the U.S. and the 
ROC, between U.S.S.R. and the PRC, and even between the two
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Chinese governments. Thus, they might in effect be two 
factors that were either independent of, or reinforce, 
each other. This discovery does suggest that the claim 
that "aid buys friendship" must be qualified.
Nevertheless, the value of the ROC's aid as a foreign policy 
instrument could also be assessed by (i) the ROC's diplomatic 
establishment in Africa and (ii) its effectiveness in 
countering Communist influence in the African continent.
The two issues will be treated simultaneously.
2. The ROC's diplomatic establishment in Africa and the 
effectiveness of its aid in deterring recognition of 
the PRC
The development of the ROC-PRC diplomatic contest either in 
Africa or in other parts of the world advanced like a zero- 
sum game; a gain for one almost mechanically meant loss to 
the other. However, during the 11 years, there were quite 
a large number of African countries that preferred to remain 
neutral in the two Chinas' competition. (See Tables Nos 9 
and 10). That is, they either recognized neither China 
right from the beginning of their independence or withdrew 
recognition. (As noted earlier, some of the reasons that 
affected their (changed) positions will be dealt with later.) 
It was understandable therefore that these countries should 
become the target of ROC-PRC competition. Thus, one way to 
assess the relationship between the ROC's aid effort and 
its success in deterring the PRC's influence in the African 
continent is to examine the evolution of their diplomatic 
competition in the area concerned.
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TABLE NO. 9: List of African Countries Recognizing
Neither China at the time of the United 
Nation General Assembly Votes on the 
China Issue between 1960 and 1971
19
60
19
61
19
62
19
63
19
64
19
65
19
66
19
67
19
68
19
69
19
70
19
71
1 . Botswana X
2. Burundi X X X X X X X X
3. Chad X X
4. Central African
Republic X X X X
5. Dahomey X X
6. Equatoral Guinea X X
7. Ethiopia X X X X X X . X X X X X
8 . Gabon X
9. Gambia X X X X
10 Ghana X X X X X X. X
11 Ivory Coast X X X
12 Lesotho X
13 Malawi X X
14 Mauritania X
15 . .Mauritius X X X X
16 Niger X X X-
17 Nigeria X X X X X X X X X X X
18 Senegal X X X X X
19 Sierra Leone X X
20 Somalia X
21 Tamzania X
22 Tunisia X X X X X X X X
23 Upper Volta X X
24. Zambia X
TOTAL 13 10 7 4 5 7 9 8 9 7 6 2
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TABLE NO. 9 continued
African Countries recognizing the ROC 
but not voting for the ROC, 1960-1971 Diplomatic Relations 
with the ROCCountry Abstained Voting for Peking
Libya* 1960,1965,1967,1968
1969,1970,
1971 1959-1978
Cameroon* 1960,1965,1966,1970 1960-1971
Congo (Braz. ) 1960,1961 1960-1964
Mauritani a 1963 1960-1965
Senegal* 1970 1960,1971 1960-19641969-1971
S. Leone* 1963 1965 1963-1971
Togo* 1960, 1961, 1962 1971 1960-1972
Upper Volta* 1961 1961-1973
Central *
African
Republic
1970 1962-19641968-1976
Chad* 1965,1966 1962-1972
Rwanda* 1965 1962-1972
Zaire* 1961,1965 1960-1972
Botswana* 1970 1971 1966-1974
Malagascar* 1960 1960-1972
* Countries receiving aid from the ROC
Notes Senegal and the CAR broke relations with the 
ROC during 1965-1968, and 1964-1967 respec­
tively, and then resumed them.
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In this connection, another two Tables-Nos. 11 and 12—  
have been provided. Table No. 11 lists all the African 
countries which, regardless of whether or not they received 
aid from the ROC, had (or still have) formal bilateral ties 
with the ROC. In this Table, we also include some infor­
mation regarding the dates of changes in their policy 
towards China; and the date of the initiation of the ROC's 
aid operation in the African recipient countries, and its 
duration. That is, except for Dahomey whose aid relations 
with the ROC were suspended for over a year (from March 1965 
to October 1966), all of the aid programmes continued from 
their inception, until 1971. Table No. 12 presents all the 
African countries which never had diplomatic ties with the 
ROC but, except for Mauritius, had diplomatic relations with 
the PRC.1
From Table No. 11 we discover the following findings:
(a) Out of a total of 42 African countries in 1971, 27 had 
had either aid and or diplomatic contacts with the ROC. 
Except for Ethiopia, Ghana, and Mauritius, the 21 aid 
recipients had all had occasional diplomatic relations with 
the ROC. This shows that, one way or the other, the aid 
factor was not isolated from the diplomatic factor. Never­
theless, if we take a further look, we soon discover that 
most of the aid relationships took place not before, but 
after the setting up of the ROC-African diplomatic ties.
TABLE NO. 11: Diplomatie Relations of African Countries vith 
the two Chinese Governments (as of March 1979)
Date of Date of Date of
Country
Opening 
Diplomatic 
ties with
Break of 
Diplomatic 
ties with
Opening 
Diplomatic 
ties with
Initial
Aid
the ROC the ROC the PRC
1 . S.Africa * 26-04-1976 - Never -
2 . Liberia 19-08-1957 23-02-1977 22-02-1977 1961
3. Libya 10-05-1959 22-10-1978 09-08-1971 1962
4 . Cameroon 19-02-1960 03-04-1971 26-03-1971 1962
5. Congo(Zaire) 10-08-1960 30-01-1973 24-11-1972 1966
6 . Gabon 09-12-1960 30-03-1974 20-04-1974 1963
7 . Malagasy 26-03-1960 06-11-1572 06-11-1972 1967
8 . Mauritania 28-11-1960 11-09-1965 27-07-1965 -
9. Senegal 23-09-1960
16-07-1969
08-11-1964
12-04-1972 07-12-1971 1964
10 Togo 27-04-1960 04-10-1972 26-09-1972 1965
11 U. Volta 14-12-1961 23-10-1973 15-09-1973 1965
12 Central
African
Republic
13-04-1962
06-05-1968
05-11-1964
1976
29-09-1964
1976 1964
13 Chad 13-01-1962 27-12-1972 28-11-1972 1965
14 Dahomey 18-01-1962 08-04-1965 12-11-1964 196323-04-1966 19-03-1973 10-01-1973
15 Rwanda 01-07-1962 13-05-1972 12-11-1971 1964
16 I. Coast * 20-07-1963 - Never 1963
17 Niger 22-07-1963 29-07-1974 20-07-1974 1964
18 S . Leone 28-09-1963 20-08-1971 29-07-1971 1964
19 Malawi * 11-07-1966 - Never 1964
20 Lesotho * 31-10-1966 - Never 1969
21. Botswana 30-12-1966 05-04-1974 06-01-1975 1968
22. Swaziland * 06-09-1968 - Never 1969
23. Gambia 12-11-1968 28-12-1974 14-12-1974 1966
24. Ethi opi a Never - 24-11-1970 1963
25. Ghana Never 05-07-196020-10-1966
29-02-1972
1967
26. Mauritius Never - 15-04-1972 1969
27. Congo (Braz.) 1960 Feb. 1964 22-02-1964
* Countries still recognizing the ROC as of March 1979.
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TABLE NO. Il: Continued
This Table shows all African countries having diplomatic 
relations with the ROC until March 1979. Most of these 
countries now have diplomatic ties with the PRC.
Congo (Brazzaville) recognized the ROC from 1960 to 
February 1964. On the 18th of that month it transferred 
recognition to the PRC and established diplomatic ties 
on the 22nd.
Sources for the construction of the Table:
R.O.C.’s Relations with the World. (Taipei: Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, March 1979); Sino-African Technical 
Cooperation (Taipei: Secretariat, Sino-African Technical 
Cooperation Committee, October 1971).
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TABLE NO. 12: African countries Never having Diplomatic 
Relations vith the ROC, but having 
Relations with the PRC, 1961-1971
1. Algeria 03-07-1962-
2. Burundi
21-12-1963-
29-02-1965;
13-10-1971-
3. Equatorial
Guinea 10-15-1970-
4. Ethiopia 24-11-1970-
5. Guinea 4-10-1959-
6. Kenya 14-12-1963-
7. Mali 27-10-1960-
8. Mauritius 15-10-1972-
9. Morocco 1-11-1958-
10 Nigeria 10-02-1971-
11 Tanzania 9-12-1961-
12 Tuni si a
1-10-1964- 27-09-1967; 
Oct. 1971-
13 Somalia 16-12-1960-
14 Sudan 1-12-1958-
15 Uganda 18-10-1962-
16. United Arab 
Republic 30-05-1956-
17. Zambia 25-12-1964-
Note: Tunisia broke relations with the PRC
during 1967-1971, then resumed them; 
Burundi broke relations with the PRC 
during 1965-1971, then resumed them.
In this respect, we can only conclude that aid alone was 
not the most essential element in building up the ROC's 
diplomatic presence in Africa, although it is very likely 
that the existence of such an aid operation might have 
served to consolidate their mutual understanding and 
relationships at a later stage.
(b) Three countries, the Congo (Brazzaville), Mauritania, 
and South Africa never received any aid from Taiwan, and 
yet for different reasons, they had officially recognized 
the latter. The Congo, possibly because of its colonial 
connection with France, recognized the Nationalist govern­
ment from February 1960 until February 1964, as did 
Mauritania (1960-1965). South Africa exchanged recognition 
with the ROC in 1931, but they did not exchange diplomats 
until 26th April 1976. The reasons for these decisions will 
now be offered as follows. South Africa is one of the 
original members of the U.N., and yet, for a different 
reason— the government's racial policy of "apartheid"— it is 
another disputed country suffering from international 
isolation. In other words, its status has also been 
challenged by other U.N. members, by the world in general, 
and by neighbouring African countries in particular. Prior 
to 1976, the ROC had been hesitant about establishing a 
diplomatic ties with South Africa despite the fact that the 
latter had always voted for its position in the U.N., that 
the two countries shared the same problem of international
isolation, and that both of them were (and still are) strongly 
anti-Communist. The reason was that the apartheid policy was 
(and still is) distasteful to the majority of the African
countries. Thus, during the 1960s, the ROC, in order to 
vin and retain influence in black Africa for voting support 
in the General Assembly, could not afford to display 
friendship for the white minority government in South 
Africa. After 1971, however, when this consideration 
became gradually less important as a result of deteriorating 
diplomatic relations between the ROC and other African 
countries, the ROC had reason to reevaluate its earlier 
policy. Conversely, South Africa also had its reasons to 
refrain earlier from diplomatic relations with the ROC. It 
can be argued that South Africa's U.N. policy was not so 
much pro-Taipei as anti-Peking. It was because of the PRC's 
harsh criticism of South Africa's apartheid policy and 
because of the fear that a closer relationship with the 
ROC might provoke Peking into more active support of South 
African dissident movements. This needs further explanation. 
South Africa has suffered severely from black nationalist 
movements since the 1960s. There are two major African 
nationalist organizations in South Africa: the African 
National Congress (ANC), founded in 1912, and the Pan- 
Africanist Congress (PAC), set up in 1959. Like all other 
liberation movements in southern Africa, these organizations 
soon became embroiled in the Sino-Soviet conflict. That is, 
both Moscow and Peking regarded South Africa as a major 
battleground between Eastern communism and Western imperial­
ism. While the Soviets viewed the confrontation as one 
based on ideological and economic conflicts, Peking saw it 
as a racial war with Moscow in the "white racist" camp, and 
with Peking leading the "coloured people". At first, Peking 
tried to maintain friendly relations with both the ANC and
countries. Thus, during the 1960s, the ROC, in order to 
win and retain influence in black Africa for voting support 
in the General Assembly, could not afford to display 
friendship for the white minority government in South 
Africa. After 1971, however, when this consideration 
became gradually less important as a result of deteriorating 
diplomatic relations between the ROC and other African 
countries, the ROC had reason to reevaluate its earlier 
policy. Conversely, South Africa also had its reasons to 
refrain earlier from diplomatic relations with the ROC. It 
can be argued that South Africa’s U.N. policy was not so 
much pro-Taipei as anti-Peking. It was because of the PRC's 
harsh criticism of South Africa's apartheid policy and 
because of the fear that a closer relationship with the 
ROC might provoke Peking into more active support of South 
African dissident movements. This needs further explanation. 
South Africa has suffered severely from black nationalist 
movements since the 1960s. There are two major African 
nationalist organizations in South Africa: the African 
National Congress (ANC), founded in 1912, and the Pan- 
Africanist Congress (PAC), set up in 1959. Like all other 
liberation movements in southern Africa, these organizations 
soon became embroiled in the Sino-Soviet conflict. That is, 
both Moscow and Peking regarded South Africa as a major 
battleground between Eastern communism and Western imperial­
ism. While the Soviets viewed the confrontation as one 
based on ideological and economic conflicts, Peking saw it 
as a racial war with Moscow in the "white racist" camp, and 
with Peking leading the "coloured people". At first, Peking 
tried to maintain friendly relations with both the ANC and
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the PAC. However, the ANC, strongly influenced by the 
Moscow-oriented South African Communist Party (SACP), 
gradually took a pro-Moscow stand, while the PAC, which 
originally opposed cooperation with Communists, fell into 
the pro-Peking group.^
Despite general acknowledgement that Peking was behind the 
PAC, there is little data to show the extent of Chinese
support. The PAC's own reports stated that two PAC missions
• . . ?had visited Peking, each receiving ¿20,000 from the PRC.
Various reports confirmed also that PAC guerrillas had been
trained in China, Tanzania, and Zambia by Chinese instruc- 
3tors. The South African government took Peking's involve­
ment very seriously. Thus, although Moscow appeared to have 
given more and better aid to southern African liberation 
organizations than Peking, the government of South Africa 
has regarded Peking as the more dangerous of the two, and 
expressed grave concern over Peking's expansion in southern 123
1. Bruce D. Larkin, China and Africa, 1949-1970: the Foreign 
Policy of the People's Republic of China (Berkeleys 
University of California Press, 1971), p. 181. According 
to Robert A. Scalapino, a radical faction of ANC was 
reportedly under strong Peking influence. See his "Sino- 
Soviet Competition in Africa". Foreign Affairs. XLII, 4 
(July 1964), p. 647. See also Colin Legum, "Africa and 
Chinas Symbolism and Substance", in A.M.Halpern, ed.
Policies Toward Chinas Views from Six Continents (New 
Yorks McGraw-Hill, 1965), p. 411. For detailed descrip­
tion of interrelations between the ANC-PAC power struggle 
and the Moscow-Peking conflict in South Africa, see 
Richard Gibson, African Liberation Movements! Contemporary 
Struggle Against White Minority Rule (New York and Londons 
Oxford University Press, 1972), pp. 55-76, 84-105.
2. Bruce D. Larkin, op.cit., pp. 190-191, note no. 53.
3. Richard Gibson, op.cit., pp. 97, 1025 Wu Chao-hsiung, 
"Kung-fei tsai Fei-chou ti huo-tung (I)” CCommunist Chinese 
activities in Africa (I)'), Fei-ch’ing yueh-pao (Chinese Communist affairs monthly, ROC), X V , 3 (May 1972), pp. 27-28.
327
Africa in general and its increasing influence in Tanzania
and Zambia in particular.'*' This anxiety was probably a
factor which finally decided South Africa to strengthen
2relations with the ROC. Thus, in 1976, out of mutual 
sympathy and practical necessity, the ROC and South Africa 
formally elevated the status of their consular relations to 
full diplomatic ties, and established embassies in each 
other's capital. The two countries now share very close 
political and economic ties. Reportedly, the ROC has 
purchased uranium from South Africa.
With regard to Mauritania and the Congo, these two countries 
scarcely voted for the ROC's cause in the U.N. despite their 
brief diplomatic relations with the ROC. Mauritania became 
independent on 28th November, 1960, and established 
diplomatic relations with the ROC on the same day. There 
were probably two reasons wich prompted Mauritania to break 
relations with the ROC in 1965s (1) Mauritania's decision
was influenced by France's new China policy in January 1964, 
and (2) Mauritania's decision was affected by the ROC's 
obstruction in 1960 of its admission to the U.N. Factor (1) 
will be dealt with later in connection with the section on 
the "French connection". Factor (2)--the connection between 
Mauritania’s case and the ROC's attitude towards Outer 12
1. Henradik J.A. Reitsma, "South Africa and the Red Dragon:
A Study of Perception", Africa Today, XXIII, 1 (January- 
March 1976), pp. 66.
2. Dr. H. Muller, South Africa's foreign minister, reportedly 
said: "Viewed from the Angolan issue, Nationalist China's 
efforts in Africa in the past 10 years had delayed 
Communist Chinese penetration into the continent for at 
least a decade". See Yu Ssu-chou, "Fei-chou kuo-chia yu 
wo chia-ch’iang Kuan-hsi" (African countries strengthen 
their relations with the ROC'1), CDN, (3rd June, 1976),
p. 1.
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Mongolia— has already been mentioned briefly in the previous 
Chapter.^ Here all that needs to be emphasized is that 
Mauritania had unluckily become involved in a political 
dispute between the ROC and the Soviet Union. Thus, while 
new African countries were admitted to the U.N. quickly and 
without controversy soon after achieving independence, 
Mauritania--because of the ROC's unwillingness to support 
Outer Mongolia's application for U.N. membership— had to 
wait almost one year. Although the ROC finally agreed not 
to block Outer Mongolia in case it would provoke black 
African into retaliation by voting for Peking on the China 
Issue, relations between the two countries were never close. 
This ROC action certainly had consequences beyond its 
immediate context.
The case of the Congo may be explained as a result of the 
latter's internal political development. The ROC's diplomatic 
relations with the Congo— a former French colony, lasted 
only 4 years. During this period, the Congo was ruled by 
President Fulbert Youlou who was strongly pro-Western and 
his policy was mainly anti-socialist. Thus under his rule 
the Congo invariably voted against the PRC. However, when 
in 1963 he was overthrown by the left-wing trade unionists, 
Alphonse Massamba-Debat took power, as head of both 
government and the military. The new head of state, and 
his successor Marien Ngouabi, deeply influenced by Marxist 
socialist ideas, made the Congo one of the most ardent 
supported of the PRC in Africa. Also possibly influences 
by the French decision in 1964, the new Congo established 1
1. See Chapter Four, pp. 242-244.
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diplomatic relations with Peking in February. Relations 
with the ROC were therefore broken off in April.'*' It was 
natural therefore that the Congo, like Mauritania, should 
not support the ROC's cause in the U.N.
These three countries, although they were only untypical 
instances, indicate that aid might be irrelevant to the 
ROC's diplomatic establishment.
(c) Similarly, the voting behaviour of Ethiopia and Ghana 
as well as their China policies were not influenced by their 
limited aid relations with the ROC. Like the Congo, Ghana's 
policy towards the two Chinese governments was subject to 
more general foreign policy shifts towards either the East 
or the West. And this in turn was again the result of a 
change in the head of state. It was the fall of President 
Kwame Nkrumah in February 1966 that resulted in a pro-ROC 
government, though only for some years. Previously President 
Nkrumah, who came to power in mid-1957, had not only been 
pro-Peking but in fact had been one of Peking's staunchest ‘ 
and most outspoken supporters. Believing that cooperation 
with the PRC, a potential superpower, would help him to 
realize his own ambition of becoming sole ruler of a united 
black Africa, Nkrumah had adopted some of Mao Tse-tung's 
revolutionary tactics in his political career. That is, 
Nkrumah had been building secret camps in Ghana since 1961 
to train recruits from various African nations for the 
purpose of overthrowing government unwilling to submit to 
his grandiose plan for a united "Socialist Africa". As a
1 . Free China Weekly, NN-LXIV-16 (21st April 1964), pp. 3-4.
consequence, a large number of PRC instructors were 
stationed in Ghana for training in subversion. The ROC 
therefore had no chance of developing any relations until 
1968, two years after Nkrumah was ousted by a military coup 
whilst on a visit to Peking.1 Although an ROC agricultural 
demonstration team was sent to aid the new Ghanaian 
government in November 1968, which remained in Ghana until 
May 1972, and, during this period, Ghana also sent agricul­
tural trainees to Taiwan to attend the ROC "Seminar for 
African Agriculturalists", Ghana never established diplomati 
relations with Taipei. Instead it continued to vote for 
Peking's admission to the U.N., though insisting that the
ROC should have the right to retain its membership at the
^  •  2  same time.
Ethiopia's case is rather unusual. Ethiopia recognized 
neither government of China until 24th November 1970, when 
it at last established diplomatic relations with Peking. 
During the 1960s, Ethiopia received agricultural assistance 
from the ROC, despite the lack of diplomatic relations, and 
supported the ROC in the U.N. until 1959 when it abstained 
on the China Issue. The fact that Ethiopia received ROC's 12
1. Nkrumah was apparently visiting Peking on a Vietnam 
peace mission. See Robert Legvold, Soviet Policy in West 
Africa (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970), p. 
263. After the coup, Nkrumah went to Guinea and Sekou 
Toure proclaimed him co-President of Guinea. He never 
regained power in Ghana. He died in 1972.
2. Under Nkrumah, Ghana's position on the China Issue was 
straight support for the PRC. Nevertheless, possibly 
due to ROC aid, plus the new government's anti-Peking 
attitude, by the end of the 1960s, Ghana's attitude was 
modified to a "Two Chinas" solution. Ghana and the PRC 
resumed diplomatic relations in February 1972. The PRC 
immediately renewed two aid projects in Ghana, which had 
been cancelled in 1966 after the severance of relations 
between the two countries. As expected, the ROC withdrew 
its missions there.
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aid was possibly due to the fact that Ethiopia had 
diplomatic and economic relations with the U.S. Neverthe­
less, Ethiopia never recognized the ROC, possibly because 
it never regarded the latter as a winning force in the 
Chinese civil war. On the other hand, however, Emperor 
Haile Selassie had not granted recognition to the PRC 
either, despite the latter's willingness to establish 
diplomatic relations.1 Four reasons can account for 
Ethiopia's reluctance. First of all, Peking had involved 
itself in the Ethiopia-Somalia border dispute. For example, 
during the fighting between Somalia and Ethiopia in the 
Ogaden and Hodh regions in 1963 and 1964, it is said that
Peking gave support to 50,000 Somali guerrilla tribesmen who
2were making raids into Ethiopia. Secondly, Peking had also 
involved itself in the Eritrean secessionist movement. 
Eritrea, a former Italian colony, became an autonomous region 
within the Ethiopian Empire in December 1950, in accordance 
with the U.N. recommendation. However, the Ethiopian 
government annulled Eritrea's autonomy in 1962 and made it 
a province. The Eritreans started a guerrilla war against 
the Ethiopian government and formed a separtist movement 
calling itself the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF), based in 
Sudan. The ELF, whose main aim was to demand independence 
for Eritrea, received support from the PRC during the mid- 
1960s. Thirdly,like most other African countries, with the 12
1. Mao Tse-tung wanted to establish relations with Ethiopia 
not only because the latter was influential among a 
number of other countries but also because it had consid­
erable following among several regional organizations,
i.e. if Ethiopia supported the PRC, other nations would 
follow suit. See John F. Copper, op.cit., p. 114.
2. John K. Cooley, East Wind over Africa: Red China's African 
Offensive (New Yorks Walker and Company, 1965), p. 28.
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notable exception of the PRC's close friend Ghana,
Emperor Selassie was a strong supporter of the nuclear
test ban treaty. Thus he felt disappointed that the PRC
refused to sign the accord.1 Finally, it is possible that
Emperor Selassie did not trust revolutionary Communism.
This was possibly due to Ethiopia's feudal tradition which
tended to be opposed to any Marxist-socialist principles.
After the Cultural Revolution was terminated in 1969, the
PRC's involvement with the ELF seemed to lessen. Meanwhile,
anti-Americanism began to grow in Ethiopia as a result of
2a cutback in American aid, and Mao Tse-tung saw an 
opportunity to replace the U.S. as supplier of aid to 
Ethiopia. Consequently, the PRC and Ethiopia established 
diplomatic relations. These two examples of Ghana and 
Ethiopia also illustrate the limited success of the ROC's 
aid programme.
(d) Nevertheless, the two Tables combined show clearly that 
during the period when the ROC's African aid was most 
active, most of the recipients maintained diplomatic 
relations with their donor. Table No. 11 especially provides 
us with a clear view of ROC-PRC diplomatic life during this
1. Message delivered in a speech given by Haile Selassie 
in a banquet to Chou En-lai. For the full text of the 
speech, see Afro-Asian Solidarity against Imperialism 
(Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1964), pp. 253-256. 
President Habib Bourguiba of Tunisia also criticized 
PRC's opposition to the treaty. The reasons why the 
PRC refused to sign the treaty were largely due to its 
hostility towards the Soviet Union, plus the fact that 
the ROC had become a signatory. In the PRC's view, 
this was a plot to create "a situation of Two Chinas". 
Adie, W.A.C., "Chou En-lai on Safari", in Roderick Mac- 
Farquhar, ed. China under Mao: Politics Takes Command 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1966), 
pp. 474-475, 480.
2. John F. Copper, op.cit., p. 114.
period. It not only demonstrates that more African 
countries maintained formal ties with the ROC than with 
the PRC but also, consequently, it reflects the effective­
ness of the ROC's foreign aid--as it might have the effect 
of consolidating relations already established. Moreover, 
most of the African aid recipients switched their 
recognition from the ROC to the PRC after 1971. This, in 
conjunction with the gradual withdrawal of the ROC's aid 
missions in Africa, explains well the subsequent decline in 
the usefulness of this tool. It is true that the PRC was 
already active in Africa prior to the ROC's departure from 
the U.N. in 1971; nonetheless, it is also true that tie 
ROC's presence in Africa during this period was a factor, 
however small, restraining the rise of Communist influence 
in the African heartland. Consequently, the ROC's departure 
from the African continent facilitated the PRC's rapport 
with the Africans.
Finally, three aid recipients, Senegal, the CAR and Dahomey, 
which switched their diplomatic relations between the two 
Chinese governments on more than one occasion before the 
end of 1971, deserve special attention. Senegal, an ex-French 
colony, provided an early test of the one policy on which 
Teipei and Peking agreed! that no nation could have diplo­
matic relations with both Chinas. Senegal granted 
recognition to the PRC on 14th March, 1961, without breaking 
relations with the ROC.1 Peking refused to establish 
diplomatic relations on that basis. Taipei, although dis­
1. Franz Ansprenger, "Nationalist China and Africa", in
United States Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS) 
Translations on Africa, 40(34740), no. 347, p. 12.
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pleased with Senegal's action, did not break relations. 
Instead, the ROC signed a technical cooperation agreement 
with Senegal on 13th September 1963, and sent a 12-man 
agricultural demonstration team from Taiwan in April 1964.1
In 1964 relations between the ROC and Senegal were broken 
off under circumstances that remain unclear. Nevertheless, 
Senegal was reported to be very anxious for the ROC agri­
cultural team to remain in Senegal, possibly due to the
impressive result that the ROC's agricultural team had
. . . 2 achieved in raising Senegal's rice yeild. Rather surpris­
ingly, the ROC not only permitted this, but enlarged the 
team to 16 members and renewed its stay every two years
3after 1965. However, diplomatic relations between the two
countries were not resumed until July 1969, and lasted only
two and a half years after that. Thus, from 1964 until 1969,
Senegal had no diplomatic ties with either China, but it
recognized the PRC and had aid relations with the ROC.
Senegal voted for Peking's admission to the U.N. in October
1971, but established diplomatic relations with the PRC on 
47th December. 1234
1. See Appendix No. 3
2. The previous record had been 500 kilograms per hectare; 
the Chinese boosted this to 6,000 kilograms in August, 
1965. See Free China Review, VI,6 (2nd October 1966), 
p. 4.
3. "Economic Relations of Taipei, Peking, Africa", JPRS, 
Translations on Africa, 163 (53556), no. 1050, p. 6.
4. But Taipei did not close its embassy at Dekar until 12th 
April 1972, and then only at Senegal’s request. Even 
then, Taipei's 43 agricultural technicians remained in 
Senegal another full year to May 1973. Senegal evidently 
appreciated the ROC aid, but possibly because of increa­
sing pressure from its pro-Peking neighbours, Mali, 
Mauritania and Guinea, it finally changed sides. See 
Hsien-fenq-an.
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Immediately upon its independence in August 1960, the
CAR was recognized by both Taipei and Peking, but only the
ROC was invited to the independence ceremony.^ The CAR
action was probably due to its colonial connection with
the French government. Nevertheless, formal diplomatic
relations with Taipei were not established until April 1962.
In May 1964, the ROC began to launch its aid programme--a
handicraft demonstration team— to the CAR. Nevertheless,
the CAR, land-locked, with few natural resources, and
receiving only French aid and a small amount of aid from
the U.S., urgently needed more constructive help from
outside. Thus, upon hearing of the PRC's willingness to
ease its transport and communication problems, CAR President
David Dacko switches recognition from the ROC to the PRC.
As expected, the ROC withdrew its embassy and the handi-
2craft demonstration team shortly. In January 1966, President 
Dacko was overthrown by a military coup, led by Colonel 
Jean-Bedel Bokassa. Bokassa immediately broke relations 
with the PRC and expelled the PRC embassy staff on the 
ground that he had discovered a cache of Chinese weapons 
and documents indicating that pro-Chinese elements in the 
CAR had intended, with Peking's aid, to overthrow the Dacko 12
1. For messages sent by PRC Premier Chou En-lai and Foreign 
Minister Chen I to Central African Prime Minister David 
Dacko, see Peking, New China News Agency Radioteletype 
in English to Europe and Asia, 1200 and 1203 GMT, 12th 
August 1960, in Daily Report, no. 159 (16th August 1960), 
p. AAA 21. For messages sent by ROC President Chiang 
Kai-shek and Foreign Minister Shen Chang-huan, see 
Chunq-fei kuan-hsi ti chan-wanq (The Prospect of Sino- 
African Relations'). (Taipei: Government Information Office, 
Executive Yiian, I960), p. 75.
2. Free China Weekly, II, 11 (8th November 1964), p. 4.
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betweengovernment.1 Nevertheless, diplomatic relations 
the CAR and the ROC were not restored until more than two 
years later in May 1968. This was followed by a technical
cooperation agreement between the two countries and a 16-
. . . 2 man ROC agricultural mission to the CAR.
After that the ROC's aid to the CAR grew steadily and in 
response Bokassa demonstrated his support for the ROC in 
the U.N. Nevertheless, for reasons that remain unclear,
Bokassa abstained in the vote on the China Issue in 1970,
, 3much to the dismay of the ROC government.
In the case of Dahomey, an ex-French colony, a change of the 
head of state— which had undergone 6 coups in 10 years since 
its independence in 1960, always resulted in a new China 
policy. Its first President Hubert Maga, established 
diplomatic relations with the ROC in January 1962, and was 
overthrown in October 1963, while visiting Taiwan. The new
leftist government established diplomatic relations with the
PRC in November 1964, although the ROC did not sever
4relations with Dahomey until April one year later.
1. Henri Donra, "Discussion of Reasons for Chinese Communists 
Expulsion from the Central African Republic", JPRS, 
Translation on Africa, 38(34365), no. 335, 52-55.
2. Free China Weekly, VIII, 18 (23rd June 1968), p. 4.
3. William Glenn, op.cit., p. 31. Following the abstention 
of the CAR in the U.N. voting, a statement was issued
by Bokassa in an interview with the magazine Africasia 
that he was ready to resume relations with Peking, if 
it wished.
4. Foreign Ministry of the ROC, Wo yu Fei-chou ko-kuo 
kuan-hsi chien-chieh (A brief introduction to relations 
between ROC and African countries), (Taipei, 1975),
p. 10.
~tf »1 n m » ii
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After a second coup in November 1965, and a third in
December, a new military government was set up which broke
off relations with Peking in January 1966, and reinstated
relations with Taipei in April, thus ending the PRC's first
brief period of official relations with Dahomey.1 However,
after three more coups in December 1967, December 1969, and
October 1972, Dahomey again reversed its China policy by
resuming diplomatic relations with the PRC in November 
21972. Despite these rather erratic diplomatic relations, 
Dahomey had always voted for the ROC since 1966.
To sum up then, the above findings justify our hypothesis 
that the Operation Vanguard project was largely effective 
politically until the ROC's loss of membership of the U.N. 
in 1971.
Having said this, however, we have another reservation: we 
could not really come to a final assessment on the value of 
the ROC's aid based solely upon its 1971 defeat in the U.N. 
This is because there were still 18 African countries (of 
these 17 were ROC aid recipients, the only non-aid 
recipient was South Africa) supporting the ROC in the 1971
vote when the majority of African countries cast a negative
t 3 vote.
Another point worth mentioning is that there were two 
major shifts of African support for the ROC: the first 123
1. Chin Shen-pao, "Da-ho-mey cheng-tsao chih fen-hsi" 
("Analysis of Dahomey's political problems"), Issues and 
Studies. IX, 9 (June 1970), pp. 54-57} Foreign Ministry 
of the ROC, op.cit., p. 10.
2. Peking Review, 1 (5th January 1973), p. 8.
3. See Appendix No. 2; and p.307.
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shift occurred during the years 1963-1965, and the 
second after 1969. This raises another questions Were 
these periods of decline in African support an indication 
of ineffectiveness of the ROC's aid? Can the rise in 
African support during these two time periods be 
attributed to the ROC's aid? To answer these questions, 
we need to consider some other external factors which 
contributed to changes of African voting patterns.
3. Factors that influenced the African voting patterns: 
changing international environment
Since some of the external factors have already been 
discussed earlier,, we will now concentrate on only a few 
issues which, though not directly related to the ROC aid 
programme, may help to explain more fully the effectiveness 
of the ROC's aid strategy. From 1960 to 1971, the most 
important issues external to Africa but which had a 
profound influence upon the China policy of African states 
were: (1) the growing tide of opinion in favour of admit­
ting the PRC to the U.N., (2) France's new China policy
after 1964, (3) the PRC's diplomatic setbacks in Third
World countries, (4) the PRC's Cultural Revolution and 
(5) the modification of U.S. pro-ROC policy. The issues 
will be examined with a view to explaining two shifts of 
African support for the ROC, 1963-1965 and 1969-1971.
(1) The mood in favour of admitting the PRC to the U.N.
Prior to the Korean War, the main argument heard against 
seating Peking was that the representation question should 
be deferred until a majority of countries recognized the PRC.
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After 1950 when the U.N. characterized the PRC as an 
aggressor, those opposed to seating Peking used the 
argument that the Peking government did not meet the 
U.N. Charter’s requirement that members be "peace-loving 
states". The U.S., in addition to citing the Korean 
aggression, pointed to Peking's intervention in Indochina—  
Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia— and to its attacks on the off­
shore islands.
Nevertheless, there were always countries sympathetic to 
the PRC and this feeling grew stronger after the early 
1960s. These countries, for instance Cameroon, Ghana, 
Guinea, Sierra Leone, etc., impressed by the greatness of 
its size, population and potential power, and possibly by 
promises of aid, often expressed the urgent need to admit 
Peking into the U.N. Their arguments for the PRC were thus 
largely based on the so-called "Chinese reality". For 
instance, Bakoto of the Cameroon stated: "Cameroon 
acknowledges... the existence in continental China of an 
authority which exercises effective control over the 
population. The reality is manifested not only by the 
Government's ability to lead the country towards its destiny 
but also by the influence which the People's Republic of 
China wields in international affairs."^ Similarly, Alex 
Quaison-Sacky of Ghana maintained "We believe that the 
People's Republic of China, representing some 630 million 
people, and with the vast economic, scientific and techno­
logical resources that it is rapidly developing, can make a
!> GAOR Twentieth Session Plenary Meetings, 1379th Meetings 
(16th November 1965), p. 14.
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useful and constructive contribution towards the maintenance 
of peace and the advancement of civilization in our time".1 
Moreover, "it is the People's Republic of China, not part 
of China (Taiwan), which is a great power. If we ignore
, 2it, we do so at our own peril". Also Diallo Telli, the 
Ambassador of Guinea, regarded the PRC as the only effective 
government of China because "...the Taiwan Government is a
refugee government, under the military protection of the 
3U.S.". Ambassador Collier of Sierra Leone also argued 
that the "Taiwan delegation is in no way adequate to 
represent China", rather, "the PRC should be admitted to 
the United Nations in keeping with the best traditions of 
an organization which has accepted the principle of univer­
sality as one of the foundation stones of its existence".^ 
Another example was Nigeria, which advocated the "Two
Chinas" solution seating in 1961, but after 1965 supported
5the seating of the PRC at Taiwan's expense. Even Pope 
Paul VI and UN Secretary General U Thant shared the view 
that the PRC should be represented in the U.N. for the peace 
of Asia and the world. Pope Paul VI was quoted as saying:
"Your vocation is to bring not only some of the peoples, 12345
1. GAOR, Plenary Meetings, 1072nd Meeting (16th December 
1961), GAOR Fifteenth Session, Plenary Meetings, 869th 
(Paragraphs 77 and 78).
2. GAOR Fifteenth Session, p. 345.
3. GAOR Plenary Meetings, 1075th Meeting (11th December 1961), 
p. 983.
4. GAOR 1076th Meeting (12th December 1961), p. 998.
5. Mr. Wachuku, Nigeria, General Assembly, 5th December 
1961, UN Document A/PV. 1071, p. 21.
This includedbut all of the peoples, to fraternize".1
bringing in 700 million Mainland Chinese to the U.N.
Similarly favouring universality of UN membership, U Thant
said in 1966, "I believe in universality. I believe that
all countries and all States should become Members of the 
2United Nations."
Consequently, the argument went, many international problems 
especially intematioanl disarmament, could not be discussed 
adequately or reach a fruitful settlement without the PRC's 
participation in the international institutions through 
which negotiations normally took place.
It was argued that with the explosion of its first nuclear 
bomb in 1964, in conjunction with its military manpower and 
aggressive nature (as indicated in the Korean War) plus the 
fact that it was not a signatory of the nuclear test ban 
treaty, the PRC could very possibly be a threat to inter­
national peace and security. Thus, it was a political 
necessity to bring the PRC into the U.N. The situation 
became less favourable to the ROC when the PRC undertook a 
more active programme in developing its external relations. 
For instance, it not only showed more interest in applying 
for U.N. membership, but also began to pursue a friendly 
course towards the outside world, especially, like the ROC, 
with those newly independent African countries. In this 
regard, Chou En-lai 's African tour which covered 10 African 
countries on one trip in early 1964 was a big boost to the 12
1. GAOR 1308th Meeting, p. 8. Or General Assembly, 4th 
October 1965, UN Document A/PV. 1347, p. 3.
2. Secretary-General/Statements and Messages/436.
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PRC's diplomatic life because, shortly afterwards, several 
countries including Tunisia, Kenya, Tanzania, the CAR, 
Dahomey, Zambia and Senegal extended diplomatic recognition. 
In July 1965, Mauritania also followed suit. This was 
clearly a diplomatic loss to the ROC not only because 3 
pro-ROC countries, the CAR, Dahomey and Mauritania, had 
switched their diplomatic ties but also because former 
non-aligned countries had decided to extend recognition to 
Peking. This helps to explain why the ROC's aid effort in 
Africa was not fully appreciated there.
Simultaneously, after 1964, the PRC further intensified its 
overseas aid programmes with the conclusion of a large 
number of economic and technical cooperation agreements 
with countries in Africa (Algeria, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya,
Mali, Somalia, Tanzania, Uganda, and the U.A.R.), in Asia 
and in Latin America.1 Hardly any of these countries voted 
for the ROC in the U.N.
(2) Shift of French position and its impact upon world 
opinion
Another external development which brought Peking new 
prestige in a part of Africa— the West— was France’s new 
China policy. On 27th January 1964, France and the PRC 
established diplomatic relations. Two days later, a Jen-min 
jih-pao editorial acclaimed this as "another major achievement 
of China's foreign policy" proving that "the scheme of U.S.
1. For the PRC's aid to these regions, see John F. Copper, 
op.cit.
imperialism and its followers to isolate China is doomed 
to complete failure".^ The repercussions of the French 
decision were obvious, not only because France was a 
permanent member of the U.N. Security Council, but also 
because France under Charles de Gaulle was trying to 
establish its credentials as a "non-aligned" power in 
East-West rivalry, and France still had close relations 
with numerous French-speaking countries in Africa which had 
not yet recognized Peking.
The PRC considered the French recognition could increase 
Peking's prestige in countries of the Third World in general 
and in former French Africa in particular. The results 
were indeed favourable, but much more limited than Peking 
expected. That is, generally speaking, de Gaulle's decision 
was less well received in former French Africa than in the 
rest of the continent. There were then 14 former French 
colonies in black Africa. Two of these, Guinea and Mali, 
had been unfriendly to France since independence, and had 
recognized Peking since 1959 and 1960, respectively. As 
expected, they openly praised de Gaulle's action in 1964.
The other 12 ex-French colonies— or the U.A.M. members—  
however, all had diplomatic relations with the ROC, and 
as mentioned earlier, only 3 (the Congo, the CAR and 
Dahomey) followed France's example in switching to recognize 
Peking. Senegal switched recognition from the ROC to a 
neutral position. And Mauritania recognized the PRC a year 
later, bringing the total number of African countries 1
1. See editorial of 29th January 1964, entitled "Greeting 
the establishment of diplomatic relations between China 
and France". Peking, New China News Agency, International 
Service in English, 1235 GMT, 28 January 1964, in Daily 
Report, no. 19 (28 January 1964) p. BBB14.
■<4b.
recognizing the PRC to 16. Also affected was the voting 
behaviour of these countries: the CAR switched from 
opposition to support for the PRC seating. Mauritania, 
switched from abstention to a similar position of support. 
Senegal, abstaining from the vote previously, no longer 
voted in opposition to the PRC. Seven countries— Cameroon, 
Chile, Cyprus, Iran, Jamaica, Libya, Rwanda and Nigeria-- 
which had voted against the PRC in 1963, voted in favour of 
its admission in 1965. Among these "inconsistent" countries 
there were 8 from Africa, and with 6 of them the ROC had 
had aid relations. But other countries rejected the French 
example and maintained relations with the ROC, partly 
because of their apprehension regarding the PRC’s covert 
support of dissident groups in various African countries. 
Three of these countries— Malagasy Republic, Ivory Coast, 
and Upper Volta— sharply criticized France's action.1
In all, then, there were several factors that influenced the
U.N. voting on the China Issue during the period 1963-1965.
In addition to the growing mood in favour of accommodating
the PRC, and France's new China policy, there was concurrently
the waning influence of the U.S. on its allies, and, in
contrast, the increasing weight of the PRC in the Third
World. All these reasons made the ROC's position less
popular and more controversial, as shown by the increasingly
2tight votes on the China Issue at the U.N. 12
1. Interview with Yang Hsi-k'un, 21st May 1979.
2. See Appendix No. 2.
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Thus, we find that the ROC's aid was not sufficiently 
rewarding to be effective in maintaining support on its own. 
This can be seen in the fact that in 1963 the ROC dispatched 
only 7 aid missions to African and yet obtained 14 favourable 
votes against the Soviet proposal to seating the PRC. This 
level of support was identical to the number of African 
countries which recognized the ROC. Later on, however, 
despite a continuous increase in the number of ROC's aid 
missions to Africa in both 1964 and 1965, the patterns of 
African voting support declined sharply. In other words, 
the level of the pro-Taipei African countries was dispropor­
tionate to the level of ROC aid dispatched. Thus, on the 
contrary, the pro-Taipei vote decreased from 14 to 8 in 1965 
whilst the number of aid missions increased from 6 to 16.
(3) The PRC's diplomatic setback in the Third World countries
Despite Peking's aid efforts in the Third World countries, 
not all its aid programmes brought favourable results. In 
1965 and after, for example, domestic upheavals in some 
African countries and in Indonesia actually brought reverses 
for the PRC’s diplomatic campaign there. This was largely 
due to criticism of the PRC's involvement in these countries’ 
internal affairs. Through the granting of aid, the PRC also 
involved itself in the encouragement of coups or in clandes­
tine support for political factions in several countries, for 
instance, in Burundi and Indonesia in 1965, in the CAR in 
1966, in Tunisia and Kenya in 1967, and in Nigeria from 1967 
to 1971.1 This political involvement significantly affected
1. See Bruce D. Larkin, op.cit., pp. 125-147. For the PRC's 
involvement in the attempted coup in Indonesia in 1965, 
see Congressional Quarterly, China! U.S. Policy since 1945, 
pp. 156 and 160.
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its diplomatic reputation abroad. For instance, all the 
aforementioned countries which accused the PRC of political 
infiltration, severed ties with Peking (Nigeria refrained 
from recognition of Peking until 1971). As a result, 
Peking’s aid operation (except for Nigeria because it did 
not receive aid from Peking until 1972) in these countries 
were also disrupted. Naturally, one should not ignore the 
fact that the PRC’s diplomatic setbacks after the mid-1960s 
were also partly due to the fact that some formerly pro-PRC 
countries, e.g. Ghana, Dahomey, the CAR and Indonesia, had 
changed their political stance as a result of coups at 
home. Thus, they were less keen on supporting the PRC.
In this regard, we can argue that this fluid situation 
helped the ROC to deter PRC's gain in the U.N. At the same 
time, one should also take into account the fact that after 
the mid-1960s, the ROC's aid in Africa began to show 
results. Despite its inception in 1961, the Vanguard 
project only began to expand at a steady pace after 1963.
It was only after 1965 that concrete results of the project 
began to register. In a way, we can argue that there 
existed a certain correlation between African voting 
support for the ROC and the latter's aid to the former 
because the increase of African pro-ROC votes developed in 
line with the volume of the ROC's aid activities. Yet even 
so, it is risky to conclude that the ROC's aid alone was 
the cause of upsetting Peking's diplomatic build up in 
African, and some of the reasons have just been mentioned. 
We can merely assume that the above issues, put together, 
created a diplomatic obstacle for the PRC, hence a lift to 
the ROC's strength, or at least helped the ROC to retain its 
previous diplomatic level in Africa.
(4) The PRC's Cultural Revolution
The domestic upheavels in some African countries coincided
with the domestic upheavals of the Cultural Revolution in
China. The Cultural Revolution brought to China not only
some years of internal confusion and economic regression,
but also, externally, a suspension of its normal diplomatic
life. For instance, on 20th September 1966, the PRC
ordered all foreign students, numbering approximately 1,000
and mostly from Afro-Asian countries and Albania, to leave
the country.1 Also in December, Peking began calling its
ambassadors home to be "re-educated" and to answer charges
levelled against them by Red Guards. By late 1967, 45 of the
46 PRC ambassadors had returned home, only Huang Hua,
ambassador to Cairo, remaining at his post. All other PRC
/ 2embassies around the world were headed by charges d'affaires. 
The situation was obviously discouraging. And it certainly 
had very negative effects on PRC's relations with many Third 
World countries. For instance, in Africa, as noted earlier, 
diplomatic relations between the PRC and Dahomey, Burundi, 
the CAR, Ghana and Tunisia were broken or suspended} those 12
1. Robert A. Scalapino, "The Cultural Revolution and Chinese 
Foreign Policy", Current Scene, VI, 13 (August 1968),
p. 82; see also Traeg Y. Ismael, "People's Republic of 
China and Africa",. Journal of Modern African Study, IX 
4 (December 1971), p. 522.
2. Daniel Tretiak, "Disappearing Act", FEER, LIX,6 (8th 
February 1968), p. 216; and "China's Foreign Policy and 
International Position during a year of Cultural Revolu­
tion", Current Scene, V, 20 (1st November 1969), p. 3.
For the list of the recalled diplomats, see Shu-chiu mei- 
jen yu ssu-hsianq tou-chenq (Fine wine, beautiful women 
and ideological struggle). (Hong Kong, 1968), pp. 62-65. 
Huang Hua was recalled to Peking on 14th July 1969, when 
the Cultural Revolution was already over.
with Kenya were reduced to a state of fiction by the 
mutual withdrawal of all diplomatic personnel without 
formal severance of relations. It is true that some of 
these breaks were precipitated by governmental changes in 
African countries, but the violence and political instability 
in China was at least a major contributing factor. Conse­
quently, by the end of the Cultural Revolution in 1969, when 
the number of independent African countries had increased to 
42, the number that continued to maintain diplomatic 
relations with Peking had fallen to 13, compared to 16 in 
1964 and 14 in 1965 when PRC activities in Africa reached 
a peak. This diplomatic setback, however, does not suggest 
that those non-committed countries would therefore favour 
extending ties with the ROC despite that it maintained 22 
formal African relations in 1969. Rather, it meant that 
there was no concrete diplomatic gain for the PRC, and 
consequently, by implication, no diplomatic losses for the 
ROC.
Despite the promising situation for the ROC at that time, 
pro-Taipei sentiment in the U.N. began to drop again after 
1969 and this time it was fatal not only in terms of the 
ROC's legitimacy struggle in the U.N. and in other world 
organizations, but, above all, in terms of the subsequent 
evolution of the ROC's foreign policy and external relations.
Two inter-related reasons can account for this anti-ROC 
development! (a) the changing international environment and 
(b) the modification of the U.S.'s pro-Taipei policy. They 
will be examined briefly and simultaneously because most of 
them have already been discussed in Chapter Four.
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(5) The changing international environment and the
modification of U.S. pro-Taipei policy
To some extent, the emergence of international detente had 
lessened tension between nations and encouraged economic 
cooperation instead of ideological and military confronta­
tions characteristic of the Cold War. Even the two Super­
powers had, though still with some hesitancy and with 
extreme caution, and despite the Vietnam War, come to see 
the declining utility value of direct military and ideolog­
ical warfaifeas means of achieving national objectives. As 
noted in the last Chapter, the U.S. had modified its 
conventional foreign policy framework of "containment".
At this time by the end of 1960s, the pro-PRC faction in the 
U.S. administration had gained strength. This group of 
people often argued that a continued insistence on military 
containment, hence a continued isolation of Peking and 
prevention of its admission into the U.N., was not only 
unrealistic but harmful to the U.S.'s national interests. 
Conversely, the strength of the pro-ROC faction in the U.S. 
administration began to decline, and this was particularly 
evident with regard to the gradual disintegration of the 
China Lobby.
In a way, it can be argued that the modified American 
attitude was developed in conformity with the trend of 
international development, but it is hard to tell to what
extent the international tides had influenced the process 
of U.S. decision-making, or vice versa. Thus, America's
new China policy might have had enormous impact upon world
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opinion, or it might have been the other way around.
Probably, a balanced judgement would be to consider that 
both factors actually reinforced each other culminating in 
the fatal vote on the China Issue in 1971. Such a conclusion 
seems plausible since, towards the end of 1960s, international 
support for the ROC began to dwindle, whilst support for the 
PRC increased. Concurrently, international confidence in 
U.S. prestige and supremacy faded. As a result of this 
anti-U.S. sentiment, some former pro-ROC countries also 
adopted an indifferent attitude or cast a negative vote on 
the China Issue, and thus affected the ROC's fate at the 
U.N.
All in all, as far as the ROC was concerned, nothing was more 
critical than the new American China policy. The U.S. no 
longer insisted on its previous claim that "the Nationalist 
government on Taiwan is the only rightful Government of all 
China, including the Mainland", but that "both Nationalist 
China on Taiwan and Communist China on Mainland are facts of 
life". This, expressed by U.S. delegate to the U.N. 
Christopher H. Philips, was interpreted as being aimed at 
creating "Two Chinas".* 1
1. Speech delivered on 12th November 1970. See Congressional 
Quarterly, op■cit., p. 195.
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IV. Conclusion
Foreign aid was used during the 1960s as an adjunct to the 
strategy of political counterattack by ftie ROC to help 
ensure national survival. The priority targets of the 
policy were to retain the ROC seat in the U.N., to 
challenge the PRC for diplomatic recognition on the African 
continent, as well as to preserve the status quo of the 
Nationalist government's power position on Taiwan island.
Between its inception in 1961 and October 1971, the ROC's 
aid to Africa showed both strengths and weaknesses.
However, after more than two decades of struggle, the ROC 
still failed to block the PRC from entry into the organi­
zation. Since then, the ROC’s aid programme in Africa has 
evidenced substantial decline. This was caused partly by 
the changing political climate in Africa and partly by the 
ROC's continued insistence on the "one China" principle.
That is, on the one hand, most of the "friendly" African 
countries, either with or without aid relations with Taipei, 
after the latter's departure from the U.N., preferred to 
establish relations with Peking and considered it as the 
Chinese reality. On the other hand, Taipei made its 
position clear that as soon as the host country entered into 
diplomatic relations with Peking, the ROC would withdraw its 
aid missions. An additional point was that, after the ROC’s 
departure from the U.N., the utility value of foreign aid 
seemed to have lost its original significance. Consequently, 
by early 1979, the ROC maintained diplomatic relations with 
only 5 countries in Africa! Ivory Coast, Lesotho, Malawi, 
Swaziland and South Africa (see Table no. 11). And there
were only Severn technical missions from the ROC with 179 
members still stationed in Africa. Compared to the 
situation in the mid-1960s, it was apparent that a large 
number of the established technical missions had been 
withdrawn since 1971. The 5 countries with whom the ROC 
still shared bilateral ties consisted of South Africa and 
four others whose foreign policies were either bound up 
with, or dependent upon, South Africa. Two of them,
Lesotho and Swaziland, are actually located inside the 
territory of South Africa. Whilst Ivory Coast and Malawi 
both advocated dialogue with white-ruled South Africa and 
were estranged somewhat from many other African countries.
It is also worth mentioning that Malawi is the only black 
African state to have diplomatic relations with South 
Africa, and moreover, like South Africa, it is also strongly 
anti-Communist.
Finally, mention should also be made of the strengths and 
weaknesses of the Vanguard project itself. Our approach 
has been to point out some of the advantages and disadvantages 
of the project in comparison to the PRC's aid operations in 
Africa.
One important factor affecting the Vanguard project was the 
size of Taiwan in comparison to the huge mainland. The PRC 
is about 266 times as large as the ROC, with 50 to 60 times 
as many people. The difference in natural resources is of 
similar magnitude. Indeed, the PRC is of course much larger 
than any African countries, and has a population more than 
double that of the entire African continent. Impressed or 
probably frightened by this enormous size, it was quite
353
natural to presume that most Africans would prefer Peking 
to Taipei. Of course, one could equally argue that it was 
because of this small size that the ROC held certain 
advantages ! at least the ROC did not frighten Africans, or 
arouse suspicion or anxiety.1 Nevertheless the limited 
amount of resources available was a very important constraint 
Secondly, by refraining from subversive activity, Taipei 
could claim that it had no imperialistic or expansionist 
intentions in Africa. Naturally, as a UN member, the ROC 
felt obliged to carry out its diplomatic activities through 
conventional methods. Moreover, because of its limited 
resources and its preoccupation with the Chinese civil war, 
the ROC was unable to undertake any such actions in a 
remote area. Although on the one hand, this "no politics 
but friendship and aid" sounded rather impressive, on the 
other hand, it served little to meet the demands of some 
radical African countries. In this regard, the PRC was 
never hesitant about using clandestine means when necessary. 
This had brought it quick results. In conjunction with this, 
the third factor affecting the performance of the Vanguard 
project was the ROC’s vagueness in ideological commitment. 
Despite its basic principle of anti-Communism, Taipei never 
emphasized, as Peking did, any Cold War ideological prefer­
ence, in its dealings with African countries. On the one 
hand, this enabled the ROC to base its aid programmes totally 
on local needs and the economic conditions of the recipients,
1. Francois Charbonnier, "Slowdown in Africa", FEER, XXXVII, 
13 (27th September 1962), p. 585; Franz Ansprenger, op.cit 
p. 10; and Leon M.S. Slawecki, "The Two Chinas in Africa", 
Foreign Affairs, XLI, 2 (January 1963), p. 393.
except for the condition that the latter must not
recongize the PRC.''' On the other hand, however, precisely
because of this refrain from political involvement or
ideological commitment, African recipients felt that aid
committed them to nothing. They normally exploited the
situation (i.e. the ROC-PRC competition) to their advantage,
or, if possible, preferred to receive aid from both Chinas
without committing themselves to either side. Fourthly,
and finally, the ROC's aid, though impressive to some
African countries, was unable to compete in size and number
of projects with the PRC, which could afford large projects
of highway or railway constructions. In fact, shortage of
aid funds was one of the main reasons why many African
countries who had received aid from Taipei during the 1960s
turned to Peking in the 1970s. In this connection, it is
necessary to say a few words about the financing of the
Vanguard Project. Initially most of the aid projects were
financed solely by the ROC government. By the late 1960s,
it cost Taipei U.S.£7 million a year, and in 1969 alone,
African missions and training programmes cost Taipei U.S.£
2 .10 million dollars. Actually since the beginning of 1968,
3the U.S. had indirectly provided most of the necessary money. 123
1. Generally this principle has been strictly followed.
One notable exception was Libya, which recognized Peking 
in 1971 but still received agricultural aid from Taipei. 
Taipei made this exception apparently because Libya had 
not established official diplomatic relations with Peking 
and there was still an ROC embassy in Libya. The ROC 
withdrew its mission from Libya in mid-1978 when Libya 
officially extended diplomatic relations with Peking.
2. Interview with Yang Hsi-k'un.
3. See Leon M .S .Slawecki, "The Two Chinas in Africa", p. 394;
O. K. Armstrong, op.cit., p. 187; Yawsoon Sim, op.cit.,
P. 21; and William Glen, op.cit., p. 30.
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Whether or not the ROC's aid served as an indirect channel 
for U.S. aid to Africa in this context was unclear, but 
some African countries did at times feel unhappy about 
supporting the ROC because of this imperialist connection.
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Chapter Six
The Strategy of Economics-and 
Trade-first Diplomacy
The ROC's defeat in the U.N. in October 1971 represented a 
remarkable turning point in the history of its foreign 
policy and external relations. This was because since then 
the ROC, with increasing international recognition of its 
Communist rival as the rightful spokesman for all China, 
has faced a heightened identity crisis and even more severe 
international isolation. The ROC has had therefore to 
display a high degree of adjustment and flexibility in the 
conduct of its foreign policy and external relations. Such 
revolutionary adjustments and extraordinary flexibility will 
be the main theme of our present study.
This Chapter will first introduce the environment that 
confronted the ROC after 1971, and the foreign policy 
options available to the ROC during the 1970s to develop 
its foreign policy strategy of "economics-and trade-first 
diplomacy". Then, focusing on this strategy, we will examine 
the motivations, objectives, principles and measures involved, 
as well as the structure and operation of the strategy. We 
also include in our study a very brief history of Taiwan's 
post-War economic development to facilitate understanding 
of the operation of the economic strategy. In a brief 
concluding section, we will provide a preliminary assessment
regarding the effectiveness of the strategy, and review a 
few of the problems now confronting policy-makers in Taiwan.
I. The ROC after the U ,N.-expulsion and the international 
environment
During the 1970s the political landscape in Asia as well 
as in the international arena experienced another rapid 
change with the communist victories in Indochina. The U.S. 
was decreasing its attempts to block this advance and, while 
preparing itself for a gradual but overall military and 
political withdrawal from the Asian mainland, had now 
definitely turned to efforts at detente with the PRC and 
the Soviet Union, the big powers behind the Indochina 
communists. The situation implied the development of a more 
complicated pattern of international power relationships in 
which the PRC and, to a lesser extent, Japan, Western 
Europe, and the newly independent countries, all had 
acquired almost equal influence to that of the two Cold War 
leaders in the international arena.
The Southeast Asian countries were also adjusting to this 
new situation by moving into relationships with the PRC and 
were to varying degrees placing less reliance on the 
influence of the U.S. in Asia. Many other former allies of 
the ROC had also taken similar steps--whether through the 
"Canadian formula" or the "Japanese model"— to desert it and 
establish bilateral relations with the PRC. The "Canadian 
formula" meant agreement to terminate diplomatic relations 
with the ROC as a condition for establishing them with the 
PRC. Almost all major western nations shifted their China 
policy in this manner. The "Japanese model" differed from
"Canadian formula" in that Japan, after switching diplomatic 
relations with the ROC to the PRC, still maintained quasi- 
governmental relationships with the ROC, an outcome which 
was unintended by the PRC but which it has tolerated, as it 
has the new U.S. China policy after 1979. More than 100 
countries since the end of 1970 have shifted their China 
policies, leaving, until January 1979, only 21 countries, 
most of them small, still recognizing the Nationalist 
government officially.'1' Among these countries, in Asia, 
the ROK is the only one left having diplomatic ties with 
Taipei. In Europe only the Holy See still maintains 
diplomatic contacts with Taipei; and in the Americas and
Africa (except for South Africa and Saudi Arabia) only a
. ? handful of less influential countries continue recognition.
The ROC's main foreign and only big-power supporter, the 
U.S., after prolonged internal debates and struggles on the 
issue, also decided to terminate its commitment. In 
actuality, when the U.S. implicitly recognized that "Taiwan 
is a part of China" in the 1972 Shanghai Communiqué, the U.S. 
had already ended, if not officially then at least theoreti­
cally, its Cold War policy. The Communiqué was issued on 
27th February 1972 at the conclusion of President Nixon’s 
trip to the PRC. One of the declaration in this Communiqué 
was that:
"The U.S. acknowledges that all Chinese on either 
side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but 
one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The 
United States Government does not challenge that 
position. It reaffirms its interests in a peaceful 12
1. See Appendix No. 4.
2. Ibid.
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settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese 
themselves. With this prospect in mind, the United 
States reaffirms the ultimate objective of the 
withdrawal of all U.S. forces and military 
installations from Taiwan. In the meantime, it 
will progressively reduce its forces and military 
installations on Taiwan as the tension in the 
area diminishes. 1
On 1st January 1979, the U.S. moved its embassy from Taipei 
to Peking.
A very significant implication of the U.S. de-recognition 
proposal was the automatic termination of the 1954 Mutual 
Defence Treaty— a Treaty which had served to protect Taiwan' 
security and to sustain the Nationalist soliders' morale for 
the last two and a half decades. Four months later the U.S. 
pulled out its remaining military personnel from Taiwan. 
Although the U.S. continued to maintain an intensive degree 
of commercial, cultural and other sorts of relations with 
the Nationalist government (which was now commonly referred 
to as the Taipei or the Taiwan government), this diplomatic 
loss and its repercussions for the ROC were incalculable. 
Consequently, except for Saudi Arabia, South Africa and 
those other smaller countries, the ROC's diplomatic life 
almost ceased to exist.
Conversely, the PRC had moved more and more towards big 
power status with countries eagerly looking to it for 
political, diplomatic, economic, social and cultural 
exchanges. As noted earlier, corresponding to the changed 
world environment, the PRC had already taken a more active 
foreign policy line after the ending of the Cultural 1
1. For the text, see Congressional Quarterly, China, U.S. 
Policy Since 1945, pp. 323-325.
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Revolution in 1969. Now Peking sought to expel Taipai 
from various international organizations, such as the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the International Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the International 
Development Association (IDA), the Asian Development Bank 
and many others.1 The purpose of such actions were to 
relegate the ROC to the status of "non-country", to push 
it further into the diplomatic dead-end of complete isolation, 
and to persuade it to disavow its decades-long struggle 
against Peking and Communism and to allow itself to be 
incorporated into the PRC, thus fulfilling the objective of 
national unification.
Here, it is necessary to mention very briefly the domestic
political situation of the ROC during the 1970s. The loss
of the ROC's seat at the U.N. and the serious impact of this
upon its international status temporarily united the people
on Taiwan. As R.N. Clough observed: "Mainlanders and
Taiwanese agreed, particularly after the ROC lost its UN
seat and the U.S. changed policy toward the PRC, that all
their resources and efforts should be concentrated on the
2development and defense of Taiwan". This sense of the 
need for national unity was enhanced in 1975 with the death 
of President Chaing Kai-shek. As mentioned in Chapter One, 
Chiang Kai-shek, though not an effective leader when he was 
on the mainland, and despite the damage to his prestige 
suffered as a result of the loss of the mainland to the 
Communists, and Taiwanese dissatisfaction under Nationalist 12
1. See Appendix No. 5.
2. R.N. Clough, op.cit., p. 46.
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irule, was regarded by the people on the island as a 
stabilizing factor for the internal unity of the island 
nation. It was Chiang alone who held the Nationalist 
system together in Taiwan under his leadership and he was 
widely accepted among the Chinese on Taiwan, both mainlanders 
and native Taiwanese. In other words, from the time that 
Chiang assumed control of the national government of the 
ROC on Taiwan, the general acceptance of his legitimacy as 
a national leader was an important stabilizing factor for 
Nationalist government in Taiwan. His death did not weaken 
the internal stability of Taiwan. On the contrary, the 
orderly and constitutional transfer of power to his son,
Chiang Ching-kuo, plus the latter's rather flexible and 
less formal style of leadership demonstrated both in 
domestic political reforms and in external relations seemed 
to promote further national unity.'1' In 1976, Chiang Kai-shek's 
opponent Mao Tse-tung died. With the departure of these two 
most powerful figures in recent Chinese history, relations 
between the mainland and Taiwan seemed to relax in a very 
subtle manner.
Two reasons can account for this development. Firstly, the 
new generations on both sides of the Taiwan Straits have 
less personal experience of the Nationalist-Communist 
hostility than their parents, despite strenous efforts by 
the two parties to indoctrinate them in the history of the 
struggle. Hence there is a possibility that they may adopt 
a different approach to resolve the unification problem
For information on Chiang Ching-kuo's leadership style, 
see Chapter One, footnote no. 1, p. 37, For information 
on his domestic political reform, see Chapter One, 
footnote no. 2, p. 66, also the following footnote.
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(i.e. through peaceful means). Secondly, there was the 
gradual decline in U.S. support for the Nationalists' 
cause, which forced the Nationalists to accept the reality 
that if they decided to continue their hostility against 
the Chinese Communists, they would have to fight alone. 
Consequently, Chiang Ching-kuo reckoned that the way to 
national survival was not only to resist Communist ideology, 
but also, more importantly, to build up a democratic govern­
ment with a strong economy and military strength, and 
sufficient internal political and social stability in 
Taiwan. Hence under Chiang Ching-kuo’s leadership, the 
emphasis of the Nationalists'fight for survival and 
legitimacy have shifted from a purely ideological confronta­
tion with the Communists, a persistent territorial claim 
against the mainland government, and an intransigent power 
contest with the CCP, to a defensive position of preserving 
the Nationalists' ideology, of safeguarding those territories 
still under the Nationalists' control, of creating a good 
political image, and, ultimately, of cultivating a unique 
identity. Thus, internally, Chiang Ching-kuo made explicit 
efforts to increase Taiwanese participation in the political 
system. Chiang's efforts began towards the end of 1960s.
For example, in the early 1950s only about half of those 
taking civil service examinations were Taiwanese but towards 
the end of 1960s, when Chiang Ching-kuo was already in 
charge of the ROC's national affairs due to his father's ill 
health, the figure rose to about 92%. At the same time, 
over 90% of those passing the examination were Taiwanese,
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and of the very highest scores 94.87% were Taiwanese.1 
This trend continued after Chiang Kai-shek’s death in 1975. 
Young Chiang's purpose was to increase the level of 
democracy as well as to promote his political popularity 
(hence legitimacy) among the local Taiwanese majority. At 
the same time, Chiang Ching-kuo recruited a group of 
intelligent, well-educated and relatively young technical 
experts into top leadership positions in the Party and the 
government, with the clear indication that the priority of
his strategy for survival would be to place emphasis on
. . . . 2 economic planning, science and education. It was against
this background that the ROC developed a new foreign policy
strategy during the 1970s. Loosely defined, this was (and
still is) the strategy of "economics-and trade-first
diplomacy". The strategy became possible only because of
the internal economic development on Taiwan. This was a
strategy which, instead of the traditional norm of bilateral
official state-to-state (or government-to-government)
political relations, put emphasis on the "economic" and
"unofficial" aspects of exchanges.
In addition to the economic strategy, however, the ROC also 
considered other foreign policy options, such as the "Japan 
option", the "Soviet option", the "nuclear option", and the 
"Independence option". However, this does not suggest that 
the ROC, in searching for alternative foreign policy options,
1. J.B. Jacobs, "Recent Leadership and Political Trends in 
Taiwan", The China Quarterly, 45 (January/March 1971), 
p. 141. The article provides a good account of Chiang 
Ching-kuo's efforts before he took office to increase 
Taiwanese participation in the political system.
2. Ibid., especially pp. 143-149.
364
has therefore ignored its relations with the U.S. The ROC 
continued to regard the U.S. as its foremost foreign friend 
and placed cooperation with it as its top foreign policy 
priority, despite the latter's "unsympathetic" attitude 
expressed in the Shanghai Communiqué. Indeed, afterwards, 
the ROC continued, and to some extent intensified, its 
attempts to impress on the American people the importance 
to the U.S. of retaining its connections with Taiwan. This 
can be seen from the fact that since the early 1970s, the 
ROC's programme to invite U.S. dignitaries, particularly 
those who had been to mainland China, to visit Taiwan was 
stepped up. Special arrangements were also established, 
after 1979, to cope with possible awkward situations caused 
by the termination of diplomatic relations. Nevertheless, 
as a natural consequence of U.S. de-recognition, the ROC's 
dependence on the U.S. had definitely declined towards the 
end of 1970s. The role of the U.S.— and hence the ROC's 
policies towards and relations with the U.S.--will be 
discussed merely occasionally in this Chapter. In other 
words, emphasis will be placed on the ROC's economic 
strategy and other foreign policy options. I.
II. Alternative ROC foreign policy options 
1. The Japan cption1
After the Second World War, Japan conducted a very unusual
1. The material relating to this Japan option is drawn chiefly 
from R.N.Clough's Island China, section on "Japan’s Rela­
tions with Taiwan", pp. 173-202; also from John F. Copper's 
"Taiwan's Strategy and America's China Policy", Orbis,
XXI, 2 (Summer 1977), pp. 261-276.
China policy of "one China in principle and two Chinas in 
practice". This peculiar relationship has already been 
described very briefly in Chapter Four. Thus, our focus 
here will be on the factors that discouraged the ROC in 
an active pursuit of the Japan option.
Japan's fundamental policy towards the two parts of China 
has been to develop as profitable relations as possible with 
each. In following this policy, however, Japanese govern­
ments have been constrained by many considerations: for 
example, deep differences among political parties— the 
ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), and the oppositions, 
the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) and the Japan Communist 
Party (JCP)— over relations with China, constant domestic 
conflict over this issue, compounded by varying pressures 
from the U.S., and from the two Chinese governments. The 
three political parties hold very different views on Japan's 
relations with the two Chinese governments. The LDP, which 
has governed Japan throughout almost the entire post-War 
period, tends to be sympathetic towards the ROC, while the 
oppositions take the side of the PRC. To make the issue 
more complicated, there are splits within each of the major 
parties. For example, the pro-Peking figures in the LDP will 
criticize government policy and press for close relations 
with the PRC. They will even make remarks on government 
policies towards the U.S., or the Soviet Union, or the ROC.1 
In brief, until September 1972, Japan’s diplomatic and other 
official relations were only with the ROC, but trade was 
conducted with both "Chinas". Or to put it more precisely,
1. For more information, see R.N. Clough, op.cit.
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Japan was pursuing a policy of "frontdoor relations with 
Taiwan and simultaneous backdoor relations with mainland 
China". After the establishment of diplomatic relations 
with the mainland government in September 1972, however, 
Japan performed an entirely reversed policy— "a frontdoor 
relations with mainland China and a backdoor relations with 
Taiwan". All official relations were therefore with the 
mainland government, but Japan continued to conduct trade 
with both mainland China and Taiwan. In order to manage 
trade and extensive people-to-people contacts in the absence 
of diplomatic ties, the Japanese government devised a number 
of institutions and techniques, first to deal with the 
mainland government (prior to September 1972) and later 
(after September 1972) with the Taiwan government. Thus, 
in 1962, two trade offices - the Liao Ch'eng-chih Liaison 
Office in Tokyo and the Takasaki Liaison Office in Peking - 
were set up for long-term trade between the PRC and Japan. 
Those who staffed the liaison offices, although not recog­
nized as representatives of their governments, were in fact 
government officials and carried on a variety of quasi- 
diplomatic functions. After diplomatic relations were 
terminated between Japan and the ROC, Japan opened a Japan 
Interchange Association in Taipei, and the ROC opened an 
Association of East Asia Relations in Tokyo. These offices, 
with similar functions to legation, represented the Japanese 
solution to the problem of how to maintain unofficial 
relations with the ROC after recognizing the PRC. The 
offices were staffed by regular diplomats who were on 
"temporary" secondment.1
1. See R.N. Clough, op.cit., pp. 180-181 and p. 190.
Clearly, neither the Taiwan government nor the mainland 
government accepted in principle the concept of "separating 
politics and economics" used by the Japanese government to 
justify its policy, nor the sharp distinction between 
"official" and "unofficial" relations in dealing with the 
two Chinese governments, but they vent along with these 
so-called "pragmatic" policies in practice.
The ROC's acceptance of Japan's "unprincipled" action was 
based on the estimation that relations with Japan were too 
important to be jeopardized, because Japan was not only its 
number one political supporter in Asia (after 1972, Japan 
has refrained from supporting the ROC politically and 
diplomatically) but also the most important trading partner 
in this region.
For decades after the 1952 Peace Treaty, the ROC's attitudes 
towards Japan were mixed. On the one hand, it wanted to 
promote close collaboration between the two island countries. 
On the other hand, the ROC was constantly haunted by the 
fear that such a collaboration would one day lead to a sort 
of "economic domination" or "political conspiracy" by the 
Japanese. The ROC was convinced that it was essential to 
encourage economic relations between the two islands as it 
might contribute to Taiwan's rapid economic growth. More 
importantly, it also reckoned on political advantages from 
increasing Japan's economic stake in Taiwan. Nevertheless, 
the Nationalists had not forgotten the colonial connection 
between the two islands, and the difference between the 
Taiwanese majority and the mainlander minority on Taiwan 
island. In other words, the Nationalists had to take into
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account a possible political link between "business circles" 
and the Taiwanese Independence Movement in formulating their 
policies towards Japan.
There were almost 50,000 Chinese residents in Japan, mostly 
Taiwanese, and they had friends and relatives in Taiwan.
They could be roughly divided into three groups: the pro-ROC 
(whether pro-Nationalist or pro-Taiwan), the pro-PRC, and 
the indifferent. Prior to 1972, the Nationalists knew that 
they could not prevent trade and other forms of unofficial 
relations between Japan and the Chinese mainland, but 
whenever the Japanese government seemed about to confer a 
more official character on those relations, the ROC would 
act to mobilize the influence of the pro-Nationalist 
politicians and businessmen in Japan to discourage the 
government. Indeed, certain businessmen from Taiwan who 
were both close to the government and well-connected in 
Japan were indispensable as intermediaries for handling 
delicate political matters. Nevertheless, there existed a 
fundamental difference between the so-called pro-Nationalist 
group and the pro-Taiwan group. The latter was (and still 
is) associated with the Taiwanese Independence Movement.
The Movement had headquarters in Tokyo. Thus the mainlander- 
dominated government in Taiwan feared that too intimate a 
relationship between Japan and Taiwan might be dangerous 
either in encouraging support in Taiwan for the Independence 
Movement or serving as a conduit for pro-Communist ideas. 
Consequently, the ROC acted very cautiously in pursuing its 
relations with Japan. And this may explain partially why 
the ROC, despite all the advantages, did not cultivate the 
"Japan option" to the maximum.

The ROC's "Japan option" assumed the possibility of a 
security alliance between Taiwan and Japan. In the wake of 
the Nixon Doctrine and the U.S. loss in Indochina, the ROC 
became increasingly concerned with its military strength at 
home and arms supplies from abroad. Obviously when the 
U.S. finalized its decision to withdraw all U.S. military 
personnel from Taiwan, the ROC's fears about security and 
national defense increased. The ROC recognized that Japan 
assumed no obligation for Taiwan's security and that, for 
decades, the Japanese government, while acknowledging that 
security in the Taiwan area was essential to the security 
of Japan, and hence East Asia, had relied almost entirely 
on the U.S. to ensure it.1 The point was that the U.S. 
regarded Japan as the cornerstone of its Asian defence 
policy and so would continue to defend Japanese interests 
even after the Nixon Doctrine. And so presumably, an 
alliance between Japan and the ROC would indirectly continue 
the U.S. commitment to Taiwan. Furthermore, the U.S.-Japanese 
defence treaty, signed in 1951, contains provision for 1
2cooperation in the event of overt hostile acts against Taiwan. 12
1. In November 1969, Eisaku Sato signed a joint communiqué with 
President Nixon declaring that security in Korea and the 
Taiwan area was vital to Japan's security. The message im­
plied that Japan assumed some sort of security responsibi­
lity toward this area. For the text of the communiqué see 
NYT, 22nd November 1969, p. 14.
2. The Treaty in fact does not include Taiwan explicitly as an 
area of security cooperation between Japan and the U.S. 
Nevertheless, article 1 of the Treaty says: "Japan grants, 
and the U.S. of America accepts, the right...to dispose 
United States land, air and sea forces in and about Japan. 
Such forces may be utilized to contribute to the maintenance 
of international peace and security in the Far East and to 
the security of Japan against armed attack...caused through 
instigation or intervention by an outside power or powers." 
Thus, implicitly, it includes protection and maintenance of 
peace and security in and around the Taiwan area. See 
American Foreign Policy 1950-1955; Basic Documents, Vol. 1, 
pp. 885-886.
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Consequently, the ROC did not object, and actually was 
rather approving, when Japanese Prime Minister Eisaku Sato 
declared that Taiwan was "within Japan's defence zone"*—  
even though this might have been construed as a violation 
of sovereignty. After that, it appeared that the ROC was 
working to encourage the continuation of this "contingency 
thinking". It was said that the Nationalist officials from 
Taiwan held frequent meetings with officials from Japan's
ruling party, the LDP, particularly those with ties to the
. . 2 Japanese military, to discuss the future of East Asia.
Or through some private but politically orientated organiza­
tions in both countries, such as the Committee on Japan-China 
Cooperation on the Japan side, or the World Anti-Communist 
League on the Taiwan side, the ROC would transmit to the
Japanese government messages for promoting mutual collabor-
. . . 3ation and advancing pan-Asian sentiment. Nationalist
officials used these talks to point out the problems Japan
would probably experience if Taiwan were to be incorporated
into mainland China, such as the vulnerability of Japan's
oil life-line, disturbances to trade, and reduction in its
, 4influence in South and Southeast Asia. 1234
1. See footnote no. 1, p. 370.
2. John F. Copper, op.cit., p. 269.
3. For more information on the functions and activities of 
these organizations see R.N. Clough, op.cit., p. 183.
4. John F. Copper, op.cit. p. 269. Similar argument had been 
given by John Kefner, in "The Future of Taiwan" in America 
(Jesuits of the U.S. and Canada), CXXXVIII, 8 (4th March 
1978), p. 163. In Kefner's opinion, the importance of 
Taiwan to Japan is not simply as an "unsinkable aircraft 
carrier", but indirectly, it facilitates Japan’s ocean 
commerce.
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Despite all these efforts the ROC's "Japan option" was not 
effective. Japan remained consistently calm and cautious 
in conducting its China policy, making itself busy in 
improving relations with both parts of China, either 
politically or economically, officially or unofficially, 
and leaving Taiwan with no choice but merely to follow 
Japan's policies.
2. The Soviet option
During the 1970s, the theme of ROC's the "Soviet option" 
was given increased attention. As John F. Copper observed:
"Taipei wants the Soviet Union as a friend and ally 
in reserve, and it seeks to convey the message to 
Peking that if the United States evacuates its 
forces, Taipei has alternatives. Although switching 
defense ties from Washington to Moscow would be 
problematical for Taipei, and would involve political 
and economic bonds that would doubtless be less 
advantageous, its 'Russian connection' serves as a 
big bargaining card vis-a-vis Peking. Some even 
suggest that Taipei's return to the mainland policy 
is maintained partly at the Krelmin's request and 
that, as a quid pro quo, Moscow will initiate 
hostilities on the Sino-Soviet border should Peking 
prepare to launch an'invasion against Taiwan. On the 
other hand, it is possible that Taipei hopes to 
achieve an agreement with Peking that there will be 
no Soviet bases on Taiwan in return for no Chinese 
military build-up in Fukien Province across the 
Taiwan Strait." *
Similarly, a newspaper editorial commented:
"The issue for Taiwan..is survival. It is true that 
Taiwan is utterly dependent economically on its 
trade with the West, particularly with the U.S.
But there would be no chance for Taiwan’s economic 
survival if it were to be overrun militarily by 
force from the mainland. So neither Washington nor 
Peking should be greatly surprised if, in the not 
too distant future, a task force of the Soviet Navy 
should make a courtesy call at the island. Or if 1
1. John F. Copper, ibid.
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Taiwan should begin buying MiGs. For the Soviets, 
the possibility of using Taiwan with its huge 
shipbuilding and industrial capacity, its airports 
and manpower, as an impregnable fortress 100 miles 
from the mainland— a permanent aircraft carrier 
anchore d in the South China Sea—  must be an enticing 
thought indeed..." 1
If the above policy calculations were correct, then the 
creation of a Taipei-Moscow rapprochment seemed to offer 
benefits to both parties. Nevertheless, as they did 
previously, the Nationalist officials flatly denied this 
"rumour". For instance, then Premier Chiang Ching-kuo 
outlines specifically four "unchangeable foreign policy 
principles" in his administration report to the Legislative 
Yuan in September 1972 with the intention of ending this 
speculation. One of these principles was said to be the
unequivocally "anti-Communist principle" that his government
2"would never cooperate with the Soviet Union". And this 
position has been repeated since then in many of his official 
speeches.
In reality, however, the ROC rather welcomed the circulation 
of this rumour. There were occasional shreds of information 
released either officially or in private indicating the 
possible application of the option. For instance, immediately 
after its withdrawal from the U.N., ROC Foreign Minister Chou 
Shu-kai announced that since the ROC had withdrawn from the 
U.N., it would develop relations both governmental and non­
governmental whenever possible and have trade dealings with 12
1. Editorial, "Another option for Taiwan", Kunq-shanq Monthly 
(The Journal of Commerce) (Taipei), 19th December 1978.
2. Two of the four principles clearly implied that the ROC 
would not become the Republic of Taiwan, and it would not 
cooperate with the Soviet Union. Chiang's speech was 
reprinted in the China Yearbook, 1972-1973, p. 9.
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nations regardless of diplomatic relations. "There would
be no political ties to our trading", Chou remarked "and
we are prepared to trade with Communist countries, aside
from the Communists in China, if we feel it is to our
advantage."1 In a similar vein, Chou said, in March 1972,
that Taiwan was willing to develop economic and other
realtions with Communist countries providing they were not 
, , ?"puppets of Communist China". Also, later in February
1973, a report said that Taiwan would lease a naval base in
the Pescadores to the Soviet Union if the U.S. recognized 
3Communist China. In May, a squadron of Soviet warships
passed through the Taiwan Straits for the first time since 
41949. There were also rumours regarding additional trips
made by Victor Louis, occasional contacts between Soviet and
Nationalist diplomats, and occasional references to Taiwan
5m  the Soviet press.
More explicit messages of a possible Soviet connection 
appeared in several Chinese newspapers in Taiwan. On 18th 
July 1978, for example, the China Times carried an article 
entitled "Exceptional Charges and Exceptional Diplomacy", 
which argued that the U.S.-Mainland relation was so 
important that it necessarily had an effect on all other 
secondary relations in the international system. No one 
really knew what the U.S. and the Chinese Communists were 12345
1. NYT, 21st November 1971, p. 1.
2. "Taiwan Seeking Communist Ties", NYT, 8th March 1972, p.6.
3. South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), 17th February 1973.
4. Washington Post, 14th Kay 1973.
5. "Intelligences Comradeship in Taiwan", FEER, LXXXVIII, 26 
(27th June 1975), p. 5; see also Chapter Four, the
Sovi et opti on .
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talking about, the article went on, but regarding Taiwan 
the central problem was clearly its security from armed 
attack by the Chinese Communists. Since World War II, it 
continued, the Soviet Union had been the major opponent of 
the U.S. and now the U.S. wanted to unite with the Chinese 
Communists to oppose the Soviet Union. The conclusion of 
the article was that such an unholy alliance would never 
come about for a number of reasons. Were it to come about, 
however, the arguments and logic advanced could easily 
lead to the conclusion that Taiwan would have to look to 
the Soviet Union in order to deal with its central problem- 
Chinese Communist pressure. Later, on 22nd December 1978, 
a very subtle message was carried in the same newspaper:
'...the U.S.-Chinese Communist deal will open the 
way for the Kremlin to try to fish in the troubled 
waters of the Taiwan Straits...This country will 
never negotiate or deal with Moscow. We want none 
of Communism in any disguise. The U.S. seems to 
have dismissed Taiwan's strategic importance. 
Russian strategists know better. They are aware 
that this island can outflank the Chinese mainland 
and that it could make Okinawa untenable.
The ROC will never play such games. If the Russians 
do so, we cannot stop them. At least the Polar 
Bear's efforts might serve the purpose of awakening 
the U.S. to the fact that as an Asian power, it is 
going to be much weaker with the military departure 
from this island bastion." 1
In this respect, it is evident that there was a connection 
between the ROC's Soviet card and its intention to delay 
U.S. plans for military withdrawal from Asia.
Meanwhile, the Nationalist officials could have calculated 
that, although an open dialogue with the Soviet Union would 1
1. Editorial, the China Times, 22nd December 1978.
provide the island with substantial benefits, certain 
negative costs might be involved. This was why Nationalist 
officials were very hesitant about playing this Soviet card 
and downplayed its attractiveness at times. In a way, the 
ROC had hoped to use this option to enhance its bargaining 
position vis-a-vis the U.S.-PRC normalization. Prior to 
President Carter's decision to abandon Taiwan, the 
Nationalists' intention in using this card was to delay or 
deter, if at all possible, the U.S. from extending full 
recognition to the PRC, or at least to ensure that normali­
zation should be carried out on terms acceptable for Taipei. 
The first newspaper article cited above clearly illustrated 
this point. Equally, Taipei may have felt that concern in 
Peking over its Soviet option might make Peking more willing 
to compromise with the U.S. over the Chinese unification 
problem. Or, if that failed, it might make Peking more 
hesitant in applying military pressure against Taiwan for 
fear of forcing Taiwan into Soviet arms. In this regard, 
the Nationalists could also have hoped (in conjunction with 
its Japan option) to cause Japan to use its considerable 
influence with the U.S. to prevent conditions which might 
lead to a Soviet presence on Taiwan.
After 1979 the objectives of ROC's Soviet option shifted to 
ensuring the ROC's continued military supply from the U.S. 
and modernization of the old weapons whilst continuing to 
try to undermine Peking's intention to take Taiwan by force. 
Ultimately, however, the most significant gain for the ROC 
if this option materialized would be legitimization and 
survival. Were the ROC to develop close ties with the Soviet
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Union and its allies, while also maintaining such ties with 
the U.S. and Japan, the ROC could create a situation of 
de facto recognition of its special status by three of the 
Pacific powers. Were this the case, it might work to 
create a sort of Superpower consensus on the maintenance of 
ROC's status quo, hence securing its national survival and 
legitimacy.
Whether or not these speculations were correct, and whether 
or not this did represent a promising bargaining strategy 
vis-a-vis the U.S. and Peking, -the Soviet option might involve 
great costs in several respects. Firstly, it might endanger 
U.S.-ROC relations, or the ROC's relations with the whole 
western world. The ROC always placed great emphasis on the 
role of popular opinion in the U.S. in preventing the American 
government from "abandoning" Taiwan. As noted in Chapter 
Three, the ROC was rather skillful in the manipulation of 
people-to-people diplomacy (or diplomacy through state 
visits) to maintain its good standing with the Americans.
In this endeavour, the ROC considered that it held two high 
cards: the ROC was (and still is) an old friend and faithful 
ally of the U.S., and it is firmly anti-Communist. Talk of 
a rapprochement between the Soviet Union and the ROC would 
undermine both of these principles— it would probably under­
mine sympathy and support for Taiwan among the American people 
and in Congress. Furthermore, developing a relationship with 
the Sovi et Union ran counter to the ROC's traditional policy 
laid down by Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-shek of maintaining 
the closest possible relations with the U.S. as well as with
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, 2 Japan, and meanwhile keeping away from the Russians.
Secondly, Nationalist leaders were suspicious of the Soviet
government. There is no doubt that after an unpleasant
experience with the Russian Communistsduring the early 1920s
as well as the post-War experience of total dependence on
the U.S., the ROC did not wish to become dependent on the
Soviet Union (or on any other country again) for it
suspected that Moscow would dump it ungraciously if it
ever served Moscow's purposes or, coming to our third point,
that the ROC would one day be "sold out" by the Soviet
government. A more important point was that, the Soviet
Union itself had so far shown no concrete evidence that it
would like to develop a significant and lasting friendship
with the Nationalists. In fact, on several occasions, the
Soviet Union was found to have worked towards a possible
reconciliation with Peking. If this should happen, the
ROC’s situation could only become more critical and
complicated.
Consequently, with the above considerations in mind, the ROC 
acted with extreme caution and at times ambiguity. It had 
to deny time and again any interest in a rapprochement with 
the Soviet Union, but it also had to keep this Soviet theme 
going. In January 1978, for example, Chiang Ching-kuo, in 
repeating his Government's foreign policy principles set 
forth in 1972, said that the ROC would not establish ties
with any Communist countries whether near or far, big or
2small. Later, in February, he was quoted as saying in a 12
1. See Chapter Two, pp. 111-112.
2. Lien-ho-pao (United Daily News, UDN) (Taipei), 10th 
January 1978, p. 1.
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U.S. T.V. interview that the national policy of his 
Government was anti-Communism, implying that the ROC 
would never follow the U.S. example of uniting with the 
Chinese Communists by collaborating with the Soviet Union.1 
Regardless of all these official pronouncements, however, 
the ROC did not stop the continued speculation.
3. The nuclear option
There was speculation that the ROC was seeking to develop
its own sources of arms and a weapons industry which could
not only enable the country to stand on its own feet but
improve its status and bargaining position. The most
important item in this industry was of course nuclear 
2weapons. Thomas N. Thompson made a remark on this: 
"Taiwan's nuclear option reflects a general attraction 
among small powers for developing nuclear weapons in the 
hope of deterring certain actions on the part of greater
» 3powers."
1. UDN, 6th February 1978, p. 1.
2. For a discussion of Taiwan's nuclear potential, see e.g. 
George Quester, "Taiwan and Nuclear Proliferation",
Orbis . XVIII, ] (Spring 1974), pp 140-150; Edward 
Schumacher, "Taiwan Team at MIT Learns Missle-Related 
Technology", IHT, 17th June 1976; "A Nuclear Taiwan?"
IHT, 1st September 1976; "Taiwan", in Willian H. Overholt, 
ed. Asia's Nuclear Future (Boulder, Colorado: Westview 
Press Inc., 1977), pp. 139-144. Melinda Liu, "Taiwan: 
Accounting for the N-factor", FEER, XCIV, 51 (17th December 
1976), pp. 32-33; a correspondent, "Taiwan: Lessons of 
the Nuclear Age", FEER, XCIII, 28 (9th July 1976), p. 23; 
Bruce J. Esposito, et. al. "The Military Viability of 
Taiwan", in Jack F. Williams, ed. op.cit., pp. 55-58;
and S. L. Chu, "Taipower's Nuclear Power Program 1969- 
1985", Industry of Free China, No. 43 (Taipei), March 
1975, pp. 2-9.
Thomas N. Thompson, "Taiwan's Ambiguous Destiny", Asian 
Survey, XVI, 7 (July 1976), p. 617.
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It might be thought that the fact that the ROC signed 
the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty would be an 
obstacle to its developing nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, 
there might be a possible way out. Since the PRC is not a 
signatory of the Treaty, if it is accepted that "Taiwan is 
a part of China (i.e. the PRC)", then Taiwan's relations 
with the Treaty need to be reassessed. In other words, as 
George Quester pointed out: "the legal gymnastics that have 
burdened the China-recognition problem may now complicate 
any effort to keep nuclear weapons from coming into the 
hands of the Taiwan regime— and the Kuomintang may now have 
reasons to seek such weapons".^
Taiwan's technical capability to build neclear weapons and 
delivery system is impressive. According to several reports 
Taiwan possesses an extremely sophisticated scientific 
establishment, including theoretical and practical expertise 
in advanced electronics, heavy industry, nuclear physics and 
nuclear power, and key military technologies. It also 
possesses an advanced air force,is coproducing F-5E aircraft 
with Northrop, and has become a major shipbuilder. Further­
more, Taiwan operates a Canadian research reactor, of the 
type India used for its nuclear explosion, and expects a 
total of 8 power reactors to be in operation by 1986. The 
Chung Shan Research Institute, a key to any future Taiwan 
nuclear ambitions, is having 15 missile guidance specialists 
trained at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
(MIT).1 2
1. George Quester, op.cit., p. 140.
2. See footnote no. 2, p. 379.
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No doubt Taiwan has begun to develop its own nuclear 
programme, and it has the technology and capability to 
go ahead with nuclear weapons production, if needed, as 
declared by Chiang Ching-kuo officially on several occasions. 
Nevertheless, in considering Taiwan's current political and 
economic circumstances, and in view of the fact that the PRC 
is a nuclear power, this go-nuclear option did not seem to 
be a practical alternative. That is, although the fact 
that the PRC is a nuclear power automatically creates an 
incentive for Taiwan to acquire nuclear weapons, there is 
reason to believe that the PRC would not employ nuclear 
weapons directly against Taiwan. The PRC has enunciated a 
non-first-use policy, and has repeated that policy on 
numerous occasions.^ There is every reason to believe that 
this policy is based on careful consideration of the long-run 
costs and benefits to the PRC of such a policy in dealing 
with other nuclear powers, and also that such firm policy
2statements provide a good guide to actual Chinese behaviour. 
Legally, such a statement would not necessarily apply to a 
territory which the PRC regards as part of itself rather 
than as a foreign nation. But as a practical matter the 
policy would have stronger force for Taiwan than for any 12
1. Announced by Chiao Kuan-hua, the leader of the PRC's 
delegation to the U.N., in the U.N. General Assembly in 
1971. See Richard H. Ullman, "No First Use of Nuclear 
Weapons", Foreign Affairs, L, 4 (July 1972), p. 669, and 
Ted Greenwood, Harold A. Feiveson and Theodore B. Taylor 
eds. Nuclear Proliferation! Motivations, Capabilities, 
and Strategies for Control (New York: McGraw-Hill Book 
Company, 1977), p. 68.
2. For a survey of the Chinese behaviour in honouring commit­
ments and of the implications for Taiwan's future, see 
e.g. William H. Overhold, "Would Chiang Find Mao an 
Excessively Strange Bedfellow?" Asian Survey, XIII, 7 
(July 1973), pp. 679-699.
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other state. The international repercussions of using 
nuclear weapons against Taiwan would be at least as great 
as for use against any other small state. In addition, the 
identification of Taiwan as a part of China might be 
expected to restrain Chinese leaders from applying nuclear 
weapons against "their own" population, and the moral 
repercussions within China of using nuclear weapons in what 
is perceived as an essentially domestic conflict would be 
incalculable. Moreover, as will be noted later in this 
Chapter, the PRC will be reluctant to destroy Taiwan's 
established economic system and its social stability. Thus, 
the normally implicit belief that nuclear weapons enhance 
developing nations' security is not always correct. Non­
nuclear powers usually are not nuclear targets, but nuclear 
powers always are. For instance, a conventionally-armed 
India will possibly dominate South Asia, but a nuclear India 
will possibly face a nuclear Pakistan and will therefore 
have to fear Pakistan. Also a nuclear India will--at best—  
not have improved its power vis-a-vis the PRC. Consequently, 
a nuclear Taiwan would not necessarily deter a nuclear 
attack by the PRC, not only for the reasons suggested above, 
but also because a nuclear Taiwan might arouse international 
hostility, particularly antagonism from the U.S. That is, 
although it is of course true that "a policy of calculated 
ambiguity toward nuclear weapons may have the merit of 
placing potential conflicts on a 'threshold', beyond which 
no protagonist would wish to move for fear of lessened 
ambiguity",*—  as weaker states develop deterrents which they 1
1. Thomas N. Thompson, op.cit., p. 617.
assume enhance their independence— alliance commitments 
may also be diluted, and even disavowed. Indeed, what 
would be most important for Taiwan in the production of 
nuclear weapons would be not so much its deterrent capability 
but its success in creating "prestige", in the sense of 
international recognition of its viability, independence, 
and power, and in cementing continued U.S. support, both 
diplomatic and material. A nuclear explosion by Taiwan in 
response to nuclear threats or demonstration explosions 
would undoubtedly heighten domestic morale and encourage 
international sympathy. Nevertheless, dropping a nuclear 
bomb in the absence of direct nuclear provocation could make 
Taiwan an even worse international diplomatic pariah than 
at present, despite the fact, that, if properly handled.it 
could conceivably restore Taiwan instantly to the world 
diplomatic map. Consequently, after careful assessment, the 
Nationalist government concluded: "We seek to continue 
developing energy for peaceful uses (such as power generation) 
so as to improve the livelihood of our people."1
24. The independence option
Could the ROC declare independence? Would this make it 
easier to survive and prosper as a political entity in the 12
1. "Developing Nuclear Weapons" in Views in a Nutshell, 
(Taipei: Government Information Office), February 1979, 
reference no. 137-Mol6. See also S.L. Chu, op.cit.,p.2.
2. It is necessary to point out that this Independence option 
is different from the generally so-called "Taiwanese 
Independence Movement", although the two are closely 
related. The former suggests an independent island 
nation freed from mainland or any outside dominance, but 
administered by "the people on the island", either the 
mainland émigrés or the native Taiwanese. The latter, 
however, implies the principle of "self-determination", 
most likely a Taiwan run by the native Taiwanese only.
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international community? Support for this alternative 
seemed to be very popular at times as the influence of 
local Taiwanese in the central government in Taiwan has 
increased steadily during recent years.
Indeed Taiwan could make a good claim for it. Taiwan has 
been de facto a separate country for three decades. As 
noted in Chapter One, it has ties with the mainland for 
only 4 years (1915-1949) in this century, More remote 
historical connections were likewise weak. Taiwan could be 
regarded as a viable nation, since its size, population and 
economy were all larger than at least one-third of the 
member states in the U.N. Nevertheless, under current 
circumstances, this option could provide the ROC with 
nothing but disadvantages.
It can be argued that the 1972 Shanghai Communiqué— which 
reaffirmed that both Taiwan and the mainland agreed that 
"Taiwan is a part of China"— had already undermined the 
cause of Taiwanese independence; because of this agreement, 
Taiwanese and mainlanders (both those on Taiwan island or 
currently on the mainland alike) were now in the same 
predicament regarding the threat of incorporation. It is 
true that the local Taiwanese majority still considers the 
minority Chinese mainlanders on Taiwan as "outsiders", but 
because of international isolation, they have learned to live 
together and to accommodate to each other, for fear of a 
Communist take-over. As Chiang Ching-kuo once asserted; 
"Nobody in Taiwan wants a Communist take-over."1 And it
1. Douglas H. Mendel, "Taiwan’s Foreign Policy; Adjusting to 
Isolation and Hostility", China Report (March-April 1976), 
p. 14.
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should always be borne in mind that the two parts of China 
have already developed into two completely different 
systems. Any attempt to integrate them into a single 
entity by either side would be not only extremely difficult 
but practically unworkable.
Nevertheless, there are disadvantages facing a "Republic 
of Taiwan" and they can be briefly summarized as follows: 
first, as far as the ROC is concerned, an independent 
Taiwan would mean the end of Nationalist rule. According 
to the principle of "self-determinatioi", Taiwan should 
then be governed by the majority native Taiwanese community. 
This action might also provoke Peking as it would openly 
disavow the principle underlying the Shanghai Communiqué, 
thereby increasing the danger that the PRC would attempt to 
use military force to gain possession of Taiwan.
Second, since the reason for declaring Taiwan's independence 
would be to increase the chance of national survival and 
international recognition, could this new Republic there­
fore acquire sufficient international support for its new 
status? The chances would hardly seem promising. Neither 
the U.S. nor Japan would be likely to recognize this new 
state formally because of the damage it would do to their 
relations with the PRC. The PRC would regard U.S. recog­
nition of the new Republic as a proof of violation the 
spirit if not the letter of the Shanghai Communiqué. The 
crux of this option is this: if the U.S. and Japan declined 
to recognize the new state of Taiwan— which would very likely 
be the case, then few countries would be likely to do so.
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Consequently, by declaring independence, the ROC would hurt 
rather than improve its international position. Even worse, 
by its own action it would have terminated the existing 
treaties and agreements with other countries who might 
not choose to renegotiate those arrangements with the 
new government. Indeed, givern the situation facing the 
ROC today, some countries might even use this opportunity 
to terminate all remaining ties.
Third, a "Republic of Taiwan" would openly disavow the 
sacred historical principle of the ROC which was laid down 
by the founding father and his successors. Nationalist 
officials put forward their position regarding the 
independence issue as this:
"The ROC has always been an independent sovereign 
state. Nothing regarding its diplomatic life 
would change this reality. Since the Chinese 
Communist set up their regime through armed 
rebellion, and they controlled the mainland with 
tyrannical measures (i.e. Communist rule), the 
regime has never gained the support of the Chinese 
people. By contrast, the democratic way of life in 
the ROC continued to be the common aspiration of the 
Chinese people. Thus, the ROC affords hope for all 
the Chinese people. A declaration of independence 
by the ROC on Taiwan cannot solve the 'China Problem'. 
On the contrary, it would dash the hopes of the 
800 million Chinese on the mainland for freedom, 
democracy and a better life." 1
Accordingly, the Independence option was not at all attractive 
unless there were drastic changes in U.S. China policy 
again; or in U.S.-Peking relations; or in the whole 
political landscape in Asia. Frankly speaking, for the 
ROC, the best solution for the time being regarding its 
present survival, physical security and the future of a 1
1. "Independence of the Republic of China". Views in a 
Nutshell (February 1979), reference no. 135-CR007.
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non-Communist Taiwan was to perpetuate the island’s 
present ambiguous status for the near future, and meanwhile 
to develop Taiwan peacefully into an independent economic 
force of a unique kind. Consequently, some day Taiwan 
would become simply another representative of the Chinese 
people, perhaps something like Singapore. Obviously, as 
noted earlier, this is the policy of maintaining the 
status quo: to defend and to preserve the current state 
of affairs rather than to change it (through force). In 
other words, this is a moderate strategy of national defence 
different from the previous offensive practice of destroying 
the existing reality. This leads us to examine the ROC's 
other foreign policy option— the economic strategy, which, 
due to its significance in the formulation of ROC's current 
foreign policy and external relations, will be considered 
exclusively in the remaining part of this Chapter.
III. The economic strategy; the strategy of economics- 
and trade-first diplomacy
In a conventional sense, the term "diplomacy " usually 
refers to either "the process by which governments (or 
states), acting through official agents, communicate with 
one another", or "the modes or techniques of foreign policy 
affecting the international system".1 By implication, 
therefore, diplomacy can be regarded as "the art of state- 
to-state (or government-to-government) interaction". It 
is not only reserved for the official level but meant 1
1. Harold Nicolson, Diplomacy (London: Thornton Butterworth 
Ltd., 1963), pp. 13-14.
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almost exclusively political interactions between or among 
states (governments). Nevertheless, in the contemporary 
world, these characteristics have gradually been attenuated 
by the emergence of growing international (economic) 
interdependence and the increasing volume of transnational 
activities. Consequently, the term diplomacy has been 
greatly stretched, becoming more and more ambiguous to the 
extent that almost all actions or interactions between 
states, whether high- or low-level, political or non­
political, formal or informal, or actions and interactions 
between or among different entities (not necessary political 
bodies, i.e. state or government), have been included. Thus, 
international trade and investment, economic contacts, 
social or cultural exchanges, even transport and communi­
cation facilities between different units can all be 
regarded as aspects of diplomacy.
In a similar vein, during the 1970s, the ROC adopted a 
rather unorthodox approach in conducting diplomacy. As 
Tsai Wei-ping, the ROC's former Vice-Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, once maintained: "In my thirty years of diplomatic 
service, diplomacy has seemed mostly for trade, exchanges, 
and similar business, so even though we can not prevent the 
continued erosion of official relations we can replace them 
with substantive unofficial relations”.1 This conviction 
of Tsai was shared by many economic technocrats in the 
ROC's official hierarchy. Consequently, the ROC's inter­
national trade and economic exchanges became the essential
1. Douglas H. Mendel, op.cit., p. 11. Tsai was the ROC's 
Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs between 1968 and 1975.
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features of its external relations, replacing, to a very 
substantial degree, the traditional form of diplomacy.
1. The economic strategy as RPC's foreign policy instrument
The ROC's economic strategy was not a new device after its 
UN debacle. On the contrary, it can be traced back to the 
1960s when Taiwan, with its increased economic capability, 
began to launch its "Overseas Development Assistance" 
programme directed at the less-developed world. This was 
discussed in the previous Chapter. The economic strategy 
of the 1970's, however, envisaged exchanges, not only with 
the less-developed countries but also with the developed 
ones, with the clear purpose of achieving a dynamic flow of 
trade interdependence. The section following will first of 
all outline the motivations and objectives of the strategy, 
then define the principles and measures involved.
(1) Motivations
The motivations behind the economic strategy can be 
discovered in some of the ROC's official pronouncements. 
Through these pronouncements, we can also discern the 
extent of flexibility involved in the formulation of ROC's 
current foreign policy in terms of ideological modification.
Along with the aforementioned Tsai Wei-ping's unconven­
tional viewpoint on diplomacy, Han Lih-wu, a delegate of 
ROC's National Assembly, once pointed outs
"We admit that diplomatic relations are important.
However, the severance of diplomatic ties (of the 
ROC) with other nations does not necessarily mean the exclusion of all other avenues of international 
intercourse. Indeed, the maintenance of diplomatic
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relations alone is not sufficient to strengthen 
the bond of friendship subsisting between different 
nations. Thus, by trade, cultural exchanges, 
technical cooperation, participation in inter­
national organizations and promotion of tourism... 
we (the ROC) would cultivate our non-diplomatic 
and substantial relations with nations and areas 
where full diplomatic relations are void." 1
Also, in the words of Sun Yun-suan, ROC’s Economic Affairs 
Minister, "Our international and diplomatic position in the
past relied on military strength. This is gradually being
, ? replaced by economic power, trade and technology." A
more radical view was given by Sun I-shuan in 1973. Sun,
who was a close associate of Chiang Ching-kuo and later
President of the government-owned Central Trust of China,
was quoted as saying :
"All the important people in the government think 
we cannot carry on anything political or economic 
with a rigid attitude. We have to be more 
flexible and realistic. Why shouldn’t we trade 
with countries like Bulgaria and Hungary? Trade 
will be our weapon to make friends." 3
Even Chiang Ching-kuo admitted frankly in his 1974 Adminis­
tration Report (at that time he was the Premier)i
"...we are doing our best to maintain relations with 
friendly countries and to expand in various ways our 
substantial relationships in the international 
community...Our strategy is to forge the political, 
economic, spiritual and other forces of our country 
into a strong combat entity." 4 1234
1. Han Lih-wu, Taiwan Today (Taipei: Cheng Chung Book 
Company, 1980), pp. 51-65. Han was the ROC's Ambassador 
to Thailand, 1956-1964, concurrently to Laos in 1962; 
Ambassador to the Philippines, 1964-1968, and Ambassador 
to Greece 1968-1972.
2. Louis Kraar, "Taiwan's Strategy for Survival", Fortune 
(November 1971), p. 129.
3. Ibid., p. 193.
4. The China Yearbook. 1975, p. 712.
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The above statements support our claim that the ROC was 
flexible in operating an "economics first" foreign policy 
strategy with the prime motivation of maximizing Taiwan’s 
external contacts and of furthering the survival of a non- 
Communi st Taiwan.
However, underlying this flexibility, we see the continued 
unremitting ideological opposition to (Chinese) Communism. 
That is, if trade with some of the Communist countries were 
possible, could Taiwan then trade with the mainland? There 
were rumours that the two parts of China— via Hong Kong 
trading firms— had trade relations: Taiwan imported small 
amounts of Chinese herbs and medical ingredients known to 
be of mainland origin, whereas the mainland imported 
Taiwan's electronic products such as televisions, watches 
etc.1 Nevertheless, with regard to this matter, the ROC’s 
position was clearly pointed out by Melinda Liu:
"Many Taiwanese theoretically see no harm in trading 
with the mainland, the majority of them vehemently 
reject the possibility of ideolbqical accord. One 
Taiwanese put it this way: 'Importing mainland pears 
and Shanghai seafood--why not? Mao jackets and 
little red books— no way." 2
Here, it is necessary to make a few comments regarding the 
PRC's intention to "liberate" Taiwan, i.e. incorporate it, 
into its political system.
For decades since 1949, the PRC has employed various 
strategies, with or without force, to attain the objective 
of national unification. Since the Shanghai Communique, the
1. Melinda Liu, "Invisible Trade with the Mainland", FEER, 
XCVII, 28 (15th July 1977), p. 41. 2
2. Ibid.
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PRC’s strategy toward Taiwan has been steadily geared to
a step-by-step peaceful absorption, meaning the isolation
of the island through efforts to have it debarred from
official bilateral ties with other countries and membership
of international organizations, while repeatedly offering
it an "intra-China postal service, telecommunication,
transportation (i.e. air links) and commercial relations".1
Since Taiwan was now theoretically a part of China, military
actions against the island thus were by implication improper
means for resolving this "domestic issue" because, as
pointed out earlier in the ROC's nuclear option, it could
either provoke public resentment or damage economic strength
on both sides. Gradually, the emphasis of the "two Chinas"
confrontation seemed to have shifted from a strictly
ideological, political and legitimacy dispute to a lower
level of economic competition. That is, in order to resist
from a Communist takeover, and to consolidate the Nationalists
legitimacy, in addition to an internal programme of political
2reform and cabinet change, the ROC tried to demonstrate to 
the world its vitality through its economic performance both 
at home and abroad, and it launched a vigorous campaign to 
compete with the mainland in international markets.
Nationalist leaders were clearly aware that, economically 
speaking, Taiwan was (and still is) much better off than the 
mainland despite the latter's economic potential and, because 12
1. Tillman Durdin, "Asian Impasse", IHT (23rd October 1980),
p. 10.
2. The programme of political reform was to increase the 
level of political participation by the local Taiwanese 
in the political system. The Cabinet changes were 
intended to absorb intelligent, well-educated and 
relatively young experts into top Party and governmental 
position, which used to be dominated by older KMT members. 
See J.B. Jacobs, op.cit.
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of this fact, that the Communist government would reconsider 
any damaging actions which were likely to upset Taiwan's 
established economy since the mainland might one day need 
to use Taiwan's economic strength to build up its own 
economy.
Moreover, Nationalist leaders believed that a totally 
different economic system guided by Sun Yat-sen's principle 
of a planned free economy with emphasis on advanced 
technology and sophisticated industry would make their 
Communist rivals’ plan to integrate Taiwan more difficult.
The idea was to widen the economic gap between the two 
entities so that incorporation would be less beneficial 
for PekingiPeking would have to maintain Taiwan's ties 
with the world economy--meaning the acceptance of capitalism—  
or engineer the destruction of Taiwan’s economic progress 
and relocate a sizeable portion of the population.
Related to this point, another reason for the adoption of 
the economic strategy, was that, according to the Nationalists, 
economic relations would be more difficult for the PRC to 
interfere with. As noted earlier, economic relations are 
not necessarily always directly operated by governments.
Being private in orientation, it would be less vulnerable 
to official Communist Chinese intervention.
(2) Objectives
The political objectives of the economic strategy were 
therefore:
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(i) to safeguard the survival of the ROC as well as of 
the mainland emigrants on Taiwan:
(ii) to safeguard the physical existence of Taiwan island 
as an independent entity free from outside (especially 
Communist Chinese) influence;
(iii) to preserve the traditional Chinese way of life, namely, 
the continuation of Chinese culture and history, and the 
standard of living that had been built up in Taiwan; and,
(iv) to promote the possiblity of any future political 
contacts (i.e. official ties) between Taiwan and its trading 
partners, through the existing (unofficial) trade relations.
Closely intertwined with the aforementioned, the economic 
objectives of the strategy were;
(i) to promote Taiwan’s economic strength, stability and 
growth, also to upgrade its industrial structure, and to 
reach economic self-sufficiency, by attracting foreign 
investment and technology in more sophisticated industries; 
in other words, internally, it was to build Taiwan up as a 
model province of China based on Sun Yat-sen's economic 
theories, and externally, to reach the status of a 
developed country;
(ii) to search for more foreign markets for Taiwan's goods 
and technology and to strengthen Taiwan's international 
trade contacts (i.e. diversification >of Taiwan's foreign 
markets) and
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(iii)to realize fully Sun Yat-sen's economic objectives of 
economic justice and prosperity for all.1
(3) Tactics
In dealing with this issue, it will be beneficial to review 
the background regarding the structural change in Taiwan's 
post-War economy.
(A ) The background of Taiwan's post-War economic development
Taiwan was originally an agrarian society with limited 
natural resources. Prior to the termination of Japanese 
colonial administration, Taiwan’s foreign trade was 
negligible with only two markets available: the Chinese 
mainland and Japan, and by 1949 both of these markets were 
cut off. Japan's policy in Taiwan was geared to building 
it up as an agricultural colony, developed primarily to 
supply additional foodstuffs for the growing population of 
rapidly industrializing Japan. An Anthony Y.C. Koo observed:
"The strategy of development when Taiwan was under the 
control of Japan (1895-1945) was to emphasize 
agriculture, especially in the production of rice 
and sugar cane. These were then in great demand in 
Japan. With an assured export market, enough 
foreign exchange was generated so that the develop- _ 
ment was financed with little or no foreign capital."
Japan created the basic mechanism which the Nationalist 
government was able to take over to manage quite effectively 12
1. Editorial, UDN, 12th November 1971; and editorial, Chinq- 
chi jih-pao (Economic Daily News) (Taipei), 30th November 
1971.
2. Anthony Y.C. Koo, "Economic Development of Taiwan", in 
Paul K.T.Shih, op.cit., p. 398.
The Nationalistthe agricultural development of Taiwan.1 
government took over the existing rural infrastructure but 
later introduced changes and refinements to make the 
system respond to Taiwan's own needs more than, of course, 
Japan's. A key instrument in effecting change was the 
Sino-American Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction 
(JCRR), which was originally established during the final 
days of the Nationalist government on the mainland and
after 1949 relocated in Taiwan, hence becoming the sinew
2of the U.S. aid mission there. Here a few comments must 
be made regarding the role and functions of the JCRR in 
terms of its contribution to ROC’s economic development 
programme.
The JCRR originally had two American commissioners and
three Chinese commissioners, and it served both as the
de facto ministry of agriculture of the ROC and as the
agricultural section of the U.S. aid mission. This unique
organization existing outside the regular bureaucracy of
both governments, was able to recruit a well-paid, highly
skilled staff. With sizable amounts of U.S. aid funds to
disburse, it played an important role in introducing
innovations in agriculture, expanding agricultural produc-
3tion, and improving the quality of rural life. 123
1. R.N. Clough, op■cit., p. 73.
2. For more information on the JCRR, see T.H. Shen, The Sino 
American Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction! Twenty 
Years of Cooperation for Agricultural Development 
(Ithaca and London: 1970)
3. Neil H. Jacoby, op.cit., pp. 62-63.
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Between 1951 and 1965, U.S. aid flooded into Taiwan
averaging £100 million a year— in 15 years the U.S.
altogether injected £1.5 billion into Taiwan's economy.
Protected by the stableinflow of this aid, as well as
benefitting from the advantages of a hardworking labour
force and sufficient foodstuffs, and many other factors,1
the ROC was able to introduce a series of economic planning
policies, including, e.g. the land reform programme
(originally proposed by Sun Yat-sen in the Principle of
People’s Livelihood and carried out in Taiwan between 1949
and 1957) and several Four-Year Economic Development Plans
(e.g. 1953-56, 1957-60, 1961-64, 1965-68, 1969-72, and
2afterwards a Six-Year Plan for Economic Development).
The fundamental aim of these actions, in combination, was to 
transform Taiwan's economy .gradually from a purely rural one 
into an advanced industrial one, from an underdeveloped 
society into a developing one and, finally, into a developed 
unit. In doing this, the Nationalist government was very 
careful to avoid over-emphasis on either rural development 
or rapid industrialization by paying equal attention to, and 
looking for a balance between, the two. Ralph N. Clough 
commented! 12
1. For a brief account of the factors for the success of 
U.S. economic aid to Taiwan, see Neil H. Jacoby, op.cit., 
pp. 243-245.
2. Other important measures, for instance, included currency 
reform and credit policies which were mainly to tackle 
Taiwan's highly accelerated inflation and to regulate 
the economy on the island. For the promotion of foreign trade, from 1956 to 1961, there were policies of foreign 
exchange reform, liberalized imports, and programmes for 
the encouragement of foreign investment.
"The ROC did not make the early mistake common to 
many developing countries of devoting all its 
attention to industrializing, while neglecting 
rural development. The efforts devoted to 
improving agriculture paid off richly in the 
contribution that agriculture was then able to 
make to the overall economic development." 1
As a consequence of this careful balancing of the needs of
rural economy and industrialization, Taiwan's agricultural
sector was able to contribute immensely to its subsequent
industrialization. In this respect, the rural economy
provided the island with not only sufficient foodstuffs
and gradually a surplus to export in the first place, but
also, later on, a substantial share of the resources needed
to finance industrialization; both were necessary for a
rapid industrial take-off. The transfer of resources was
accomoplished in several ways: by government taxation, by
payment to landlords and money-lenders, through farmers'
savings deposited voluntarily in financial institutions and
then invested in the non-agricultural sector, and by the
terms of trade between farm and factory products, which
were unfavourable to the farmer throughout the period 1950-
1969. Thus in Taiwan's case, not only did agriculture play
a vital role in providing capital for industry, but also
exports of agricultural products financed at least one-half
of total imports during the early period of industrialization,
1953-1962, when the effective constraint on Taiwan's develop-
2ment was a shortage of foreign exchange. 12
1. R.N. Clough, op.cit. , p 75.
2. Liang Kuo-shu and Lee Teng-hui, "Taiwan", in Shinichi 
Ichimura, ed. The Economic Development of East and 
Southeast Asia (Honolulu: University of Hawaii, 1975), 
pp. 304-308, 322.
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The ROC's policy of a limited squeeze on agriculture 
caused substantially more resources to flow out of that 
sector than to flow in. Yet agricultural production 
continued to increase at a satisfactory rate, and the 
farmers' per capita income, although still lower than that 
of the non-agricultural population, increased fairly 
steadily at a rate commensurate with that of the non- 
agricultural population until the mid-1960s. With this 
additional income, the rural population, constituting 
around half of the total population from 1952-1962, made 
another important contribution to industrialization by 
providing an expanding market for industrial products.
From another angle, however, the process of Taiwan's economic 
structural change can be outlined in conjunction with the 
different stages of its Economic Development Plans. The 
Plans began in 1953 when Taiwan's post-War economy had been 
restored to a level where further development was possible 
and desirable. Prior to 1960, the major emphasis of the 
Plans was basically internally orientated, that is, to 
reorganize and restore internal economic order of the 
island and to maintain at least a minimum level of economic 
growth and stability. At this stage, two events were most 
necessary to pave the way for Taiwan's consequent economic 
performance: the land reform programme and, as mentioned 
earlier, the influence of the U.S. aid mission (the JCRR 
programme) which had created a favourable climate for private
investment by liberalizing economic controls and reducing 
bureaucracy.* 1
1. F .A . Lumley, op.cit., p. 89.
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By 1960, a foundation had been laid for both agriculture 
and light industries. Overseas investment and industrial 
expansion were encouraged, and monetary stability had been 
achieved. In 1964, a year before the termination of U.S. 
aid, Taiwan's economy was beginning to take off. It was 
at this time that the Nationalist government began to place 
strong emphasis on export expansion. In 1965, a tax and 
duty free industrial processing zone— a Free Port— was 
established at Kaohsiung.^  The creation of this processing 
zone indicated the moment of transition of Taiwan's economic 
structure from an inward-looking rural economy to an 
increasingly modern outward-looking industrial unit based 
on a high level of import-export transactions. The develop­
ment of Taiwan's economic structure was also demonstrated 
by the fact that the U.S., in view of Taiwan's promising
economic prospects, decided to terminate its aid to Taiwan
2and to replace it with the policy of "Trade— not aid” .
Since the Fifth Four-Year Economic Plan, 1969-1972, Taiwan's 
economic planning has been geared to aspects of rapid 
industrialization, to the adoption of sophisticated 
technologies and a further encouragement of foreign invest­
ment and international trade. In other words, this Plan, 
and subsequent ones, urged the expansion and modernization 
of existing industries as well as the establishment and 
promotion of basic and sophisticated industries and technology- 12
1. In these zones, manufacturers could import their basic 
materials process them, and export the finished products 
free of duty. The establishment of these export proces­
sing zones were a solid part of the Nationalist govern­
ment's export encouragement programme, which had quite 
impressive results.
2. Neil H. Jacobs, op.cit., p. 237.
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intensive export industries. The stage was set for rapid 
industrialization. The progression from labour-intensive 
industry to heavy industries which are capital-intensive 
and based on advanced technology and a high level of manu­
facturing sophistication was becoming more and more apparent. 
Meanwhile, local manufacturers were invited to co-operate 
with well established foreign factories "for the purpose 
of acquiring the know-how needed in developing heavy and 
precision industries".1 All these are orientated towards 
creating some sort of trade interdependence, making Taiwan
an economically self-sufficient unit and advancing its 
. . 2international trade. In this connection, it needs to be 
mentioned very briefly that during this period, Taiwan's 
major foreign investors were American, Japanese, and overseas 
Chinese, and its major trading partners continued to be the 
U.S. and Japan. Exports to the Netherlands, Italy,
Australia and Malaysia were promoted, but still at a rather 
low level, whereas imports, in addition to those from the 
U.S. and Japan, came mainly from South Korea, the Netherlands, 
Indonesia and West Germany.
The results of this long-term economic planning have been 
shown by the fact that Taiwan, towards the end of 1979, was 
recognized as being among the top 20 trading "nations" in 
the world, the 8th among all U.S. trading partners. This 
made Taiwan a recent example of the "economic miracle"— with 12
1. F. A. Lumley, op.cit., p. 107.
2. For a detailed information on Taiwan's economic structural 
changes, see Walter Galenson, ed. Economic Growth and 
Structural Change in Taiwan; The Postwar Experience of the 
Republic of China (Ithacas Cornell University Press, 1979) 
The material relating to the above matter in this part of 
the Chapter is based upon F. A. Lumley, op.cit., Chapters 
VII-XI, pp. 84-130. 401
a gross domestic product ranging from an annual average 
increase of 7.2 percent for the first 7 years after 1953 
to a high of 11.5 percent in 1972; and a per capita income 
which grew from £103 U.S. dollars to £372 over the same 
period. Income distribution among the people also improved: 
the comparison of the top 20 percent to the bottom 20 percent 
wage earnings showed a 20 to 1 ratio in 1953 vs. a 4 to 1 
ratio in 1972.''' F.A. Lumley commented:
"In thirty years a new generation has grown up 
and a second generation comes forward. Already 
the mainland Chinese who arrived in the late 
forties are now completely integrated with the 
local Taiwanese (themselves of Chinese origin). 
During these years Taiwan has emerged from the 
status of a poor ex-colonial dependency with its 
industry and infrastructure destroyed by the war, 
and an economy based on agriculture, to that of 
an industrial nation, a blue print to serve as 
examples for any underdeveloped country." 2
Indeed, despite the effect of large amount of U.S. aid in 
contributing to the Taiwan's economic development, Taiwan's 
post-War economic performance was impressive. Evidently, 
this was because the Nationalist government had utilized 
its internal economic strength and stability plus its 
external aid from the U.S. as the foundation for development 
and then as the springboard for its foreign trade expansion. 
The outcome was that Taiwan's exports of goods and services 
in the 1970'S amounted to 33% of the GNP, and its trading 
partners had increased from 2 (the U.S. and Japan) in 1949 
to over 140 today. As Taiwan's foreign trade increased, its 
composition changed as well. In 1952, agricultural products 1
1. Smith Hempstone, "The Song is Ended, but the Melody Lingers 
on", St. Louis Globe Democrat, 26th December 1979, 
reprinted in Views in a Nutshell, March 1980, reference 
no. 430-SAR202.
F.A. Lumley, op.cit., p. 14.
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2.
constituted 22% of total exports, processed agricultural 
products (mostly sugar) 70%, and industrial products only 
8%. By 1974, 84% of Taiwan’s exports were industrial 
products and 16% agricultural or processed agricultural 
products. Moreover, not only the quantity but also the 
variety of Taiwan’s exports expanded. For example, both 
the export of canned foods, which in 1952 amounted to only 
3% of the value of sugar exports, and fisheries products, 
which were not exported at all at that time, by 1973 
surpassed sugar exports, which themselves had more than 
trebled in value.^
The composition of Taiwan's imports likewise changed over
this period. In 1952, consumer goods constituted 20% of
imports, agricultural and industrial raw materials 67%, and
capital goods 13%. By 1975, consumer goods had dropped to
7% of total imports, agricultural and industrial raw
materials amounted to 61%, and capital goods had increased
to 32%. By becoming more self-sufficient in consumer goods,
Taiwan was then able to divert large amounts of foreign
exchange to the purchase of the capital equipment needed
2for the continued expansion of the industrial plant.
(B) The structure and operation of the economic strategy 
With the above information in mind, we can now proceed to
1. Taiwan Statistical Data Book 1976 (Taipei: Council for 
International Economic Cooperation and Development 
Executive Yuan, 1976), pp. 182, 197, hereafter referred 
to as TSDB. In 1974, Taiwan's sugar exports had more 
than trebled again because of a temporary world sugar 
shortage and a sharp rise in sugar prices.
2. Ibid., p . 183 .
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look at the structure and operation of the ROC's economic 
strategy and its relevance to its current foreign policy 
strategy of survival. ROC's policy was to place Taiwan 
deliberately at the centre of trade relations between the 
developed and the less-developed world. And the reason for 
this was to try to establish Taiwan's indispensability to 
many nations and economies and thus create an economic basis 
for continued political independence.
Taiwan's international trade has been conducted with both 
developed and less-developed countries. The strategy for 
promoting its external trade is, in conformity with the 
process of its internal economic development, to regard 
itself as a "trade intermediary", interacting with the two 
different types of economic unit. For analytical clarity, 
we will outline a model which shows the pattern of Taiwan's 
international trade (Figure No. 2). The model involves a 
continuous flow of economic interactions among three types of 
economic actors: the "developed" (DV), the "intermediate"
(ID) and the "less-developed" (LDV). This categorization 
is only relative.
According to the model, Taiwan, in terms of technology 
development, falls into the ID category. This is because of 
its capacity to coduct and cope with a skillful two-way 
trading traffic with both the DV and the LDV. Trade with 
DV countries suggests the import of technology, either in 
the form of products and processes, as well as the export 
of labour-intensive products. Trade with LDV countries 
involves less sophisticated, more practical and suitable
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technology, plus various capital-intensive goods exports 
countries. Limited raw materials are imported from LDV to 
ID countries as well.
In most cases ID countries and LDV countries have an 
advantage in that they can benefit by copying the more 
advanced (or higher level) technology of the DV countries, 
save research costs, and hopefully develop more rapidly.
This is because they adapt advanced technology to less 
developed countries' needs. The advanced industrial 
countries' (i.e. the DV) technology employed in their 
manufacturing of machinery and equipment is in some ways 
inappropriate for immediate utilization by the LDV countries 
because the former’s technology is normally geared to less 
labour-intensive goals where the labour aspect is not a 
critical factor; rather it is a plus, in LDV countries.
Thus what the LDV really need are machines and equipment 
that are inexpensive, easily operable and efficient. In 
other words, they need a work-horse instead of a thoroughbred. 
As E.F. Schumacher commented!
"It is surely an astonishing error to assume that 
the technology developed in the West is necessarily 
appropriate to the developing countries. Granted 
that their technological backwardness is an impor­
tant reason for their poverty; granted, too, that 
their traditional methods of production, in their 
present condition of decay, lack essential viability: 
it by no means follows that the technology of the 
richest countries is necessarily suitable for the 
advancement of the poor. It must never be forgotten 
that modern technology is the product of the countries 
which are 'long' in capital and 'short' in labour, 
and that its main purpose, abundantly demonstrated 
by the trend towards automation, is to substitute
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machines for men. How could this technology fit 
the conditions of countries which suffer from a 
surplus of labour and a shortage of machines?"1
Meanwhile, there is a world-wide demand for a highly 
sophisticated and expensive machinery whereas the need for 
the work-horse type machinery is still limited. Taiwan, 
therefore, takes advantage of being the "mediator" between 
the two.
For instance, Taiwan used to depend heavily upon Japan and 
the U.S., for its staples, raw materials and a variety of 
labour-intensive products, such as clothing, plywood, plastic 
articles, and transistor radios. Its capital-intensive goods 
like ungraded petroleum products, chemicals, pulps and paper, 
rubber goods, and certain machines and electrical supplies 
are exported mainly to the LDV countries.
The growth of exports to the less-developed countries 
would have been slower and less impressive had it not been 
for the escalation of the Vietnam War and the concomitant 
increased demand of the countries in the area because of 
reconstruction efforts and the operation of the "Overseas 
Development Assistance" programme. Being such an inter­
mediary in trade (i.e. technology transfer) and producing 
for two different types of markets, Taiwan's economic growth 
and foreign trade began to expand intensively.
As mentioned earlier, it can be argued that the "Overseas 
Development Assistance" programme commenced in 1960 marked 1
1. E .E .Schumacher, "Industrialization through 'Intermediate 
Technology'", in E.T. Stokes, ed. Developing the Third 
World! The Experience of the Nineteen-Sixties (London: 
Cambridge University Press, 1971,), pp. 88-89.
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the transition of the Taiwanese economy from being a mere
"aid recipient" to, especially after 1965, an "aid
donor", transmitting its technology and know-how to the
LDV countries. In other words, through aid-giving, Taiwan
departed from the LDV and moved up into the ID category.
And since the mid-1970s Taiwan's economic planning gradually
has arrived at developing DV-type industries and infr ^ struc- 
1ture.
In short, Taiwan's economic strategy can be understood in
the words of Ramon H. Myers: "import raw materials, create
additional selling value by processing, and export finished 
2products". Indeed, Taiwan produces and exports commodities 
that use relatively less capital per unit and imports items 
requiring more capital. According to Ramon H. Myers again, 
this framework of intermediate industries based upon import- 
export interactions could achieve cost reduction through 
economies of scale and new technology. And the industries 12
1. Since 1972, the ROC has launched the Ten Major Construc­
tion Projects. Among the 10 projects, 6 were related to 
transportation, 3 projects were devoted to the develop­
ment of heavy and chemical industries, and one project, 
the construction of nuclear power plants, involved energy 
supply. Following the completion of these projects 
toward the end of 1970s, the ROC has started to carry out 
12 new projects aimed at further building up the infra­
structure for industrial development by opening up the 
less-developed eastern part of Taiwan, and accelerating 
rural reconstruction to ease the labour shortage and
slow down the migration of population toward urban centres. 
Thus, unlike the 10 major construction projects which 
placed emphasis on industrial development, the ultimate 
aim of the 12 new projects is to elevate Taiwan's economy 
status to the developed level. See China Yearbook, 1980, 
pp. 12-15.
2. Ramon H. Myers, "The Economic Development of Taiwan", in 
Hungdah Chiu, ed. China and the Question of Taiwan,
pp. 52-53.
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dependent upon exports therefore benefit by (or take 
advantage of) learning from more advanced competitors and 
borrowing technology across the board.1
It is through this strategy that the ROC is slowly setting 
up its own pattern of trade interdependence, linking itself 
and its future with the world economy, while at the same 
time, searching for a national self-sufficiency and an 
independent identity. In this regard, the Nationalist 
officials hoped the absence of ROC’s diplomatic life could 
do less harm to Taiwan's national economy and its aim for 
survival as these could be complemented by the island's 
intensive "unofficial" contacts overseas.
(4) The implementation of the economic strategy
To facilitate the implementation of this strategy, in July 
1970, the ROC established the China External Trade Develop­
ment Council (CETDC), and later in 1971, a supplementary 
institution, the Far East Trade Service, Inc. (FETS). 
Nominally, the CETDC is said to be a non-profit-making 
private organization, with the purpose of promoting sales
of commodities made in Taiwan and of developing the two-way
2 . . . .trade of the ROC. Its major activities are to survey 
overseas markets; to collect, compile and disseminate trade 
information; to explore trade opportunities and introduce 
trade partners; to receive visiting traders and assist them 
in establishing relations with local businessmen; to 
organize trade missions and participate in international 12
1. Ibid.
2. The China Yearbook, 1980, p. 332.
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trade fairs; to sponsor shows of Taiwan products in Taipei 
and in major cities overseas; and to provide assistance in 
procuring raw materials and capital goods from abroad.1 In 
addition, however, also in the light of the nature of the 
activities mentioned above, the CETDC is to take the place 
of commercial attaches in diplomatic missions or official
. 2trade missions. It operates with the full support of both 
the business community and the Government, and it is
supported by compulsory donations from exporters of 0.06
3percent of their earnings. The CETDC had 33 overseas
offices by the end of 1979. These offices go by a variety 
of names, such as the Officina Commercial de Taiwan in 
Buenos Aires, the CETDC Correspondent in Melbourne, the 
Far East Trading Co. Ltd. in Montreal, the CETDC Representa­
tive's Office in Jakarta, and the CETDC Branch Office in
4New York. In countries where the use of the word "China" 
might cause problems, the name FETS will be substituted.
For instance, there are the FETS Honorary Representative
in Kuwait, the FETS Representative Office in Zurich,
5Switzerland, and the Tokyo Office of the FETS.
Similarly, in order to promote Taiwan's substantive trade 
relations with European countries, another non-profit-making 
private organization, the Euro-Asia Trade Organization (EATO), 
was set up in November 1975. Its purpose is to provide a 
wide range of free services for the development of Taiwan's 12345
1. Ibid.
2. R.N.Clough, op.cit., p. 162.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid., pp. 162-163.
5. Ibid. See also China News, ed. 1976 Directory of Taiwan 
(Taipeii China News, 1976), pp. 113-117.
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trade with Europe.1 The primary functions of the EATO 
consist of the followings (1) initiating contacts and 
establishing working relationship with trade promotion 
organizations, chambers of commerce, federations of 
industries and other relevant agencies in European 
countries; (2) assisting European manufacturers or 
exporters and importers in finding sales outlets and 
suppliers on Taiwan; (3) assisting local manufacturers or 
exporters and importers in developing business contacts in 
European countries; (4) arranging or sponsoring visits to 
Taiwan for business leaders, journalists, and trade or 
industrial missions of European countries; (5) collecting 
and disseminating trade information on European countries; 
and (6) disseminating information on the economic progress 
and trade potential of the ROC.^
As a consequence of EATO's efforts, several European trade 
offices have been set up in Taiwan despite the absence of 
diplomatic ties. There are, for example, the Belgian Trade 
Association, Taipei, established in August 1979; the France 
Asia Trade Promotion Association, established in September 
1978; the Hellenic Organization for the Promotion of 
Exporters, established in January 1979; the Spanish 
Cervantes Center, established in May 1974 and the Anglo- 
Taiwan Trade Committee, established in February 1976.3 
There are also two cultural representatives, the Centre
1 .
2 .
3.
Euro-Asia Trade Organization, ed. Euro-Asia Trade Organi­
zation 1981 (Taipei: Euro-Asia Trade Organization, 1981),
p. 2.
Ibid.
Council for Trade Promotion,bpth established in January 1981, and the German Trade Office, established in May the
same year
Culturel et Scientifique Français and the German Cultural 
Center.1 More important than these developments has been
the plan of opening of offices by several European banks
. . . 2 in Taiwan to facilitate financial transactions. Equally,
Taiwan has set up several commercial banking facilities in
, 3Europe: 3 in P a n s  and 1 in London.
The items of Taiwan’s two-way trade relations with the 
European countries were many-faceted. West Germany has been 
Taiwan's largest trading partner in Europe. Next have been 
the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, France, Italy, and 
Belgium. Taiwan’s major export items to this region are 
textiles products (to West Germany and the U.K.) eletrical 
machinery and apparatus (to West Germany), and canned goods
(to West Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium and the U.K.),
4 . . . . .etc. On the other hand, principal import items include
machinery and tools, and chemical and pharmaceuticals (mainly
from West Germany), transportation equipment (from West
Germany, the U.K. and France), electrical machinery and
equipment (from West Germany, the Netherlands, the U.K. and 1234
1. Ibid.. p. 36.
2. This plan became a reality with the opening of the Banque 
de Paris et des Pay-Bas, and the Societe Generale (of 
France, both offices were established in August 1980)j 
the East Asian Bank (of West Germany, established in July 
1980); the Amsterdam-Rotterdam Bank N.V.; and the Hollän­
dische Bank Unie N.V. (of the Netherlands, the former 
established in May 1981, the latter established in August 
1980); and Grindlays Bank Limited, and Lloyds Bank Inter­
national Limited (of the United Kingdom, the former 
established in June and the latter in March 1981). Ibid.
3. The name of the bank is the First Commercial Bank.
4. TSDB 1980, p p . 205-221; and Board of Foreign Trade, Ministry 
of Economic Affairs, Taipei, ed. Foreign Trade Development 
of the Republic of China, 1979, (hereafter FTDROC). (Taipei: 
(Dah Shin Printing & Stationery Co. Ltd.,) 1979), p. 10.
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Switzerland).* None of these trading partners have 
official ties with Taiwan.
With regard to the African continent, Taiwan's economic and
technical assistance programme continued during the 1970s,
but it was limited to only 4 African countries: Malawi,
Ivory Coast, Lesotho and Swaziland. All of them were less-
developed and have diplomatic relations with Taipei. Except
for Malawi, which exports tobacco leaves to Taiwan, the
others have no significant two-way trade ties with Taiwan,
despite the latter's efforts to expand trade with them.
Nevertheless, they all have very close cultural and social
exchanges programmes with Taiwan, and Taiwan’s assistance
missions there extended to many fields, as noted in Chapter
Five, mainly agriculture, handicrafts and medical services.
Moreover, in recent years, there has been substantial demand
for Taiwanese consumer goods and light industrial machinery
2in the African market. Finally, it is necessary to mention
Taiwan's trade relations with South Africa. Since the two
countries exchanged diplomats in 1976, bilateral trade
between them has increased. In 1979, for instance, it
3amounted to U.S. £200 million. The principal import item 
from South Africa to Taiwan was maize (corn), whereas the 
latter exported agricultural development know-how to the 
former. Recently there has been speculation that the two 
have developed a joint programme for scientific and industrial 
research into nuclear energy. 123
1. Board of Foreign Trade, TSDB, 1980, pp. 214-249, and 
Board of Foreign Trade, FTDROC, p. 10.
2. FTDROC, p. 13.
3. The China Yearbook. 1980, p. 342.
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The ROC’s overseas assistance programme has also extended 
to Central and South America and the Caribbean. Ever since 
the first agricultural mission was sent to the Dominican 
Republic in 1963, the ROC's assistance programme in these 
areas has grown. It is true that during the 1960s, the 
ROC's foreign aid priority was the African continent. 
Nevertheless, during the 1970s, as a result of the new 
state of affairs in the UN, the emphasis of the ROC's 
foreign aid programme has shifted to the Latin American 
countries. In 1979, 15 technical missions, composed of 
141 Chinese specialists were assigned to work under govern- 
ment-to-government arrangements in 12 countries in the 
region.^ 12 of them were agricultural technical missions
stationed in Bolivia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El 
Salvador, Ecuador, Guantemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, 
Panama, Paraguay, and Uruguay; 2 of them were fishery 
technical missions stationed in Honduras and Panama; and 1
other was an electrical technical mission assigned to 
2Honduras. Except for Ecuador, all other 11 countries have 
diplomatic ties with the ROC. Through these missions, the 
ROC was to transfer its experience in land reform, etc. to 
this region. Meanwhile, the ROC has become a good market 
for agricultural products and raw materials from Latin 
American countries, even with those countries that had no 
official relations with it, e.g. Chile, Columbia, Peru,
3and Venezuela. Apart from trade relations, the ROC has 
maintained close cultural and athletic ties with the Latin 
American countries.
1. The China Yearbook, 1980, p 350-352.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., pp. 353-354; and 357-358.
Despite the absence of diplomatic ties, the ROC has also 
put intense effort into developing substantive relations with 
all its neighbours. In Southeast Asia, for instance,
Taiwan's machinery products and equipment are rather 
popular. On the other hand, Taiwan has relied on this 
region for the supply of crude oil (from Indonesia), lumber 
(Malaysia), maize (Thailand), rubber, and mineral products, 
etc. Particularly worth mentioning here is Hong Kong, 
which has become Taiwan's third largest export market 
(bananas, textile products, plywood, metal manufactures, 
plastic articles, iron and steel, etc.) in recent years.
In return, Taiwan also bought machinery and tools from Hong 
Kong, As emphasized in Chapter Four, the importance of
this region to the ROC lies in the fact that it has a large 
population and a heavy concentration of overseas Chinese.
The latter serve not only to promote foreign investment in 
Taiwan, but are also a target of political propaganda vis- 
a-vis the mainland.
In recent years, Australia has become one of Taiwan's 
principal trade partners. Taiwan's major export items to 
it have been textile products, plastic products and electrical 
apparatus. Conversely, Taiwan imported farm produce, animal 
and dairy products, iron ore, and coal from Australia.
The ROK, the only country still recognizing Taiwan in 
Asia, also has bilateral trade relations with Taiwan. 
Nevertheless, since both countries export similar items, 
e.g. textile products and electronic goods, their relations 
often suffered from the problem of competition for foreign
markets.
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Needless to say, in Taiwan's trading with its neighbouring 
countries, Japan played a dominant role. As mentioned 
earlier, Japan has been one of the 2 leading trading 
partners of Taiwan. Despite the absence of official ties 
since 1972, bilateral trade has continued to grow. Similar 
to their previous trading patterns, Taiwan's export trade 
to Japan consisted mainly of low-cost agricultural products 
and light industrial goods. What Taiwan imported from Japan 
were high-cost raw materials and machinery and equipment 
which were essential for the promotion of Taiwan export 
trade and economic growth. In other words, Taiwan still 
depended on Japan for the supply of raw materials and 
capital equipment. These items would then be reprocessed 
into finished products for either domestic consumption or 
export.
In discussing Taiwan's foreign trade development, one can 
not ignore the growing importance of two Middle Eastern 
countries, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. The former has no 
diplomatic ties with the ROC but, like the latter which does 
have formal relations with the ROC, has been a major supplier 
of crude oil to it. To facilitate the oil business, the 
ROC has set up a branch office of the Chinese Petroleum 
Corporation in Kuwait in 1979.1 Kuwait also imported a 
large quantity of textile products, canned foods and foot-wear 
from Taiwan. In fact, in recent years, in order to cope 
with Taiwan's rising demand for oil and in view of the 
value of the Middle East market, the Nationalist government
1. The China Yearbook 1980, p. 340.
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has set up a "Middle East Trade Promotion Group".1
Particularly after the termination, of U.S.-ROC relations,
Saudi Arabia has become more and more an indispensable ally
as well as a major trading partner of Taiwan. The importance
of Saudi Arabia lies not only in the fact that it still
recognizes the ROC, that it is strongly anti-Communist and
that it has traditionally had a close friendship with the
ROC, but also, that it is a reliable source of oil for
Taiwan. For instance, during the 1973 oil embargo, Saudi
Arabia classified Taiwan as a friendly country and hence 
. . . 2did not intercept its oil supply to Taiwan. In addition 
to oil, Saudi Arabia sold to Taiwan chemical fertilizers, 
hides and skins. The leading export items from Taiwan to 
Saudi Arabia have been textiles, chemical, machinery, canned 
foods, plywood, plastic products, tea and sugar.
Finally, it is necessary to mention the ROC’s economic ties 
with the U.S., its largest trading partner for decades. In 
this connection, it is also necessary to say a few words 
regarding the ROC’s relations with the U.S. since the 1979
Taiwan Relations Act, the foundation of current U.S.-Taiwan
3relations, came into force on 1st January 1979. A relevant 
issue here is that of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan.
1. Board of Foreign Trade, FTDROC., p. 12.
2. Liu Kang-sheng, "King Faisal Meets President Chiang",
Free China Review (June 1971), pp. 13-17.
3. For the text of the Act, see Congressional Quarterly, 
Chinas U.S. Policy since 1945, pp. 343-345; see also 
Euro-Asia Trade Organization, ed. Taiwan Relations Act- 
An American Model (Taipei: Euro-Asia Trade Organization, 
1981); and China Yearbook 1980, pp. 347-350.
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U.S. relations with Taiwan differ from all Taiwan’s other 
external relations in that, as noted in Chapter Three, the 
U.S., after the relocation of the ROC on Taiwan in 1949, has 
not only had political and military commitments to Taiwan 
but also it has had very close economic relations with the 
island. Regardless of its normalization with the mainland 
government during the 1970s,with Sino-Soviet relations 
still in a stage of fluidity, the U.S. has acted carefully 
in developing its China policies. Thus, despite pressure 
from the mainland government, the U.S. has not wanted total 
termination of relations with Taiwan. Instead, the U.S. 
and Taiwan have worked out arrangements for continuing 
commercial, cultural and other relations.
On the U.S. side, the Taiwan Relations Act was adopted with 
the clear purpose of giving general direction and policy 
guidance to U.S. policy-makers in handling continuing 
(unofficial) relations with the Nationalist government on 
Taiwan. Meanwhile, the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), 
the new office of the U.S., was registered and incorporated 
in the District of Columbia on 15th January 1979. The 
Institute then set up an office in Taipei and a branch office 
in Kaohsiung. Its counterpart organization, the Coordination 
Council for North American Affairs (CCNAA) was established 
on the 23rd of the following month, under the order of the 
Executive Yuan of the ROC. The Council later established an 
office in Washington D.C. and branch offices in New York, 
Chicago, Houston, Atlantic, Seattle, San Francisco, Los 
Angeles and Honolulu.*
1. The China Yearbook, 1980, p. 348.
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Offices of the two counterpart organizations have assumed 
most of the functions previously performed by the ambassies 
and consulates. Since the establishment of the offices of 
the counterpart organizations, they and their personnel 
have been accorded proper privileges and immunities by the 
receiving authorities. The two organizations started talks 
on the agreement on privileges, exemptions and immunities in 
June 1979. According to the draft of the agreement, the 
receiving authorities will accord to the offices and 
personnel of the sending counterpart the privileges, 
exemptions and immunities equal to those of international 
organizations and their personnel.1
As a result, cultural relations, exchange visits and 
economic relations have continued to grow steadily between 
the two countries. Nevertheless, the key issue remains U.S. 
military relations with Taiwan. For instance, section 2 
(Findings and Declarations of Policy) of the Taiwan 
Relations Act reads: "it is the policy of the U.S...to 
provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character, and to 
maintain the capacity of the U.S. to resist any resort to 
force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the
security, or the social or economic system, of the people of
2 . . .Taiwan. Accordingly, the U.S. is still in charge of Taiwan's
security, hence it continues to supply defensive weapons to
Taiwan. The issue of whether or not the U.S. should continue
its arms sales has already caused resentment from Peking.
It has also become a domestic issue in the U.S. Even today,
1. Ibid.
2. Articles (5) and (6) of Section 2, see Congressional 
Quarterly, op.cit., p. 343.
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the issue is still unsettled and it continues to strain 
relations between Washington and Peking .
Despite this complication, bilateral trade between Taiwan 
and the U.S. has continued to grow. The U.S. has bought 
canned food, sugar, textile products, plywood, metal 
manufactures, plastic articles, rubber products, toys and 
games, etc. from Taiwan, whereas Taiwan has obtained supplies 
of soybeans, wheat, cotton raw, machinery and tools, chemicals 
and pharmaceuticals, transportation equipment, iron and 
steel, etc. from the U.S. Thus, in spite of the severance 
of official ties, the U.S. and Taiwan have continued to enjoy 
close two-way trade links and, hence, a continuation of 
practical and substantive relations through unofficial 
dealings.
Finally, there are many other similar civic organizations 
playing an important role in promoting Taiwan's contacts 
with the outside world. Just to name a few, there are the 
Chinese and Philippines Cultural and Economic Association, 
the Chinese Public Relations Association, the Federation of 
Taiwan Importers' and Exporters’ Association, the General 
Chamber of Commerce, and the International Trade Association,
2. Findings
The operation of the economic strategy indicates that ROC's 
foreign policy has been transformed under the notion of 
"economics first" . In addition to the practice of " 'One
1. The China Yearbook, 1980, p. 333.
China' in theory and 'Two Chinas' or 'One China, One 
Taiwan' in reality", or "One China but Two economic 
realities", the ROC's foreign policy reflects the 
intention to draw clear distinctions between "official" 
and "unofficial" matters, between "politics" and "economics" 
and between "domestic" and "foreign" affairs.^ It also 
reflects the fact that relations with countries other than 
the U.S. are becoming increasingly important. With the 
exception of the PRC, the Nationalist government would even 
consider a rapprochement with the Communist world, 
especially on economic matters. As the ROC's Foreign 
Minister Chou Shu-kai said in his post-UN speech on his 
Government's future foreign policy:
"(i) The ROC should strengthen its existing official, 
bilateral interactions, that is, stabilize the number 
of countries still recognizing us and make efforts to 
reinforce such existing relations,
(ii) With countries which at present do not have 
formal relations with us, we shall maintain and 
further promote trade and cultural exchanges to 
our mutual benefit, and
(iii) With all other countries, so long as they are 
not hostile to us and so long as they have no hostile 
intentions towards us, we may promote trade, travel or 
such other relations without political implications or 
complications." 2
The above speech clearly implied that no political strings 
should be attached to unofficial interactions. Since the 
latter often referred to matters like economic links, trade, 
social exchanges or other lower-level dealings rather than 12
1. Editorial, China-chi iih-pao, 31st December 1971, p. 1.
2. Chou Shu-kai's administration report to the Legislative 
YOan, 19th February 1982. See also Chinq-chi iih-pao, 
2nd March 1972, p. 1.
political contacts, "economic interests" should be placed 
as the top foreign policy priority. Nevertheless, this 
position should not be construed as contradicting the 
ROC's decades-old political or ideological stances. 
According to Chou Shu-kai again, there was a need to stress 
unofficial dealings because it would enable his Government 
to delineate effectively the boundary between "domestic" 
and "foreign" affairs.1 This distinction was vital because 
during those years the ROC's foreign policy was conducted 
in such an ambiguous manner that it constantly treated its 
"internal dispute" with the PRC as the dominant foreign 
policy issue. As noted in Chapter One, its foreign policy 
position of "anti-Communism" was fundamentally an extension 
of its domestic confrontation with the Chinese Communists. 
It was because of this linkage that the ROC rejected almost 
all potential dialogues with countries which had, or were 
inclined to have, any form of contact with either Peking or 
countries which had relations with Communist ideology— the 
official dictum of the Nationalists' position was that "all 
those who are not my friends are my enemies". In a way, 
this was a self-destructive policy because, with the 
departure of the Cold War bipolarity, it merely led the 
ROC into its current predicament of isolation and hostility. 
It was only after leaving the U.N. and the creation of the
1. Chou Shu-kai's speech to Japan's Foreign Minister Fukutn 
Takeo. Chou said that after leaving the U.N. the 
foreign policy of his country had changed. "Our 
external relations will now emphasize economic contacts 
rather than official political interactions..." Chou's 
speech implied that the Nationalist government would 
not break diplomatic relations lightly (as it had done 
previously) with countries having diplomatic realtions 
with its Communist rival on the mainland. See Japan Times 
29th December 1972, p. 1.
new international power order unfavourable to it that the 
Nationalist government began to realize the importance of 
differentiating between "domestic" and "foreign" affairs. 
Confrontation with the Chinese Communists was, therefore, 
merely an internal matter. Consequently, the Nationalist 
government's position had modified— "all those who are not 
my enemies are my friends"— indicating vividly a new theme 
of the ROC's anti-Communist programme, i.e. the Chinese 
Communists alone were the number one enemy. Clearly, this 
was a positive shift in the ROC's ideological outlook.
Thus, during the 1970s, the ROC foreign policy reflected 
a certain degree of flexibility and adaptability. The 
Nationalist government was prepared to adopt flexible 
responses to new developments both at home and abroad and 
such reactions would be conducted in conformity with the 
trend of international developments even though this required 
certain alterations in its national positions. IV.
IV. Effectiveness of the economic strategy
The effectiveness of the economic strategy cannot, however, 
be accurately measured, because the actual period of time 
involved in its application is not long enough to make a 
definitive judgement. Besides, even if a tentative assess­
ment could be made, no solid prediction of future develop­
ment is possible because the ROC's present situation is 
almost unique in the contemporary world and dependent upon 
too many imponderable factors. We shall therefore deal 
with the issue by reviewing the development of some of the
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ROC’s post-UN external relations with regard to the policy 
objectives (political and economic) outlined previously 
and by presenting some of the problems that confront the 
operation of the strategy today.
When the ROC was ejected from the U.N., the PRC’s 
representatives promptly replaced those from Taiwan in the 
Security Council and other organs of the U.N. The PRC 
demanded that all reference to the ROC or Taiwan be 
excluded from UN publications. Hence, even basic compilations 
of statistics such as the Statistical Yearbook and UN trade 
and demographic reports contain no data on Taiwan from 1972 
on.1 Most of the inter-governmental organizations related
to the U.N., including UNESCO, WHO, the FAO, WMO, IHB, ICAO,
. . 2ITU and IMCO, one by one expelled Taipei and seated Peking.
The ILO and the IAEA also expelled Taipei, but Peking chose 
not to enter.
Needless to say, concomitant with this unfavourable develop­
ment, the ROC’s diplomatic ties became considerably 
circumscribed. The speed with which it lost diplomatic 
recognition developed almost at the same rate as its 
Communist counterpart gained it. And the situation has 
been deteriorating ever since. Thus, towards the end of 
1979, the ROC maintained diplomatic relations with only 21 
countries, most of them small and uninfluential. It 
retained membership in only 4 U.N. Specialized Agencies
1. R.N. Clough, op.cit. p. 156. For information on Taiwan's 
economic development after 1971, see Taiwan Statistical 
Data Book, and Monthly Statistics of Exports & Imports 
(Taipeis Ministry of Finance), etc.
See Appendix No. 5.2.
(IMF, IBRD, International Finance Corporation and Inter­
national Development Association, and although the ROC 
had not yet been expelled from these organizations, Peking 
had already taken measures to attack it); in 9 other inter­
governmental organizations (the International Union for 
Publication of Custom Tariffs, the Permanent Court of 
Arbitration, the International Committee of Military 
Medicines and Pharmacy, the International Office of 
Epizootics, the International Cotton Advisory Committee, 
the Asian Productivity Organization, the Afro-Asian Rural 
Reconstruction Organization, the Asian and Pacific Council, 
and the Asian Development Bank); and in 257 international 
non-governmental organizations.1 The nature of these non­
governmental organizations are: science and technology (31), 
medicine and hygiene (34), communications and travel (16), 
economics and finance (41), politics, administration and 
law (25), journalism (8), culture (10), arts (7), education
(7), sports (44), religion and social welfare (22), and
2women, family, youth, etc. (12). This situation was 
hardly comparable with the early 1970s. In January 1970, 
for instance, the ROC had diplomatic ties with 68 countries, 
while membership of inter-government or international non­
governmental organizations was certainly not a major source
, 3of worry. 123
1. The China Yearbook 1980, pp. 358-360.
2. Ibid.
3. The Republic of China's Relations with the World (Taipei: 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Treaty Department, March 
1979).
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The above shows that by 1979 the ROC was limited to a low- 
profile diplomatic and political life abroad, as seen in 
the fact that most of the inter-government organization or 
international non-governmental organizations to which the 
BOC was still affiliated were either economic, cultural or 
scientific in orientation. In this respect, it can be 
concluded that, under the current economic strategy, the 
ROC had had to put aside political considerations and had 
made substantial progress in promoting its unofficial ties. 
It also reflects the fact that the PRC's goal, as noted 
earlier in Chapter One, was thus not merely to prevent the 
ROC from claiming to represent China in the international 
community but also to eliminate representatives of Taiwan 
from all international organizations, whether such 
representatives used the name "China" or not. From the 
PRC's viewpoint, it was just as necessary to oppose "One 
China, One Taiwan" as it was to oppose "Two Chinas".
Communist influence had at any event been kept away from 
Taiwan island. Meanwhile, on the island, the traditional 
Chinese way of life and culture, and a high living standard 
had been preserved and promoted. Another achievement of 
the conomic strategy was that decision makers in Taiwan 
had managed to diversify Taiwan's overseas markets— which 
used to be concentrated in the U.S. and Japan— and sources 
of supply in the light of the uncertainties and difficulties 
looming ahead. Taiwan's external trade had been expanded
intensively to both the DV and the LDV. Western Europe 
had been given new emphasis because of its importance as a
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potential market, source of technology, supplier of capital 
and even, conceivably, as an important future supplier of
military equipment.^ Increased emphasis had also been
. . 2placed on the Middle East and the African ccntinent.
Although the absence of diplomatic ties had hindered somewhat 
the expansion of trade, the trade figures showed that 
progress was being made. For instance, the severance of 
diplomatic relations in September 1972 had little effect on 
Taiwan’s trade with Japan, for Taiwan's exports to Japan 
which had amounted to $245 million in 1971, increased to 
$694 million in 1975. Imports from Japan increased from
3$827 million in 1971 to $1.8 billion in 1975. Also on the
increase were Japanese visitors to Taiwan - from 278,000
4 . .in 1972 to 419,000 in 1975. Similarly with Europe, although 
by 1976 the ROC's only diplomatic relations there were with 
the Holy See, its European trade had increased from $400 
million in 1971 to $1.6 billion in 1975.^
By the end of 1979, Taiwan's principal markets had expanded 
with the inclusion of Australia (ties with Taiwan ended in 
December 1972), Canada (ties with Taiwan ended in 1971), U.K. 
(ties with Taiwan ended in 1950), Saudi Arabia and Indonesia 
(ties with Taiwan also ended in 1950), and major suppliers, 
Kuwait (ties with Taiwan ended in 1971), Saudi Arabia, West 
Germany (ties with Taiwan ended in 1972), Australia, Indonesia,
1. See Board of Foreiqn Trade, FTDROC 1979
2. TSDB, pp. 684, 189, 191.
3. TSDB, P- 117.
4. TSDB, P- 193.
5. Board of Foreiqn Trade, op.cit., d . 8.
the U.K., and Malaysia.^- Trade with Latin America and
African countries, though still growing slowly, had also
been promoted. For instance, Taiwan used to have little
trade with Latin American countries because of geographical
2distance and different commercial practices. But now the 
Nationalist government has set up 5 trade promotion offices 
to step up trade activities."^ Taiwan has slowly become a
potential market for agricultural products and raw materials
4 . . .from Latin America. As for the African countries, which
Taiwan had very limited commercial relations with during the 
1960s except for the aid programme, the Nationalist govern­
ment also began to pay attention to it during the 1970s as 
it is anticipated that there would be a substantial demand
in the African market for Taiwan's consumer goods and light
. . 5industrial machinery.
So far, this expansion of trade and foreign markets has 
enabled the Nationalist government to continue its 
sovereignty on the island (preserve its internal legitimacy) 
as well as safeguard the physical security of the island. 
Nevertheless, there was no guarantee as yet that the present 
situation based on unofficial contacts could be long-lasting 
and elevated into the political sphere. Nor was there any 
promise that Taiwan, under the Nationalist rule, could be 
converted in the very long run into a sort of autonomous unit, 
remaining self-governing, or that the Nationalist government 1
1. Ibid., p. 13.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
could promote its external legitimacy. This was because 
there was no way the Nationalist government could predict 
totally, or influence, let alone control, the future trend 
of the international environment on one hand or, on the 
other hand, the policy the PRC might launch for Chinese 
re-unification.
Therefore, behind these informal methods of international 
dealings, the Nationalist government remained deeply anxious 
and frustrated: international de-recognition, as discussed 
in Chapter One, though not indispensable to its survival, 
still played a major part in determining the state's 
international relations. Otherwise, the Nationalist govern­
ment would encounter fewer problems in its international 
trade. For instance, despite its desire to promote economic 
relations with the European Economic Community (EEC) 
countries, the ROC, being uncertain in status, faced several 
obstacles. Statistics show that Taiwan's trade with the EEC 
countries has grown steadily since 1971.^ However, business­
men in Taiwan found it extremely difficult and inconvenient 
to obtain visas for these countries. Also, since there were 
no diplomatic ties, Taiwan suffered from import controls,
unfair quota limitations and countervailing duties on its
2export of sensitive items to the EEC. As a consequence, 
there were problems of insufficient representation and
promotion of manufacturers and traders, also insufficient
3after-sale services. As R.N. Clough described the situation 1
1. Euro-Asia Trade Organization, ed. Economic Progress and 
. European Trade of Republic of China (Taipei: Euro-Asia
Trade Organization, source from Department of Statistics, 
Ministry of Finance, 1980).
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid. - 429 -
'...officials cannot negotiate quotas for textile 
exports to the EEC countries, which places the ROC 
at a disadvantage relative to its principal compe­
titor, the Republic of Korea. Quotas on imports 
of textiles from Taiwan are unilaterally imposed 
by the EEC countries...Another problem is the 
refusal of some countries to allow Taiwan the trade 
preferences given other developing countries or to 
permit Taiwan to participate in trade fairs...
The difficulty of negotiating solutions that require 
government action for problems impeding trade is a 
continuing headache for ROC officials. Foreign 
officials may refuse to see ROC officials because 
of their sensitivity to possible PRC reactions or, 
in extreme cases, may even refuse to admit ROC 
officials to the country. ROC officials travel on 
ordinary passports and receive no diplomatic privi­
leges or immunities in countries with which Taiwan 
does not have diplomatic relations. Even when ROC 
officials are able to see the appropriate foreign 
officials, their representations are weakened by 
their lack of official status in the eyes of the 
foreign government. Consequently, ROC officials 
must rely more heavily than the representatives 
of most other countries on personal connections 
and influence to accomplish their purposes." 1
Indeed, trade cannot be promoted effectively unless freedom 
to travel exists, especially for the traders themselves, 
but also for officials who must negotiate solutions to 
problems with which the private businessmen cannot cope.
The inconvenience caused by Taiwan's political circumstances 
does curb Taiwan's foreign economic relations, however 
impressive its internal economic development. Thus, after 
all, a total separation between political and economic 
matters, official and unofficial affairs is theoretically 
possible but practically unfeasible. The likely effective­
ness of the economic strategy is therefore weakened.
Another reason for adopting the economic strategy was to 
discourage Peking's interference. By the end of 1979, Peking 
had not launched any itensive campaign to interfere with 1
1. R.N. Clough, op.cit., pp. 165-166.
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Taiwan's external economic relations (except for U.S. 
arms sales to Taiwan). One way to explain this is that 
the Peking government still wanted to absorb Taiwan into 
its system, hopefully with a high level of economic 
development. Otherwise, if the absorption turned into 
reality only in a political sense, the Peking government 
could still show to the world that there was at least a 
part of China, under its leadership, which was economically 
not backward, however small this part was. Thus, it would 
prefer an economically viable Taiwan. Yet even so, there 
were scattered examples of such interference. The Mexican 
government, for instance, responded to PRC representations 
by closing the ROC's commercial office in that country.^
The Toronto Dominion Bank was struck off the list of banks 
in the U.S. through which trade with the China mainland 
could be conducted, apparently in retaliation for the
bank's having opened a branch office in Taipei in February 
21975. Also the PRC's banks once stopped accepting American
Express travellers' cheques, probably because the company
had joined the USA-ROC Economic Council established in the
. 3U.S. in 1976 to promote trade with Taiwan.
Actually, Peking's attack on the ROC's position in inter­
governmental organizations and in all kinds of international 
non-government organizations was far more severe than its 
interference in Taiwan^ external economic relations. For 
instance, under Peking's pressure the ROC was excluded from 1
1. Ibid., p. 166.
2. "When not to bank on a blind eye", FEER, LXXXIX, 36,
(5th September 1975), p. 10.
3. Washington Post, 21st November, 1976.

most of the important intergovernmental organizations and 
international non-governmental organizations, even from 
some of international sports organizations such as the 
Olympic Games and the International Basketball Federation. 
Pressure was also placed on several other less significant 
international sports federations such as Judo, Equestrian, 
Archery, etc. although towards the end of 1979 the fight 
to retain Taiwan's membership was still continuing.*
In all, the ROC's unorthodox methods of diplomacy have indeed
served to compensate for its international isolation after
the U.N. expulsion, and hence ensured its survival and
economic viability. At least Taiwan remains a non-Communist
area, even though "the new policy of economics first (was)
leading Taiwan to increase trade with nations that
recognize the mainland and to do business, if only indirectly,
2with Eastern Europe." With the expansion of trade, Taiwan's 
living standards were rising at the same rate. All these, 
however, are not sufficient to prove at this stage that 
the strategy of "economics- and trade-first diplomacy" 
could achieve the ROC's political purposes of national 
survival and unification, or the long-term aspiration of a 
San Min Chu I world system. It-could nevertheless at least 
temporarily avoid international isolation caused by the 
absence of diplomatic ties.
1. Private conversation with Mao hing-tsu in London on 5th 
September 1981. Mao is the President of the ROC's 
Judo Association, and Vice-President of the Judo 
Federation of Asia.
2. Louis Kraar, or.cit ., p. 129.
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V. Conclusion
To sum up, as a consequence of changes in the international 
political environments, the ROC's post-UN expulsion foreign 
policy has demonstrated a significant level of flexibility 
and adjustment. Instead of relying on the U.S. totally for 
national security and survival, the ROC developed its own 
foreign policy strategy - the strategy of "economics- and 
trade-first diplomacy". This method placed emphasis on Taiwan's 
international economic, trade and other unofficial contacts 
rather than the traditional diplomacy of political and/or offi­
cial interactions. It was to step up Taiwan's international 
trade network of interdependence (with both the developed and 
less-developed world), linking Taiwan and its future with 
other parts of the world. In this regard, except for the 
Chinese Communists, all countries in the world, Communists 
and non-Communist alike, developed and less-developed, were 
regarded by the ROC as either desirable or potential trade 
partners. Resistance to Soviet Communism was equally reduced 
to the level of ideological and political argument. In 
actuality, it was almost replaced by the new theme of seeking 
accommodation, via some East European countries, between the 
two sides. Other foreign policy options had been also con­
sidered by the Nationalist government as well, but almost 
all of them had a price to pay and thus remained only possi­
bilities. Indeed, in view of ROC's present situation, 
decision-makers recognized that there would be too much to 
lose if they adopted any of the options lightly. Even with 
regard to the current economic strategy, in spite of its 
promising results. no one can be sure what it will achieve 
in the very long run.
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Chapter Seven
Conclusion
Basis of RPC's foreign policy
Since 1949, the survival of the ROC regime on Taiwan has 
been permanently in question. Challenges to its legitimacy 
have come from the world community and from the native 
Taiwanese population, but above all they have come from the 
PRC on the mainland. This struggle for survival and for 
the recovery of the mainland has dominated almost all the 
ROC's external relations and foreign policies.
The basic principle of the ROC regime was and still is an 
ideological one--anti-communism. The main policies adopted 
to consolidate its legitimacy and to ensure national survival 
include the realization of the San Min Chu I ideology (as a 
counter force to Chinese Communism), the implementation of 
the mainland recovery programme and the promotion of close 
relationships with the democratic world, particularly with 
the U.S. Its ultimate foreign policy goal was and still is 
to promote the world of a great commonwealth in which, under 
the San Min Chu I system, China would be treated equally 
among other states.
The bedrock of the ROC's foreign policy strategies has been 
U.S. support which stemmed from the Korean War in 1950 and 
also partly from its global containment policy. This 
relationship turned out to be the ROC's principal and 
crucial lifeline in the face of threats from the PRC and 
of international isolation.
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Yet one of the chief arguments of this thesis has been that 
the ROC's post-1949 foreign policy has not been entirely 
static and rigid. The ROC adopted several foreign policy 
strategies to further the task of national survival, and 
such strategies, while all based upon the unchangeable 
principle of anti-communism, increasingly demonstrated 
significant elements of flexibility and adaptability.
General considerations affecting the formulation of the 
RPC’s foreign policy
As was emphasized in Chapter One, Taiwan is a very small 
island with virtually no natural resources, and as a result 
of these limitations, as well as the ROC's unusual political 
situation after 1949, the ROC’s national capability has been 
severly constrained. That is, as a small country, the ROC 
has been unable to make any impact upon world opinion on 
major issues such as World Communism and the Cold War. It 
was unable to influence changes in opinion in other countries 
and at the U.N. Some examples were given in Chapters Five , 
and Six: the ROC's inability to prevent or delay France and 
some African countries from seeking diplomatic relations with 
the PRC in 1964 and afterwards in spite of strong U.S. support 
and a favourable international climate at that time; and the 
ROC’s diplomatic setback at the U.N. in 1971 and its 
consequent failure to prevent its major ally, the U.S., and 
the world community from recognizing the PRC.
The fact that the ROC was a small country with no international 
influence also made it vulnerable to outside influence. This 
included ROC's dependent relationship with the U.S. Since the
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U.S. was and still is a Superpower and leader of the 
democratic world, its China policy could thus have a 
powerful effect upon general world opinion. Thus the U.S. 
support for the ROC, however vital and advantageous to the 
latter, could have a negative effect because this support 
could be weakened or withdrawn at the will of the United 
States.
The ROC's vulnerability to the U.S. and ultimately to outside 
forces can briefly be explained in this way: if U.S. support 
was positive, i.e. in favour of the ROC, as it was during 
the Cold War period, the ROC's capability to tackle national 
affairs was strengthened, as was its national security, and 
its legitimacy was enhanced. Thus, as seen in Chapters 
Three and Four, from the outbreak of the Korean War until 
the mid-1960s, the ROC was able to pursue its national goals, 
such as, internally, resisting the PRC military challenge to 
take Taiwan by force, consolidating Nationalist rule on 
Taiwan (i.e. internal legitimacy); and, externally, protecting 
the ROC's legal position at the U.N. and securing inter­
national recognition (i.e. external legitimacy), by making 
use of U.S. support as well as of the general mood of anti­
communism in the world. Naturally, in return, the U.S. and 
the democratic world benefited, even if only very marginally, 
from Taiwan's strategic position in the Pacific for containing 
communist influence there. Yet even then, the ROC was not 
granted a free hand to do as it wished by the United States. 
This was chiefly because of the unequal relationship between 
the U.S. and the ROC: while the U.S. was and still is the 
only major friend of the ROC, the latter was merely one
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element in the whole range of U.S. global security calcula­
tions. In other words, as a small country, the ROC's 
political survival as well as the development of its anti­
communist programme have depended almost entirely upon U.S. 
support, whilst the U.S. obviously does not depend on the 
ROC for either its programme of anti-communism or for its 
political existence. Moreover, as a Superpower, the U.S. 
had to cope with other wider issues in international power 
relationships than the ROC's problems. One example given in 
Chapter Three was the U.S. policy of restraining the ROC 
from military attack on the mainland, however promising 
such a strategy may have seemed during the 1950s when 
Communist rule on the mainland was less stable and when 
it still suffered from severe internal problems and external 
isolation, because the major concern of the U.S. at that time 
was to avoid direct military confrontation with the communist 
world for fear of provoking a third world war. Instead, the 
ROC had to play down its theme of military counterattack and 
to concentrate its efforts on improving its democratic image 
in Taiwan and on promoting its economic modernization 
programme.
Later, since the mid-1960s, when the U.S. has become more 
and more concerned with some other issues in East-West 
relations, such as the SALT disarmament talks, the Vietnam 
War, its own political image at home and abroad, and, above 
all, its relations with the PRC, and less and less concerned 
with ROC's domestic problems of anti-(Chinese) communism and 
of mainland recovery, the disparity in the unequal relation­
ship between the U.S. and the ROC made itself increasingly
felt. Thus, as U.S. foreign policy goals altered and the 
ROC came to occupy a decreasingly prominent place in its 
considerations, the ROC's capabilities were seriously under­
mined by U.S. actions. This was especially evident in the 
1970s when the U.S. reversed its pro-ROC China policy and 
steadily moved towards détente with international communism. 
Conseguently, as a result of the new China policy of the U.S., 
the ROC not only lost its international status but also 
became increasingly isolated.
The ROC's predicament could be contrasted with that of 
Israel, which also suffers from the problems of national 
survival and international recognition, and which also has 
a dependent relationship with the U.S., but which is still 
not only recognized but actively supported by its patron.
In comparison, the ROC's bargaining strength vis-a-vis the 
U.S. was relatively weaker and even guite insignificant. 
Although this partly stemmed from the ROC's weaknesses 
mentioned above, it was also partly because of the ROC's 
inability to muster public support in the United States 
which could put pressure on the U.S. government. For example, 
one can draw a comparison between the China Lobby and the 
Jewish Lobby— both lobbies sought to influence U.S. policies 
to their respective advantages. In spite of the fact that 
the China Lobby was once very active in the U.S. administra­
tion and was reportedly one of the ROC's chief diplomatic 
channels during the Cold War period for influencing American 
China policies, it was never as powerful as the Jewish Lobby 
in determining U.S. policies. Indeed, where the Jewish 
Lobby has obtained a unique and almost unalterable commitment
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to the survival of Israel, the strength of the China Lobby 
generally diminished. Many reasons can account fot 1his 
difference. Very briefly, first of all, the size of the 
China Lobby was rather small compared to the Jewish Lobby. 
The latter for a variety of reasons was and is relatively 
better organized, better financed, better staffed and, 
above all, more homogeneous in its views about Israel. 
Secondly, unlike the Jewish Lobby, the China Lobby lacked 
strong support from either Americans or ethnic Chinese- 
Americans. Perhaps because historically the Chinese have 
generally been rather apolitical, or perhaps because as 
immigrants to America, they were reluctant to engage in 
politics, or perhaps because, as time goes by, the younger 
generation has come to feel less strongly about the "two 
Chinas" conflict, ethnic Chinese-Americans were not active 
in supporting the Nationalist cause. Although, as noticed 
in Chapters Three and Six, there were some non-Chinese 
Americans behind the Nationalist cause who promoted the 
ROC's interest, and who were still anti-Communist, they 
found it increasingly difficult to mobilize public support 
because of overall changes in U.S. China policy, and 
because of the deaths of some key members of the Lobby, 
not to mention that of Chiang Kai-shek, to whom they were 
strongly committed. Senator Charles Mathias' remark is 
indicative of the change. He said:
"...The once formidable 'China Lobby', now a Taiwan 
Lobby, failed to mount an effective campaign against 
the Carter Admini strati on.'s decision in late 1978 to 
transfer American recognition from the Republic of 
China on Taiwan to the People's Republic of China.
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The efforts of American conservative groups (who 
complained of Taiwanese acquienscence in the change) 
were ineffective, although they might have been 
highly effective if these groups had won the united 
support of an aroused Chinese-American community." 1
A final point regarding the negative effect of the ROC's 
dependence on the U.S. is that the ROC, having once been 
tagged a staunch ally of the U.S. suffered from that 
reputation as far as some other states were concerned even 
after the U.S.-ROC relationship had begun to decline. One 
example given in Chapter Five was of some newly independent 
non-aligned African countries rejecting the ROC's offers of 
foreign aid because they wanted to preserve their non-align­
ment and avoid any taint of contact with an "imperialist 
lackey". Also in Chapter Five, it was noted that one of the 
reasons for the French President de Gaulle's new China policy 
was his intention to increase French independence from U.S. 
influence.
The ROC's weakness was further aggravated by the fact that, 
after 1949, Chiang Kai-shek, who had ruled the ROC for more 
than half a century, continued to perceive the ROC as a big 
country, governing both the vast mainland and Taiwan, and 
standing side by side with other major countries in the 
world. Consequently, Chiang's foreign policies have been 
seen by foreign observers as unrealistic, unadaptable and 
inflexible.
Chiang's "mis-perception" was no doubt due in part to the 
fact that he was affected by the continuing influence of 
traditional "Sino-centricism" and the Confucian philosophy
1. Charles McC. Mathias, Jr., "Ethnic Groups and Foreign 
Policy", LIX, 5 Foreign Affairs (Summer 1981) p. 978.
of "peaceful ordering". As mentioned in Chapter One, both 
of these elements encouraged a strong belief among the 
Chinese leaders that foreign policy was principally an 
extension of domestic government and that by managing the 
internal affairs of China well, they could equally well 
determine external affairs. Thus, largely due to their 
ignorance and lack of experience of the outside world, they 
tended to be inflexible, reserved and very conservative in 
their handling of diplomatic matters. Perhaps it was 
because of the above reasons or because of the fact that the 
pre-1949 ROC was preoccupied by a wide range of major domestic 
problems, or both, that Chiang Kai-shek had not himself 
actively engaged in international diplomacy. The fact that 
China had had bitter experience of the imperialists who had 
raped China during the 18th and 19th centuries, and made it 
sign a series of unequal treaties, also helps to explain why 
the Nationalists were suspicious of dealings with the outside 
world. Indeed, Chiang had only limited success in promoting 
China's international relations and its national status when 
he was on the mainland except for the event in 1945 when 
China, under his leadership, was elevated to the superpower 
league and most of the unequal treaties were terminated. 
Nevertheless, this success was soon undermined by the renewal 
of the Chinese civil war and the subsequent division of 
China. The enforced retreat of the ROC to Taiwan constituted 
a severe blow to Chiang's international prestige. But it was 
only on this island that Chiang gradually found out more 
about the outside world. That is, in order to realize the 
ROC's programme of mainland recovery, to secure the ROC's
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"rightful" position as well as to ensure its continued 
existence in the world, and in view of the political 
environment of the ROC after 1949, Chiang had to seek 
collaboration with the U.S., and to approach other anti- 
and/or non-communist countries to gain their support for 
his cause. This made it essential for Chiang to keep his 
government in good standing internationally. Nevertheless, 
probably influenced by the historical factors mentioned 
above, Chiang still tended to regard the ROC's dependent 
relationship with the U.S. as one where the ROC would 
assist the U.S. in fighting the international anti-Communist 
war, and not the other way round. Also, as noted in Chapter 
Two, Chiang often made the point that his anti-Communist 
struggle represented the struggle between "wanq tao" (i.e. 
the good force, representing the democratic world) and 
"pa tao" (i.e. the evil force, representing the communist 
world) and that the former would eventually conquer the 
latter. Even so, Chiang showed some elements of flexibility 
in his foreign policies, but such adjustments were indeed 
very limited.
This feeling of self-importance was characteristic of 
Chiang's unrealistic and inflexible attitudes in conducting 
foreign policies and external affairs. It also reflected 
his political naviety. His mentality was still that of the 
supreme leader of China, a big country with an enormous 
reservoir of natural resource and with the potential to 
balance East-West relations. He failed to realize, or 
perhaps he deliberately ignored, the reality that after 1949 
his authority was confined to only 0.38 percent of the whole
Chinese territory, that he had obviously lost the "Mandate 
of Heaven" as a result of the civil war in the 1940s, and 
that the political survival of the ROC and the fate of 
Taiwan depended mainly upon conflicts in East-West relations, 
e.g. hostility between the two Superpowers, and/or between 
the Soviet Union and the PRC, or between the U.S. and the 
PRC. Thus, it is fair to say that had it not been for 
Chiang's insistence on the "one China" principle which was 
clearly expressed in the mainland recovery programme and 
which was closely followed by the ROC in its foreign policies 
and external relations, the ROC might still be a member of 
the U.N.— though probably only in the General Assembly.
Even its security might have been stronger and it would 
have been less isolated today had Chiang accepted the offer 
of a "two Chinas" solution as early as the 1960s.
Having said this, however, one needs to bear in mind the 
point emphasized in Chapter One, that one of the main reasons 
why Chiang felt he could not afford to consider a "two 
Chinas" solution or to abandon the "one China" principle 
was the problem surrounding the ROC's legitimate position 
on Taiwan. During the first two decades after 1949, the 
ROC's position on Taiwan was less assured than it is today.
At that time, the ROC faced a potential military threat 
from the PRC. It also suffered from internal instability 
because the native Taiwanese majority had not yet been 
entirely won over to its rule and their support for the 
ROC’s value system of San Min Chu I was limited. To them 
the San Min Chu I ideology was a set of theories which 
meant very little in the way of concrete improvement in
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their conditions. Moreover, after fifty years of colonial 
administration, some Taiwanese aspired for an independent 
Taiwan ruled by Taiwanese alone. This unfavourable 
situation was aggravated by the unpleasant memory of the 
"February 28th Uprising"in 1947 and by the history of ROC 
rule on the mainland. Since the pre-1949 Nationalist-led 
national government of the ROC had had the reputation of 
being divided, ineffectual, and riddled with corruption, 
and had quite obviously lost the civil war, Taiwanese found 
it difficult to accept the ROC's authority on Taiwan without 
reservation. Moreover, it was the ROC's defeat in 1949 that 
had led to the Communist threat to, and the flight of 1.5 
million "outsiders" to, Taiwan. Thus, many Taiwanese only 
supported the ROC's mainland recovery programme because of 
the hope that, if it succeeded, they could get rid of the 
ROC, i.e. Taiwan could perhaps remain autonomous. Under 
such circumstances, it is understandable that Chiang would 
make almost no compromise over the "one China" principle. 
And he continued to regard his government as the government 
of all China and to declare his determination to return 
eventually to the mainland. To him, abandonment of these 
positions would mean that he would not only legitimize the 
permanent political division of China but also accept his 
personal responsibility for the Nationalist defeat in 1949. 
Thus, under Chiang Kai-shek’s leadership, the ROC would 
scarcely enter into relations, either official or unofficial 
with countries which supported communist ideology and/or 
which had relations or any sort of contacts with the PRC, 
the only exceptions being: the ROC's consular relations with 
Britain despite the latter's recognition of the PRC in 1950,
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the ROC's diplomatic and aid relations with Senegal in the 
early 1960s despite the latters's recognition of the PRC in 
1961 and the ROC's tolerance of Japan's "two Chinas" policy.
ROC’s foreign policy gradually began to show signs of 
flexibility and adaptability in the 1960s. For example, 
Chapter Four indicated that the ROC, in view of the Sino- 
Soviet split and rapprochment between the two Superpowers, 
had considered a "Russian option". It also began more 
vigorously to seek support from other neighbouring countries 
and overseas Chinese for its anti-communist programme, instead 
of relying totally on the U.S. A more striking example of 
flexibility and adaptability was given in Chapter Five when 
the ROC took the initiative of launching the Vanguard 
Project in Africa. This task reflected not only the ROC's 
growing capability in conducting an independent foreign 
policy and external affairs, but also the Nationalist 
leaders growing awareness of developments in the outside 
world. Although the ROC continued to follow the "one China" 
principle strictly as the criterion for its foreign relations, 
a few exceptions cited above help to point out that great 
scope for policy adjustments was on the way.
During the 1970s, particularly after its defeat at the UN 
in 1971, the ROC's foreign policy and external relations 
displayed even greater flexibility. Although anti-communism 
was still its unchangeable principle, the ROC encouraged 
limited contacts with selected communist countries basically 
in the economic, social and cultural spheres. Thus, the ROC 
began to approach Eastern bloc countries as well as some other 
countries which recognized the PRC. Also as in the case of
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Senegal, for example, the ROC continued to provide 
agricultural aid to Libya at its request and retain an 
embassy there until mid-1978, regardless of Libya's 
recognition of the PRC in 1971. Also, as mentioned in 
Chapter Six, despite Japan's and the U.S.'s increasing 
contacts with the PRC, the ROC decided to retain contacts 
with Japan and the U.S. even at a semi-official level. At 
the same time, the ROC encouraged unofficial contacts, or 
what the Nationalists described as "practical relations", 
with the outside world and participation in international 
governmental or non-governmental organizations so as to 
build up connections overseas, hence avoiding the fate of 
complete international isolation. Naturally, the theme of 
the mainland recovery programme was also soft-pedalled.
That is, it no longer focused on an immediate massive 
military take-over of the mainland, but more and more on 
winning over support for the realization of the San Min Chu I 
system on Taiwan.
Outline of the four foreign policy strategies for survival
In this thesis, the study of the evolution of the ROC's post- 
1949 foreign policy strategies and its external relations has 
been divided into three periods which saw four different 
strategies in operation.
The strategy of military counterattack; Chapter Three dealt 
with the first period of the ROC's foreign policy strategies 
which dated from the relocation of the Nationalist government 
in Taipei in October 1949 until the signing of the U.S.-ROC 
Communiqué in December 1958. During this period, the dominant
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foreign policy strategy of the ROC was that of military 
counterattack which was adopted immediately after the 
outbreak of the Korean War in January 1950.
This strategy was formulated in conjunction with the U.S. 
policy of global containment aimed at halting communist 
expansion beyond areas already under communist control. The 
success of this strategy depended primarily on U.S. support 
and secondly on anti-communist sentiment world-wide. As a 
result of this dependence, and also due to the internal 
instability of the ROC at that time, very few relations 
with other countries were developed. It was believed that 
concentration on the special relationship with the U.S. would 
facilitate the subsequent establishment of other ROC 
missions abroad.
Nevertheless, the U.S. never committed itself to direct 
involvement in the ROC's mainland recovery programme. Nor 
did it commit itself to defending more than the area of 
Taiwan itself, thus reserving its position vis-a-vis the 
offshore islands, instead, it acted at times to restrain 
the ROC's military ambitions and operations along the Taiwan 
Straits.
During this period, the Nationalist government regarded Taiwan 
as having two interrelated functions! (1) as a transit 
port for the ROC in its preparations for launching a massive 
military attack on the Chinese Communists (the task to be 
carried out as part of the international programme of 
anti-communism) and (2) as a strategic post in the Pacific 
vital to the security of the Western world.
Thus, this was largely an offensive and aggressive strategy 
for survival, which aimed at destroying the status quo 
along the Taiwan Straits (otherwise it would mean tacit 
acceptance of the Communist victory on the mainland and/or 
the existence of the two Chinas) and ateliminating communist 
ideology on a global scale.
The strategy of political counterattack: Chapter Four described 
the second phase of the ROC's foreign policy strategy which 
can be characterized as one of political counterattack, and 
it lasted from the end of 1958 until the ROC's expulsion from 
the U.N. in October 1971. During this period, which was 
marked by international détente and also by the Sino-Soviet 
split, the prospect of direct military confrontation between 
the East and the West declined. Consequently, the prospect 
of U.S. support for the ROC’s military programme diminished 
even more.
With U.S. support becoming less whole-hearted, the ROC was 
forced to revise its long-held assumptions. Instead of 
depending on the U.S. totally, the ROC began to search for 
other foreign policy options. At one stage the Russian 
option was considered but rejected because of the fear of 
ending up as a pawn in the political chessboard of the 
Superpowers and of the harm that communist influence would 
cause to the country. Although, despite much speculation, 
this Russian connection was never turned into official 
policy, it did indicate the fact that the ROC now perceived 
the Russians as less of a threat to world peace than the 
Chinese Communists. Meanwhile, the ROC also considered 
seeking more active support from overseas Chinese and from
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neighbouring courtries in Asia. The ROC's efforts did not 
enjoy success, but they did demonstrate that the ROC was 
at least diplomatically now more enterprising and active 
than in the previous decade. And, above all, the ROC 
gradually reduced its dependence, although very reluctantly, 
on the United States.
In effect, since the signing of the U.S.-ROC Communiqué, the 
ROC's military threats to return to the mainland had already 
lost their original significance. Instead of being the 
principal national objective, it sounded increasingly like 
a ritual incantation. It was in this Communiqué that the 
ROC conceded that its mainland recovery programme and its 
overall anti-communist strategy of military counterattack 
were now only "30 percent military and 70 percent political".
This modified strategy suggested a long-term plan of 
"political influence" in winning over the hearts and minds 
of enemies rather than one of drastic military confrontation.
It was clearly less aggressive and more defensive in nature 
than the previous military strategy. Meanwhile, the role of 
Taiwan in the ROC's national programme had also been 
modified. It was no longer seen as a mere transit port but 
more and more regarded as a permanent base for the Nationalists. 
In other words, Taiwan was to be developed into a San Min Chu I 
model province of China, which would serve as a bastion in 
the Pacific against communism.
The strategy of foreign aid: chapter Five discussed the ROC's 
foreign policy strategy of aid in Africa between 1961 and
1971. This strategy was developed as an adjunct of the ROC
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overall political strategy, but the priority of its aim 
was to counter Peking's pending application for U.N. 
membership. Thus, potential allies among the African 
countries were offered aid as part of the ROC's diplomatic 
campaign for international recognition, particularly at the 
U.N. By this stage, it had become even more obvious that 
the ROC's strategy for survival had changed its course, i.e. 
from an aggressive posture of wanting to overthrow the 
status quo through military recovery of mainland and through 
a direct military confrontation with the whole communist 
world to a more defensive one of preserving the status quo 
by strengthening its internal legitimacy on Taiwan island 
and by maintaining and promoting its international status. 
Indeed, it was considered better and wiser to keep a small 
portion of China free (from communism) and for it to prosper, 
than to engage futilely in a programme which had little 
support and which had become increasingly illusory.
The aid programmes concentrated on agriculture and although 
they were rather samll in scale and limited in funds, they 
managed to achieve quite impressive results in the 24 
African countries to which assistance was given. Since 1971, 
the ROC has maintained very few aid relations with Africa, 
and the focus of its foreign aid programme has shifted to 
some Latin American countries.
The strategy of economics- and trade-first diplomacy: Chapter 
Six examined the fourth phase of the ROC's post-1949 foreign 
policy development which has been the strategy of economics- 
and trade-first diplomacy, from the expulsion of the ROC 
from the U.N. in October 1971 to the present, although our
The most marked change (and also the most positive evidence 
of flexibility) in the ROC's foreign policy during this 
period has been the major shift of emphasis in its 
diplomatic activities from largely political and official 
dealings to more and more economic and unofficial or semi- 
offical dealings (although it is true this has been an 
element in that policy since 1949), and from the insistence 
on a strict "one China" principle— the ROC in principle and 
in practice— to a principle of one China in theory but two 
Chinas in reality. Although ideology (i.e. anti-communism) 
continued to play an essential part in the formulation and 
direction of the ROC's foreign policy and external relations, 
it has been less rigidly applied. That is, in a politically 
unpredictable world in which ideological boundaries have 
become increasingly blurred and less important, the ROC has 
grandually accepted the reality that the wider objective of 
anti-communism should play a less prominent role in deter­
mining its foreign policies. The "one China" principle 
remained unaltered but it would not, as it had done 
previously, restrict the ROC from entering into relations 
with other countries (regardless of their ideological stance) 
which recognized the PRC, as long as these countries were not 
hostile towards the ROC. In other words, the ROC no longer 
insisted on a total termination of relations with countries 
which had either official or unofficial relations with the 
PRC. Nor did it insist on a total blockade of relations with 
countries which were by nature communist sympathizers. This 
enabled the ROC to extend the dimensions of its external 
relations. Thus, trade and commercial relations with the
study only dealt with the period up to the end of 1979.
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communist world, notably with East European countries, were 
not only permitted but also incorporated into the ROC's 
external trade promotion programme.
These revolutionary adjustments were made partly because of 
political necessity, and partly because of the ROC's new 
leader, Chiang Ching-kuo. Chiang Ching-kuo is obviously more 
flexible in style, more pragmatic in attitude and less 
affected by China's historical legacy than his father,
Chiang Kai-shek. There are various complementary reasons 
for this, being his father's son and the new leader of the 
Nationalist Party, Chiang Ching-kuo naturally has had to 
accept the burden of the mission to reunify China through 
the implementation of the mainland recovery programme, i.e. 
he has to continue the "one China" principle and the anti­
communist ideology adopted by his father. However, bearing 
in mind that Chiang Ching-kuo never ruled the mainland as 
his father did and hence was not the one responsible for its 
loss, it is quite plausible to argue that Chiang Ching-kuo 
is less susceptible than his father to the "Sino-centricism" 
mentality, that he can afford more flexibility in the ROC's 
foreign policy and that, consequently, he has more foreign 
policy options open. Equally, one can always argue that 
Chiang Ching-kuo's different leadership style is not a 
product of the above factors, because they will only lead to 
decreasing support for the ROC's cause— Chiang can see more 
clearly that the ROC would need powerful allies to help 
re-take the mainland and that such help is unlikely to be 
forthcoming. Thus in this sense he is merely accepting the 
inevitable. Naturally, another argument is that Chiang
Ching-kuo has a better opportunity than his father to under­
take a less restricted foreign policy and to promote the 
ROC's external relations because the ROC in the 1970s has 
faced less domestic constraint, i.e. less threat of its 
legitimacy at home. The ROC has consolidated its rule on 
Taiwan, and the Taiwanese are more convinced that the 
San Min Chu I ideology is not merely a set of empty theories 
but has shown practical results in Taiwan, and that their 
fate is more and more intertwined with the Nationalists. The 
increase in internal support (i.e. internal legitimacy), 
together with Chiang Ching-kuo's "two Chinas" strategy, has 
subtly transformed the nature of the China problem, and 
hence the direction of the ROC's foreign policy. That is, 
for Chiang Ching-kuo, the predominant concern is not so 
much to recover the lost mainland, as to secure Taiwan as 
the last foothold of the Nationalists. At the very least, 
Taiwan must be kept as a small China, free from communist 
domination, and imbued with traditional Chinese values and 
the traditional Chinese way of life.
Thus, Chiang Ching-kuo's policies have been directed at 
widening the differences between the mainland and Taiwan 
with the aim of making reunification of the two parts of 
China difficult, and keeping Taiwan away from communist 
influence. One of the purposes of the economic strategy 
was therefore to attempt to enmesh other countries in a 
network of trade, economic and technological relations with 
Taiwan so that it would be against, or even be harmful to, 
their interest for the PRC to take over Taiwan (although it 
would admittedly be difficult for the ROC to make itself so
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indispensible to such countries that they would actually 
restrain or bring pressure to bear on the PRC). Meanwhile, 
the programme of mainland recovery, though still ostensibly 
an unchangeable national principle of the ROC, became more 
and more an official rhetoric which carries little weight.
As Brian Crozier noted: "It had begun as a fierce resolve; 
it became an inspiration, then a myth, t’ en a liturgy".*
Or as Joseph R. L. Sterne remarked in t ie wake of diplomatic 
setbacks in 1971 and 1972:
"Officially, the government is adhering doggedly 
to the dogma that it is the only legitimate 
authority for the Chinese and that one day there 
will be a return to the Mainland. But in actual 
practice, this concept is being soft-pedalled. 
The government is pragmatically pursuing more 
immediate concerns— survival, prosperity, 
domestic cohesion. Or as one observer put it, 
•This government professes to be the government 
of China but it is behaving more and more as the 
government of Taiwan'."2
Indeed it had become unrealistic and unthinkable for the ROC 
to commit itself to the mainland recovery programme at the 
expense of Taiwan's modernization and survival. Thus, as 
long as Taiwan enjoys economic prosperity, viability and 
social stability, and as long as the Nationalist government 
exercises effective control over it and the offshore islands, 
and above all, as long as it obtains a certain level of domes­
tic consensus, the ROC's survival and identity in the world is 
a matter of fact. In other words, no one could deny the 
existence of the ROC in Taiwan as a political reality, despite 
increasing international de-recognition and isolation and 
diminishing support from the United States and the world.
1. Brian Crozier, OD.Cit. , P- 351
2. Paul K.T.Shih, op.cit., P- 378
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Thus, today, although in theory both the ROC and the PRC 
continue to agree that there is but one China and that 
Taiwan is only a part of it, in reality, it is obvious that 
China has developed increasingly into a divided nation.
With the mainland and Taiwan developing steadily their 
drastically different systems and with the new generations 
much less concerned about the personal hostility between 
Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Tse-tung, and the power struggle 
between the Nationalists and the Communists, the task to 
terminate the ROC’s survival has become equally as difficult 
as the task of reuniting the two parts of China. Indeed, 
even today, there seems to be little prospect of a 
predictable end to the thirty years of confrontation between 
the little China on Taiwan and the big China of the Chinese 
Communists on the mainland. The ROC, in spite of U.S. 
de-recognition, is still fighting for its cause. And the 
focus of its foreign relations has obviously widened. In 
addition to the U.S., the ROC has turned its attention to 
other openly anti-communist regimes, e.g. South Africa,
Saudi Arabia, and some Latin American countries for 
support.
To sum up, the ROC's foreign policy strategies have elements 
of flexibility. The ROC certainly has made adjustments to 
meet changing political reality. Nevertheless, underlying 
this flexibility, most noticeably in its decision to trade 
with selected communist countries and in its application of 
the "one China" principle, one notices that there is a strong 
aspect of consistency, i.e. continuity, in the ROC's foreign 
policy. That is, in its anti-communist programme, which the
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ROC is gradually able to distinguish Chinese communism from 
international communism, the Chinese Communists (but not 
the Russian Communists) are still regarded as the chief 
(foreign) enemy. Thus, the ROC began to dissociate its 
internal programme of anti-Chinese-Communists and its overall 
programme of anti-communism, although the two were still 
closely related. The point was that during the Cold War 
bipolarity when U.S.-PRC relations were still strained, the 
ROC had intentionally and skillfully attached its domestic 
programme of anti-communism to, and, in effect, made it the 
backbone of, its external programme of anti-communism. It 
was only after the U.N. defeat and U.S. de-recognition that 
the ROC gradually began to draw a line between its domestic 
politics and foreign policies. However, another way of 
looking at this issue was that although the Chinese 
Communists were still the enemies, if the ROC's post-UN 
foreign policy was to establish a fait accompli of "one 
China, two states", then this intention of developing Taiwan 
as a different state (i.e. different from* the PRC) showed 
that, as far as the ROC was concerned, the PRC could be 
treated as a domestic as well as a foreign enemy.
Thus, the current ROC's foreign policy strategy for 
survival is a synthesis of all preceding strategies, i.e. 
the elements of each strategy still continue and are 
effective, for example, the appeal of anti-communism to 
Saudi Arabia in the 1970's. Moreover, although it continues 
to seek support from the U.S., it has gradually realized 
that strong domestic institutions and stability which can 
provide national unity and consensus (i.e. self-reliance) are 
the most important elements for an effective foreign policy.
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Consequently, it is possible to view the future of the ROC 
on Taiwan with some optimism. The Nationalists' success in 
gaining greater domestic legitimacy, and incorporating more 
Taiwanese in the administration during the 1970s indicated 
less domestic constraint on its task to pursuit political 
survival. It obviously reckons that self-reliance is more 
vital to the issue of survival. For the time being, despite 
its political disadvantages, the ROC does seem to possess 
certain assets in its survival battle, as Ralph Clough 
remarked:
"Its population is larger than that of two-thirds 
of the members of the United Nations and its 
people are more highly educated than those of 
most developing countries. It has built a strong 
and diversified economy based on large-scale trade 
with many countries, despite an absence of diplo­
matic relations with most of those countries in 
recent years. It has devised ingenious unorthodox 
substitutes for diplomatic relations and has 
earned the sympathy of many people in the United 
States, Japan and elsewhere. Up to the present 
time, PRC's efforts to isolate Taiwan, while 
complicating the island's international relations, 
have not significantly weakened its ability to 
survive and prosper independently. The opposition 
of the people of Taiwan to being incorporated into 
the PRC also seems substantially unaffected." 1
Theodore Hsi-en Chen similarly commented:
"So far, Taiwan has managed to survive and prosper 
in spite of her expulsion from the United Nations 
and the diplomatic desertion of erstwhile friends 
and allies...As long as most nations adhere to 
the present policy of recognizing one China in 
principle, and dealing with two Chinese govern­
ments in practice, Taiwan will probably continue 
to be a stable and prosperous country where 16 
million people are living in peace and relative 
contentment." 2 1
1. Ralph N. Clough, op.cit., p. 172.
2. Chen Theodore Hsi-en, "Taiwan after Chiang Kai-shek", 
Current History, LXIX, (September 1975), p. 90.
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These assessments, although saluting the effectiveness of 
the ROC's strategies for survival so far, carefully avoid 
the thorny question of the ability of the Nationalist 
government to resist possible international pressure to 
terminate its position in the very long run. It is true 
that so far, the ROC is still in control of Taiwan and the 
offshore islands and it has managed to keep these territories 
intact from either communist or outside domination. Yet, 
of course, the ROC's future in the end remains uncertain.
Appendix No. 1: Text of the "Important Question" Resolution
and the Proposal to "Seat the PRC"
Both the Resolution, adopted on 17th November 1960 and the 
Proposal, proposed on 17th November 1961, were accepted and 
debated as agenda items 90 and 91 in the Plenary Meeting of 
the 16th Session of the General Assembly in 1961 and through 
the years until October 1971.
(1) The Text of the Resolution reads:
The General Assembly,
Noting that a serious divergence of views exists among 
Member States concerning the representation of a 
founder Member who is named in the Charter of the 
United Nations,
Recalling that this matter has been described 
repeatedly in the General Assembly by all segments 
of opinion as vital and crucial and that on 
numerous occasions its inclusion in the agenda has 
been requested under rule 15 of the Assembly's rule 
of procedure as an item of an important and urgent 
character.
Recalling further the recommendation contained in its 
resolution 396(V) of 14 December 1950 that, whenever 
more than one authority claims to be the government 
entitled to represent a Member State in the United 
Nations and this question becomes the subject of 
controversy in the United Nationa, the question 
should be considered in the light of the purposes 
and principles of the Charter and the circumstances 
of each case.
Decides, in accordance with Article 18 of the Charter 
of the United Nations, that any proposal to change 
the representation of China is an important Question. 
(Resolution 1668 (XVI), 17 November 1960.)
(2) The text of the Proposal reads:
The General Assembly,
Considering it necessary to restore the lawful rights 
ot tne people's Republic of China in the United Nations,
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Bearing in mind that only representatives of the People's 
Republic are competent to occupy China's place in the 
United Nations and its Organs,
Resolves to remove immediately from all United Nations 
Organs the representatives of the Chianq Kai-shek 
clique who are unlawfully occupying the place of China 
in the United Nations.
Invites the Government of the People's Republic of China 
to send its representatives to participate in the work 
of the United Nations and all its Organs.
(UN Document A14873, 17th September 1961)
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APPENDIX NO. 4s ROC Diplomatic Relations
January 1971 - January 1979
(a) List of Countries Ending Diplomatic Relations with 
the ROC, January 1971 - January 1979
Name of Countries Date of Ending Diplomatic Ties
1. Argentine 19-02-1972
2. Australia 22-12-1972
3. Austria 28-05-1971
4. Barbados 11-01-1971
5. Belgium 25-10-1971
6. Benin 19-01-1973
7. Botswana 05-04-1974
8. Brazil 16-08-1974
9. Cameroon 03-04-1971
10. Cen. Africa Empire 23-08-1976
11. Chad 27-12-1972
12. Chile 05-01-1971
13. Cyprus 12-01-1972
14. Ecuador 17-11-1971
15. Gabonese Rep. 30-03-1974
16. Gambia 28-12-1974
17. Greece 05-06-1972
18. Iran 17-08-1971
19. Jamaica 01-11-1972
20. Japan 29-09-1972
21. Jordan 14-04-1977
22. Kuwait 29-03-1971
23. Lebanon 09-11-1971
24. Liberia 23-02-1977
25. Libya 14-09-1978
26. Madagascar Rep. 15-12-1972
27. Maldives 15-04-1972
28. Malta 31-01-1972
29. Mexico 16-11-1971
30. New Zealand 22-12-1972
475
Name of Countries Date of Ending Diplomatic Ties
31. Niger 29-07-1974
32. Peru 02-11-1971
33. Philippines 09-06-1975
34. Portugal 06-01-1975
35. Rwanda 13-05-1972
36. Senegal 07-12-1971
37. Sierra Leone 20-08-1971
38 . Spain 12-03-1973
39. Thailand 01-07-1975
40. Togo 04-10-1972
41. Turkey 05-08-1971
42 . U.S.A. 01-01-1979
43. Upper Volta 23-10-1973
44. Venezuela 29-06-1974
45. Western Samoa 06-11-1975
46. Zaire 30-01-1973
List of Countries still recognizing the ROC as of
January 1979
Name of Countries
1. Bolivia (Latin America)
2. Colombia (L.A.)
3. Costa Rica (L.A.)
4. Dominican Republic (L.A.)
5. El Salvador (L.A.)
6. Guatemala (L.A.)
7. Haiti (L.A.)
8. Holy See (the Vatican City, Europe)
9. Honduras (L.A.)
10. Ivory Coast (Africa)
11. South Korea (Asia)
12. Lesotho (Africa)
13. Malawi (Africa)
14. Nicaragua (L.A.)
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Name of Countries
15. Panama (L.A.)
16. Paraguay (L.A.)
17. Saudi Arabia (the Middle East)
18. South Africa (Africa)
19. Swaziland (Africa)
20. Tonga (the Pacific)
21. Uruguay (L.A.)
Adhering to the principle of "one China", both Chinese 
Nationalist and Communist regimes have since 1949 made it 
a policy not to establish diplomatic relations with those 
who maintain diplomatic relations with the rival regime.
Hence some countries recognize and maintain diplomatic 
relations with the former, and some with the latter. Some 
grant recognition but fall short of exchanging envoys.
Some have switched their diplomatic relations from one 
side to the other. Others have recognized neither. Thus, 
in presenting the above lists, we can also discover the 
number of countries which recognized the PRC as of January 
' 1979.
In January 1979, the total number of states in the world 
were 166. Total UN membership was 155. Among them, there 
were 21 countries still recognizing the ROC; 125 recognized 
the PRC (almost 6 times more than that recognized the ROC); 
20 countries - Andorra, Angola, Bahamas, Bophuthaswana, 
Dominica, Liechtenstein, Monaco, Nauru, Qatar, Singapore, 
Soloman Islands, St. Lucia, Transkei, Tuyalu, United Arab 
Emirates, Kiribati, Bahrain, Bhutan, Ecudaor and Israel - 
had relations with neither.
Sources for the construction of the lists: The Republic of 
China's Relations with the world (Taipei: Treaty Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.March 1979).
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